Linux EFI Development - Date Index

• Date Index

• Re: [PATCH V4 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually, (continued)
  • Re: [PATCH V4 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually, Matt Fleming
    • Re: [PATCH V4 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH V4 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH] efi: arm64: Check whether x18 is preserved by runtime services calls, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH] efi/arm*: Only register page tables when they exist, Mark Rutland
  • Re: [PATCH] efi/arm*: Only register page tables when they exist, Will Deacon
    • Re: [PATCH] efi/arm*: Only register page tables when they exist, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH] efi/arm*: Only register page tables when they exist, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH 4.14 090/118] x86/pti: Unbreak EFI old_memmap, Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH 0/4] x86/xen/efi: Initialize UEFI secure boot state during dom0 boot, Daniel Kiper
  • [PATCH 1/4] efi/stub: Extract efi_get_secureboot() to separate file, Daniel Kiper
  • [PATCH 3/4] efi: Tweak efi_get_secureboot() and its data section assignment, Daniel Kiper
  • [PATCH 4/4] efi: Rename efi_get_secureboot() to __efi_get_secureboot() and make it static, Daniel Kiper
  • [PATCH 2/4] x86/xen/efi: Initialize boot_params.secure_boot in xen_efi_init(), Daniel Kiper
  • Re: [PATCH 0/4] x86/xen/efi: Initialize UEFI secure boot state during dom0 boot, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 0/4] x86/xen/efi: Initialize UEFI secure boot state during dom0 boot, Daniel Kiper
      • Re: [PATCH 0/4] x86/xen/efi: Initialize UEFI secure boot state during dom0 boot, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH] efi: Clarify that reset attack mitigation needs appropriate userspace, Matthew Garrett
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: Clarify that reset attack mitigation needs appropriate userspace, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH 4.14 13/38] efi/capsule-loader: Reinstate virtual capsule mapping, Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH] PTI: unbreak EFI old_memmap, Jiri Kosina
• [PATCH] MAINTAINERS: Add Ard Biesheuvel to EFI test driver and efivarfs, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH] MAINTAINERS: Remove Matt Fleming as EFI co-maintainer, Matt Fleming
  • Re: [PATCH] MAINTAINERS: Remove Matt Fleming as EFI co-maintainer, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH] MAINTAINERS: Remove Matt Fleming as EFI co-maintainer, Matt Fleming
      • Re: [PATCH] MAINTAINERS: Remove Matt Fleming as EFI co-maintainer, Ingo Molnar
        • Re: [PATCH] MAINTAINERS: Remove Matt Fleming as EFI co-maintainer, Ard Biesheuvel
          • Re: [PATCH] MAINTAINERS: Remove Matt Fleming as EFI co-maintainer, Ingo Molnar
• [GIT PULL 0/5] EFI updates for v4.16, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 1/5] efi/capsule-loader: pr_err() strings should end with newlines, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 3/5] efi: Use PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(), Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 4/5] efi: move ARM CPER code to new file, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 5/5] efi: parse ARM error information value, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 2/5] arm64: efi: ignore EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute if RP and/or WP are set, Ard Biesheuvel
• [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI fixes for v4.15, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Fix kernel param add_efi_memmap regression, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 2/2] efi: capsule-loader: reinstate virtual capsule mapping, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH] module: allow symbol exports to be disabled, Ard Biesheuvel
• [RFT PATCH] efi: capsule-loader: reinstate virtual capsule mapping, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [RFT PATCH] efi: capsule-loader: reinstate virtual capsule mapping, Bryan O'Donoghue
    • Re: [RFT PATCH] efi: capsule-loader: reinstate virtual capsule mapping, Ard Biesheuvel
      • RE: [RFT PATCH] efi: capsule-loader: reinstate virtual capsule mapping, Song, Ge
• BUG: EFI capsule loader fails as of 4.13, the capsule is not passed in contiguous virtual memory, Richard Ruigrok
• EFI crash with PCID on, Andy Lutomirski
  • Re: EFI crash with PCID on, Andy Lutomirski
    • Re: EFI crash with PCID on, Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH 0/2] Make capsules in a contiguous virtual space, Ge Song
  • Re: [PATCH 0/2] Make capsules in a contiguous virtual space, Richard Ruigrok
    • Re: [PATCH 0/2] Make capsules in a contiguous virtual space, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH 1/2] Revert "efi/capsule-loader: Use page addresses rather than struct page pointers", Ge Song
• [PATCH 2/2] efi/capsule-loader: Request a contiguous virtual space for capsules, Ge Song
• [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with %cr3, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
• [PATCH 2/3] x86/efi: Replace efi_pgd with efi_mm.pgd, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
• [PATCH 1/3] efi: Use efi_mm in x86 as well as ARM, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
• [PATCH V2] x86/efi: fix kernel param add_efi_memmap regression, Dave Young
  • Re: [PATCH V2] x86/efi: fix kernel param add_efi_memmap regression, Matt Fleming
• [PATCH 1/2] kconfig: use bool instead of boolean for type definition attributes, again, Masahiro Yamada
  • Re: [PATCH 1/2] kconfig: use bool instead of boolean for type definition attributes, again, Greg Kroah-Hartman
  • Re: [PATCH 1/2] kconfig: use bool instead of boolean for type definition attributes, again, Masahiro Yamada
• [PATCH 4.4 013/105] efi: Move some sysfs files to be read-only by root, Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH 4.4 103/105] Revert "x86/mm/pat: Ensure cpa->pfn only contains page frame numbers", Greg Kroah-Hartman
  • Re: [PATCH 4.4 103/105] Revert "x86/mm/pat: Ensure cpa->pfn only contains page frame numbers", Roland Dreier
    • Re: [PATCH 4.4 103/105] Revert "x86/mm/pat: Ensure cpa->pfn only contains page frame numbers", Greg Kroah-Hartman
      • Re: [PATCH 4.4 103/105] Revert "x86/mm/pat: Ensure cpa->pfn only contains page frame numbers", Roland Dreier
        • Re: [PATCH 4.4 103/105] Revert "x86/mm/pat: Ensure cpa->pfn only contains page frame numbers", Matt Fleming
    • Re: [PATCH 4.4 103/105] Revert "x86/mm/pat: Ensure cpa->pfn only contains page frame numbers", Ben Hutchings
      • Re: [PATCH 4.4 103/105] Revert "x86/mm/pat: Ensure cpa->pfn only contains page frame numbers", Roland Dreier
        • Re: [PATCH 4.4 103/105] Revert "x86/mm/pat: Ensure cpa->pfn only contains page frame numbers", Greg Kroah-Hartman
          • Re: [PATCH 4.4 103/105] Revert "x86/mm/pat: Ensure cpa->pfn only contains page frame numbers", Roland Dreier
            • Re: [PATCH 4.4 103/105] Revert "x86/mm/pat: Ensure cpa->pfn only contains page frame numbers", Guenter Roeck
              • Re: [PATCH 4.4 103/105] Revert "x86/mm/pat: Ensure cpa->pfn only contains page frame numbers", Roland Dreier
                • Re: [PATCH 4.4 103/105] Revert "x86/mm/pat: Ensure cpa->pfn only contains page frame numbers", Guenter Roeck
                  • Re: [PATCH 4.4 103/105] Revert "x86/mm/pat: Ensure cpa->pfn only contains page frame numbers", Guillaume Tucker
                    • Re: [PATCH 4.4 103/105] Revert "x86/mm/pat: Ensure cpa->pfn only contains page frame numbers", Greg Kroah-Hartman
            • Re: [PATCH 4.4 103/105] Revert "x86/mm/pat: Ensure cpa->pfn only contains page frame numbers", Guenter Roeck
            • Re: [PATCH 4.4 103/105] Revert "x86/mm/pat: Ensure cpa->pfn only contains page frame numbers", Guenter Roeck
              • Re: [PATCH 4.4 103/105] Revert "x86/mm/pat: Ensure cpa->pfn only contains page frame numbers", Greg Kroah-Hartman
                • Re: [PATCH 4.4 103/105] Revert "x86/mm/pat: Ensure cpa->pfn only contains page frame numbers", Guenter Roeck
                  • Re: [PATCH 4.4 103/105] Revert "x86/mm/pat: Ensure cpa->pfn only contains page frame numbers", Roland Dreier
                    • Re: [PATCH 4.4 103/105] Revert "x86/mm/pat: Ensure cpa->pfn only contains page frame numbers", Greg Kroah-Hartman
          • Re: [PATCH 4.4 103/105] Revert "x86/mm/pat: Ensure cpa->pfn only contains page frame numbers", Guenter Roeck
• [PATCH 4.4 102/105] Revert "x86/efi: Hoist page table switching code into efi_call_virt()", Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH 4.4 101/105] Revert "x86/efi: Build our own page table structures", Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH 3.18 11/64] efi: Move some sysfs files to be read-only by root, Greg Kroah-Hartman
• Booting LiveCD image from EFI PXE?, Locane
• [PATCH V3 0/2] CPER ARM error information parsing, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V3 1/2] efi: move ARM CPER code to new file, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V3 2/2] efi: parse ARM error information value, Tyler Baicar
  • Re: [PATCH V3 0/2] CPER ARM error information parsing, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH 4.14 038/164] efi: Move some sysfs files to be read-only by root, Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH 4.14 039/164] efi/esrt: Use memunmap() instead of kfree() to free the remapping, Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH 4.9 017/148] efi/esrt: Use memunmap() instead of kfree() to free the remapping, Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH 4.9 016/148] efi: Move some sysfs files to be read-only by root, Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH v5 1/2] arm64: Define cputype macros for Falkor CPU, Shanker Donthineni
  • [PATCH v5 2/2] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Shanker Donthineni
• [PATCH 41/45] arch/x86: remove duplicate includes, Pravin Shedge
  • Re: [PATCH 41/45] arch/x86: remove duplicate includes, Juergen Gross
• [RESEND PATCH v4 1/2] arm64: Define cputype macros for Falkor CPU, Shanker Donthineni
  • [RESEND PATCH v4 2/2] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Shanker Donthineni
    • Re: [RESEND PATCH v4 2/2] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Mark Rutland
      • Re: [RESEND PATCH v4 2/2] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Shanker Donthineni
• [PATCH] efi: make EFI a menuconfig to ease disabling it all, Vincent Legoll
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: make EFI a menuconfig to ease disabling it all, Matt Fleming
    • Re: [PATCH] efi: make EFI a menuconfig to ease disabling it all, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH] efi: make EFI a menuconfig to ease disabling it all, Vincent Legoll
        • Re: [PATCH] efi: make EFI a menuconfig to ease disabling it all, Austin S. Hemmelgarn
          • [PATCH,v2] efi: make EFI a menuconfig to ease disabling it all, Vincent Legoll
            • [PATCH] efi: make EFI a menuconfig to ease disabling it all, Vincent Legoll
• [PATCH resend] fix boot hang with earlyprintk=efi,keep, Dave Young
• [PATCH V2 0/2] CPER ARM error information parsing, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V2 1/2] efi: move ARM CPER code to new file, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V2 1/2] efi: move ARM CPER code to new file, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH V2 1/2] efi: move ARM CPER code to new file, Tyler Baicar
        • Re: [PATCH V2 1/2] efi: move ARM CPER code to new file, Tyler Baicar
          • Re: [PATCH V2 1/2] efi: move ARM CPER code to new file, Ard Biesheuvel
            • Re: [PATCH V2 1/2] efi: move ARM CPER code to new file, Tyler Baicar
              • Re: [PATCH V2 1/2] efi: move ARM CPER code to new file, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH V2 2/2] efi: parse ARM error information value, Tyler Baicar
• [GIT PULL 0/3] EFI fixes for v4.15, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 3/3] efi: add comment to avoid future expanding of sysfs systab, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 2/3] efi/esrt: use memunmap rather kfree to free the remapping, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 1/3] efi: move some sysfs files to be read-only by root, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [GIT PULL 0/3] EFI fixes for v4.15, Ingo Molnar
• [PATCH] efi: move some sysfs files to be read-only by root, Greg Kroah-Hartman
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: move some sysfs files to be read-only by root, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH] efi: move some sysfs files to be read-only by root, Greg Kroah-Hartman
  • [PATCH v2] efi: move some sysfs files to be read-only by root, Greg Kroah-Hartman
    • Re: [PATCH v2] efi: move some sysfs files to be read-only by root, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: move some sysfs files to be read-only by root, Tobin C. Harding
    • Re: [PATCH] efi: move some sysfs files to be read-only by root, Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub, Gary Lin
  • [RFC v3 PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Introduce Security Version to x86, Gary Lin
  • [RFC v3 PATCH 2/2] arm64/efi: Introduce Security Version to ARM64, Gary Lin
  • Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub, Josh Boyer
    • Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub, Gary Lin
      • Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub, Ingo Molnar
        • Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub, Gary Lin
          • Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub, Ingo Molnar
            • Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub, Gary Lin
              • Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub, Ingo Molnar
                • Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub, Gary Lin
                  • Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub, Ingo Molnar
                    • Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub, Gary Lin
  • Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub, Alan Cox
    • Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub, Gary Lin
• [PATCH] efi: add comment to avoid future expanding of sysfs systab, Dave Young
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: add comment to avoid future expanding of sysfs systab, Greg KH
• [PATCH 4.4 03/27] x86/mm/pat: Ensure cpa->pfn only contains page frame numbers, Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH 4.4 05/27] x86/efi: Build our own page table structures, Greg Kroah-Hartman
  • Re: [PATCH 4.4 05/27] x86/efi: Build our own page table structures, Ben Hutchings
    • Re: [PATCH 4.4 05/27] x86/efi: Build our own page table structures, Greg Kroah-Hartman
      • RE: [PATCH 4.4 05/27] x86/efi: Build our own page table structures, Ghannam, Yazen
        • Re: [PATCH 4.4 05/27] x86/efi: Build our own page table structures, Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH 4.4 04/27] x86/efi: Hoist page table switching code into efi_call_virt(), Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH] fix system_state checking in early_ioremap, Dave Young
  • Re: [PATCH] fix system_state checking in early_ioremap, Dave Young
• [PATCH v5 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local, Jiri Slaby
• [PATCH v5 26/27] x86_32: assembly, change all ENTRY+ENDPROC to SYM_FUNC_*, Jiri Slaby
• [PATCH v5 23/27] x86_64: assembly, change all ENTRY+ENDPROC to SYM_FUNC_*, Jiri Slaby
• [PATCH] x86: move parse_early_param to earlier code for add_efi_memmap, Dave Young
  • Re: [PATCH] x86: move parse_early_param to earlier code for add_efi_memmap, Dave Young
    • Re: [PATCH] x86: move parse_early_param to earlier code for add_efi_memmap, Matt Fleming
      • Re: [PATCH] x86: move parse_early_param to earlier code for add_efi_memmap, Ingo Molnar
        • Re: [PATCH] x86: move parse_early_param to earlier code for add_efi_memmap, Matt Fleming
    • Re: [PATCH] x86: move parse_early_param to earlier code for add_efi_memmap, Ingo Molnar
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Linus Torvalds
  • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Greg Kroah-Hartman
    • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Greg Kroah-Hartman
      • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Greg Kroah-Hartman
          • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Ard Biesheuvel
            • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Greg Kroah-Hartman
              • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Kees Cook
                • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Ard Biesheuvel
            • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Matt Fleming
              • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Dave Young
              • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Dave Young
                • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Joe Perches
                  • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Dave Young
                • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Greg Kroah-Hartman
                  • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Dave Young
                    • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Greg Kroah-Hartman
                      • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Ard Biesheuvel
                        • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Greg Kroah-Hartman
                          • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Ard Biesheuvel
                            • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Greg Kroah-Hartman
                            • RE: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, David Laight
                              • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Greg Kroah-Hartman
                                • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Dave Young
                                  • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Greg Kroah-Hartman
                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Dave Young
                                      • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Greg Kroah-Hartman
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Ard Biesheuvel
                                          • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Greg Kroah-Hartman
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Dave Young
                                      • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Dave Young
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Greg Kroah-Hartman
      • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Linus Torvalds
        • Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p, Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH 0/4] Using the hash in MOKx to blacklist kernel module, Lee, Chun-Yi
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • [PATCH 0/4] Using the hash in MOKx to blacklist kernel module, Lee, Chun-Yi
    • [PATCH 1/4] MODSIGN: do not load mok when secure boot disabled, Lee, Chun-Yi
      • Re: [PATCH 1/4] MODSIGN: do not load mok when secure boot disabled, James Bottomley
        • Re: [PATCH 1/4] MODSIGN: do not load mok when secure boot disabled, joeyli
    • [PATCH 3/4] MODSIGN: load blacklist from MOKx, Lee, Chun-Yi
    • [PATCH 4/4] MODSIGN: checking the blacklisted hash before loading a kernel module, Lee, Chun-Yi
    • [PATCH 2/4] MODSIGN: print appropriate status message when getting UEFI certificates list, Lee, Chun-Yi
• [PATCH] efi: Use PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(), Vasyl Gomonovych
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: Use PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(), Matt Fleming
• [PATCH v4 0/2] Implement a software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Shanker Donthineni
  • [PATCH v4 2/2] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Shanker Donthineni
    • Re: [PATCH v4 2/2] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Will Deacon
      • Re: [PATCH v4 2/2] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Shanker Donthineni
        • Re: [PATCH v4 2/2] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Shanker Donthineni
  • [PATCH v4 1/2] arm64: Define cputype macros for Falkor CPU, Shanker Donthineni
• [PATCH v3 0/2] Implement a software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Shanker Donthineni
  • [PATCH v3 2/2] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Shanker Donthineni
    • Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Stephen Boyd
      • Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Timur Tabi
    • Re: [v3,2/2] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Manoj Iyer
  • [PATCH v3 1/2] arm64: Define cputype macros for Falkor CPU, Shanker Donthineni
• [PATCH v2 0/2] Implement a software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Shanker Donthineni
  • [PATCH v2 2/2] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Shanker Donthineni
    • Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Shanker Donthineni
  • [PATCH v2 1/2] arm64: Define cputype macros for Falkor CPU, Shanker Donthineni
• arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Bhupesh Sharma
  • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Bhupesh Sharma
    • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, AKASHI Takahiro
      • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Bhupesh Sharma
          • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, AKASHI Takahiro
            • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Bhupesh SHARMA
              • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Ard Biesheuvel
                • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Bhupesh Sharma
                  • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, AKASHI Takahiro
                    • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Ard Biesheuvel
                      • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, AKASHI Takahiro
                        • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Ard Biesheuvel
                          • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Bhupesh SHARMA
                          • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, AKASHI Takahiro
                            • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Ard Biesheuvel
                              • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Bhupesh Sharma
                                • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Dave Young
                                  • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, AKASHI Takahiro
                                    • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Bhupesh SHARMA
                                      • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, AKASHI Takahiro
                                        • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Bhupesh Sharma
                                      • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, AKASHI Takahiro
                                        • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Bhupesh Sharma
                                  • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Bhupesh Sharma
                                    • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, AKASHI Takahiro
                            • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Dave Young
                              • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Dave Young
                              • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, AKASHI Takahiro
                                • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Ard Biesheuvel
                                  • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Bhupesh Sharma
                                    • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, AKASHI Takahiro
                                      • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Bhupesh Sharma
                                        • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, AKASHI Takahiro
                                          • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Bhupesh Sharma
                                            • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, AKASHI Takahiro
                                              • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Bhupesh Sharma
                                                • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Dave Young
                                                  • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Dave Young
                                                    • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, AKASHI Takahiro
                                                    • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Bhupesh Sharma
                                                    • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Dave Young
                                                    • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, AKASHI Takahiro
                                                    • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Bhupesh Sharma
                                                    • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, AKASHI Takahiro
                                                    • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Bhupesh Sharma
                                                    • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Dave Young
                                                    • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, AKASHI Takahiro
          • Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP, Dave Young
• [PATCH 00/30] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, David Howells
  • [PATCH 02/30] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown, David Howells
  • [PATCH 04/30] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 09/30] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 30/30] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode, David Howells
  • [PATCH 29/30] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode, David Howells
  • [PATCH 28/30] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 27/30] Lock down kprobes, David Howells
  • [PATCH 26/30] Lock down ftrace, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 26/30] Lock down ftrace, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 26/30] Lock down ftrace, Jiri Kosina
      • Re: [PATCH 26/30] Lock down ftrace, David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH 26/30] Lock down ftrace, Jiri Kosina
        • Re: [PATCH 26/30] Lock down ftrace, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 26/30] Lock down ftrace, Jiri Kosina
  • [PATCH 25/30] Lock down /proc/kcore, David Howells
  • [PATCH 23/30] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module, David Howells
  • [PATCH 24/30] debugfs: Disallow use of debugfs files when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 22/30] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport), David Howells
  • [PATCH 20/30] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 21/30] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL, David Howells
  • [PATCH 18/30] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 18/30] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down, Joey Lee
      • Re: [PATCH 18/30] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down, joeyli
  • [PATCH 19/30] scsi: Lock down the eata driver, David Howells
  • [PATCH 17/30] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 16/30] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 14/30] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 15/30] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 12/30] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 13/30] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down, Jiri Bohac
      • [PATCH 08a/30] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE, Jiri Bohac
      • [PATCH 08b/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down, Jiri Bohac
      • Re: [PATCH 08a/30] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE, David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH 08a/30] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE, Jiri Bohac
        • Re: [PATCH 08a/30] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE, David Howells
          • Re: [PATCH 08a/30] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE, Jiri Bohac
          • Re: [PATCH 08a/30] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down, Jiri Bohac
      • Re: [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 10/30] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 11/30] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 07/30] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot, David Howells
  • [PATCH 03/30] ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode, David Howells
  • [PATCH 05/30] Restrict /dev/{mem, kmem, port} when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 06/30] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 01/30] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 04/30] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 04/30] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, Jiri Bohac
  • Re: [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down, Jiri Bohac
  • Re: [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down, Jiri Bohac
  • Re: [PATCH 00/30] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Andrew Morton
• [PATCH 0/3] Implement a software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Shanker Donthineni
  • [PATCH 2/3] arm64: Prepare SCTLR_ELn accesses to handle Falkor erratum 1041, Shanker Donthineni
  • [PATCH 3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Shanker Donthineni
    • Re: [PATCH 3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Robin Murphy
      • Re: [PATCH 3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Shanker Donthineni
        • Re: [PATCH 3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, James Morse
          • Re: [PATCH 3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Shanker Donthineni
            • Re: [PATCH 3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, James Morse
              • Re: [PATCH 3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Shanker Donthineni
    • Re: [3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Manoj Iyer
      • Re: [3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, James Morse
        • Re: [3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Manoj Iyer
          • Re: [3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Manoj Iyer
            • Re: [3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Manoj Iyer
              • Re: [3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Manoj Iyer
                • Re: [3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041, Manoj Iyer
  • [PATCH 1/3] arm64: Define cputype macros for Falkor CPU, Shanker Donthineni
• efi/esrt: use memunmap rather kfree to free the remapping, Pan Bian
  • Re: efi/esrt: use memunmap rather kfree to free the remapping, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH] efi: setting secure boot flag in EFI stub when the sentinel is tainted., Lee, Chun-Yi
• [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, David Howells
  • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Mimi Zohar
  • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, James Morris
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, David Howells
    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, James Morris
      • Message not available
        • Message not available
          • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Andy Lutomirski
            • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Alexei Starovoitov
              • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Andy Lutomirski
            • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
              • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Andy Lutomirski
                • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Kees Cook
                  • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Andy Lutomirski
                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Kees Cook
                • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                  • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Andy Lutomirski
                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Peter Jones
                      • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Thomas Gleixner
                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                      • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Andy Lutomirski
                      • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Peter Dolding
              • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, David Howells
                • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Andy Lutomirski
                • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, David Howells
                  • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Andy Lutomirski
                  • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, David Howells
                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Andy Lutomirski
                      • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                          • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Andy Lutomirski
                            • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                          • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                            • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                            • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                              • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                                • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                                  • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                                      • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                                          • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                            • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Alan Cox
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, David Howells
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Alan Cox
                                          • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                  • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                      • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                          • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                                            • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                              • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Andy Lutomirski
                                                • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                                  • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Greg Kroah-Hartman
                                              • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                                                • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                                                  • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Theodore Y. Ts'o
                                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Greg Kroah-Hartman
                                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Theodore Y. Ts'o
                                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Greg Kroah-Hartman
                                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Mike Galbraith
                                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Pavel Machek
                                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, David Howells
                                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Theodore Y. Ts'o
                                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Andy Lutomirski
                                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Justin Forbes
                                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Peter Dolding
                                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, David Howells
                                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Peter Dolding
                                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Peter Dolding
                                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Justin Forbes
                                                    • Message not available
                                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Jann Horn
                                          • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Andy Lutomirski
                                          • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, David Howells
                                            • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Andy Lutomirski
                                            • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, David Howells
                                            • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Eric W. Biederman
                              • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, David Howells
                                • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                      • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, David Howells
                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Andy Lutomirski
                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Pavel Machek
                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, David Howells
                      • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                      • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Andy Lutomirski
              • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                  • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                      • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Al Viro
                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                      • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                      • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Pavel Machek
    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, David Howells
      • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, James Morris
        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Alan Cox
  • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Alexei Starovoitov
    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
      • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, joeyli
    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, joeyli
      • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Alexei Starovoitov
        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Daniel Borkmann
        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, joeyli
• [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI updates for v4.15, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 1/2] efi/capsule-loader: pr_err() strings should end with newlines, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 2/2] arm64: efi: ignore EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute if RP and/or WP are set, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI updates for v4.15, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI updates for v4.15, Ingo Molnar
      • Re: [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI updates for v4.15, Ard Biesheuvel
• [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI fixes for v4.14, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 2/2] efi/libstub: arm: don't randomize runtime regions when CONFIG_HIBERNATION=y, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 1/2] efi/efi_test: Prevent an Oops in efi_runtime_query_capsulecaps(), Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: don't randomize runtime regions when CONFIG_HIBERNATION=y, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map, jeffy
  • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map, Matthias Brugger
  • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map, Russell King - ARM Linux
    • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map, Will Deacon
  • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map, Gregory CLEMENT
  • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map, Matthias Brugger
    • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map, Russell King - ARM Linux
      • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map, Matthias Brugger
      • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map, Matthias Brugger
• [Part1 PATCH v7 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active, Brijesh Singh
• [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, David Howells
  • [PATCH 14/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 14/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down, joeyli
  • [PATCH 27/27] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode, David Howells
  • [PATCH 26/27] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 26/27] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode, James Morris
    • Re: [PATCH 26/27] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode, David Howells
  • [PATCH 25/27] Lock down /proc/kcore, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 25/27] Lock down /proc/kcore, James Morris
    • Re: [PATCH 25/27] Lock down /proc/kcore, David Howells
  • [PATCH 24/27] debugfs: Disallow use of debugfs files when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 23/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module, David Howells
  • [PATCH 22/27] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport), David Howells
  • [PATCH 20/27] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 21/27] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL, David Howells
  • [PATCH 19/27] scsi: Lock down the eata driver, David Howells
  • [PATCH 17/27] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 17/27] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down, joeyli
  • [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down, Alexei Starovoitov
      • Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down, joeyli
      • Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down, jlee
        • Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
          • Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down, jlee
          • Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
            • Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down, joeyli
    • Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down, Alexei Starovoitov
      • Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 16/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 16/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down, joeyli
  • [PATCH 15/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 15/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down, joeyli
  • [PATCH 13/27] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 13/27] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down, joeyli
  • [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down, joeyli
    • Re: [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down, Alan Cox
    • Re: [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down, joeyli
    • Re: [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down, joeyli
  • [PATCH 11/27] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 11/27] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down, joeyli
  • [PATCH 08/27] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 08/27] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down, joeyli
  • [PATCH 09/27] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 09/27] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down, joeyli
    • Re: [PATCH 09/27] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down, James Morris
  • [PATCH 10/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 10/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down, joeyli
  • [PATCH 06/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 06/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot, joeyli
  • [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, James Morris
    • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, Mimi Zohar
      • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, joeyli
        • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, Mimi Zohar
          • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, Mimi Zohar
            • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, joeyli
              • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, Mimi Zohar
          • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, Mimi Zohar
        • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, David Howells
          • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, Mimi Zohar
      • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, Mimi Zohar
        • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, David Howells
          • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, Mimi Zohar
          • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, David Howells
  • [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, James Morris
  • [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, joeyli
    • Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, James Morris
    • Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, Mimi Zohar
    • Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, Mimi Zohar
    • Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, Mimi Zohar
      • Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, Mimi Zohar
        • Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
          • Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, Mimi Zohar
  • [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown, Randy Dunlap
    • Re: [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown, Thiago Jung Bauermann
    • Re: [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown, David Howells
  • [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down, joeyli
    • Re: [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down, James Morris
  • [PATCH 05/27] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 05/27] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down, joeyli
    • Re: [PATCH 05/27] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down, James Morris
  • Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down, Ethan Zhao
    • Re: [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Mimi Zohar
  • Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, David Howells
    • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Mimi Zohar
      • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Luis R. Rodriguez
        • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, AKASHI, Takahiro
          • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Luis R. Rodriguez
            • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, AKASHI, Takahiro
              • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Mimi Zohar
                • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, AKASHI, Takahiro
                  • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Mimi Zohar
                  • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Alan Cox
                    • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Mimi Zohar
                    • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Luis R. Rodriguez
                      • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Alan Cox
                        • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Luis R. Rodriguez
                          • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Alan Cox
                      • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, David Howells
                        • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Linus Torvalds
                          • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Alan Cox
                          • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Mimi Zohar
                            • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Greg Kroah-Hartman
                              • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Mimi Zohar
                            • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Linus Torvalds
                              • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Matthew Garrett
                                • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Linus Torvalds
                                  • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Matthew Garrett
                                    • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Linus Torvalds
                                      • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Matthew Garrett
                                  • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Luis R. Rodriguez
                                    • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Matthew Garrett
                                      • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, James Bottomley
                                        • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Matthew Garrett
                                          • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, James Bottomley
                                            • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Matthew Garrett
                                    • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Mimi Zohar
                                      • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Luis R. Rodriguez
                                        • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Mimi Zohar
                                          • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Luis R. Rodriguez
                                            • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Mimi Zohar
                                  • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Pavel Machek
                                    • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Luis R. Rodriguez
                                      • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Alan Cox
              • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Luis R. Rodriguez
                • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Mimi Zohar
                  • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Luis R. Rodriguez
                    • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Luis R. Rodriguez
        • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Mimi Zohar
          • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Luis R. Rodriguez
• [PATCH] efi: parse ARM error information value, Tyler Baicar
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: parse ARM error information value, Andy Shevchenko
    • Re: [PATCH] efi: parse ARM error information value, Tyler Baicar
• [Part1 PATCH v6 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active, Brijesh Singh
• Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown, David Howells
  • Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown, Johannes Berg
    • Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown, Randy Dunlap
  • Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown, Florian Weimer
  • Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown, David Howells
  • Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown, David Howells
  • Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown, joeyli
  • Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
  • Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown, Pavel Machek
• [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local, Jiri Slaby
  • Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local, Jiri Slaby
      • Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local, Jiri Slaby
          • Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local, Mark Rutland
            • Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local, Jiri Slaby
              • Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local, Mark Rutland
          • Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local, Ard Biesheuvel
            • Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local, Jiri Slaby
• [PATCH v4 26/27] x86_32: assembly, change all ENTRY+ENDPROC to SYM_FUNC_*, Jiri Slaby