Linux EFI Development - Date Index

• Date Index

• Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, (continued)
  • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Thomas Gleixner
    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
  • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Andy Lutomirski
  • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Peter Dolding
  • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, David Howells
    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Andy Lutomirski
    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, David Howells
      • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Andy Lutomirski
      • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, David Howells
        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Andy Lutomirski
          • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
            • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
              • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Andy Lutomirski
                • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
              • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                  • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                      • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                          • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                            • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                              • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Alan Cox
                            • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, David Howells
                            • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Alan Cox
                              • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                      • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                          • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                            • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                              • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                                • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                  • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Andy Lutomirski
                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                      • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Greg Kroah-Hartman
                                  • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                                      • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Theodore Y. Ts'o
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Greg Kroah-Hartman
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Theodore Y. Ts'o
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Greg Kroah-Hartman
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Mike Galbraith
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Pavel Machek
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, David Howells
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Theodore Y. Ts'o
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Andy Lutomirski
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Justin Forbes
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Peter Dolding
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, David Howells
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Peter Dolding
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Peter Dolding
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Justin Forbes
                                        • Message not available
                                        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
                            • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Jann Horn
                              • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Andy Lutomirski
                              • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, David Howells
                                • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Andy Lutomirski
                                • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, David Howells
                                • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Eric W. Biederman
                  • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, David Howells
                    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
          • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, David Howells
            • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Andy Lutomirski
            • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Pavel Machek
        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, David Howells
          • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
          • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Andy Lutomirski
  • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
      • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
          • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Al Viro
            • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
          • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Linus Torvalds
            • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
          • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Pavel Machek
  • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, David Howells
    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, James Morris
      • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Alan Cox
  • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Alexei Starovoitov
    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Matthew Garrett
      • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, joeyli
    • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, joeyli
      • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Alexei Starovoitov
        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, Daniel Borkmann
        • Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot, joeyli
• [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI updates for v4.15, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 1/2] efi/capsule-loader: pr_err() strings should end with newlines, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 2/2] arm64: efi: ignore EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute if RP and/or WP are set, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI updates for v4.15, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI updates for v4.15, Ingo Molnar
      • Re: [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI updates for v4.15, Ard Biesheuvel
• [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI fixes for v4.14, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 2/2] efi/libstub: arm: don't randomize runtime regions when CONFIG_HIBERNATION=y, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 1/2] efi/efi_test: Prevent an Oops in efi_runtime_query_capsulecaps(), Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: don't randomize runtime regions when CONFIG_HIBERNATION=y, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map, jeffy
  • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map, Matthias Brugger
  • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map, Russell King - ARM Linux
    • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map, Will Deacon
  • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map, Gregory CLEMENT
  • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map, Matthias Brugger
    • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map, Russell King - ARM Linux
      • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map, Matthias Brugger
      • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map, Matthias Brugger
• [Part1 PATCH v7 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active, Brijesh Singh
• [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, David Howells
  • [PATCH 14/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 14/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down, joeyli
  • [PATCH 27/27] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode, David Howells
  • [PATCH 26/27] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 26/27] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode, James Morris
    • Re: [PATCH 26/27] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode, David Howells
  • [PATCH 25/27] Lock down /proc/kcore, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 25/27] Lock down /proc/kcore, James Morris
    • Re: [PATCH 25/27] Lock down /proc/kcore, David Howells
  • [PATCH 24/27] debugfs: Disallow use of debugfs files when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 23/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module, David Howells
  • [PATCH 22/27] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport), David Howells
  • [PATCH 20/27] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 21/27] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL, David Howells
  • [PATCH 19/27] scsi: Lock down the eata driver, David Howells
  • [PATCH 17/27] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 17/27] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down, joeyli
  • [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down, Alexei Starovoitov
      • Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down, joeyli
      • Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down, jlee
        • Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
          • Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down, jlee
          • Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
            • Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down, joeyli
    • Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down, Alexei Starovoitov
      • Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 16/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 16/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down, joeyli
  • [PATCH 15/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 15/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down, joeyli
  • [PATCH 13/27] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 13/27] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down, joeyli
  • [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down, joeyli
    • Re: [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down, Alan Cox
    • Re: [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down, joeyli
    • Re: [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down, joeyli
  • [PATCH 11/27] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 11/27] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down, joeyli
  • [PATCH 08/27] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 08/27] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down, joeyli
  • [PATCH 09/27] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 09/27] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down, joeyli
    • Re: [PATCH 09/27] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down, James Morris
  • [PATCH 10/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 10/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down, joeyli
  • [PATCH 06/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 06/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot, joeyli
  • [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, James Morris
    • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, Mimi Zohar
      • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, joeyli
        • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, Mimi Zohar
          • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, Mimi Zohar
            • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, joeyli
              • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, Mimi Zohar
          • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, Mimi Zohar
        • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, David Howells
          • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, Mimi Zohar
      • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, Mimi Zohar
        • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, David Howells
          • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, Mimi Zohar
          • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, David Howells
  • [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, James Morris
  • [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, joeyli
    • Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, James Morris
    • Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, Mimi Zohar
    • Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, Mimi Zohar
    • Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, Mimi Zohar
      • Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, Mimi Zohar
        • Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
          • Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, Mimi Zohar
  • [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown, Randy Dunlap
    • Re: [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown, Thiago Jung Bauermann
    • Re: [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown, David Howells
  • [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down, joeyli
    • Re: [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down, James Morris
  • [PATCH 05/27] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 05/27] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down, joeyli
    • Re: [PATCH 05/27] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down, James Morris
  • Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down, Ethan Zhao
    • Re: [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Mimi Zohar
  • Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, David Howells
    • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Mimi Zohar
      • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Luis R. Rodriguez
        • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, AKASHI, Takahiro
          • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Luis R. Rodriguez
            • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, AKASHI, Takahiro
              • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Mimi Zohar
                • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, AKASHI, Takahiro
                  • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Mimi Zohar
                  • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Alan Cox
                    • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Mimi Zohar
                    • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Luis R. Rodriguez
                      • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Alan Cox
                        • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Luis R. Rodriguez
                          • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Alan Cox
                      • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, David Howells
                        • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Linus Torvalds
                          • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Alan Cox
                          • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Mimi Zohar
                            • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Greg Kroah-Hartman
                              • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Mimi Zohar
                            • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Linus Torvalds
                              • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Matthew Garrett
                                • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Linus Torvalds
                                  • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Matthew Garrett
                                    • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Linus Torvalds
                                      • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Matthew Garrett
                                  • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Luis R. Rodriguez
                                    • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Matthew Garrett
                                      • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, James Bottomley
                                        • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Matthew Garrett
                                          • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, James Bottomley
                                            • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Matthew Garrett
                                    • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Mimi Zohar
                                      • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Luis R. Rodriguez
                                        • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Mimi Zohar
                                          • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Luis R. Rodriguez
                                            • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Mimi Zohar
                                  • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Pavel Machek
                                    • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Luis R. Rodriguez
                                      • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Alan Cox
              • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Luis R. Rodriguez
                • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Mimi Zohar
                  • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Luis R. Rodriguez
                    • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Luis R. Rodriguez
        • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Mimi Zohar
          • Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown, Luis R. Rodriguez
• [PATCH] efi: parse ARM error information value, Tyler Baicar
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: parse ARM error information value, Andy Shevchenko
    • Re: [PATCH] efi: parse ARM error information value, Tyler Baicar
• [Part1 PATCH v6 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active, Brijesh Singh
• Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown, David Howells
  • Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown, Johannes Berg
    • Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown, Randy Dunlap
  • Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown, Florian Weimer
  • Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown, David Howells
  • Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown, David Howells
  • Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown, joeyli
  • Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
  • Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown, Pavel Machek
• [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local, Jiri Slaby
  • Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local, Jiri Slaby
      • Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local, Jiri Slaby
          • Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local, Mark Rutland
            • Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local, Jiri Slaby
              • Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local, Mark Rutland
          • Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local, Ard Biesheuvel
            • Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local, Jiri Slaby
• [PATCH v4 26/27] x86_32: assembly, change all ENTRY+ENDPROC to SYM_FUNC_*, Jiri Slaby
• [PATCH v4 23/27] x86_64: assembly, change all ENTRY+ENDPROC to SYM_FUNC_*, Jiri Slaby
  • Re: [PATCH v4 23/27] x86_64: assembly, change all ENTRY+ENDPROC to SYM_FUNC_*, Rafael J. Wysocki
  • Re: [PATCH v4 23/27] x86_64: assembly, change all ENTRY+ENDPROC to SYM_FUNC_*, Boris Ostrovsky
• [PATCH] efi/efi_test: Prevent an Oops in efi_runtime_query_capsulecaps(), Dan Carpenter
  • Re: [PATCH] efi/efi_test: Prevent an Oops in efi_runtime_query_capsulecaps(), Matt Fleming
    • ACK: [PATCH] efi/efi_test: Prevent an Oops in efi_runtime_query_capsulecaps(), ivanhu
      • Re: ACK: [PATCH] efi/efi_test: Prevent an Oops in efi_runtime_query_capsulecaps(), Matt Fleming
• [0-Day CI notification] 0-Day kernel test service will be shut down from Sep 30 3PM to Oct 5, Philip Li
• [Part1 PATCH v5 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active, Brijesh Singh
• [PATCH] efi/capsule-loader: pr_err() strings should end with newlines, Arvind Yadav
  • Re: [PATCH] efi/capsule-loader: pr_err() strings should end with newlines, Matt Fleming
• [PATCH v3 0/5] Call GetEventLog before ExitBootServices, Thiebaud Weksteen
  • [PATCH v3 1/5] tpm: move tpm_eventlog.h outside of drivers folder, Thiebaud Weksteen
  • [PATCH v3 5/5] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table, Thiebaud Weksteen
    • Re: [PATCH v3 5/5] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table, Jason Gunthorpe
  • [PATCH v3 3/5] tpm: add event log format version, Thiebaud Weksteen
  • [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Thiebaud Weksteen
    • Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Jarkko Sakkinen
      • Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Thiebaud Weksteen
        • Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Jarkko Sakkinen
          • Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Jarkko Sakkinen
            • Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Thiebaud Weksteen
              • Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Jarkko Sakkinen
                • Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, James Morris
                  • Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Jarkko Sakkinen
                    • Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Jarkko Sakkinen
                      • Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Jarkko Sakkinen
                        • Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Javier Martinez Canillas
                          • Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Jarkko Sakkinen
                            • Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Jarkko Sakkinen
                    • Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Jarkko Sakkinen
                      • Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Jarkko Sakkinen
                        • Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Thiebaud Weksteen
                          • Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Jarkko Sakkinen
                          • Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Jarkko Sakkinen
            • Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Marc-André Lureau
      • Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Thiebaud Weksteen
  • [PATCH v3 2/5] tpm: rename event log provider files, Thiebaud Weksteen
    • Re: [PATCH v3 2/5] tpm: rename event log provider files, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [PATCH v3 0/5] Call GetEventLog before ExitBootServices, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 0/5] Call GetEventLog before ExitBootServices, Javier Martinez Canillas
• [Part1 PATCH v4 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active, Brijesh Singh
  • Re: [Part1 PATCH v4 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active, Borislav Petkov
• Re: [PATCH v2 RESEND 1/2] x86/UV: Introduce a helper function to check UV system at earlier stage, Dave Young
• [PATCH] arm64: efi: ignore EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute if RP and/or WP are set, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH] arm64: efi: ignore EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute if RP and/or WP are set, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH] arm64: efi: ignore EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute if RP and/or WP are set, Stephen Boyd
    • Re: [PATCH] arm64: efi: ignore EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute if RP and/or WP are set, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH] arm64: efi: ignore EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute if RP and/or WP are set, Stephen Boyd
• [PATCH v2 0/3] Call GetEventLog before ExitBootServices, Thiebaud Weksteen
  • [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table, Thiebaud Weksteen
    • Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table, Jason Gunthorpe
      • Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table, Thiebaud Weksteen
        • Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table, Thiebaud Weksteen
          • Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table, Jason Gunthorpe
    • Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table, kbuild test robot
      • Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table, Thiebaud Weksteen
    • Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table, Jarkko Sakkinen
      • Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table, Thiebaud Weksteen
  • [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Thiebaud Weksteen
    • Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, kbuild test robot
    • Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Javier Martinez Canillas
      • Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Thiebaud Weksteen
        • Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Javier Martinez Canillas
    • Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Jarkko Sakkinen
      • Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Matthew Garrett
        • Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Jarkko Sakkinen
          • Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Jarkko Sakkinen
          • Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Thiebaud Weksteen
            • Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v2 1/3] tpm: move tpm_eventlog.h outside of drivers folder, Thiebaud Weksteen
  • Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] Call GetEventLog before ExitBootServices, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v2 0/3] Call GetEventLog before ExitBootServices, Javier Martinez Canillas
  • Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] Call GetEventLog before ExitBootServices, Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH 1/2] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Thiebaud Weksteen
  • [PATCH 2/2] tpm: surface TPM event log based on EFI table, Thiebaud Weksteen
    • Re: [PATCH 2/2] tpm: surface TPM event log based on EFI table, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Thiebaud Weksteen
      • Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices, Ard Biesheuvel
• [GIT PULL] EFI changes for v4.14, Ingo Molnar
• [PATCH 00/14] EFI capsule update support for IOT2000 devices, Jan Kiszka
  • [PATCH 13/14] efi/capsule-loader: Use page addresses rather than struct page pointers, Jan Kiszka
  • [PATCH 12/14] efi/capsule-loader: Redirect calls to efi_capsule_setup_info() via weak alias, Jan Kiszka
  • [PATCH 14/14] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header, Jan Kiszka
  • [PATCH 07/14] efi/capsule: Fix return code on failing kmap/vmap, Jan Kiszka
  • [PATCH 08/14] efi/capsule: Remove pr_debug() on ENOMEM or EFAULT, Jan Kiszka
  • [PATCH 10/14] efi/capsule: Adjust return type of efi_capsule_setup_info(), Jan Kiszka
  • [PATCH 11/14] efi/capsule-loader: Use a cached copy of the capsule header, Jan Kiszka
  • [PATCH 09/14] efi/capsule: Clean up pr_err/_info() messages, Jan Kiszka
  • [PATCH 01/14] efi: Move efi_status_to_err() to drivers/firmware/efi/, Jan Kiszka
  • [PATCH 04/14] efi: Add misc char driver interface to update EFI firmware, Jan Kiszka
  • [PATCH 05/14] efi/capsule: Move 'capsule' to the stack in efi_capsule_supported(), Jan Kiszka
  • [PATCH 06/14] efi/capsule: Allocate whole capsule into virtual memory, Jan Kiszka
  • [PATCH 03/14] x86/efi: Force EFI reboot to process pending capsules, Jan Kiszka
  • [PATCH 02/14] efi: Add 'capsule' update support, Jan Kiszka
  • Re: [PATCH 00/14] EFI capsule update support for IOT2000 devices, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 00/14] EFI capsule update support for IOT2000 devices, Jan Kiszka
      • Re: [PATCH 00/14] EFI capsule update support for IOT2000 devices, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
  • [PATCH V2 2/3] x86/efi: Replace efi_pgd with efi_mm.pgd, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
  • [PATCH V2 1/3] efi: Use efi_mm in x86 as well as ARM, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
  • [PATCH V2 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with %cr3, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
  • Re: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually, Bhupesh Sharma
    • Re: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually, Bhupesh Sharma
      • RE: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually, Prakhya, Sai Praneeth
        • Re: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually, Bhupesh Sharma
          • Re: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
            • Re: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
              • RE: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually, Prakhya, Sai Praneeth
                • Re: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually, Bhupesh Sharma
                  • RE: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually, Prakhya, Sai Praneeth
• [GIT PULL 0/5] more EFI changes for v4.14, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 4/5] efi: move efi_mem_type() to common code, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 2/5] efi/random: Increase size of firmware supplied randomness, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 3/5] efi/reboot: Make function pointer orig_pm_power_off static, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 1/5] efi/libstub: Enable reset attack mitigation, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 5/5] efi: bgrt: use efi_mem_type(), Ard Biesheuvel
• [RFC 00/11] KVM, EFI, arm64: EFI Runtime Services Sandboxing, Florent Revest
  • [RFC 09/11] EFI, arm, arm64: Enable EFI Runtime Services later, Florent Revest
  • [RFC 11/11] KVM, arm64: Don't trap internal VMs SMC calls, Florent Revest
  • [RFC 10/11] efi, arm64: Sandbox Runtime Services in a VM, Florent Revest
  • [RFC 08/11] KVM, arm, arm64: Initialize KVM's core earlier, Florent Revest
  • [RFC 05/11] KVM: Expose VM/VCPU creation functions, Florent Revest
  • [RFC 07/11] KVM: Allow initialization before the module target, Florent Revest
  • [RFC 04/11] KVM, arm, arm64: Offer PAs to IPAs idmapping to internal VMs, Florent Revest
    • Re: [RFC 04/11] KVM, arm, arm64: Offer PAs to IPAs idmapping to internal VMs, Christoffer Dall
      • Re: [RFC 04/11] KVM, arm, arm64: Offer PAs to IPAs idmapping to internal VMs, Florent Revest
        • Re: [RFC 04/11] KVM, arm, arm64: Offer PAs to IPAs idmapping to internal VMs, Christoffer Dall
  • [RFC 06/11] KVM, arm64: Expose a VCPU initialization function, Florent Revest
  • [RFC 03/11] KVM: Allow VM lifecycle management without userspace, Florent Revest
  • [RFC 02/11] KVM: arm64: Return an Unknown ID on unhandled HVC, Florent Revest
  • [RFC 01/11] arm64: Add an SMCCC function IDs header, Florent Revest
  • Re: [RFC 00/11] KVM, EFI, arm64: EFI Runtime Services Sandboxing, Florent Revest
  • Re: [RFC 00/11] KVM, EFI, arm64: EFI Runtime Services Sandboxing, Christoffer Dall
    • Re: [RFC 00/11] KVM, EFI, arm64: EFI Runtime Services Sandboxing, Florent Revest
      • Re: [RFC 00/11] KVM, EFI, arm64: EFI Runtime Services Sandboxing, Christoffer Dall
  • Re: [RFC 00/11] KVM, EFI, arm64: EFI Runtime Services Sandboxing, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [RFC 00/11] KVM, EFI, arm64: EFI Runtime Services Sandboxing, Florent Revest
• [PATCH 1/2] x86_32: boot, extract efi_pe_entry from startup_32, Jiri Slaby
  • [PATCH 2/2] x86_64: boot, extract efi_pe_entry from startup_64, Jiri Slaby
• [efi:next 2/3] drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c:163:21: error: 'RANDOM_SEED_SIZE' undeclared, kbuild test robot
• [PATCH][next] efi/reboot: make function pointer orig_pm_power_off static, Colin King
  • Re: [PATCH][next] efi/reboot: make function pointer orig_pm_power_off static, Ard Biesheuvel
• Thinkpad e545 woes, Evgeny Laktanov
• [PATCH] efi: random: increase size of firmware supplied randomness, Ard Biesheuvel
• [RFC PATCH 1/2] efi: import USB I/O related declarations from the UEFI spec, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [RFC PATCH 2/2] efi: libstub: add support for the Chaoskey RNG USB stick to the stub, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] efi: libstub: add support for the Chaoskey RNG USB stick to the stub, Greg KH
      • Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] efi: libstub: add support for the Chaoskey RNG USB stick to the stub, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] efi: libstub: add support for the Chaoskey RNG USB stick to the stub, Greg KH
          • Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] efi: libstub: add support for the Chaoskey RNG USB stick to the stub, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] efi: import USB I/O related declarations from the UEFI spec, Greg KH
    • Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] efi: import USB I/O related declarations from the UEFI spec, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] efi: import USB I/O related declarations from the UEFI spec, Greg KH
        • Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] efi: import USB I/O related declarations from the UEFI spec, Ard Biesheuvel
• [GIT PULL 00/14] EFI changes for v4.14, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 05/14] efi: arm/arm64: Add missing assignment of efi.config_table, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 09/14] arm: efi: remove pointless dummy .reloc section, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 14/14] firmware: efi: esrt: constify attribute_group structures., Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 13/14] firmware: efi: constify attribute_group structures., Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 11/14] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 12/14] firmware: dcdbas: constify attribute_group structures., Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 10/14] arm: efi: replace open coded constants with symbolic ones, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 06/14] efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 08/14] arm: efi: remove forbidden values from the PE/COFF header, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 07/14] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 04/14] efi/libstub: arm64: set -fpie when building the EFI stub, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 02/14] efi/libstub: arm64: use hidden attribute for struct screen_info reference, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 03/14] efi/libstub: arm64: force 'hidden' visibility for section markers, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 01/14] efi: arm: Don't mark ACPI reclaim memory as MEMBLOCK_NOMAP, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [GIT PULL 00/14] EFI changes for v4.14, Ingo Molnar
• [PATCH 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
  • [PATCH 2/3] x86/efi: Replace efi_pgd with efi_mm.pgd, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
  • [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
    • Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3, Andy Lutomirski
      • Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
        • Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3, Andy Lutomirski
      • Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3, Mark Rutland
          • Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3, Will Deacon
            • Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3, Mark Rutland
              • Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3, Matt Fleming
                • Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3, Andy Lutomirski
                  • Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3, Mark Rutland
                    • Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3, Will Deacon
                      • Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3, Andy Lutomirski
                        • Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3, Peter Zijlstra
                          • Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3, Andy Lutomirski
                            • Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3, Peter Zijlstra
                              • Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3, Andy Lutomirski
                                • Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3, Peter Zijlstra
                                  • Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3, Ard Biesheuvel
                                • Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
                                  • Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3, Andy Lutomirski
                            • Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3, Peter Zijlstra
      • Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
        • Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3, Andy Lutomirski
  • [PATCH 1/3] efi: Use efi_mm in x86 as well as ARM, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • [PATCH 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
    • Re: [PATCH 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually, Bhupesh Sharma
      • RE: [PATCH 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually, Prakhya, Sai Praneeth
• [PATCH v9 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions, Baoquan He
  • [PATCH v9 2/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions, Baoquan He
    • Re: [PATCH v9 2/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions, Baoquan He
      • Re: [PATCH v9 2/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH v9 2/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions, Baoquan He
  • [PATCH v9 1/2] efi: Introduce efi_early_memdesc_ptr to get pointer to memmap descriptor, Baoquan He
    • Re: [PATCH v9 1/2] efi: Introduce efi_early_memdesc_ptr to get pointer to memmap descriptor, Matt Fleming
      • Re: [PATCH v9 1/2] efi: Introduce efi_early_memdesc_ptr to get pointer to memmap descriptor, Baoquan He
    • [PATCH v10 1/2] efi: Introduce efi_early_memdesc_ptr to get pointer to memmap descriptor, Baoquan He
• [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation, Matthew Garrett
  • Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation, Matthew Garrett
      • Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation, Lukas Wunner
        • Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation, Matthew Garrett
  • Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation, Matthew Garrett
      • Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation, Matthew Garrett
          • Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation, Ard Biesheuvel
            • Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation, Matthew Garrett
      • Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation, Lukas Wunner
• Re: [PATCH v6 RESEND] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions, Matt Fleming
  • Re: [PATCH v6 RESEND] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions, Baoquan He
    • Re: [PATCH v6 RESEND] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions, Matt Fleming
      • Re: [PATCH v6 RESEND] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions, Baoquan He
• [PATCH v8 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions, Baoquan He
  • [PATCH v8 2/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions, Baoquan He
  • [PATCH v8 1/2] efi: Introduce efi_memdesc_ptr to get pointer to memmap descriptor, Baoquan He
  • Re: [PATCH v8 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions, Baoquan He
    • Re: [PATCH v8 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions, Baoquan He
      • Re: [PATCH v8 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions, Chao Fan
      • Re: [PATCH v8 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions, Chao Fan
        • Re: [PATCH v8 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions, Baoquan He
• [PATCH 0/3] constify firmware attribute_group structures., Arvind Yadav
  • [PATCH 2/3] firmware: efi: constify attribute_group structures., Arvind Yadav
  • [PATCH 3/3] firmware: efi: esrt: constify attribute_group structures., Arvind Yadav
  • [PATCH 1/3] firmware: dcdbas: constify attribute_group structures., Arvind Yadav
    • Re: [PATCH 1/3] firmware: dcdbas: constify attribute_group structures., Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges, Stuart Hayes
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • [PATCH] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges, Stuart Hayes
    • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges, Matt Fleming
      • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges, Ingo Molnar
        • [PATCH v2] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges, Stuart Hayes
          • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges, Ingo Molnar
        • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges, Stuart Hayes
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD), Brijesh Singh
  • [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption, Brijesh Singh
  • [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support, Tom Lendacky
        • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support, Borislav Petkov
  • [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature, Tom Lendacky
        • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature, Borislav Petkov
          • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature, Tom Lendacky
            • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature, Borislav Petkov
              • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature, Tom Lendacky
                • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature, Borislav Petkov
                  • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature, Tom Lendacky
                    • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature, Borislav Petkov
  • [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 04/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 04/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV, Borislav Petkov
  • [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active, Tom Lendacky
  • [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes, Borislav Petkov
      • RE: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes, David Laight
        • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes, Tom Lendacky
      • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes, Tom Lendacky
  • [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV, Tom Lendacky
  • [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area under SEV, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area under SEV, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area under SEV, Tom Lendacky
  • [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code, Tom Lendacky
        • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code, Tom Lendacky
  • [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback, Borislav Petkov
    • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback, Kees Cook
  • [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
  • [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages, Tom Lendacky
  • [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active, Borislav Petkov
  • [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables, Borislav Petkov
          • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables, Brijesh Singh
            • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables, Andy Lutomirski
              • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables, Brijesh Singh
            • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables, Borislav Petkov
              • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables, Brijesh Singh
  • [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot, Brijesh Singh
  • [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active, Tom Lendacky
        • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active, Borislav Petkov
  • [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active, Brijesh Singh
    • RE: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active, David Laight
      • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active, Arnd Bergmann
        • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active, Brijesh Singh
          • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active, H. Peter Anvin
            • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active, Brijesh Singh
              • RE: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active, David Laight
              • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active, Borislav Petkov
                • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active, Borislav Petkov
                  • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active, Brijesh Singh
                    • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active, Borislav Petkov
                      • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active, Brijesh Singh
                        • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active, Borislav Petkov
                          • Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active, Brijesh Singh
• [PATCH v1 0/6] uuid: Convert rest users to new API, Andy Shevchenko
  • [PATCH v1 2/6] mei: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Andy Shevchenko
    • Re: [PATCH v1 2/6] mei: Switch to use new generic UUID API, kbuild test robot
  • [PATCH v1 5/6] uuid: Kill uapi/uuid.h, Andy Shevchenko
    • Re: [PATCH v1 5/6] uuid: Kill uapi/uuid.h, kbuild test robot
    • Re: [PATCH v1 5/6] uuid: Kill uapi/uuid.h, Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH v1 1/6] efi: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Andy Shevchenko
    • Re: [PATCH v1 1/6] efi: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH v1 1/6] efi: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Andy Shevchenko
        • Re: [PATCH v1 1/6] efi: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Christoph Hellwig
          • Re: [PATCH v1 1/6] efi: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH v1 1/6] efi: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH v1 4/6] vmbus: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Andy Shevchenko
    • RE: [PATCH v1 4/6] vmbus: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Haiyang Zhang
      • Re: [PATCH v1 4/6] vmbus: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Andy Shevchenko
    • Re: [PATCH v1 4/6] vmbus: Switch to use new generic UUID API, kbuild test robot
    • Re: [PATCH v1 4/6] vmbus: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Christoph Hellwig
  • [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Andy Shevchenko
    • Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Andy Shevchenko
      • Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Greg Kroah-Hartman
        • Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Andy Shevchenko
          • Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Greg Kroah-Hartman
            • Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Andy Shevchenko
              • Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Christoph Hellwig
                • Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Andy Shevchenko
                • Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Greg Kroah-Hartman
  • [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Andy Shevchenko
    • Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Rafael J. Wysocki
    • Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Mika Westerberg
      • Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Rafael J. Wysocki
        • Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Andy Shevchenko
          • Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Rafael J. Wysocki
            • Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Andy Shevchenko
              • Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Rafael J. Wysocki
            • Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Christoph Hellwig
              • Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Rafael J. Wysocki
                • Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API, Christoph Hellwig
• [PATCH 4.11 38/88] efi: Process the MEMATTR table only if EFI_MEMMAP is enabled, Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen, Greg Kroah-Hartman
  • Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen, Daniel Kiper