On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 3:46 PM Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > For example, I love signed kernel modules. The fact that I love them > has absolutely zero to do with secure boot, though. There is > absolutely no linkage between the two issues: I use (self-)signed > kernel modules simply because I think it's a good thing in general. > The same thing is true of some lockdown patch. Maybe it's a good thing > in general. But whether it's a good thing is _entirely_ independent of > any secure boot issue. I can see using secure boot without it, but I > can very much also see using lockdown without secure boot. > The two things are simply entirely orthogonal. They have _zero_ > overlap. I'm not seeing why they'd be linked at all in any way. Lockdown is clearly useful without Secure Boot (and I intend to deploy it that way for various things), but I still don't understand why you feel that the common case of booting a kernel from a boot chain that's widely trusted derives no benefit from it being harder to subvert that kernel into subverting that boot chain. For cases where you're self-signing and feel happy about that, you just set CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT to n and everyone's happy? -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-efi" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
