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Re: [PATCH v11 29/45] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: fix return value of __setup handlers
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [Question] Should retain 2M alignment if kernel image is bad aligned at entry or BSS overlaps?
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[Question] Should retain 2M alignment if kernel image is bad aligned at entry or BSS overlaps?
From
: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH] efi: fix return value of __setup handlers
From
: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
[efi:urgent] BUILD SUCCESS 258dd902022cb10c83671176688074879517fd21
From
: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [GIT PULL] More EFI fixes for v5.17
From
: pr-tracker-bot@xxxxxxxxxx
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
From
: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 3/4] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 3/4] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 3/4] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v8 1/4] efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v8 2/4] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v8 4/4] docs: security: Add secrets/coco documentation
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v8 3/4] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v8 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
[GIT PULL] More EFI fixes for v5.17
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v4 3/3] efifb: Remove redundant efifb_setup_from_dmi stub
From
: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v4 2/3] sysfb: Enable boot time VESA graphic mode selection
From
: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v4 1/3] sysfb: Make config option dependencies explicit
From
: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 2/3] sysfb: Enable boot time VESA graphic mode selection
From
: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 3/3] efifb: Remove redundant efifb_setup_from_dmi stub
From
: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 1/3] sysfb: Make config option dependencies explicit
From
: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 3.1/45] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB save area
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 29/45] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 16/45] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 28/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI kexec handling into common code
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 43/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 11/45] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 35/45] x86/compressed: Use firmware-validated CPUID leaves for SEV-SNP guests
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 33/45] x86/boot: Add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 17/45] x86/sev: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 06/45] x86/boot: Use MSR read/write helpers instead of inline assembly
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 37/45] x86/compressed/64: Add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 15/45] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 36/45] x86/compressed: Export and rename add_identity_map()
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 34/45] x86/compressed: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 31/45] x86/sev: Move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 38/45] x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 08/45] x86/sev: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 12/45] x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 07/45] x86/compressed/64: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 42/45] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 41/45] x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 14/45] x86/sev: Check the vmpl level
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 19/45] x86/kernel: Make the .bss..decrypted section shared in RMP table
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 23/45] x86/head/64: Re-enable stack protection
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 18/45] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 27/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI vendor table lookup to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 39/45] x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 26/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI config table lookup to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 21/45] x86/mm: Validate memory when changing the C-bit
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 10/45] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 22/45] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 45/45] virt: sevguest: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 20/45] x86/kernel: Validate ROM memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 30/45] KVM: x86: Move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 09/45] x86/mm: Extend cc_attr to include AMD SEV-SNP
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 32/45] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 40/45] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 25/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI system table lookup to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 13/45] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 44/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 24/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI detection to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 05/45] x86/boot: Introduce helpers for MSR reads/writes
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 02/45] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 03/45] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB save area
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 01/45] KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and vmpl field in the VMSA
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 04/45] KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH RFC v2 2/2] libstub: ensure allocated memory to be executable
From
: Baskov Evgeniy <baskov@xxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH RFC v2 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
From
: Baskov Evgeniy <baskov@xxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH RFC v2 1/2] libstub: declare DXE services table
From
: Baskov Evgeniy <baskov@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] pstore: Don't use semaphores in always-atomic-context code
From
: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] pstore: Don't use semaphores in always-atomic-context code
From
: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
From
: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
From
: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v3] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] pstore: Don't use semaphores in always-atomic-context code
From
: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
From
: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
From
: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
From
: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
From
: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 00/17] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
From
: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
[efi:next] BUILD SUCCESS 0ea9e1c3dbd4e78f7a82d23fdc959622432e461c
From
: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
From
: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
[efi:next] BUILD SUCCESS 1e9e574abaea04b78913ef887d79038ba5d1d2e8
From
: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efivars: Respect "block" flag in efivar_entry_set_safe()
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v2] pstore: Don't use semaphores in always-atomic-context code
From
: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH] efivars: Respect "block" flag in efivar_entry_set_safe()
From
: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] pstore: Don't use semaphores in always-atomic-context code
From
: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH] pstore: Don't use semaphores in always-atomic-context code
From
: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Introduce sv48 support without relocatable kernel
From
: Alexandre Ghiti <alexandre.ghiti@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] riscv/efi_stub: Fix get_boot_hartid_from_fdt() return value
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] riscv/efi_stub: Fix get_boot_hartid_from_fdt() return value
From
: Atish Patra <atishp@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] riscv/efi_stub: Fix get_boot_hartid_from_fdt() return value
From
: Sunil V L <sunilvl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] arm64: move efi_reboot to restart handler
From
: Krzysztof Adamski <krzysztof.adamski@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] arm64: move efi_reboot to restart handler
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] arm64: move efi_reboot to restart handler
From
: Guenter Roeck <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] arm64: move efi_reboot to restart handler
From
: Krzysztof Adamski <krzysztof.adamski@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] arm64: move efi_reboot to restart handler
From
: Guenter Roeck <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] x86/e820: Refactor range_update and range_remove
From
: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] arm64: move efi_reboot to restart handler
From
: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] arm64: move efi_reboot to restart handler
From
: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] x86/e820: Refactor range_update and range_remove
From
: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 07/17] integrity: restrict INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE to restrict_link_by_ca
From
: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 17/17] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true
From
: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 16/17] integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found
From
: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 15/17] efi/mokvar: move up init order
From
: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 14/17] KEYS: link machine trusted keys to secondary_trusted_keys
From
: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 13/17] integrity: store reference to machine keyring
From
: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 11/17] KEYS: Introduce link restriction for machine keys
From
: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 10/17] KEYS: add a reference to machine keyring
From
: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] riscv/efi_stub: Fix get_boot_hartid_from_fdt() return value
From
: Andreas Schwab <schwab@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] riscv/efi_stub: Fix get_boot_hartid_from_fdt() return value
From
: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@xxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] riscv/efi_stub: Fix get_boot_hartid_from_fdt() return value
From
: Andreas Schwab <schwab@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] riscv/efi_stub: Fix get_boot_hartid_from_fdt() return value
From
: Andreas Schwab <schwab@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] riscv/efi_stub: Fix get_boot_hartid_from_fdt() return value
From
: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@xxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] riscv/efi_stub: Fix get_boot_hartid_from_fdt() return value
From
: Andreas Schwab <schwab@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] riscv/efi_stub: Fix get_boot_hartid_from_fdt() return value
From
: Sunil V L <sunilvl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v3] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v3] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v5 2/2] EDAC/ghes: use cper functions to avoid code duplication
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v2] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] builddeb: Support signing kernels with the module signing key
From
: Ben Hutchings <ben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] builddeb: Support signing kernels with the module signing key
From
: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] builddeb: Support signing kernels with the module signing key
From
: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 45/45] virt: sevguest: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 44/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 42/45] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 43/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 40/45] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 39/45] x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 34/45] x86/compressed: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 35/45] x86/compressed: Use firmware-validated CPUID leaves for SEV-SNP guests
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 37/45] x86/compressed/64: Add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 38/45] x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 36/45] x86/compressed: Export and rename add_identity_map()
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 41/45] x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 32/45] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 33/45] x86/boot: Add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 29/45] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 28/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI kexec handling into common code
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 30/45] KVM: x86: Move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 31/45] x86/sev: Move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 25/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI system table lookup to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 23/45] x86/head/64: Re-enable stack protection
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 26/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI config table lookup to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 27/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI vendor table lookup to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 24/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI detection to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 22/45] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 19/45] x86/kernel: Make the .bss..decrypted section shared in RMP table
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 20/45] x86/kernel: Validate ROM memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 18/45] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 16/45] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 14/45] x86/sev: Check the vmpl level
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 17/45] x86/sev: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 15/45] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 13/45] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 12/45] x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 07/45] x86/compressed/64: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 08/45] x86/sev: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 01/45] KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and vmpl field in the VMSA
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 02/45] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 11/45] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 09/45] x86/mm: Extend cc_attr to include AMD SEV-SNP
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 04/45] KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 05/45] x86/boot: Introduce helpers for MSR reads/writes
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 10/45] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 06/45] x86/boot: Use MSR read/write helpers instead of inline assembly
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 03/45] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB save area
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
RE: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: David Laight <David.Laight@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 02/43] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] builddeb: Support signing kernels with the module signing key
From
: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Nayna <nayna@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] x86/e820: Refactor range_update and range_remove
From
: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] x86/e820: Refactor range_update and range_remove
From
: Daniel Gutson <daniel.gutson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] x86/e820: Refactor range_update and range_remove
From
: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] builddeb: Support signing kernels with the module signing key
From
: Julian Andres Klode <julian.klode@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: MAINTAINERS update suggestion (subject change)
From
: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 30/43] KVM: SEV: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 33/43] x86/compressed: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 30/43] KVM: SEV: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement
From
: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Re: [BUG SEVERE] Failure to enable EFI Runtime services on T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 4/6] x86/e820: Tag e820_entry with crypto capabilities
From
: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 1/6] mm/memblock: Tag memblocks with crypto capabilities
From
: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 42/43] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [BUG SEVERE] Failure to enable EFI Runtime services on T2 Macs
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[BUG SEVERE] Failure to enable EFI Runtime services on T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 33/43] x86/compressed: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup
From
: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] builddeb: Support signing kernels with the module signing key
From
: Matthew Wilcox <willy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] builddeb: Support signing kernels with the module signing key
From
: Julian Andres Klode <julian.klode@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 42/43] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
From
: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] x86/e820: Refactor range_update and range_remove
From
: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 42/43] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 37/43] x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup
From
: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] builddeb: Support signing kernels with the module signing key
From
: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 30/43] KVM: SEV: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement
From
: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 4/6] x86/e820: Tag e820_entry with crypto capabilities
From
: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] x86/e820: Refactor range_update and range_remove
From
: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 2/6] mm/mmzone: Tag pg_data_t with crypto capabilities
From
: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 1/6] mm/memblock: Tag memblocks with crypto capabilities
From
: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 42/43] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 42/43] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 42/43] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 38/43] x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 31/43] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 38/43] x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests
From
: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 31/43] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 42/43] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 41/43] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3] arm64: move efi_reboot to restart handler
From
: Krzysztof Adamski <krzysztof.adamski@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 41/43] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] builddeb: Support signing kernels with the module signing key
From
: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] builddeb: Support signing kernels with the module signing key
From
: Matthew Wilcox <willy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] builddeb: Support signing kernels with the module signing key
From
: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 6/6] drivers/node: Show in sysfs node's crypto capabilities
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 43/43] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 42/43] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 6/6] drivers/node: Show in sysfs node's crypto capabilities
From
: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 41/43] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 40/43] x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 38/43] x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 37/43] x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 36/43] x86/compressed/64: Add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 35/43] x86/compressed: Export and rename add_identity_map()
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 33/43] x86/compressed: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 38/43] x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 31/43] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 38/43] x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests
From
: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 31/43] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 31/43] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 32/43] x86/boot: Add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 23/43] KVM: x86: Move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs to helper
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 31/43] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] builddeb: Support signing kernels with the module signing key
From
: Matthew Wilcox <willy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 6/6] drivers/node: Show in sysfs node's crypto capabilities
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 6/6] drivers/node: Show in sysfs node's crypto capabilities
From
: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 6/6] drivers/node: Show in sysfs node's crypto capabilities
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 6/6] drivers/node: Show in sysfs node's crypto capabilities
From
: "Limonciello, Mario" <mario.limonciello@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 29/43] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 6/6] drivers/node: Show in sysfs node's crypto capabilities
From
: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 6/6] drivers/node: Show in sysfs node's crypto capabilities
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 6/6] drivers/node: Show in sysfs node's crypto capabilities
From
: "Limonciello, Mario" <mario.limonciello@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 29/43] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 28/43] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI kexec handling into common code
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 6/6] drivers/node: Show in sysfs node's crypto capabilities
From
: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 6/6] drivers/node: Show in sysfs node's crypto capabilities
From
: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 6/6] drivers/node: Show in sysfs node's crypto capabilities
From
: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 6/6] drivers/node: Show in sysfs node's crypto capabilities
From
: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 6/6] drivers/node: Show in sysfs node's crypto capabilities
From
: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 6/6] drivers/node: Show in sysfs node's crypto capabilities
From
: "Limonciello, Mario" <mario.limonciello@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 1/6] mm/memblock: Tag memblocks with crypto capabilities
From
: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 1/6] mm/memblock: Tag memblocks with crypto capabilities
From
: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 23/43] KVM: x86: Move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs to helper
From
: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v6 6/6] drivers/node: Show in sysfs node's crypto capabilities
From
: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v6 5/6] x86/efi: Tag e820_entries as crypto capable from EFI memmap
From
: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v6 4/6] x86/e820: Tag e820_entry with crypto capabilities
From
: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v6 3/6] x86/e820: Refactor range_update and range_remove
From
: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v6 2/6] mm/mmzone: Tag pg_data_t with crypto capabilities
From
: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v6 1/6] mm/memblock: Tag memblocks with crypto capabilities
From
: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v6 0/6] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption
From
: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 23/43] KVM: x86: Move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs to helper
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 26/43] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI config table lookup to helper
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 25/43] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI system table lookup to helper
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 24/43] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI detection to helper
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 22/43] x86/sev: Move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID to helper
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 4/5] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
From
: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 4/5] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 20/43] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 4/5] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
From
: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 42/43] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 05/43] x86/compressed/64: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 05/43] x86/compressed/64: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot
From
: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 40/43] x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 19/43] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 18/43] x86/kernel: Validate ROM memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 10/43] x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 4/5] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 4/5] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
From
: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 15/43] x86/sev: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 10/43] x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 5/5] docs: security: Add coco/efi_secret documentation
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 2/5] efi/libstub: Reserve confidential computing secret area
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 4/5] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 17/43] x86/kernel: Make the .bss..decrypted section shared in RMP table
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 3/5] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 15/43] x86/sev: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 5/5] docs: security: Add coco/efi_secret documentation
From
: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 4/5] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
From
: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 3/5] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
From
: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 2/5] efi/libstub: Reserve confidential computing secret area
From
: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 1/5] efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area
From
: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 05/43] x86/compressed/64: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 05/43] x86/compressed/64: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot
From
: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 05/43] x86/compressed/64: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 43/43] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
From
: Peter Gonda <pgonda@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 42/43] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key
From
: Peter Gonda <pgonda@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 05/43] x86/compressed/64: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot
From
: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 41/43] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
From
: Peter Gonda <pgonda@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 40/43] x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device
From
: Peter Gonda <pgonda@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 39/43] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs
From
: Peter Gonda <pgonda@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 10/43] x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 05/43] x86/compressed/64: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: James Bottomley <jejb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: James Bottomley <jejb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v5 20/20] extcon: intel-cht-wc: Report RID_A for ACA adapters
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v5 19/20] extcon: intel-cht-wc: Add support for registering a power_supply class-device
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v5 16/20] extcon: intel-cht-wc: Use new cht_wc_model intel_soc_pmic field
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v5 18/20] extcon: intel-cht-wc: Refactor cht_wc_extcon_get_charger()
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v5 17/20] extcon: intel-cht-wc: Support devs with Micro-B / USB-2 only Type-C connectors
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v5 15/20] i2c: cht-wc: Make charger i2c-client instantiation board/device-model specific
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v5 14/20] mfd: intel_soc_pmic_chtwc: Add cht_wc_model data to struct intel_soc_pmic
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v5 12/20] power: supply: bq25890: Support higher charging voltages through Pump Express+ protocol
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v5 13/20] power: supply: bq25890: Use the devm_regmap_field_bulk_alloc() helper
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v5 11/20] power: supply: bq25890: On the bq25892 set the IINLIM based on external charger detection
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v5 10/20] power: supply: bq25890: Add support for registering the Vbus boost converter as a regulator
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v5 09/20] power: supply: bq25890: Add bq25890_set_otg_cfg() helper
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v5 08/20] power: supply: bq25890: Drop dev->platform_data == NULL check
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v5 07/20] power: supply: bq25890: Enable charging on boards where we skip reset
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v5 06/20] power: supply: bq25890: Add support to read back the settings from the chip
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v5 05/20] power: supply: bq25890: Add support to skip reset at probe() / remove()
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v5 04/20] power: supply: bq25890: Add a bq25890_rw_init_data() helper
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v5 03/20] power: supply: bq25890: Reduce reported CONSTANT_CHARGE_CURRENT_MAX for low temperatures
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v5 02/20] power: supply: bq25890: Rename IILIM field to IINLIM
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v5 01/20] power: supply: core: Refactor power_supply_set_input_current_limit_from_supplier()
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v5 00/20] power-suppy/i2c/extcon: Fix charger setup on Xiaomi Mi Pad 2 and Lenovo Yogabook
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 02/43] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v7 5/5] docs: security: Add coco/efi_secret documentation
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v7 3/5] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v7 4/5] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v7 2/5] efi/libstub: Reserve confidential computing secret area
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v7 1/5] efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv3.1 1/7] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv3.1 1/7] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv3 2/7] efi/x86: Get full memory map in allocate_e820()
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv3 2/7] efi/x86: Get full memory map in allocate_e820()
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv3.1 1/7] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv3.1 1/7] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v4 12/20] power: supply: bq25890: Support higher charging voltages through Pump Express+ protocol
From
: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v4 18/20] extcon: intel-cht-wc: Refactor cht_wc_extcon_get_charger()
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v4 17/20] extcon: intel-cht-wc: Support devs with Micro-B / USB-2 only Type-C connectors
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v4 12/20] power: supply: bq25890: Support higher charging voltages through Pump Express+ protocol
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v4 01/20] power: supply: core: Refactor power_supply_set_input_current_limit_from_supplier()
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v4 18/20] extcon: intel-cht-wc: Refactor cht_wc_extcon_get_charger()
From
: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v4 17/20] extcon: intel-cht-wc: Support devs with Micro-B / USB-2 only Type-C connectors
From
: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v4 15/20] i2c: cht-wc: Make charger i2c-client instantiation board/device-model specific
From
: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v4 12/20] power: supply: bq25890: Support higher charging voltages through Pump Express+ protocol
From
: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v4 01/20] power: supply: core: Refactor power_supply_set_input_current_limit_from_supplier()
From
: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v4 01/20] power: supply: core: Refactor power_supply_set_input_current_limit_from_supplier()
From
: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv3.1 1/7] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Move error message to warning
From
: arshad hussain <arshad.super@xxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH] efi: Move error message to warning
From
: arshad hussain <arshad.super@xxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 16/20] extcon: intel-cht-wc: Use new cht_wc_model intel_soc_pmic field
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 14/20] mfd: intel_soc_pmic_chtwc: Add cht_wc_model data to struct intel_soc_pmic
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 12/20] power: supply: bq25890: Support higher charging voltages through Pump Express+ protocol
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 20/20] extcon: intel-cht-wc: Report RID_A for ACA adapters
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 19/20] extcon: intel-cht-wc: Add support for registering a power_supply class-device
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 18/20] extcon: intel-cht-wc: Refactor cht_wc_extcon_get_charger()
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 17/20] extcon: intel-cht-wc: Support devs with Micro-B / USB-2 only Type-C connectors
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 15/20] i2c: cht-wc: Make charger i2c-client instantiation board/device-model specific
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 13/20] power: supply: bq25890: Use the devm_regmap_field_bulk_alloc() helper
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 11/20] power: supply: bq25890: On the bq25892 set the IINLIM based on external charger detection
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 10/20] power: supply: bq25890: Add support for registering the Vbus boost converter as a regulator
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 09/20] power: supply: bq25890: Add bq25890_set_otg_cfg() helper
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 08/20] power: supply: bq25890: Drop dev->platform_data == NULL check
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 07/20] power: supply: bq25890: Enable charging on boards where we skip reset
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 06/20] power: supply: bq25890: Add support to read back the settings from the chip
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 05/20] power: supply: bq25890: Add support to skip reset at probe() / remove()
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 04/20] power: supply: bq25890: Add a bq25890_rw_init_data() helper
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 03/20] power: supply: bq25890: Reduce reported CONSTANT_CHARGE_CURRENT_MAX for low temperatures
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 01/20] power: supply: core: Refactor power_supply_set_input_current_limit_from_supplier()
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 02/20] power: supply: bq25890: Rename IILIM field to IINLIM
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 resend 00/20] power-suppy/i2c/extcon: Fix charger setup on Xiaomi Mi Pad 2 and Lenovo Yogabook
From
: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv3.1 5/7] x86/mm: Reserve unaccepted memory bitmap
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv3.1 1/7] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv3 5/7] x86/mm: Reserve unaccepted memory bitmap
From
: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv3 1/7] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH 1/3] memblock: define functions to set the usable memory range
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v5 2/2] EDAC/ghes: use cper functions to avoid code duplication
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 36/40] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 36/40] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 36/40] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 29/40] x86/compressed/64: add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv3 5/7] x86/mm: Reserve unaccepted memory bitmap
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv3 7/7] x86/tdx: Unaccepted memory support
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv3 6/7] x86/mm: Provide helpers for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv3 2/7] efi/x86: Get full memory map in allocate_e820()
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv3 3/7] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv3 1/7] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv3 0/7] Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv3 4/7] x86/boot/compressed: Handle unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fixes for v5.17
From
: pr-tracker-bot@xxxxxxxxxx
[PATCH v9 43/43] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 41/43] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 42/43] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 39/43] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 40/43] x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 38/43] x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 37/43] x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 35/43] x86/compressed: Export and rename add_identity_map()
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 36/43] x86/compressed/64: Add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 34/43] x86/compressed: Use firmware-validated CPUID leaves for SEV-SNP guests
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 19/43] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 25/43] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI system table lookup to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 26/43] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI config table lookup to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 27/43] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI vendor table lookup to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 30/43] KVM: SEV: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 32/43] x86/boot: Add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 33/43] x86/compressed: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 31/43] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 29/43] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 28/43] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI kexec handling into common code
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 24/43] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI detection to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 22/43] x86/sev: Move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 23/43] KVM: x86: Move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 21/43] x86/head/64: Re-enable stack protection
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 20/43] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 17/43] x86/kernel: Make the .bss..decrypted section shared in RMP table
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 16/43] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 18/43] x86/kernel: Validate ROM memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 15/43] x86/sev: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 14/43] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 13/43] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 10/43] x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 11/43] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 12/43] x86/sev: Check the vmpl level
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 06/43] x86/sev: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 07/43] x86/mm: Extend cc_attr to include AMD SEV-SNP
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 08/43] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 09/43] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 05/43] x86/compressed/64: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 03/43] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB save area
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 04/43] KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 02/43] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 01/43] KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and vmpl field in the VMSA
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 00/43] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[GIT PULL] EFI fixes for v5.17
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] riscv/efi_stub: Fix get_boot_hartid_from_fdt() return value
From
: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [RFC PATCH 1/1] riscv/efi_stub: Add support for RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL
From
: Sunil V L <sunilvl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH] riscv/efi_stub: Fix get_boot_hartid_from_fdt() return value
From
: Sunil V L <sunilvl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 29/40] x86/compressed/64: add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 36/40] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 29/40] x86/compressed/64: add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 36/40] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [RFC PATCH 1/1] riscv/efi_stub: Add support for RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL
From
: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@xxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v5 0/2] EDAC/ghes: refactor memory error reporting to avoid code duplication
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
From
: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 35/40] x86/sev: use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v5 3/5] x86/e820: Tag e820_entry with crypto capabilities
From
: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
From
: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
From
: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [RFC PATCH 1/1] riscv/efi_stub: Add support for RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL
From
: Sunil V L <sunilvl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [RFC PATCH 1/1] riscv/efi_stub: Add support for RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[RFC PATCH 1/1] riscv/efi_stub: Add support for RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL
From
: Sunil V L <sunilvl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[RFC PATCH 0/1] RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL support in linux
From
: Sunil V L <sunilvl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v5 0/2] EDAC/ghes: refactor memory error reporting to avoid code duplication
From
: Boris Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v5 0/2] EDAC/ghes: refactor memory error reporting to avoid code duplication
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v5 0/2] EDAC/ghes: refactor memory error reporting to avoid code duplication
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v5 1/2] efi/cper: add cper_mem_err_status_str to decode error description
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v5 2/2] EDAC/ghes: use cper functions to avoid code duplication
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v5 0/2] EDAC/ghes: refactor memory error reporting to avoid code duplication
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v4 1/2] efi/cper: add cper_mem_err_status_str to decode error description
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 7/8] integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found
From
: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 1/8] integrity: Fix warning about missing prototypes
From
: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 3/8] integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keys
From
: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 4/8] KEYS: store reference to machine keyring
From
: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
From
: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 2/8] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine
From
: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 5/8] KEYS: Introduce link restriction for machine keys
From
: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 8/8] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true
From
: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 6/8] efi/mokvar: move up init order
From
: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v4 1/2] efi/cper: add cper_mem_err_status_str to decode error description
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 34/40] x86/sev: add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [RESEND PATCH v3 1/2] efi/cper: add cper_mem_err_status_str to decode error description
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 33/40] x86/compressed/64: add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [RESEND PATCH v3 1/2] efi/cper: add cper_mem_err_status_str to decode error description
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [RESEND PATCH v3 1/2] efi/cper: add cper_mem_err_status_str to decode error description
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [RESEND PATCH v3 1/2] efi/cper: add cper_mem_err_status_str to decode error description
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 1/2] efi/cper: add cper_mem_err_status_str to decode error description
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 2/2] EDAC/ghes: use cper functions to avoid code duplication
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 0/2] EDAC/ghes: refactor memory error reporting to avoid code duplication
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [RESEND PATCH v3 1/2] efi/cper: add cper_mem_err_status_str to decode error description
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 5.16 0502/1039] of: fdt: Aggregate the processing of "linux,usable-memory-range"
From
: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [RESEND PATCH v3 1/2] efi/cper: add cper_mem_err_status_str to decode error description
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 5.15 427/846] of: fdt: Aggregate the processing of "linux,usable-memory-range"
From
: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 5.16 0503/1039] efi: apply memblock cap after memblock_add()
From
: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH 1/3] memblock: define functions to set the usable memory range
From
: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 5.15 428/846] efi: apply memblock cap after memblock_add()
From
: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[efi:urgent] BUILD SUCCESS f5390cd0b43c2e54c7cf5506c7da4a37c5cef746
From
: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
[RESEND PATCH v3 1/2] efi/cper: add cper_mem_err_status_str to decode error description
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[RESEND PATCH v3 2/2] EDAC/ghes: use cper functions to avoid code duplication
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[RESEND PATCH v3 0/2] EDAC/ghes: refactor memory error reporting to avoid
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 32/40] x86/compressed: use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Introduce sv48 support without relocatable kernel
From
: Alexandre Ghiti <alexandre.ghiti@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Introduce sv48 support without relocatable kernel
From
: Alexandre Ghiti <alexandre.ghiti@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Introduce sv48 support without relocatable kernel
From
: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm64: Fix image check alignment at entry
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH] efi/libstub: arm64: Fix image check alignment at entry
From
: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 31/40] x86/compressed: add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 29/40] x86/compressed/64: add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 29/40] x86/compressed/64: add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv2 0/7] Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 29/40] x86/compressed/64: add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 29/40] x86/compressed/64: add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 29/40] x86/compressed/64: add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 29/40] x86/compressed/64: add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 2/8] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine
From
: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 29/40] x86/compressed/64: add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 29/40] x86/compressed/64: add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 29/40] x86/compressed/64: add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 29/40] x86/compressed/64: add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: runtime: avoid EFIv2 runtime services on Apple x86 machines
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 29/40] x86/compressed/64: add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 30/40] x86/boot: add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v5 3/5] x86/e820: Tag e820_entry with crypto capabilities
From
: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 2/8] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine
From
: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 0/2] EDAC/ghes: refactor memory error reporting to avoid
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 1/2] efi/cper: add cper_mem_err_status_str to decode error description
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 2/2] EDAC/ghes: use cper functions to avoid code duplication
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 2/8] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine
From
: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 2/8] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine
From
: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 2/8] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine
From
: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 2/8] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine
From
: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv2 5/7] x86/mm: Reserve unaccepted memory bitmap
From
: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 2/8] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine
From
: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH 1/3] memblock: define functions to set the usable memory range
From
: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v5 3/5] x86/e820: Tag e820_entry with crypto capabilities
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 29/40] x86/compressed/64: add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv2 1/7] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v5 1/5] mm/memblock: Tag memblocks with crypto capabilities
From
: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v5 1/5] mm/memblock: Tag memblocks with crypto capabilities
From
: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH 1/3] memblock: define functions to set the usable memory range
From
: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH 1/3] memblock: define functions to set the usable memory range
From
: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH 1/3] memblock: define functions to set the usable memory range
From
: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 29/40] x86/compressed/64: add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 29/40] x86/compressed/64: add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 20/40] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 20/40] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv2 1/7] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 2/8] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine
From
: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv2 5/7] x86/mm: Reserve unaccepted memory bitmap
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv2 6/7] x86/mm: Provide helpers for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 2/8] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine
From
: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv2 5/7] x86/mm: Reserve unaccepted memory bitmap
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 2/8] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine
From
: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv2 3/7] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv2 3/7] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv2 1/7] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv2 1/7] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv2 1/7] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH 1/3] memblock: define functions to set the usable memory range
From
: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 20/40] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs
From
: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 20/40] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 20/40] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv2 1/7] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: runtime: avoid EFIv2 runtime services on Apple x86 machines
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
[PATCH] efi: runtime: avoid EFIv2 runtime services on Apple x86 machines
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [BUG][SEVERE] Enabling EFI runtime services causes panics in the T2 security chip on Macs equipped with it.
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [BUG][SEVERE] Enabling EFI runtime services causes panics in the T2 security chip on Macs equipped with it.
From
: Orlando Chamberlain <redecorating@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [BUG][SEVERE] Enabling EFI runtime services causes panics in the T2 security chip on Macs equipped with it.
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [BUG][SEVERE] Enabling EFI runtime services causes panics in the T2 security chip on Macs equipped with it.
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 2/8] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine
From
: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [GIT PULL] EFI updates for v5.17
From
: pr-tracker-bot@xxxxxxxxxx
Re: [PATCH v8 12/40] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes
From
: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 12/40] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 12/40] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes
From
: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 2/8] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine
From
: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 12/40] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH 1/3] memblock: define functions to set the usable memory range
From
: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv2 6/7] x86/mm: Provide helpers for unaccepted memory
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv2 1/7] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv2 5/7] x86/mm: Reserve unaccepted memory bitmap
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 2/8] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine
From
: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv2 3/7] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv2 6/7] x86/mm: Provide helpers for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv2 7/7] x86/tdx: Unaccepted memory support
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv2 5/7] x86/mm: Reserve unaccepted memory bitmap
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv2 4/7] x86/boot/compressed: Handle unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv2 3/7] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv2 2/7] efi/x86: Get full memory map in allocate_e820()
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv2 1/7] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv2 0/7] Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH 1/3] memblock: define functions to set the usable memory range
From
: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 24/40] x86/compressed/acpi: move EFI system table lookup to helper
From
: Chao Fan <fanchao.njupt@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [BUG][SEVERE] Enabling EFI runtime services causes panics in the T2 security chip on Macs equipped with it.
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [BUG][SEVERE] Enabling EFI runtime services causes panics in the T2 security chip on Macs equipped with it.
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [BUG][SEVERE] Enabling EFI runtime services causes panics in the T2 security chip on Macs equipped with it.
From
: Orlando Chamberlain <redecorating@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 8/8] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true
From
: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 5/8] KEYS: Introduce link restriction for machine keys
From
: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 2/8] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine
From
: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 01/40] x86/compressed/64: detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 01/40] x86/compressed/64: detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot
From
: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 3/3] efi: enforce usable memory range after reserving regions
From
: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 2/3] of: fdt: use memblock usable range interface
From
: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 1/3] memblock: define functions to set the usable memory range
From
: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 0/3] usable memory range fixes (arm64/fdt/efi)
From
: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@xxxxxxxxxx>
[GIT PULL] EFI updates for v5.17
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 01/40] x86/compressed/64: detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [BUG][SEVERE] Enabling EFI runtime services causes panics in the T2 security chip on Macs equipped with it.
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [BUG][SEVERE] Enabling EFI runtime services causes panics in the T2 security chip on Macs equipped with it.
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
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