Linux EFI/UEFI Development
Thread Index
[
Prev Page
][
Next Page
]
[PATCHv5 10/12] x86/tdx: Unaccepted memory support
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv5 08/12] x86/mm: Provide helpers for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv5 03/12] efi/x86: Get full memory map in allocate_e820()
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv5 04/12] x86/boot: Add infrastructure required for unaccepted memory support
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Introduce sv48 support without relocatable kernel
From
: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 0/8] mm, x86/cc: Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
[no subject]
From
: Unknown
Re: [PATCH v2 7/9] mm: Calc the right pfn if page size is not 4K
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2 7/9] mm: Calc the right pfn if page size is not 4K
From
: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] introduce mirrored memory support for arm64
From
: mawupeng <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: Supplies needed from INDIA, reply for details
From
: "GCAP Supplies" <www@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2 7/9] mm: Calc the right pfn if page size is not 4K
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] introduce mirrored memory support for arm64
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2 7/9] mm: Calc the right pfn if page size is not 4K
From
: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2 7/9] mm: Calc the right pfn if page size is not 4K
From
: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 2/2] arm64/boot: Add support to relocate kernel image to mirrored region without kaslr
From
: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 0/2] Add support to relocate kernel image to mirrored region
From
: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 1/2] arm64/boot/KASLR: Add support to relocate kernel image to mirrored region
From
: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Remove references of EFI earlyprintk from documentation
From
: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] introduce mirrored memory support for arm64
From
: mawupeng <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
[efi:next] BUILD SUCCESS 21b68da7bf4a0f27837a652565a76b9c95e54793
From
: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
How to list keys used for kexec
From
: Michal Suchánek <msuchanek@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] introduce mirrored memory support for arm64
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v2 9/9] ia64/efi: Code simplification in efi_init
From
: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v2 8/9] efi: Disable mirror feature if kernelcore is not specified
From
: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v2 6/9] mm: Demote warning message in vmemmap_verify() to debug level
From
: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v2 7/9] mm: Calc the right pfn if page size is not 4K
From
: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v2 5/9] mm: Ratelimited mirrored memory related warning messages
From
: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v2 3/9] efi: Make efi_find_mirror() public
From
: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v2 4/9] arm64/mirror: arm64 enabling - find mirrored memory ranges
From
: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v2 2/9] arm64: efi: Add fake memory support
From
: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v2 1/9] efi: Make efi_print_memmap() public
From
: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v2 0/9] introduce mirrored memory support for arm64
From
: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: remove use of list iterator variable after loop
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: remove use of list iterator variable after loop
From
: Jakob Koschel <jakobkoschel@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] x86: Set the NX-compatibility flag in the PE header
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: Increasing EFI_MMAP_NR_SLACK_SLOTS
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Add missing prototype for efi_capsule_setup_info
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services by default on RT
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH 2/2] efi: replace usage of found with dedicated list iterator variable
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: remove use of list iterator variable after loop
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 6/8] x86/mm: Provide helpers for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 2/8] efi/x86: Get full memory map in allocate_e820()
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 2/8] efi/x86: Get full memory map in allocate_e820()
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 4/4] docs: security: Add secrets/coco documentation
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 1/4] efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 2/4] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 3/4] efi: Register efi_secret platform device if EFI secret area is declared
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v3 00/30] arm64: support WXN and entry with MMU enabled
From
: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 3/4] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 3/4] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 8/8] mm/vmstat: Add counter for memory accepting
From
: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 8/8] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true
From
: Michal Suchánek <msuchanek@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 8/8] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true
From
: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 8/8] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true
From
: Michal Suchánek <msuchanek@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 8/8] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true
From
: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 8/8] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true
From
: Michal Suchánek <msuchanek@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 29/30] efi/arm64: libstub: run image in place if randomized by the loader
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 30/30] arm64: efi/libstub: enter with the MMU on if executing in place
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 28/30] efi: libstub: pass image handle to handle_kernel_image()
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 26/30] arm64: head: avoid cache invalidation when entering with the MMU on
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 27/30] arm64: head: clean the ID map page to the PoC
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 25/30] arm64: head: record the MMU state at primary entry
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 24/30] arm64: mm: add support for WXN memory translation attribute
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 22/30] arm64: setup: drop early FDT pointer helpers
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 23/30] arm64: mm: move ro_after_init section into the data segment
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 21/30] arm64: head: remap the kernel text/inittext region read-only
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 02/30] arm64: mm: make vabits_actual a build time constant if possible
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 11/30] arm64: head: add helper function to remap regions in early page tables
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 05/30] arm64: head: simplify page table mapping macros (slightly)
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 19/30] arm64: kaslr: deal with init called with VA randomization enabled
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 20/30] arm64: head: relocate kernel only a single time if KASLR is enabled
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 18/30] arm64: head: record CPU boot mode after enabling the MMU
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 16/30] arm64: head: factor out TTBR1 assignment into a macro
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 15/30] arm64: idreg-override: use early FDT mapping in ID map
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 17/30] arm64: head: populate kernel page tables with MMU and caches on
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 14/30] arm64: head: create a temporary FDT mapping in the initial ID map
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 13/30] arm64: head: use relative references to the RELA and RELR tables
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 12/30] arm64: head: cover entire kernel image in initial ID map
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 10/30] arm64: mm: provide idmap pointer to cpu_replace_ttbr1()
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 09/30] arm64: head: pass ID map root table address to __enable_mmu()
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 07/30] arm64: head: split off idmap creation code
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 08/30] arm64: kernel: drop unnecessary PoC cache clean+invalidate
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 06/30] arm64: head: switch to map_memory macro for the extended ID map
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 04/30] arm64: head: drop idmap_ptrs_per_pgd
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 03/30] arm64: head: move assignment of idmap_t0sz to C code
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 01/30] arm64: head: move kimage_vaddr variable into C file
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 00/30] arm64: support WXN and entry with MMU enabled
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 4/8] x86/boot/compressed: Handle unaccepted memory
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 0/8] mm, x86/cc: Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 5/8] x86/mm: Reserve unaccepted memory bitmap
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 4/8] x86/boot/compressed: Handle unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 6/8] x86/mm: Provide helpers for unaccepted memory
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 7/8] x86/tdx: Unaccepted memory support
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 6/8] x86/mm: Provide helpers for unaccepted memory
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 5/8] x86/mm: Reserve unaccepted memory bitmap
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 4/8] x86/boot/compressed: Handle unaccepted memory
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCHv4 0/8] mm, x86/cc: Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 0/3] EDAC/ghes: refactor memory error reporting to avoid code duplication
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] fs: remove unnecessary conditional
From
: David Sterba <dsterba@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v2] fs: remove unnecessary conditional
From
: cgel.zte@xxxxxxxxx
Re: [PATCH v12 29/46] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v12 29/46] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 3/4] efi: Register efi_secret platform device if EFI secret area is declared
From
: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 2/4] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
From
: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 1/3] efi/cper: add cper_mem_err_status_str to decode error description
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v12 29/46] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data
From
: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 2.1/46] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv4 7/8] x86/tdx: Unaccepted memory support
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Remove references of EFI earlyprintk from documentation
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv4 2/8] efi/x86: Get full memory map in allocate_e820()
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv4 0/8] mm, x86/cc: Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v12 22/46] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs
From
: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v12 22/46] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v12 2.1/46] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv4 6/8] x86/mm: Provide helpers for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv4 4/8] x86/boot/compressed: Handle unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCHv4 8/8] mm/vmstat: Add counter for memory accepting
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Remove references of EFI earlyprintk from documentation
From
: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@xxxxxxx>
[PATCHv4 5/8] x86/mm: Reserve unaccepted memory bitmap
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v12 22/46] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs
From
: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v11 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 1/3] efi/cper: add cper_mem_err_status_str to decode error description
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Introduce sv48 support without relocatable kernel
From
: Alexandre Ghiti <alexandre.ghiti@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services by default on RT
From
: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services by default on RT
From
: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services by default on RT
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services by default on RT
From
: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services by default on RT
From
: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 0/3] EDAC/ghes: refactor memory error reporting to avoid code duplication
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 3/4] efi: Register efi_secret platform device if EFI secret area is declared
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services by default on RT
From
: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 1/2] efi: remove use of list iterator variable after loop
From
: Jakob Koschel <jakobkoschel@xxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 2/2] efi: replace usage of found with dedicated list iterator variable
From
: Jakob Koschel <jakobkoschel@xxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 1/4] efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 4/4] docs: security: Add secrets/coco documentation
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 3/4] efi: Register efi_secret platform device if EFI secret area is declared
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 2/4] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v9 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services by default on RT
From
: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <a.darwish@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services by default on RT
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [RFC PATCH v2 00/18] arm64: efi: leave MMU and caches on at boot
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [RFC PATCH v2 00/18] arm64: efi: leave MMU and caches on at boot
From
: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v2] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services by default on RT
From
: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services with PREEMPT_RT
From
: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services with PREEMPT_RT
From
: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services with PREEMPT_RT
From
: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services with PREEMPT_RT
From
: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services with PREEMPT_RT
From
: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms
From
: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 3/4] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms
From
: "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[no subject]
From
: Unknown
[RFC PATCH v2 17/18] efi/arm64: libstub: run image in place if randomized by the loader
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[RFC PATCH v2 18/18] arm64: efi/libstub: enter with the MMU on if executing in place
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[RFC PATCH v2 16/18] efi: libstub: pass image handle to handle_kernel_image()
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[RFC PATCH v2 15/18] arm64: lds: move idmap_pg_dir out of .rodata
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[RFC PATCH v2 12/18] arm64: head: avoid cache invalidation when entering with the MMU on
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[RFC PATCH v2 14/18] arm64: head: clean the ID map page to the PoC
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[RFC PATCH v2 13/18] arm64: head: record CPU boot mode after enabling the MMU
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[RFC PATCH v2 11/18] arm64: mm: make vabits_actual a build time constant if possible
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[RFC PATCH v2 10/18] arm64: head: record the MMU state at primary entry
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[RFC PATCH v2 09/18] arm64: head: relocate kernel only a single time if KASLR is enabled
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[RFC PATCH v2 08/18] arm64: setup: defer R/O remapping of FDT
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[RFC PATCH v2 05/18] arm64: head: factor out TTBR1 assignment into a macro
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[RFC PATCH v2 04/18] arm64: head: cover entire kernel image in ID map
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[RFC PATCH v2 02/18] arm64: head: split off idmap creation code
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[RFC PATCH v2 06/18] arm64: head: populate kernel page tables with MMU and caches on
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[RFC PATCH v2 03/18] arm64: kernel: drop unnecessary PoC cache clean+invalidate
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[RFC PATCH v2 07/18] arm64: kaslr: deal with init called with VA randomization enabled
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[RFC PATCH v2 01/18] arm64: head: drop idmap_ptrs_per_pgd
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[RFC PATCH v2 00/18] arm64: efi: leave MMU and caches on at boot
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms
From
: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms
From
: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms
From
: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms
From
: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH] x86: Set the NX-compatibility flag in the PE header
From
: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
From
: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms
From
: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH 0/9] introduce mirrored memory support for arm64
From
: mawupeng <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH 0/9] introduce mirrored memory support for arm64
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH 7/9] mm: Calc the right pfn if page size is not 4K
From
: mawupeng <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH 7/9] mm: Calc the right pfn if page size is not 4K
From
: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH] Removing the unused TODO
From
: Dipankar Das <dipsonu10@xxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH] Removing the unused TODO
From
: Dipankar Das <dipsonu10@xxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 8/9] efi: Disable mirror feature if kernelcore is not specified
From
: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 9/9] ia64/efi: Code simplification in efi_init
From
: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 7/9] mm: Calc the right pfn if page size is not 4K
From
: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 6/9] mm: Demote warning message in vmemmap_verify() to debug level
From
: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 5/9] mm: Ratelimited mirrored memory related warning messages
From
: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 4/9] arm64/mirror: arm64 enabling - find mirrored memory ranges
From
: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 3/9] efi: Make efi_find_mirror() public
From
: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 2/9] arm64: efi: Add fake memory support
From
: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 1/9] efi: Make efi_print_memmap() public
From
: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 0/9] introduce mirrored memory support for arm64
From
: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v12 40/46] x86/sev: add sev=debug cmdline option to dump SNP CPUID table
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
From
: baskov@xxxxxxxxx
Re: [PATCH v8 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH 1/1] riscv/efi_stub: Add support for RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL
From
: Sunil V L <sunilvl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH V3 1/1] riscv/efi_stub: Add support for RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL
From
: Sunil V L <sunilvl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH V3 0/1] RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL support in linux
From
: Sunil V L <sunilvl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH 1/1] riscv/efi_stub: Add support for RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL
From
: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 1/1] riscv/efi_stub: Add support for RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL
From
: Sunil V L <sunilvl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 0/1] RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL support in linux
From
: Sunil V L <sunilvl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [RFC PATCH V2 1/1] riscv/efi_stub: Add support for RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL
From
: Sunil V L <sunilvl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [RFC PATCH V2 0/1] RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL support in linux
From
: Sunil V L <sunilvl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [RFC PATCH V2 0/1] RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL support in linux
From
: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [RFC PATCH V2 1/1] riscv/efi_stub: Add support for RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL
From
: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 0/3] EDAC/ghes: refactor memory error reporting to avoid code duplication
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 5.16 06/37] efi: fix return value of __setup handlers
From
: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 5.15 06/32] efi: fix return value of __setup handlers
From
: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 5.10 04/30] efi: fix return value of __setup handlers
From
: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 4.19 47/57] efi: fix return value of __setup handlers
From
: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 5.4 03/17] efi: fix return value of __setup handlers
From
: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH 4.14 15/22] efi: fix return value of __setup handlers
From
: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V8 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
[PATCH] x86/efi: Remove references of EFI earlyprintk from documentation
From
: Akihiko Odaki <akihiko.odaki@xxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH V8 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
From
: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fix for v5.17
From
: pr-tracker-bot@xxxxxxxxxx
Re: [PATCH v12 32/46] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Peter Gonda <pgonda@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
From
: baskov@xxxxxxxxx
Re: [PATCH v12 32/46] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Boris Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
[GIT PULL] EFI fix for v5.17
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v3] pstore: Don't use semaphores in always-atomic-context code
From
: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3] pstore: Don't use semaphores in always-atomic-context code
From
: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v12 32/46] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Peter Gonda <pgonda@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v12 46/46] virt: sevguest: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement
From
: Peter Gonda <pgonda@xxxxxxxxxx>
[RFC PATCH v0 6/6] Temporarily pass the kaslr seed via register X1
From
: ardb@xxxxxxxxxx
[RFC PATCH v0 5/6] Remap code section of loaded kernel and boot it
From
: ardb@xxxxxxxxxx
[RFC PATCH v0 4/6] Discover QEMU fwcfg device and use it to load the kernel
From
: ardb@xxxxxxxxxx
[RFC PATCH v0 3/6] Add paging code to manage the full ID map
From
: ardb@xxxxxxxxxx
[RFC PATCH v0 2/6] Add DTB processing
From
: ardb@xxxxxxxxxx
[RFC PATCH v0 1/6] Implement a bare metal Rust runtime on top of QEMU's mach-virt
From
: ardb@xxxxxxxxxx
[RFC PATCH v0 0/6] Minimal Linux/arm64 VM firmware (written in Rust)
From
: ardb@xxxxxxxxxx
Re: [PATCH v12 32/46] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v12 32/46] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v12 32/46] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Peter Gonda <pgonda@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v7 3/3] efi/cper: reformat CPER memory error location to more readable
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v7 2/3] EDAC/ghes: Unify CPER memory error location reporting
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v7 1/3] efi/cper: add cper_mem_err_status_str to decode error description
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v7 0/3] EDAC/ghes: refactor memory error reporting to avoid code duplication
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 43.1/46] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 38/46] x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 37/46] x86/compressed/64: Add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 36/46] x86/compressed: Export and rename add_identity_map()
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 41/46] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 40/46] x86/sev: add sev=debug cmdline option to dump SNP CPUID table
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 32/46] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 35/46] x86/compressed: Use firmware-validated CPUID leaves for SEV-SNP guests
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 45/46] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 33/46] x86/boot: Add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 44/46] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 29/46] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 31/46] x86/sev: Move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 43/46] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 39/46] x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 42/46] x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 30/46] KVM: x86: Move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 46/46] virt: sevguest: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 34/46] x86/compressed: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 27/46] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI vendor table lookup to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 28/46] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI kexec handling into common code
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 17/46] x86/sev: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 21/46] x86/mm: Validate memory when changing the C-bit
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 26/46] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI config table lookup to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 25/46] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI system table lookup to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 24/46] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI detection to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 18/46] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 19/46] x86/kernel: Make the .bss..decrypted section shared in RMP table
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 23/46] x86/head/64: Re-enable stack protection
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 22/46] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 20/46] x86/kernel: Validate ROM memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 16/46] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 15/46] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 14/46] x86/sev: Check the vmpl level
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 13/46] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 12/46] x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 10/46] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 08/46] x86/sev: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 11/46] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 09/46] x86/mm: Extend cc_attr to include AMD SEV-SNP
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 07/46] x86/compressed/64: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 05/46] x86/boot: Introduce helpers for MSR reads/writes
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 06/46] x86/boot: Use MSR read/write helpers instead of inline assembly
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 04/46] KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 03/46] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB save area
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 02/46] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 00/46] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v12 01/46] KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and vmpl field in the VMSA
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 2/2] EDAC/ghes: use cper functions to avoid code duplication
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 2/2] EDAC/ghes: use cper functions to avoid code duplication
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH V7 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] x86/e820: Refactor range_update and range_remove
From
: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v11 44/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v11 44/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v11 44/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v11 42/45] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v11 44/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v11 42/45] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v11 44/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v11 42/45] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 2/2] EDAC/ghes: use cper functions to avoid code duplication
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v11 39/45] x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH] efi: Add missing prototype for efi_capsule_setup_info
From
: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v11 39/45] x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests
From
: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
[efi:next] BUILD SUCCESS 2baa81c83f6f3a927cfbbbd707b669d039302625
From
: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
From
: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v11 22/45] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v11 42/45] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v11 22/45] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs
From
: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v11 44/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [Question] Should retain 2M alignment if kernel image is bad aligned at entry or BSS overlaps?
From
: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v11 44/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
[RFC PATCH V2 1/1] riscv/efi_stub: Add support for RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL
From
: Sunil V L <sunilvl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[RFC PATCH V2 0/1] RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL support in linux
From
: Sunil V L <sunilvl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 2/2] libstub: ensure allocated memory to be executable
From
: Baskov Evgeniy <baskov@xxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 1/2] libstub: declare DXE services table
From
: Baskov Evgeniy <baskov@xxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
From
: Baskov Evgeniy <baskov@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
From
: baskov@xxxxxxxxx
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
From
: baskov@xxxxxxxxx
[PATCH v6 2/2] EDAC/ghes: use cper functions to avoid code duplication
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v6 1/2] efi/cper: add cper_mem_err_status_str to decode error description
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v6 0/2] EDAC/ghes: refactor memory error reporting to avoid code duplication
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v11 39/45] x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [Question] Should retain 2M alignment if kernel image is bad aligned at entry or BSS overlaps?
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v11 29/45] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [Question] Should retain 2M alignment if kernel image is bad aligned at entry or BSS overlaps?
From
: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v11 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v11 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support
From
: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v11 29/45] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v11 42/45] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v11 29/45] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v11 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v11 42/45] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
[efi:urgent] BUILD SUCCESS 9feaf8b387ee0ece9c1d7add308776b502a35d0c
From
: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [Question] Should retain 2M alignment if kernel image is bad aligned at entry or BSS overlaps?
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 2/4] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
From
: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [Question] Should retain 2M alignment if kernel image is bad aligned at entry or BSS overlaps?
From
: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v11 29/45] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: fix return value of __setup handlers
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [Question] Should retain 2M alignment if kernel image is bad aligned at entry or BSS overlaps?
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[Question] Should retain 2M alignment if kernel image is bad aligned at entry or BSS overlaps?
From
: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH] efi: fix return value of __setup handlers
From
: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
[efi:urgent] BUILD SUCCESS 258dd902022cb10c83671176688074879517fd21
From
: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [GIT PULL] More EFI fixes for v5.17
From
: pr-tracker-bot@xxxxxxxxxx
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
From
: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 3/4] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 3/4] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 3/4] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v8 1/4] efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v8 2/4] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v8 4/4] docs: security: Add secrets/coco documentation
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v8 3/4] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v8 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
[GIT PULL] More EFI fixes for v5.17
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
From
: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v4 3/3] efifb: Remove redundant efifb_setup_from_dmi stub
From
: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v4 2/3] sysfb: Enable boot time VESA graphic mode selection
From
: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v4 1/3] sysfb: Make config option dependencies explicit
From
: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 2/3] sysfb: Enable boot time VESA graphic mode selection
From
: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 3/3] efifb: Remove redundant efifb_setup_from_dmi stub
From
: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v4 1/3] sysfb: Make config option dependencies explicit
From
: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 3.1/45] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB save area
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 29/45] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 16/45] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 28/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI kexec handling into common code
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 43/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 11/45] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 35/45] x86/compressed: Use firmware-validated CPUID leaves for SEV-SNP guests
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 33/45] x86/boot: Add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 17/45] x86/sev: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 06/45] x86/boot: Use MSR read/write helpers instead of inline assembly
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 37/45] x86/compressed/64: Add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 15/45] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 36/45] x86/compressed: Export and rename add_identity_map()
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 34/45] x86/compressed: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 31/45] x86/sev: Move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 38/45] x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 08/45] x86/sev: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 12/45] x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 07/45] x86/compressed/64: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 42/45] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 41/45] x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 14/45] x86/sev: Check the vmpl level
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 19/45] x86/kernel: Make the .bss..decrypted section shared in RMP table
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 23/45] x86/head/64: Re-enable stack protection
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 18/45] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 27/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI vendor table lookup to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 39/45] x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 26/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI config table lookup to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 21/45] x86/mm: Validate memory when changing the C-bit
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 10/45] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 22/45] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 45/45] virt: sevguest: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 20/45] x86/kernel: Validate ROM memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 30/45] KVM: x86: Move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 09/45] x86/mm: Extend cc_attr to include AMD SEV-SNP
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 32/45] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 40/45] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 25/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI system table lookup to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 13/45] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 44/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 24/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI detection to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 05/45] x86/boot: Introduce helpers for MSR reads/writes
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 02/45] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 03/45] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB save area
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 01/45] KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and vmpl field in the VMSA
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 04/45] KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v11 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH RFC v2 2/2] libstub: ensure allocated memory to be executable
From
: Baskov Evgeniy <baskov@xxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH RFC v2 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
From
: Baskov Evgeniy <baskov@xxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH RFC v2 1/2] libstub: declare DXE services table
From
: Baskov Evgeniy <baskov@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] pstore: Don't use semaphores in always-atomic-context code
From
: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] pstore: Don't use semaphores in always-atomic-context code
From
: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
From
: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
From
: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v3] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] pstore: Don't use semaphores in always-atomic-context code
From
: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
From
: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
From
: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
From
: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
From
: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 00/17] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
From
: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
[efi:next] BUILD SUCCESS 0ea9e1c3dbd4e78f7a82d23fdc959622432e461c
From
: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
From
: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
[efi:next] BUILD SUCCESS 1e9e574abaea04b78913ef887d79038ba5d1d2e8
From
: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efivars: Respect "block" flag in efivar_entry_set_safe()
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v2] pstore: Don't use semaphores in always-atomic-context code
From
: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH] efivars: Respect "block" flag in efivar_entry_set_safe()
From
: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] pstore: Don't use semaphores in always-atomic-context code
From
: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH] pstore: Don't use semaphores in always-atomic-context code
From
: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Introduce sv48 support without relocatable kernel
From
: Alexandre Ghiti <alexandre.ghiti@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] riscv/efi_stub: Fix get_boot_hartid_from_fdt() return value
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] riscv/efi_stub: Fix get_boot_hartid_from_fdt() return value
From
: Atish Patra <atishp@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] riscv/efi_stub: Fix get_boot_hartid_from_fdt() return value
From
: Sunil V L <sunilvl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] arm64: move efi_reboot to restart handler
From
: Krzysztof Adamski <krzysztof.adamski@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] arm64: move efi_reboot to restart handler
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] arm64: move efi_reboot to restart handler
From
: Guenter Roeck <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] arm64: move efi_reboot to restart handler
From
: Krzysztof Adamski <krzysztof.adamski@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] arm64: move efi_reboot to restart handler
From
: Guenter Roeck <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] x86/e820: Refactor range_update and range_remove
From
: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] arm64: move efi_reboot to restart handler
From
: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] arm64: move efi_reboot to restart handler
From
: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] x86/e820: Refactor range_update and range_remove
From
: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 07/17] integrity: restrict INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE to restrict_link_by_ca
From
: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 17/17] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true
From
: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 16/17] integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found
From
: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 15/17] efi/mokvar: move up init order
From
: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 14/17] KEYS: link machine trusted keys to secondary_trusted_keys
From
: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 13/17] integrity: store reference to machine keyring
From
: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 11/17] KEYS: Introduce link restriction for machine keys
From
: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v8 10/17] KEYS: add a reference to machine keyring
From
: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] riscv/efi_stub: Fix get_boot_hartid_from_fdt() return value
From
: Andreas Schwab <schwab@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] riscv/efi_stub: Fix get_boot_hartid_from_fdt() return value
From
: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@xxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] riscv/efi_stub: Fix get_boot_hartid_from_fdt() return value
From
: Andreas Schwab <schwab@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] riscv/efi_stub: Fix get_boot_hartid_from_fdt() return value
From
: Andreas Schwab <schwab@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] riscv/efi_stub: Fix get_boot_hartid_from_fdt() return value
From
: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@xxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] riscv/efi_stub: Fix get_boot_hartid_from_fdt() return value
From
: Andreas Schwab <schwab@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] riscv/efi_stub: Fix get_boot_hartid_from_fdt() return value
From
: Sunil V L <sunilvl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v3] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v3] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v5 2/2] EDAC/ghes: use cper functions to avoid code duplication
From
: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v3] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v2] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] builddeb: Support signing kernels with the module signing key
From
: Ben Hutchings <ben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] builddeb: Support signing kernels with the module signing key
From
: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] builddeb: Support signing kernels with the module signing key
From
: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 45/45] virt: sevguest: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 44/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 42/45] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 43/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 40/45] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 39/45] x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 34/45] x86/compressed: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 35/45] x86/compressed: Use firmware-validated CPUID leaves for SEV-SNP guests
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 37/45] x86/compressed/64: Add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 38/45] x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 36/45] x86/compressed: Export and rename add_identity_map()
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 41/45] x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 32/45] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 33/45] x86/boot: Add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 29/45] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 28/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI kexec handling into common code
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 30/45] KVM: x86: Move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 31/45] x86/sev: Move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 25/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI system table lookup to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 23/45] x86/head/64: Re-enable stack protection
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 26/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI config table lookup to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 27/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI vendor table lookup to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 24/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI detection to helper
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 22/45] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 19/45] x86/kernel: Make the .bss..decrypted section shared in RMP table
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 20/45] x86/kernel: Validate ROM memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 18/45] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 16/45] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 14/45] x86/sev: Check the vmpl level
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 17/45] x86/sev: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 15/45] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 13/45] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 12/45] x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 07/45] x86/compressed/64: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 08/45] x86/sev: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 01/45] KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and vmpl field in the VMSA
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 02/45] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 11/45] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 09/45] x86/mm: Extend cc_attr to include AMD SEV-SNP
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 04/45] KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 05/45] x86/boot: Introduce helpers for MSR reads/writes
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 10/45] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 06/45] x86/boot: Use MSR read/write helpers instead of inline assembly
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH v10 03/45] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB save area
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
RE: [PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: David Laight <David.Laight@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 02/43] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
[PATCH] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] builddeb: Support signing kernels with the module signing key
From
: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v7 0/5] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
From
: Nayna <nayna@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] x86/e820: Refactor range_update and range_remove
From
: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] x86/e820: Refactor range_update and range_remove
From
: Daniel Gutson <daniel.gutson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] x86/e820: Refactor range_update and range_remove
From
: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] builddeb: Support signing kernels with the module signing key
From
: Julian Andres Klode <julian.klode@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: MAINTAINERS update suggestion (subject change)
From
: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 30/43] KVM: SEV: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 33/43] x86/compressed: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 30/43] KVM: SEV: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement
From
: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Re: [BUG SEVERE] Failure to enable EFI Runtime services on T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 4/6] x86/e820: Tag e820_entry with crypto capabilities
From
: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 1/6] mm/memblock: Tag memblocks with crypto capabilities
From
: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 42/43] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key
From
: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
Re: [BUG SEVERE] Failure to enable EFI Runtime services on T2 Macs
From
: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[BUG SEVERE] Failure to enable EFI Runtime services on T2 Macs
From
: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 33/43] x86/compressed: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup
From
: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] builddeb: Support signing kernels with the module signing key
From
: Matthew Wilcox <willy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] builddeb: Support signing kernels with the module signing key
From
: Julian Andres Klode <julian.klode@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 42/43] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key
From
: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
From
: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] x86/e820: Refactor range_update and range_remove
From
: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 42/43] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key
From
: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 37/43] x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup
From
: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v2] builddeb: Support signing kernels with the module signing key
From
: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v9 30/43] KVM: SEV: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement
From
: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 4/6] x86/e820: Tag e820_entry with crypto capabilities
From
: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] x86/e820: Refactor range_update and range_remove
From
: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Re: [PATCH v6 2/6] mm/mmzone: Tag pg_data_t with crypto capabilities
From
: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
[Index of Archives]
[Linux Kernel Development]
[Security]
[Linux ARM Kernel]
[Tools]
[Linux MIPS]
[Linux S390]
[Bugtraq]
[Share Photos]>
[Fedora ARM]