Linux EFI/UEFI Development
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- [PATCHv6 01/15] x86/boot: Centralize __pa()/__va() definitions
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv6 03/15] efi/x86: Get full memory map in allocate_e820()
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/8] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption
- From: Richard Hughes <hughsient@xxxxxxxxx>
- RE: [PATCHv5 06/12] x86/boot/compressed: Handle unaccepted memory
- From: "Xu, Min M" <min.m.xu@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V10 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: WANG Xuerui <kernel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V10 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V10 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: WANG Xuerui <kernel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [efi:next] BUILD SUCCESS a6cfe03c34bad8c7f51aba49a73403e348c51d1f
- From: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V10 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 06/12] x86/boot/compressed: Handle unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 06/12] x86/boot/compressed: Handle unaccepted memory
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- [syzbot] KASAN: use-after-free Read in anon_vma_interval_tree_remove
- From: syzbot <syzbot+dae32a647a56f4d153da@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 06/12] x86/boot/compressed: Handle unaccepted memory
- From: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 5/5] mtd: ubi: block: add option to enable scanning for partitions
- From: Daniel Golle <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 3/5] partitions/efi: add support for uImage.FIT sub-partitions
- From: Daniel Golle <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 4/5] mtd_blkdevs: add option to enable scanning for partitions
- From: Daniel Golle <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 2/5] block: add partition parser for U-Boot uImage.FIT
- From: Daniel Golle <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 1/5] block: add new flag to add partitions read-only
- From: Daniel Golle <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 0/5] partition parser for U-Boot's uImage.FIT
- From: Daniel Golle <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 2/5] block: add partition parser for U-Boot uImage.FIT
- From: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 2/5] block: add partition parser for U-Boot uImage.FIT
- From: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 10/12] x86/tdx: Unaccepted memory support
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 08/12] x86/mm: Provide helpers for unaccepted memory
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 10/12] x86/tdx: Unaccepted memory support
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 08/12] x86/mm: Provide helpers for unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 08/12] x86/mm: Provide helpers for unaccepted memory
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 06/12] x86/boot/compressed: Handle unaccepted memory
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/8] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/8] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/8] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 3/5] partitions/efi: add support for uImage.FIT sub-partitions
- From: Daniel Golle <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 4/5] mtd_blkdevs: add option to enable scanning for partitions
- From: Daniel Golle <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 5/5] mtd: ubi: block: add option to enable scanning for partitions
- From: Daniel Golle <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 2/5] block: add partition parser for U-Boot uImage.FIT
- From: Daniel Golle <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 1/5] block: add new flag to add partitions read-only
- From: Daniel Golle <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 0/5] partition parser for U-Boot's uImage.FIT
- From: Daniel Golle <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/2] Add support to relocate kernel image to mirrored region
- From: mawupeng <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 10/12] x86/tdx: Unaccepted memory support
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/8] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption
- From: Boris Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/8] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/8] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption
- From: Boris Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/8] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/8] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption
- From: Boris Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 08/12] x86/mm: Provide helpers for unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/8] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption
- From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/8] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 06/12] x86/boot/compressed: Handle unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- RE: [PATCH v8 0/8] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption
- From: "Limonciello, Mario" <Mario.Limonciello@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/8] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: stub: prefer mirrored memory for randomized allocations
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: stub: prefer mirrored memory for randomized allocations
- From: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: stub: prefer mirrored memory for randomized allocations
- From: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 02/12] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: stub: prefer mirrored memory for randomized allocations
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: stub: prefer mirrored memory for randomized allocations
- From: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 10/12] x86/tdx: Unaccepted memory support
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/8] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption
- From: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/8] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 08/12] x86/mm: Provide helpers for unaccepted memory
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 07/12] x86/mm: Reserve unaccepted memory bitmap
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 02/12] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [efi:next] BUILD SUCCESS 736e0f2179d3005d994ab5addd282988de2e4615
- From: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] efi: stub: prefer mirrored memory for randomized allocations
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 06/12] x86/boot/compressed: Handle unaccepted memory
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 06/12] x86/boot/compressed: Handle unaccepted memory
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/2] Add support to relocate kernel image to mirrored region
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 5/5] mtd: ubi: block: add option to enable scanning for partitions
- From: Daniel Golle <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4/5] mtd_blkdevs: add option to enable scanning for partitions
- From: Daniel Golle <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 3/5] partitions/efi: add support for uImage.FIT sub-partitions
- From: Daniel Golle <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/5] block: add partition parser for U-Boot uImage.FIT
- From: Daniel Golle <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/5] block: add new flag to add partitions read-only
- From: Daniel Golle <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 0/5] partition parser for U-Boot's uImage.FIT
- From: Daniel Golle <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 05/12] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 04/12] x86/boot: Add infrastructure required for unaccepted memory support
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH 3/4] efi: stub: implement generic EFI zboot
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH 4/4] arm64: efi: enable generic EFI compressed boot
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH 2/4] efi: stub: split off printk() routines
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH 1/4] efi: stub: add prototypes for load_image and start_image
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH 0/4] efi: implement generic compressed boot support
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V9 21/24] LoongArch: Add zboot (compressed kernel) support
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V9 21/24] LoongArch: Add zboot (compressed kernel) support
- From: "Russell King (Oracle)" <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V9 21/24] LoongArch: Add zboot (compressed kernel) support
- From: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V9 21/24] LoongArch: Add zboot (compressed kernel) support
- From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V9 21/24] LoongArch: Add zboot (compressed kernel) support
- From: "Russell King (Oracle)" <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V9 21/24] LoongArch: Add zboot (compressed kernel) support
- From: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V9 21/24] LoongArch: Add zboot (compressed kernel) support
- From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V9 09/24] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 8/8] drivers/node: Show in sysfs node's crypto capabilities
- From: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 6/8] x86/e820: Tag e820_entry with crypto capabilities
- From: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 5/8] x86/e820: Refactor e820__range_remove
- From: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 3/8] x86/e820: Add infrastructure to refactor e820__range_{update,remove}
- From: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 2/8] mm/mmzone: Tag pg_data_t with crypto capabilities
- From: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 4/8] x86/e820: Refactor __e820__range_update
- From: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 7/8] x86/efi: Mark e820_entries as crypto capable from EFI memmap
- From: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 1/8] mm/memblock: Tag memblocks with crypto capabilities
- From: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 0/8] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption
- From: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 07/12] x86/mm: Reserve unaccepted memory bitmap
- From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 06/12] x86/boot/compressed: Handle unaccepted memory
- From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 04/12] x86/boot: Add infrastructure required for unaccepted memory support
- From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 05/12] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 02/12] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 03/12] efi/x86: Get full memory map in allocate_e820()
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 03/12] efi/x86: Get full memory map in allocate_e820()
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 03/12] efi/x86: Get full memory map in allocate_e820()
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 06/12] x86/boot/compressed: Handle unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: How to list keys used for kexec
- From: "Guozihua (Scott)" <guozihua@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 06/12] x86/boot/compressed: Handle unaccepted memory
- From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 5/8] x86/e820: Refactor e820__range_remove
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 5/8] x86/e820: Refactor e820__range_remove
- From: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH 4/5] mtd_blkdevs: scan partitions on mtdblock if FIT_PARTITION is set
- From: Daniel Golle <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 5/8] x86/e820: Refactor e820__range_remove
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH 4/5] mtd_blkdevs: scan partitions on mtdblock if FIT_PARTITION is set
- From: Daniel Golle <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH 4/5] mtd_blkdevs: scan partitions on mtdblock if FIT_PARTITION is set
- From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 1/8] mm/memblock: Tag memblocks with crypto capabilities
- From: Daniel Gutson <daniel.gutson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 1/8] mm/memblock: Tag memblocks with crypto capabilities
- From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 8/8] drivers/node: Show in sysfs node's crypto capabilities
- From: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 1/8] mm/memblock: Tag memblocks with crypto capabilities
- From: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: How to list keys used for kexec
- From: Michal Suchánek <msuchanek@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH 4/5] mtd_blkdevs: scan partitions on mtdblock if FIT_PARTITION is set
- From: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 07/13] riscv: Implement sv48 support
- From: Nick Kossifidis <mick@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 2/8] mm/mmzone: Tag pg_data_t with crypto capabilities
- From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 8/8] drivers/node: Show in sysfs node's crypto capabilities
- From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 1/8] mm/memblock: Tag memblocks with crypto capabilities
- From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: How to list keys used for kexec
- From: "Guozihua (Scott)" <guozihua@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 0/8] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption
- From: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 6/8] x86/e820: Tag e820_entry with crypto capabilities
- From: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 8/8] drivers/node: Show in sysfs node's crypto capabilities
- From: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 7/8] x86/efi: Mark e820_entries as crypto capable from EFI memmap
- From: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 4/8] x86/e820: Refactor __e820__range_update
- From: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 5/8] x86/e820: Refactor e820__range_remove
- From: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 3/8] x86/e820: Add infrastructure to refactor e820__range_{update,remove}
- From: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 2/8] mm/mmzone: Tag pg_data_t with crypto capabilities
- From: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 0/8] x86: Show in sysfs if a memory node is able to do encryption
- From: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 1/8] mm/memblock: Tag memblocks with crypto capabilities
- From: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH 1/5] block: add new flag to add partitions read-only
- From: Daniel Golle <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH 0/5] partition parser for U-Boot's uImage.FIT
- From: Daniel Golle <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH 5/5] mtd/ubi/block: scan for partitions in case FIT_PARTITION is set
- From: Daniel Golle <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH 4/5] mtd_blkdevs: scan partitions on mtdblock if FIT_PARTITION is set
- From: Daniel Golle <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH 3/5] partitions/efi: add support for uImage.FIT sub-partitions
- From: Daniel Golle <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH 2/5] block: add partition parser for U-Boot uImage.FIT
- From: Daniel Golle <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 01/12] x86/boot/: Centralize __pa()/__va() definitions
- From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv5 01/12] x86/boot/: Centralize __pa()/__va() definitions
- From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv5 09/12] x86/tdx: Make _tdx_hypercall() and __tdx_module_call() available in boot stub
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv5 12/12] x86/mm: Report unaccepted memory in /proc/meminfo
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv5 07/12] x86/mm: Reserve unaccepted memory bitmap
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv5 11/12] mm/vmstat: Add counter for memory accepting
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv5 00/12] mm, x86/cc: Implement support for unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv5 06/12] x86/boot/compressed: Handle unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv5 01/12] x86/boot/: Centralize __pa()/__va() definitions
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv5 05/12] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv5 02/12] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv5 10/12] x86/tdx: Unaccepted memory support
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv5 08/12] x86/mm: Provide helpers for unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv5 03/12] efi/x86: Get full memory map in allocate_e820()
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv5 04/12] x86/boot: Add infrastructure required for unaccepted memory support
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Introduce sv48 support without relocatable kernel
- From: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 0/8] mm, x86/cc: Implement support for unaccepted memory
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- [no subject]
- Re: [PATCH v2 7/9] mm: Calc the right pfn if page size is not 4K
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 7/9] mm: Calc the right pfn if page size is not 4K
- From: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] introduce mirrored memory support for arm64
- From: mawupeng <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Supplies needed from INDIA, reply for details
- From: "GCAP Supplies" <www@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 7/9] mm: Calc the right pfn if page size is not 4K
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] introduce mirrored memory support for arm64
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 7/9] mm: Calc the right pfn if page size is not 4K
- From: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 7/9] mm: Calc the right pfn if page size is not 4K
- From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/2] arm64/boot: Add support to relocate kernel image to mirrored region without kaslr
- From: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 0/2] Add support to relocate kernel image to mirrored region
- From: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/2] arm64/boot/KASLR: Add support to relocate kernel image to mirrored region
- From: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Remove references of EFI earlyprintk from documentation
- From: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] introduce mirrored memory support for arm64
- From: mawupeng <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- [efi:next] BUILD SUCCESS 21b68da7bf4a0f27837a652565a76b9c95e54793
- From: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
- How to list keys used for kexec
- From: Michal Suchánek <msuchanek@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] introduce mirrored memory support for arm64
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 9/9] ia64/efi: Code simplification in efi_init
- From: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 8/9] efi: Disable mirror feature if kernelcore is not specified
- From: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 6/9] mm: Demote warning message in vmemmap_verify() to debug level
- From: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 7/9] mm: Calc the right pfn if page size is not 4K
- From: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 5/9] mm: Ratelimited mirrored memory related warning messages
- From: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 3/9] efi: Make efi_find_mirror() public
- From: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 4/9] arm64/mirror: arm64 enabling - find mirrored memory ranges
- From: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 2/9] arm64: efi: Add fake memory support
- From: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 1/9] efi: Make efi_print_memmap() public
- From: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 0/9] introduce mirrored memory support for arm64
- From: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: remove use of list iterator variable after loop
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: remove use of list iterator variable after loop
- From: Jakob Koschel <jakobkoschel@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] x86: Set the NX-compatibility flag in the PE header
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Increasing EFI_MMAP_NR_SLACK_SLOTS
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: Add missing prototype for efi_capsule_setup_info
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services by default on RT
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 2/2] efi: replace usage of found with dedicated list iterator variable
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: remove use of list iterator variable after loop
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v10 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 6/8] x86/mm: Provide helpers for unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 2/8] efi/x86: Get full memory map in allocate_e820()
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 2/8] efi/x86: Get full memory map in allocate_e820()
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
- From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 4/4] docs: security: Add secrets/coco documentation
- From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 1/4] efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area
- From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 2/4] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
- From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 3/4] efi: Register efi_secret platform device if EFI secret area is declared
- From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/30] arm64: support WXN and entry with MMU enabled
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 3/4] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
- From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 3/4] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
- From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
- From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 8/8] mm/vmstat: Add counter for memory accepting
- From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v10 8/8] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true
- From: Michal Suchánek <msuchanek@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v10 8/8] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true
- From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v10 8/8] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true
- From: Michal Suchánek <msuchanek@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v10 8/8] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true
- From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v10 8/8] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true
- From: Michal Suchánek <msuchanek@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 29/30] efi/arm64: libstub: run image in place if randomized by the loader
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 30/30] arm64: efi/libstub: enter with the MMU on if executing in place
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 28/30] efi: libstub: pass image handle to handle_kernel_image()
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 26/30] arm64: head: avoid cache invalidation when entering with the MMU on
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 27/30] arm64: head: clean the ID map page to the PoC
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 25/30] arm64: head: record the MMU state at primary entry
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 24/30] arm64: mm: add support for WXN memory translation attribute
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 22/30] arm64: setup: drop early FDT pointer helpers
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 23/30] arm64: mm: move ro_after_init section into the data segment
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 21/30] arm64: head: remap the kernel text/inittext region read-only
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 02/30] arm64: mm: make vabits_actual a build time constant if possible
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 11/30] arm64: head: add helper function to remap regions in early page tables
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 05/30] arm64: head: simplify page table mapping macros (slightly)
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 19/30] arm64: kaslr: deal with init called with VA randomization enabled
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 20/30] arm64: head: relocate kernel only a single time if KASLR is enabled
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 18/30] arm64: head: record CPU boot mode after enabling the MMU
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 16/30] arm64: head: factor out TTBR1 assignment into a macro
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 15/30] arm64: idreg-override: use early FDT mapping in ID map
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 17/30] arm64: head: populate kernel page tables with MMU and caches on
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 14/30] arm64: head: create a temporary FDT mapping in the initial ID map
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 13/30] arm64: head: use relative references to the RELA and RELR tables
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 12/30] arm64: head: cover entire kernel image in initial ID map
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 10/30] arm64: mm: provide idmap pointer to cpu_replace_ttbr1()
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 09/30] arm64: head: pass ID map root table address to __enable_mmu()
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 07/30] arm64: head: split off idmap creation code
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 08/30] arm64: kernel: drop unnecessary PoC cache clean+invalidate
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 06/30] arm64: head: switch to map_memory macro for the extended ID map
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 04/30] arm64: head: drop idmap_ptrs_per_pgd
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 03/30] arm64: head: move assignment of idmap_t0sz to C code
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 01/30] arm64: head: move kimage_vaddr variable into C file
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 00/30] arm64: support WXN and entry with MMU enabled
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 4/8] x86/boot/compressed: Handle unaccepted memory
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 0/8] mm, x86/cc: Implement support for unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 5/8] x86/mm: Reserve unaccepted memory bitmap
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 4/8] x86/boot/compressed: Handle unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 6/8] x86/mm: Provide helpers for unaccepted memory
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 7/8] x86/tdx: Unaccepted memory support
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 6/8] x86/mm: Provide helpers for unaccepted memory
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 5/8] x86/mm: Reserve unaccepted memory bitmap
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 4/8] x86/boot/compressed: Handle unaccepted memory
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 0/8] mm, x86/cc: Implement support for unaccepted memory
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 0/3] EDAC/ghes: refactor memory error reporting to avoid code duplication
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] fs: remove unnecessary conditional
- From: David Sterba <dsterba@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2] fs: remove unnecessary conditional
- Re: [PATCH v12 29/46] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v12 29/46] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 3/4] efi: Register efi_secret platform device if EFI secret area is declared
- From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 2/4] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
- From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 1/3] efi/cper: add cper_mem_err_status_str to decode error description
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v12 29/46] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data
- From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 2.1/46] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv4 1/8] mm: Add support for unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv4 7/8] x86/tdx: Unaccepted memory support
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Remove references of EFI earlyprintk from documentation
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv4 2/8] efi/x86: Get full memory map in allocate_e820()
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv4 0/8] mm, x86/cc: Implement support for unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v12 22/46] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs
- From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v12 22/46] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v12 2.1/46] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv4 6/8] x86/mm: Provide helpers for unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv4 4/8] x86/boot/compressed: Handle unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv4 3/8] efi/x86: Implement support for unaccepted memory
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv4 8/8] mm/vmstat: Add counter for memory accepting
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Remove references of EFI earlyprintk from documentation
- From: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv4 5/8] x86/mm: Reserve unaccepted memory bitmap
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v12 22/46] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs
- From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v11 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 1/3] efi/cper: add cper_mem_err_status_str to decode error description
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Introduce sv48 support without relocatable kernel
- From: Alexandre Ghiti <alexandre.ghiti@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services by default on RT
- From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services by default on RT
- From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services by default on RT
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services by default on RT
- From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services by default on RT
- From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 0/3] EDAC/ghes: refactor memory error reporting to avoid code duplication
- From: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 3/4] efi: Register efi_secret platform device if EFI secret area is declared
- From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services by default on RT
- From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/2] efi: remove use of list iterator variable after loop
- From: Jakob Koschel <jakobkoschel@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/2] efi: replace usage of found with dedicated list iterator variable
- From: Jakob Koschel <jakobkoschel@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 1/4] efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area
- From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 4/4] docs: security: Add secrets/coco documentation
- From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 3/4] efi: Register efi_secret platform device if EFI secret area is declared
- From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 2/4] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
- From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
- From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
- From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services by default on RT
- From: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <a.darwish@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services by default on RT
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v2 00/18] arm64: efi: leave MMU and caches on at boot
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v2 00/18] arm64: efi: leave MMU and caches on at boot
- From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services by default on RT
- From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services with PREEMPT_RT
- From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services with PREEMPT_RT
- From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services with PREEMPT_RT
- From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services with PREEMPT_RT
- From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] efi: Allow to enable EFI runtime services with PREEMPT_RT
- From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms
- From: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 3/4] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
- From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms
- From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [no subject]
- [RFC PATCH v2 17/18] efi/arm64: libstub: run image in place if randomized by the loader
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v2 18/18] arm64: efi/libstub: enter with the MMU on if executing in place
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v2 16/18] efi: libstub: pass image handle to handle_kernel_image()
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v2 15/18] arm64: lds: move idmap_pg_dir out of .rodata
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v2 12/18] arm64: head: avoid cache invalidation when entering with the MMU on
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v2 14/18] arm64: head: clean the ID map page to the PoC
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v2 13/18] arm64: head: record CPU boot mode after enabling the MMU
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v2 11/18] arm64: mm: make vabits_actual a build time constant if possible
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v2 10/18] arm64: head: record the MMU state at primary entry
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v2 09/18] arm64: head: relocate kernel only a single time if KASLR is enabled
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v2 08/18] arm64: setup: defer R/O remapping of FDT
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v2 05/18] arm64: head: factor out TTBR1 assignment into a macro
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v2 04/18] arm64: head: cover entire kernel image in ID map
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v2 02/18] arm64: head: split off idmap creation code
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v2 06/18] arm64: head: populate kernel page tables with MMU and caches on
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v2 03/18] arm64: kernel: drop unnecessary PoC cache clean+invalidate
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v2 07/18] arm64: kaslr: deal with init called with VA randomization enabled
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v2 01/18] arm64: head: drop idmap_ptrs_per_pgd
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v2 00/18] arm64: efi: leave MMU and caches on at boot
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms
- From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms
- From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms
- From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms
- From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
- From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
- From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] x86: Set the NX-compatibility flag in the PE header
- From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
- From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms
- From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
- From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/9] introduce mirrored memory support for arm64
- From: mawupeng <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/9] introduce mirrored memory support for arm64
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 7/9] mm: Calc the right pfn if page size is not 4K
- From: mawupeng <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 7/9] mm: Calc the right pfn if page size is not 4K
- From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] Removing the unused TODO
- From: Dipankar Das <dipsonu10@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] Removing the unused TODO
- From: Dipankar Das <dipsonu10@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 8/9] efi: Disable mirror feature if kernelcore is not specified
- From: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 9/9] ia64/efi: Code simplification in efi_init
- From: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 7/9] mm: Calc the right pfn if page size is not 4K
- From: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 6/9] mm: Demote warning message in vmemmap_verify() to debug level
- From: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 5/9] mm: Ratelimited mirrored memory related warning messages
- From: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4/9] arm64/mirror: arm64 enabling - find mirrored memory ranges
- From: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 3/9] efi: Make efi_find_mirror() public
- From: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/9] arm64: efi: Add fake memory support
- From: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/9] efi: Make efi_print_memmap() public
- From: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 0/9] introduce mirrored memory support for arm64
- From: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v12 40/46] x86/sev: add sev=debug cmdline option to dump SNP CPUID table
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/1] riscv/efi_stub: Add support for RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL
- From: Sunil V L <sunilvl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V3 1/1] riscv/efi_stub: Add support for RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL
- From: Sunil V L <sunilvl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V3 0/1] RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL support in linux
- From: Sunil V L <sunilvl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/1] riscv/efi_stub: Add support for RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL
- From: Heinrich Schuchardt <heinrich.schuchardt@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/1] riscv/efi_stub: Add support for RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL
- From: Sunil V L <sunilvl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 0/1] RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL support in linux
- From: Sunil V L <sunilvl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH V2 1/1] riscv/efi_stub: Add support for RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL
- From: Sunil V L <sunilvl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH V2 0/1] RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL support in linux
- From: Sunil V L <sunilvl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH V2 0/1] RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL support in linux
- From: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH V2 1/1] riscv/efi_stub: Add support for RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL
- From: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 0/3] EDAC/ghes: refactor memory error reporting to avoid code duplication
- From: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 5.16 06/37] efi: fix return value of __setup handlers
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 5.15 06/32] efi: fix return value of __setup handlers
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 5.10 04/30] efi: fix return value of __setup handlers
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4.19 47/57] efi: fix return value of __setup handlers
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 5.4 03/17] efi: fix return value of __setup handlers
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4.14 15/22] efi: fix return value of __setup handlers
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V8 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] x86/efi: Remove references of EFI earlyprintk from documentation
- From: Akihiko Odaki <akihiko.odaki@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V8 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
- From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fix for v5.17
- From: pr-tracker-bot@xxxxxxxxxx
- Re: [PATCH v12 32/46] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
- From: Peter Gonda <pgonda@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
- Re: [PATCH v12 32/46] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
- From: Boris Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- [GIT PULL] EFI fix for v5.17
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3] pstore: Don't use semaphores in always-atomic-context code
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3] pstore: Don't use semaphores in always-atomic-context code
- From: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v12 32/46] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
- From: Peter Gonda <pgonda@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v12 46/46] virt: sevguest: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement
- From: Peter Gonda <pgonda@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v0 6/6] Temporarily pass the kaslr seed via register X1
- [RFC PATCH v0 5/6] Remap code section of loaded kernel and boot it
- [RFC PATCH v0 4/6] Discover QEMU fwcfg device and use it to load the kernel
- [RFC PATCH v0 3/6] Add paging code to manage the full ID map
- [RFC PATCH v0 2/6] Add DTB processing
- [RFC PATCH v0 1/6] Implement a bare metal Rust runtime on top of QEMU's mach-virt
- [RFC PATCH v0 0/6] Minimal Linux/arm64 VM firmware (written in Rust)
- Re: [PATCH v12 32/46] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
- From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v12 32/46] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
- From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v12 32/46] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
- From: Peter Gonda <pgonda@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 3/3] efi/cper: reformat CPER memory error location to more readable
- From: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 2/3] EDAC/ghes: Unify CPER memory error location reporting
- From: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 1/3] efi/cper: add cper_mem_err_status_str to decode error description
- From: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 0/3] EDAC/ghes: refactor memory error reporting to avoid code duplication
- From: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 43.1/46] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 38/46] x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 37/46] x86/compressed/64: Add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 36/46] x86/compressed: Export and rename add_identity_map()
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 41/46] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 40/46] x86/sev: add sev=debug cmdline option to dump SNP CPUID table
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 32/46] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 35/46] x86/compressed: Use firmware-validated CPUID leaves for SEV-SNP guests
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 45/46] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 33/46] x86/boot: Add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 44/46] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 29/46] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 31/46] x86/sev: Move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID to helper
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 43/46] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 39/46] x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 42/46] x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 30/46] KVM: x86: Move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs to helper
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 46/46] virt: sevguest: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 34/46] x86/compressed: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 27/46] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI vendor table lookup to helper
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 28/46] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI kexec handling into common code
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 17/46] x86/sev: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 21/46] x86/mm: Validate memory when changing the C-bit
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 26/46] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI config table lookup to helper
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 25/46] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI system table lookup to helper
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 24/46] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI detection to helper
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 18/46] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 19/46] x86/kernel: Make the .bss..decrypted section shared in RMP table
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 23/46] x86/head/64: Re-enable stack protection
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 22/46] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 20/46] x86/kernel: Validate ROM memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 16/46] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 15/46] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 14/46] x86/sev: Check the vmpl level
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 13/46] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 12/46] x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 10/46] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 08/46] x86/sev: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 11/46] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 09/46] x86/mm: Extend cc_attr to include AMD SEV-SNP
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 07/46] x86/compressed/64: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 05/46] x86/boot: Introduce helpers for MSR reads/writes
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 06/46] x86/boot: Use MSR read/write helpers instead of inline assembly
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 04/46] KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 03/46] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB save area
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 02/46] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 00/46] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v12 01/46] KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and vmpl field in the VMSA
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 2/2] EDAC/ghes: use cper functions to avoid code duplication
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 2/2] EDAC/ghes: use cper functions to avoid code duplication
- From: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V7 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] x86/e820: Refactor range_update and range_remove
- From: Martin Fernandez <martin.fernandez@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v11 44/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v11 44/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v11 44/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v11 42/45] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v11 44/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v11 42/45] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v11 44/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v11 42/45] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 2/2] EDAC/ghes: use cper functions to avoid code duplication
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v11 39/45] x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] efi: Add missing prototype for efi_capsule_setup_info
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v11 39/45] x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests
- From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
- [efi:next] BUILD SUCCESS 2baa81c83f6f3a927cfbbbd707b669d039302625
- From: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
- From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v11 22/45] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v11 42/45] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v11 22/45] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v11 44/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [Question] Should retain 2M alignment if kernel image is bad aligned at entry or BSS overlaps?
- From: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v11 44/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH V2 1/1] riscv/efi_stub: Add support for RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL
- From: Sunil V L <sunilvl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH V2 0/1] RISCV_EFI_BOOT_PROTOCOL support in linux
- From: Sunil V L <sunilvl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 2/2] libstub: ensure allocated memory to be executable
- From: Baskov Evgeniy <baskov@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 1/2] libstub: declare DXE services table
- From: Baskov Evgeniy <baskov@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
- From: Baskov Evgeniy <baskov@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
- Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
- [PATCH v6 2/2] EDAC/ghes: use cper functions to avoid code duplication
- From: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 1/2] efi/cper: add cper_mem_err_status_str to decode error description
- From: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 0/2] EDAC/ghes: refactor memory error reporting to avoid code duplication
- From: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v11 39/45] x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [Question] Should retain 2M alignment if kernel image is bad aligned at entry or BSS overlaps?
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v11 29/45] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [Question] Should retain 2M alignment if kernel image is bad aligned at entry or BSS overlaps?
- From: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v11 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v11 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support
- From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v11 29/45] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v11 42/45] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v11 29/45] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v11 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v11 42/45] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
- From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
- [efi:urgent] BUILD SUCCESS 9feaf8b387ee0ece9c1d7add308776b502a35d0c
- From: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [Question] Should retain 2M alignment if kernel image is bad aligned at entry or BSS overlaps?
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 2/4] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
- From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [Question] Should retain 2M alignment if kernel image is bad aligned at entry or BSS overlaps?
- From: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v11 29/45] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: fix return value of __setup handlers
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [Question] Should retain 2M alignment if kernel image is bad aligned at entry or BSS overlaps?
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [Question] Should retain 2M alignment if kernel image is bad aligned at entry or BSS overlaps?
- From: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] efi: fix return value of __setup handlers
- From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
- [efi:urgent] BUILD SUCCESS 258dd902022cb10c83671176688074879517fd21
- From: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [GIT PULL] More EFI fixes for v5.17
- From: pr-tracker-bot@xxxxxxxxxx
- Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
- From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH RFC v2 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 3/4] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 3/4] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
- From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 3/4] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 1/4] efi: Save location of EFI confidential computing area
- From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 2/4] virt: Add efi_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
- From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 4/4] docs: security: Add secrets/coco documentation
- From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 3/4] efi: Load efi_secret module if EFI secret area is populated
- From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area
- From: Dov Murik <dovmurik@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
- [GIT PULL] More EFI fixes for v5.17
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V6 09/22] LoongArch: Add boot and setup routines
- From: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v4 3/3] efifb: Remove redundant efifb_setup_from_dmi stub
- From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v4 2/3] sysfb: Enable boot time VESA graphic mode selection
- From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v4 1/3] sysfb: Make config option dependencies explicit
- From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v4 2/3] sysfb: Enable boot time VESA graphic mode selection
- From: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v4 3/3] efifb: Remove redundant efifb_setup_from_dmi stub
- From: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v4 1/3] sysfb: Make config option dependencies explicit
- From: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 3.1/45] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB save area
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 29/45] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 16/45] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 28/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI kexec handling into common code
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 43/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 11/45] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 35/45] x86/compressed: Use firmware-validated CPUID leaves for SEV-SNP guests
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 33/45] x86/boot: Add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 17/45] x86/sev: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 06/45] x86/boot: Use MSR read/write helpers instead of inline assembly
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 37/45] x86/compressed/64: Add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 15/45] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 36/45] x86/compressed: Export and rename add_identity_map()
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 34/45] x86/compressed: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 31/45] x86/sev: Move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID to helper
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 38/45] x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 08/45] x86/sev: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 12/45] x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 07/45] x86/compressed/64: Detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 42/45] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 41/45] x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 14/45] x86/sev: Check the vmpl level
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 19/45] x86/kernel: Make the .bss..decrypted section shared in RMP table
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 23/45] x86/head/64: Re-enable stack protection
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 18/45] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 27/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI vendor table lookup to helper
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 39/45] x86/sev: Use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 26/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI config table lookup to helper
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 21/45] x86/mm: Validate memory when changing the C-bit
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 10/45] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 22/45] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 45/45] virt: sevguest: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 20/45] x86/kernel: Validate ROM memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 30/45] KVM: x86: Move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs to helper
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 09/45] x86/mm: Extend cc_attr to include AMD SEV-SNP
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 32/45] x86/compressed/64: Add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 40/45] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 25/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI system table lookup to helper
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 13/45] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 44/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 24/45] x86/compressed/acpi: Move EFI detection to helper
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 05/45] x86/boot: Introduce helpers for MSR reads/writes
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 02/45] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 03/45] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB save area
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 01/45] KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and vmpl field in the VMSA
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 04/45] KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH RFC v2 2/2] libstub: ensure allocated memory to be executable
- From: Baskov Evgeniy <baskov@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH RFC v2 0/2] Handle UEFI NX-restricted page tables
- From: Baskov Evgeniy <baskov@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH RFC v2 1/2] libstub: declare DXE services table
- From: Baskov Evgeniy <baskov@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] pstore: Don't use semaphores in always-atomic-context code
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] pstore: Don't use semaphores in always-atomic-context code
- From: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
- From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
- From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3] efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs
- From: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] pstore: Don't use semaphores in always-atomic-context code
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
- From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
- From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
- From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
- From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v10 21/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit
- From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 00/17] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK
- From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [efi:next] BUILD SUCCESS 0ea9e1c3dbd4e78f7a82d23fdc959622432e461c
- From: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
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