Re: [PATCH v8 0/4] Allow guest access to EFI confidential computing secret area

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On 29/03/2022 21:30, Borislav Petkov wrote:

> 
> So now that I think of it, it would be even nicer if the fact whether
> guest debugging is allowed, were available to the guest *very early*
> during boot. Because I think the most important cases where you'd want
> to singlestep a SEV* guest with the qemu gdbstub is early guest kernel
> boot code. So it would be cool if we'd have access to the debugging
> setting that early.
> 
> Lemme have a look at your patches in detail to get an idea what's
> happening there.

Is efi_config_parse_tables() early enough?  That's where we learn for
the first time that the firmware has a launch-secrets area that we can
look at.

We can add there (say, next to the call to efi_tpm_eventlog_init()) a
code to:

1. map the secret area (ioremap_encrypted())
2. parse the table, look for the "sev debug enabled" GUID.
3. set the value of the kernel variable that we can later use anywhere.


Of course Ard might know about a better mechanism or place to do that.


-Dov



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