Linux EFI Development - Date Index

• Date Index

• [PATCH v9 30/38] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM, (continued)
  • [PATCH v9 30/38] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v9 28/38] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v9 29/38] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v9 24/38] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v9 25/38] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v9 26/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v9 23/38] x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v9 22/38] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v9 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v9 19/38] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v9 17/38] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v9 14/38] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v9 12/38] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v9 13/38] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v9 11/38] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa(), Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap(), Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap(), Brian Gerst
      • Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap(), Tom Lendacky
        • Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap(), Brian Gerst
          • Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap(), Arnd Bergmann
            • Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap(), Brian Gerst
          • Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap(), Tom Lendacky
            • Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap(), Brian Gerst
              • Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap(), Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v9 06/38] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v9 08/38] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v9 05/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v9 03/38] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature, Brian Gerst
      • Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature, Tom Lendacky
        • Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature, Brian Gerst
          • Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature, Borislav Petkov
            • Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature, Tom Lendacky
          • Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v9 02/38] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v9 01/38] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME), Tom Lendacky
  • Re: [PATCH v9 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD), Ingo Molnar
    • Re: [PATCH v9 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD), Tom Lendacky
• [RFC PATCH v1] efivarfs: define integrity_read method, Mimi Zohar
• [RFC PATCH] efivarfs: define integrity_read method, Mimi Zohar
  • Re: [RFC PATCH] efivarfs: define integrity_read method, Al Viro
• [PATCH 00/18] treewide: Move storage class before return type, Joe Perches
  • [PATCH 11/18] x86/efi: Move asmlinkage before return type, Joe Perches
• [GIT PULL] EFI changes for v4.13, Ingo Molnar
• [PATCH v2 0/7] ARM: efi: PE/COFF cleanup/hardening, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH v2 1/7] arm: efi: remove forbidden values from the PE/COFF header, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH v2 2/7] arm: efi: remove pointless dummy .reloc section, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH v2 3/7] arm: efi: replace open coded constants with symbolic ones, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH v2 4/7] arm: compressed: discard ksymtab/kcrctab sections, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections, Gregory CLEMENT
      • Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections, Ard Biesheuvel
          • Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections, Gregory CLEMENT
            • Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections, Ard Biesheuvel
              • Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections, Gregory CLEMENT
                • Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections, Ard Biesheuvel
                  • Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections, Ard Biesheuvel
                    • Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections, Gregory CLEMENT
                      • Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH v2 6/7] arm: compressed: put zImage header and EFI header in dedicated section, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH v2 7/7] arm: efi: add PE/COFF debug table to EFI header, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it, Peter Jones
    • Re: [PATCH] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD), Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 03/38] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 02/38] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 01/38] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME), Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 05/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap(), Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 10/38] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 16/38] efi: Add an EFI table address match function, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 18/38] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 11/38] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa(), Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 17/38] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 19/38] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 15/38] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 14/38] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 13/38] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 22/38] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 12/38] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 23/38] x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 21/38] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 09/38] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 08/38] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 06/38] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 25/38] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 24/38] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 26/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 28/38] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 29/38] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 30/38] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v8 RESEND 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Joerg Roedel
      • Re: [PATCH v8 RESEND 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 31/38] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 33/38] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 38/38] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 37/38] compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __nostackp function attribute, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 35/38] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 36/38] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 34/38] x86/mm: Create native_make_p4d() for PGTABLE_LEVELS <= 4, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 RESEND 32/38] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests, Tom Lendacky
• [PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD), Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 01/38] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME), Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 03/38] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 05/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 02/38] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 06/38] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 08/38] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 09/38] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 14/38] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 15/38] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 13/38] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 12/38] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 11/38] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa(), Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 10/38] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap(), Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 17/38] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 18/38] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 19/38] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 16/38] efi: Add an EFI table address match function, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 22/38] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 24/38] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 30/38] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 29/38] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 28/38] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 26/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 25/38] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 21/38] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v8 23/38] x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active, Tom Lendacky
• [PATCH v5 2/2] eif/capsule-pstore: Add capsule pstore backend, Qiuxu Zhuo
• [PATCH v5 1/2] efi: Add 'nr_config_table' variable in efi structure, Qiuxu Zhuo
• [PATCH v5 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support, Qiuxu Zhuo
  • RE: [PATCH v5 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support, Zhuo, Qiuxu
    • Re: [PATCH v5 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support, Ard Biesheuvel
• [RFC] memory corruption caused by efi driver?, Yisheng Xie
  • Re: [RFC] memory corruption caused by efi driver?, Greg KH
    • Re: [RFC] memory corruption caused by efi driver?, Xishi Qiu
      • Re: [RFC] memory corruption caused by efi driver?, Greg KH
• [PATCH v4 2/2] eif/capsule-pstore: Add capsule pstore backend, Qiuxu Zhuo
  • Re: [PATCH v4 2/2] eif/capsule-pstore: Add capsule pstore backend, Ard Biesheuvel
    • RE: [PATCH v4 2/2] eif/capsule-pstore: Add capsule pstore backend, Zhuo, Qiuxu
• [PATCH v4 1/2] efi: Add 'nr_config_table' variable in efi structure, Qiuxu Zhuo
• [PATCH v4 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support, Qiuxu Zhuo
  • Re: [PATCH v4 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support, Kees Cook
    • Re: [PATCH v4 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH v4 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support, Ard Biesheuvel
        • RE: [PATCH v4 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support, Zhuo, Qiuxu
          • Re: [PATCH v4 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support, Ard Biesheuvel
            • RE: [PATCH v4 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support, Zhuo, Qiuxu
• [PATCH v2 0/2] xen/efi: Fixes, Daniel Kiper
  • [PATCH v2 1/2] efi: Process MEMATTR table only if EFI_MEMMAP, Daniel Kiper
  • [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen, Daniel Kiper
    • Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen, Boris Ostrovsky
• [PATCH 0/2] xen/efi: Fixes, Daniel Kiper
  • [PATCH 1/2] efi: Process MEMATTR table only if EFI_MEMMAP, Daniel Kiper
    • Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: Process MEMATTR table only if EFI_MEMMAP, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 2/2] x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen, Daniel Kiper
    • Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/2] x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen, Andrew Cooper
      • Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/2] x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen, Daniel Kiper
    • Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen, Ingo Molnar
      • Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen, Daniel Kiper
• [PATCH v3 2/2] eif/capsule-pstore: Add capsule pstore backend, Qiuxu Zhuo
  • Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] eif/capsule-pstore: Add capsule pstore backend, Kees Cook
    • RE: [PATCH v3 2/2] eif/capsule-pstore: Add capsule pstore backend, Zhuo, Qiuxu
      • Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] eif/capsule-pstore: Add capsule pstore backend, Kees Cook
        • RE: [PATCH v3 2/2] eif/capsule-pstore: Add capsule pstore backend, Zhuo, Qiuxu
• [PATCH v3 1/2] efi: Add 'nr_config_table' variable in efi structure, Qiuxu Zhuo
  • Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] efi: Add 'nr_config_table' variable in efi structure, Kees Cook
    • RE: [PATCH v3 1/2] efi: Add 'nr_config_table' variable in efi structure, Zhuo, Qiuxu
  • Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] efi: Add 'nr_config_table' variable in efi structure, Ard Biesheuvel
    • RE: [PATCH v3 1/2] efi: Add 'nr_config_table' variable in efi structure, Zhuo, Qiuxu
• [PATCH v3 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support, Qiuxu Zhuo
• [PATCH v2 18/31] efi-stub.txt: standardize document format, Mauro Carvalho Chehab
  • Re: [PATCH v2 18/31] efi-stub.txt: standardize document format, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH v7 00/36] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD), Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v7 02/36] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v7 06/36] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v7 06/36] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support, Thomas Gleixner
      • Re: [PATCH v7 06/36] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v7 04/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v7 07/36] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v7 07/36] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active, Thomas Gleixner
      • Re: [PATCH v7 07/36] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v7 07/36] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active, Thomas Gleixner
      • Re: [PATCH v7 07/36] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing, Thomas Gleixner
      • Re: [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing, Tom Lendacky
        • Re: [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing, Thomas Gleixner
          • Re: [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing, Tom Lendacky
            • Re: [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing, Thomas Gleixner
  • [PATCH v7 14/36] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v7 14/36] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v7 15/36] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v7 22/36] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v7 25/36] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v7 25/36] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH v7 25/36] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v7 26/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v7 26/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v7 27/36] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v7 27/36] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH v7 27/36] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v7 28/36] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v7 32/36] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v7 32/36] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests, Juergen Gross
    • Re: [PATCH v7 32/36] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v7 35/36] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v7 35/36] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v7 34/36] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v7 34/36] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH v7 34/36] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place, Tom Lendacky
        • Re: [PATCH v7 34/36] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place, Borislav Petkov
          • Re: [PATCH v7 34/36] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v7 36/36] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v7 36/36] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v7 33/36] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v7 33/36] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v7 31/36] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v7 31/36] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v7 30/36] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v7 29/36] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v7 29/36] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings, kbuild test robot
  • [PATCH v7 24/36] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v7 24/36] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v7 23/36] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v7 23/36] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v7 21/36] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v7 20/36] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v7 20/36] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v7 18/36] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v7 18/36] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME, Matt Fleming
  • [PATCH v7 17/36] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v7 17/36] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0, Matt Fleming
  • [PATCH v7 19/36] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v7 19/36] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear, Borislav Petkov
    • Re: [PATCH v7 19/36] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear, Matt Fleming
  • [PATCH v7 16/36] efi: Add an EFI table address match function, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v7 16/36] efi: Add an EFI table address match function, Matt Fleming
  • [PATCH v7 13/36] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v7 12/36] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v7 11/36] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa(), Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v7 11/36] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa(), Borislav Petkov
    • Re: [PATCH v7 11/36] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa(), Andy Lutomirski
      • Re: [PATCH v7 11/36] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa(), Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v7 09/36] x86/mm: Simplify p[gum]d_page() macros, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v7 10/36] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v7 10/36] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption, Thomas Gleixner
      • Re: [PATCH v7 10/36] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v7 05/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v7 03/36] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v7 03/36] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v7 01/36] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME), Tom Lendacky
• [PATCH 4.11 05/13] efi: Fix boot panic because of invalid BGRT image address, Greg Kroah-Hartman
• Re: [PATCH v6 23/34] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active, Borislav Petkov
• [PATCH 4.11 048/150] efi: Dont issue error message when booted under Xen, Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH 4.11 049/150] efi/bgrt: Skip efi_bgrt_init() in case of non-EFI boot, Greg Kroah-Hartman
  • Re: [PATCH 4.11 049/150] efi/bgrt: Skip efi_bgrt_init() in case of non-EFI boot, Maniaxx
    • Re: [PATCH 4.11 049/150] efi/bgrt: Skip efi_bgrt_init() in case of non-EFI boot, Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH 4.9 034/119] efi: Dont issue error message when booted under Xen, Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [GIT PULL] EFI fix, Ingo Molnar
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • [GIT PULL] EFI fix, Ingo Molnar
  • [GIT PULL] EFI fix, Ingo Molnar
    • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fix, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fix, Linus Torvalds
        • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fix, Ingo Molnar
    • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fix, Linus Torvalds
      • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fix, Ingo Molnar
• [GIT PULL] Another EFI BGRT fix for v4.12, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH] efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH v2] efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address, Dave Young
  • Re: [PATCH v2] efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH] x86/efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address, Dave Young
  • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address, Dave Young
    • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address, Maniaxx
  • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address, Dave Young
      • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address, Dave Young
• [PATCH v6 00/34] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD), Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 01/34] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME), Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 06/34] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 06/34] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v6 05/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 05/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v6 15/34] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 16/34] efi: Add an EFI table address match function, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 19/34] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 19/34] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear, kbuild test robot
  • [PATCH v6 24/34] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 24/34] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH v6 24/34] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 29/34] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 29/34] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v6 31/34] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 34/34] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 33/34] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 32/34] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 30/34] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 30/34] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH v6 30/34] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 28/34] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Nick Sarnie
      • Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
        • Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Borislav Petkov
          • Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
            • Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Borislav Petkov
              • Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
                • Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Borislav Petkov
              • Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
          • Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Joerg Roedel
            • Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Borislav Petkov
              • Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 27/34] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME, kbuild test robot
      • Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME, Christoph Hellwig
      • Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME, Tom Lendacky
        • Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME, Borislav Petkov
          • Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 22/34] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 22/34] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v6 23/34] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 23/34] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH v6 23/34] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 21/34] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 18/34] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 18/34] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v6 17/34] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 14/34] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 14/34] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH v6 14/34] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 13/34] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 13/34] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v6 11/34] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 12/34] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Boris Ostrovsky
      • Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Tom Lendacky
        • Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Boris Ostrovsky
          • Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Tom Lendacky
            • Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Boris Ostrovsky
              • Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Andrew Cooper
                • Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Tom Lendacky
                  • Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Boris Ostrovsky
                    • Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Andrew Cooper
                    • Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Tom Lendacky
                      • Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Boris Ostrovsky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Andy Lutomirski
      • Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Tom Lendacky
        • Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Andy Lutomirski
          • Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, kbuild test robot
  • [PATCH v6 08/34] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 09/34] x86/mm: Simplify p[gum]d_page() macros, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 09/34] x86/mm: Simplify p[gum]d_page() macros, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v6 07/34] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 04/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 04/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v6 02/34] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 03/34] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 20/34] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 20/34] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH v6 20/34] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data, Tom Lendacky
        • Re: [PATCH v6 20/34] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data, Borislav Petkov
  • Re: [PATCH v6 00/34] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD), Nick Sarnie
    • Re: [PATCH v6 00/34] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD), Tom Lendacky
• [PATCH] efi: arm: Don't mark ACPI reclaim memory as MEMBLOCK_NOMAP, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: arm: Don't mark ACPI reclaim memory as MEMBLOCK_NOMAP, Mark Rutland
    • Re: [PATCH] efi: arm: Don't mark ACPI reclaim memory as MEMBLOCK_NOMAP, Ard Biesheuvel
• [GIT PULL 00/13] First batch of EFI updates for v4.13, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 01/13] x86/efi: Clean up efi CR3 save/restore, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 01/13] x86/efi: Clean up efi CR3 save/restore, Ingo Molnar
      • Re: [PATCH 01/13] x86/efi: Clean up efi CR3 save/restore, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH 01/13] x86/efi: Clean up efi CR3 save/restore, Andy Lutomirski
  • [PATCH 03/13] efi/capsule: Remove pr_debug on ENOMEM or EFAULT, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 07/13] efi/capsule: Remove NULL test on kmap(), Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 09/13] efi/capsule-loader: Use page addresses rather than struct page pointers, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 13/13] efi: arm: enable DMI/SMBIOS, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 11/13] efi/efi_test: Use memdup_user() helper, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 12/13] x86/efi: Add EFI_PGT_DUMP support for x86_32 and kexec, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 10/13] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 10/13] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header, Ingo Molnar
      • Re: [PATCH 10/13] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH 10/13] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header, Ingo Molnar
  • [PATCH 08/13] efi/capsule-loader: Redirect calls to efi_capsule_setup_info via weak alias, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 06/13] efi/capsule-loader: Use a cached copy of the capsule header, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 05/13] efi/capsule: Adjust return type of efi_capsule_setup_info, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 04/13] efi/capsule: Clean up pr_err/info messages, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 02/13] efi/capsule: Fix return code on failing kmap/vmap, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [GIT PULL 00/13] First batch of EFI updates for v4.13, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [GIT PULL 00/13] First batch of EFI updates for v4.13, Ingo Molnar
      • Re: [GIT PULL 00/13] First batch of EFI updates for v4.13, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [GIT PULL 00/13] First batch of EFI updates for v4.13, Ingo Molnar
• [PATCH v2] efi: arm: enable DMI/SMBIOS, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH v2] efi: arm: enable DMI/SMBIOS, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH v2] efi: arm: enable DMI/SMBIOS, Russell King - ARM Linux
      • Re: [PATCH v2] efi: arm: enable DMI/SMBIOS, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH 0/7] ARM: efi: PE/COFF cleanup/hardening, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 1/7] arm: efi: remove forbidden values from the PE/COFF header, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 3/7] arm: efi: replace open coded constants with symbolic ones, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 6/7] arm: compressed: put zImage header and EFI header in dedicated section, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 2/7] arm: efi: remove pointless dummy .reloc section, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 7/7] arm: efi: add PE/COFF debug table to EFI header, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 4/7] arm: compressed: discard ksymtab/kcrctab sections, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH 0/7] ARM: efi: PE/COFF cleanup/hardening, Ard Biesheuvel
• Problem with new X.509 is_hash_blacklisted() interface, James Bottomley
  • Re: Problem with new X.509 is_hash_blacklisted() interface, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: Problem with new X.509 is_hash_blacklisted() interface, David Howells
    • Re: Problem with new X.509 is_hash_blacklisted() interface, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: Problem with new X.509 is_hash_blacklisted() interface, David Howells
      • Re: Problem with new X.509 is_hash_blacklisted() interface, Ard Biesheuvel
• Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression], Dave Young
  • Message not available
    • Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression], Dave Young
      • Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression], Dave Young
        • Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression], Maniaxx
          • Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression], Dave Young
            • Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression], Maniaxx
              • Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression], Dave Young
                • Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression], Dave Young
• [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode, David Howells
  • [PATCH 1/5] efi: Move the x86 secure boot switch to generic code, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 1/5] efi: Move the x86 secure boot switch to generic code, joeyli
  • [PATCH 2/5] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 2/5] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit, joeyli
  • [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, Casey Schaufler
    • Re: [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, Casey Schaufler
      • Re: [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, joeyli
    • Re: [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, joeyli
  • [PATCH 5/5] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 5/5] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode, joeyli
    • Re: [PATCH 5/5] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode, James Morris
  • [PATCH 4/5] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 4/5] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode, joeyli
  • Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode, Kees Cook
• [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V17 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V17 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption, Robert Richter
      • Re: [PATCH V17 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption, Baicar, Tyler
  • [PATCH V17 03/11] cper: add timestamp print to CPER status printing, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V17 10/11] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V17 11/11] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V17 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V17 07/11] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V17 09/11] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V17 05/11] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V17 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V17 04/11] efi: parse ARM processor error, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V17 02/11] ras: acpi/apei: cper: add support for generic data v3 structure, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V17 02/11] ras: acpi/apei: cper: add support for generic data v3 structure, Will Deacon
  • Re: [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64, Borislav Petkov
  • Re: [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64, Will Deacon
    • Re: [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64, Robert Richter
      • Re: [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64, Will Deacon
        • Re: [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64, Robert Richter
          • Re: [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64, Robert Richter
• [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix write/erase id tracking, Kees Cook
  • RE: [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix write/erase id tracking, Lofstedt, Marta
• [PATCH 0/3] efi: arm64: use -fpie for building the stub, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 1/3] efi/libstub: arm64: use hidden attribute for struct screen_info reference, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 1/3] efi/libstub: arm64: use hidden attribute for struct screen_info reference, Matthias Kaehlcke
  • [PATCH 2/3] efi/libstub: arm64: force 'hidden' visibility for section markers, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 2/3] efi/libstub: arm64: force 'hidden' visibility for section markers, Matthias Kaehlcke
  • [PATCH 3/3] efi/libstub: arm64: set -fpie when building the EFI stub, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 3/3] efi/libstub: arm64: set -fpie when building the EFI stub, Matthias Kaehlcke
      • Re: [PATCH 3/3] efi/libstub: arm64: set -fpie when building the EFI stub, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH 3/3] efi/libstub: arm64: set -fpie when building the EFI stub, Matthias Kaehlcke
  • Re: [PATCH 0/3] efi: arm64: use -fpie for building the stub, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH v4] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
  • Re: [PATCH v4] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
  • Re: [PATCH v4] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Dave Young
  • Re: [PATCH v4] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Matt Fleming
• [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Disable runtime services on kexec kernel if booted with efi=old_map, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
  • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Disable runtime services on kexec kernel if booted with efi=old_map, Dave Young
    • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Disable runtime services on kexec kernel if booted with efi=old_map, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
  • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Disable runtime services on kexec kernel if booted with efi=old_map, joeyli
  • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Disable runtime services on kexec kernel if booted with efi=old_map, Matt Fleming
• [PATCH] efi/bgrt: skip efi_bgrt_init in case non-efi boot, Dave Young
  • Re: [PATCH] efi/bgrt: skip efi_bgrt_init in case non-efi boot, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH V16 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V16 04/11] efi: parse ARM processor error, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V16 09/11] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V16 09/11] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH V16 11/11] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V16 10/11] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V16 10/11] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH V16 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V16 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH V16 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section, Baicar, Tyler
        • Re: [PATCH V16 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section, Borislav Petkov
          • Re: [PATCH V16 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section, Baicar, Tyler
  • [PATCH V16 07/11] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V16 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V16 03/11] cper: add timestamp print to CPER status printing, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V16 05/11] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V16 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V16 02/11] ras: acpi/apei: cper: add support for generic data v3 structure, Tyler Baicar
• Re: [PATCH 4.11 00/28] 4.11.1-stable review, Matt Fleming
  • Message not available
    • Re: [PATCH 4.11 00/28] 4.11.1-stable review, Matt Fleming
      • Re: [PATCH 4.11 00/28] 4.11.1-stable review, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH v3] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
  • Re: [PATCH v3] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Dave Young
    • Re: [PATCH v3] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
      • Re: [PATCH v3] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
• [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix read iter after pstore API refactor, Kees Cook
  • Re: [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix read iter after pstore API refactor, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix read iter after pstore API refactor, Kees Cook
      • Re: [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix read iter after pstore API refactor, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix read iter after pstore API refactor, Kees Cook
          • Re: [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix read iter after pstore API refactor, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH V2] x86/efi: Add EFI_PGT_DUMP support for x86_32, kexec, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
  • Re: [PATCH V2] x86/efi: Add EFI_PGT_DUMP support for x86_32, kexec, Matt Fleming
• [PATCH] efi: remove duplicate 'const' specifiers, Arnd Bergmann
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: remove duplicate 'const' specifiers, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: remove duplicate 'const' specifiers, David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: remove duplicate 'const' specifiers, Matt Fleming
• [PATCH] x86/efi: Add EFI_PGT_DUMP support for x86_32, kexec and efi=old_map, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
  • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Add EFI_PGT_DUMP support for x86_32, kexec and efi=old_map, Borislav Petkov
    • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Add EFI_PGT_DUMP support for x86_32, kexec and efi=old_map, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
• [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64, Matthias Kaehlcke
  • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64, Greg Hackmann
    • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64, Matthias Kaehlcke
      • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64, Matthias Kaehlcke
          • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64, Ard Biesheuvel
            • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64, Matthias Kaehlcke
              • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64, Ard Biesheuvel
                • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64, Matthias Kaehlcke
                • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64, Greg Hackmann
                  • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64, Ard Biesheuvel
                    • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64, Matthias Kaehlcke
• [PATCH] x86/boot/32: Fix UP boot on Quark and possibly other platforms, Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH] x86/efi: Fix kexec kernel panic when efi=old_map is enabled, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
  • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Fix kexec kernel panic when efi=old_map is enabled, joeyli
    • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Fix kexec kernel panic when efi=old_map is enabled, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
  • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Fix kexec kernel panic when efi=old_map is enabled, Matt Fleming
    • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Fix kexec kernel panic when efi=old_map is enabled, Dave Young
• [PATCH] efi: don't issue error message when booted under xen, Juergen Gross
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: don't issue error message when booted under xen, Matt Fleming
• Re: [PATCH] rtc: rtc-efi: Add an enable parameter and make it false for X86 by default, Matt Fleming
• [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Lukas Wunner
  • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Lukas Wunner
      • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Arnd Bergmann
        • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Lukas Wunner
          • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Ard Biesheuvel
            • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, David Daney
            • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Lukas Wunner
              • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Ard Biesheuvel
                • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Lukas Wunner
                  • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Ard Biesheuvel
                    • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Lukas Wunner
                      • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Ard Biesheuvel
                        • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Lukas Wunner
                          • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Arnd Bergmann
                            • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Lukas Wunner
                          • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Ard Biesheuvel
                            • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Lukas Wunner
• Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] arm64: kvm: support kvmtool to detect RAS extension feature, gengdongjiu
  • Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] arm64: kvm: support kvmtool to detect RAS extension feature, James Morse
    • Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] arm64: kvm: support kvmtool to detect RAS extension feature, gengdongjiu
• Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error, gengdongjiu
  • Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error, gengdongjiu
    • Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error, James Morse
      • Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error, gengdongjiu
  • Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error, James Morse
    • Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error, Christoffer Dall
      • Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error, James Morse
        • Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error, gengdongjiu
          • Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error, Christoffer Dall
            • Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error, gengdongjiu
    • Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error, gengdongjiu
      • Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error, James Morse
        • Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error, gengdongjiu
• [GIT PULL] Hardware module parameter annotation for secure boot, David Howells
• [GIT PULL] EFI changes for v4.12, Ingo Molnar
• Linux 11-rc1 to rc8 boot problem, Paweł S
• [PATCH 1/2] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user, Geliang Tang
  • [PATCH 2/2] efi/efi_test: drop useless kfree, Geliang Tang
    • Re: [PATCH 2/2] efi/efi_test: drop useless kfree, ivanhu
      • Re: [PATCH 2/2] efi/efi_test: drop useless kfree, Geliang Tang
  • Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user, Matt Fleming
    • Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user, ivanhu
      • Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user, Matt Fleming
• [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
  • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Thomas Garnier
  • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Matt Fleming
    • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Bhupesh Sharma
        • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
          • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Borislav Petkov
            • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
            • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
      • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Russ Anderson
    • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
• [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
  • Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
    • Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Thomas Garnier
      • Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
        • Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
• [PATCH 1/1 linux-next] efi/capsule: kmap() can't fail, Fabian Frederick
  • Re: [PATCH 1/1 linux-next] efi/capsule: kmap() can't fail, Matt Fleming
• [PATCH 0/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback, Julien Grall
  • [PATCH 2/3 v2] arm/xen: Consolidate calls to shutdown hypercall in a single helper, Julien Grall
    • Re: [PATCH 2/3 v2] arm/xen: Consolidate calls to shutdown hypercall in a single helper, Stefano Stabellini
  • [PATCH 3/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback, Julien Grall
    • Re: [PATCH 3/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback, Boris Ostrovsky
    • Re: [PATCH 3/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback, Stefano Stabellini
  • [PATCH 1/3 v2] xen: Export xen_reboot, Julien Grall
    • Re: [PATCH 1/3 v2] xen: Export xen_reboot, Boris Ostrovsky
      • Re: [PATCH 1/3 v2] xen: Export xen_reboot, Juergen Gross
        • Re: [PATCH 1/3 v2] xen: Export xen_reboot, Juergen Gross
  • Re: [PATCH 0/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback, Julien Grall
    • Re: [PATCH 0/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback, Juergen Gross
      • Re: [PATCH 0/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback, Julien Grall
  • Re: [PATCH 0/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback, Juergen Gross
• [PATCH] efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns, Hans de Goede
  • Re: [PATCH] efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH] efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns, Matt Fleming
  • Re: efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns, Hans de Goede
    • Re: efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns, Matt Fleming
      • Re: efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns, Hans de Goede
• [PATCH v1 1/8] lib/uuid: Introduce uuid_{be|le}_cmp_p{p}() helpers, Andy Shevchenko
  • [PATCH v1 2/8] ASoC: Intel: Skylake: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}(), Andy Shevchenko
    • Re: [PATCH v1 2/8] ASoC: Intel: Skylake: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}(), Vinod Koul
      • Re: [PATCH v1 2/8] ASoC: Intel: Skylake: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}(), Andy Shevchenko
  • [PATCH v1 8/8] ACPI: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers, Andy Shevchenko
    • Re: [PATCH v1 8/8] ACPI: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers, Rafael J. Wysocki
      • Re: [PATCH v1 8/8] ACPI: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers, Borislav Petkov
        • Re: [PATCH v1 8/8] ACPI: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers, Andy Shevchenko
          • Re: [PATCH v1 8/8] ACPI: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v1 4/8] vfio-mdev: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}(), Andy Shevchenko
  • [PATCH v1 5/8] vmbus: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers, Andy Shevchenko