Linux EFI Development - Date Index

• Date Index

• [PATCH v6 06/34] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support, (continued)
  • [PATCH v6 06/34] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 06/34] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v6 05/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 05/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v6 15/34] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 16/34] efi: Add an EFI table address match function, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 19/34] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 19/34] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear, kbuild test robot
  • [PATCH v6 24/34] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 24/34] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH v6 24/34] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 29/34] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 29/34] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v6 31/34] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 34/34] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 33/34] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 32/34] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 30/34] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 30/34] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH v6 30/34] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 28/34] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Nick Sarnie
      • Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
        • Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Borislav Petkov
          • Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
            • Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Borislav Petkov
              • Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
                • Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Borislav Petkov
              • Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
          • Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Joerg Roedel
            • Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Borislav Petkov
              • Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 27/34] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME, kbuild test robot
      • Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME, Christoph Hellwig
      • Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME, Tom Lendacky
        • Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME, Borislav Petkov
          • Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 22/34] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 22/34] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v6 23/34] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 23/34] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH v6 23/34] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 21/34] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 18/34] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 18/34] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v6 17/34] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 14/34] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 14/34] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH v6 14/34] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 13/34] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 13/34] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v6 11/34] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 12/34] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Boris Ostrovsky
      • Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Tom Lendacky
        • Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Boris Ostrovsky
          • Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Tom Lendacky
            • Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Boris Ostrovsky
              • Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Andrew Cooper
                • Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Tom Lendacky
                  • Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Boris Ostrovsky
                    • Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Andrew Cooper
                    • Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Tom Lendacky
                      • Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Boris Ostrovsky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Andy Lutomirski
      • Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Tom Lendacky
        • Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Andy Lutomirski
          • Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3, kbuild test robot
  • [PATCH v6 08/34] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 09/34] x86/mm: Simplify p[gum]d_page() macros, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 09/34] x86/mm: Simplify p[gum]d_page() macros, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v6 07/34] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 04/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 04/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v6 02/34] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 03/34] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v6 20/34] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH v6 20/34] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH v6 20/34] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data, Tom Lendacky
        • Re: [PATCH v6 20/34] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data, Borislav Petkov
  • Re: [PATCH v6 00/34] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD), Nick Sarnie
    • Re: [PATCH v6 00/34] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD), Tom Lendacky
• [PATCH] efi: arm: Don't mark ACPI reclaim memory as MEMBLOCK_NOMAP, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: arm: Don't mark ACPI reclaim memory as MEMBLOCK_NOMAP, Mark Rutland
    • Re: [PATCH] efi: arm: Don't mark ACPI reclaim memory as MEMBLOCK_NOMAP, Ard Biesheuvel
• [GIT PULL 00/13] First batch of EFI updates for v4.13, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 01/13] x86/efi: Clean up efi CR3 save/restore, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 01/13] x86/efi: Clean up efi CR3 save/restore, Ingo Molnar
      • Re: [PATCH 01/13] x86/efi: Clean up efi CR3 save/restore, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH 01/13] x86/efi: Clean up efi CR3 save/restore, Andy Lutomirski
  • [PATCH 03/13] efi/capsule: Remove pr_debug on ENOMEM or EFAULT, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 07/13] efi/capsule: Remove NULL test on kmap(), Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 09/13] efi/capsule-loader: Use page addresses rather than struct page pointers, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 13/13] efi: arm: enable DMI/SMBIOS, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 11/13] efi/efi_test: Use memdup_user() helper, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 12/13] x86/efi: Add EFI_PGT_DUMP support for x86_32 and kexec, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 10/13] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 10/13] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header, Ingo Molnar
      • Re: [PATCH 10/13] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH 10/13] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header, Ingo Molnar
  • [PATCH 08/13] efi/capsule-loader: Redirect calls to efi_capsule_setup_info via weak alias, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 06/13] efi/capsule-loader: Use a cached copy of the capsule header, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 05/13] efi/capsule: Adjust return type of efi_capsule_setup_info, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 04/13] efi/capsule: Clean up pr_err/info messages, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 02/13] efi/capsule: Fix return code on failing kmap/vmap, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [GIT PULL 00/13] First batch of EFI updates for v4.13, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [GIT PULL 00/13] First batch of EFI updates for v4.13, Ingo Molnar
      • Re: [GIT PULL 00/13] First batch of EFI updates for v4.13, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [GIT PULL 00/13] First batch of EFI updates for v4.13, Ingo Molnar
• [PATCH v2] efi: arm: enable DMI/SMBIOS, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH v2] efi: arm: enable DMI/SMBIOS, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH v2] efi: arm: enable DMI/SMBIOS, Russell King - ARM Linux
      • Re: [PATCH v2] efi: arm: enable DMI/SMBIOS, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH 0/7] ARM: efi: PE/COFF cleanup/hardening, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 1/7] arm: efi: remove forbidden values from the PE/COFF header, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 3/7] arm: efi: replace open coded constants with symbolic ones, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 6/7] arm: compressed: put zImage header and EFI header in dedicated section, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 2/7] arm: efi: remove pointless dummy .reloc section, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 7/7] arm: efi: add PE/COFF debug table to EFI header, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 4/7] arm: compressed: discard ksymtab/kcrctab sections, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH 0/7] ARM: efi: PE/COFF cleanup/hardening, Ard Biesheuvel
• Problem with new X.509 is_hash_blacklisted() interface, James Bottomley
  • Re: Problem with new X.509 is_hash_blacklisted() interface, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: Problem with new X.509 is_hash_blacklisted() interface, David Howells
    • Re: Problem with new X.509 is_hash_blacklisted() interface, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: Problem with new X.509 is_hash_blacklisted() interface, David Howells
      • Re: Problem with new X.509 is_hash_blacklisted() interface, Ard Biesheuvel
• Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression], Dave Young
  • Message not available
    • Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression], Dave Young
      • Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression], Dave Young
        • Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression], Maniaxx
          • Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression], Dave Young
            • Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression], Maniaxx
              • Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression], Dave Young
                • Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression], Dave Young
• [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode, David Howells
  • [PATCH 1/5] efi: Move the x86 secure boot switch to generic code, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 1/5] efi: Move the x86 secure boot switch to generic code, joeyli
  • [PATCH 2/5] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 2/5] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit, joeyli
  • [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, Casey Schaufler
    • Re: [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, Casey Schaufler
      • Re: [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, joeyli
    • Re: [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, joeyli
  • [PATCH 5/5] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 5/5] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode, joeyli
    • Re: [PATCH 5/5] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode, James Morris
  • [PATCH 4/5] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 4/5] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode, joeyli
  • Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode, Kees Cook
• [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V17 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V17 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption, Robert Richter
      • Re: [PATCH V17 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption, Baicar, Tyler
  • [PATCH V17 03/11] cper: add timestamp print to CPER status printing, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V17 10/11] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V17 11/11] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V17 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V17 07/11] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V17 09/11] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V17 05/11] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V17 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V17 04/11] efi: parse ARM processor error, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V17 02/11] ras: acpi/apei: cper: add support for generic data v3 structure, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V17 02/11] ras: acpi/apei: cper: add support for generic data v3 structure, Will Deacon
  • Re: [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64, Borislav Petkov
  • Re: [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64, Will Deacon
    • Re: [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64, Robert Richter
      • Re: [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64, Will Deacon
        • Re: [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64, Robert Richter
          • Re: [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64, Robert Richter
• [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix write/erase id tracking, Kees Cook
  • RE: [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix write/erase id tracking, Lofstedt, Marta
• [PATCH 0/3] efi: arm64: use -fpie for building the stub, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 1/3] efi/libstub: arm64: use hidden attribute for struct screen_info reference, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 1/3] efi/libstub: arm64: use hidden attribute for struct screen_info reference, Matthias Kaehlcke
  • [PATCH 2/3] efi/libstub: arm64: force 'hidden' visibility for section markers, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 2/3] efi/libstub: arm64: force 'hidden' visibility for section markers, Matthias Kaehlcke
  • [PATCH 3/3] efi/libstub: arm64: set -fpie when building the EFI stub, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 3/3] efi/libstub: arm64: set -fpie when building the EFI stub, Matthias Kaehlcke
      • Re: [PATCH 3/3] efi/libstub: arm64: set -fpie when building the EFI stub, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH 3/3] efi/libstub: arm64: set -fpie when building the EFI stub, Matthias Kaehlcke
  • Re: [PATCH 0/3] efi: arm64: use -fpie for building the stub, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH v4] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
  • Re: [PATCH v4] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
  • Re: [PATCH v4] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Dave Young
  • Re: [PATCH v4] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Matt Fleming
• [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Disable runtime services on kexec kernel if booted with efi=old_map, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
  • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Disable runtime services on kexec kernel if booted with efi=old_map, Dave Young
    • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Disable runtime services on kexec kernel if booted with efi=old_map, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
  • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Disable runtime services on kexec kernel if booted with efi=old_map, joeyli
  • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Disable runtime services on kexec kernel if booted with efi=old_map, Matt Fleming
• [PATCH] efi/bgrt: skip efi_bgrt_init in case non-efi boot, Dave Young
  • Re: [PATCH] efi/bgrt: skip efi_bgrt_init in case non-efi boot, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH V16 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V16 04/11] efi: parse ARM processor error, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V16 09/11] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V16 09/11] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH V16 11/11] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V16 10/11] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V16 10/11] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH V16 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V16 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH V16 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section, Baicar, Tyler
        • Re: [PATCH V16 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section, Borislav Petkov
          • Re: [PATCH V16 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section, Baicar, Tyler
  • [PATCH V16 07/11] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V16 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V16 03/11] cper: add timestamp print to CPER status printing, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V16 05/11] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V16 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V16 02/11] ras: acpi/apei: cper: add support for generic data v3 structure, Tyler Baicar
• Re: [PATCH 4.11 00/28] 4.11.1-stable review, Matt Fleming
  • Message not available
    • Re: [PATCH 4.11 00/28] 4.11.1-stable review, Matt Fleming
      • Re: [PATCH 4.11 00/28] 4.11.1-stable review, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH v3] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
  • Re: [PATCH v3] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Dave Young
    • Re: [PATCH v3] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
      • Re: [PATCH v3] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
• [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix read iter after pstore API refactor, Kees Cook
  • Re: [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix read iter after pstore API refactor, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix read iter after pstore API refactor, Kees Cook
      • Re: [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix read iter after pstore API refactor, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix read iter after pstore API refactor, Kees Cook
          • Re: [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix read iter after pstore API refactor, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH V2] x86/efi: Add EFI_PGT_DUMP support for x86_32, kexec, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
  • Re: [PATCH V2] x86/efi: Add EFI_PGT_DUMP support for x86_32, kexec, Matt Fleming
• [PATCH] efi: remove duplicate 'const' specifiers, Arnd Bergmann
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: remove duplicate 'const' specifiers, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: remove duplicate 'const' specifiers, David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: remove duplicate 'const' specifiers, Matt Fleming
• [PATCH] x86/efi: Add EFI_PGT_DUMP support for x86_32, kexec and efi=old_map, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
  • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Add EFI_PGT_DUMP support for x86_32, kexec and efi=old_map, Borislav Petkov
    • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Add EFI_PGT_DUMP support for x86_32, kexec and efi=old_map, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
• [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64, Matthias Kaehlcke
  • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64, Greg Hackmann
    • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64, Matthias Kaehlcke
      • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64, Matthias Kaehlcke
          • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64, Ard Biesheuvel
            • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64, Matthias Kaehlcke
              • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64, Ard Biesheuvel
                • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64, Matthias Kaehlcke
                • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64, Greg Hackmann
                  • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64, Ard Biesheuvel
                    • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64, Matthias Kaehlcke
• [PATCH] x86/boot/32: Fix UP boot on Quark and possibly other platforms, Andy Lutomirski
• [PATCH] x86/efi: Fix kexec kernel panic when efi=old_map is enabled, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
  • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Fix kexec kernel panic when efi=old_map is enabled, joeyli
    • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Fix kexec kernel panic when efi=old_map is enabled, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
  • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Fix kexec kernel panic when efi=old_map is enabled, Matt Fleming
    • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Fix kexec kernel panic when efi=old_map is enabled, Dave Young
• [PATCH] efi: don't issue error message when booted under xen, Juergen Gross
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: don't issue error message when booted under xen, Matt Fleming
• Re: [PATCH] rtc: rtc-efi: Add an enable parameter and make it false for X86 by default, Matt Fleming
• [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Lukas Wunner
  • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Lukas Wunner
      • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Arnd Bergmann
        • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Lukas Wunner
          • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Ard Biesheuvel
            • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, David Daney
            • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Lukas Wunner
              • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Ard Biesheuvel
                • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Lukas Wunner
                  • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Ard Biesheuvel
                    • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Lukas Wunner
                      • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Ard Biesheuvel
                        • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Lukas Wunner
                          • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Arnd Bergmann
                            • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Lukas Wunner
                          • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Ard Biesheuvel
                            • Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code, Lukas Wunner
• Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] arm64: kvm: support kvmtool to detect RAS extension feature, gengdongjiu
  • Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] arm64: kvm: support kvmtool to detect RAS extension feature, James Morse
    • Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] arm64: kvm: support kvmtool to detect RAS extension feature, gengdongjiu
• Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error, gengdongjiu
  • Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error, gengdongjiu
    • Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error, James Morse
      • Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error, gengdongjiu
  • Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error, James Morse
    • Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error, Christoffer Dall
      • Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error, James Morse
        • Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error, gengdongjiu
          • Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error, Christoffer Dall
            • Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error, gengdongjiu
    • Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error, gengdongjiu
      • Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error, James Morse
        • Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error, gengdongjiu
• [GIT PULL] Hardware module parameter annotation for secure boot, David Howells
• [GIT PULL] EFI changes for v4.12, Ingo Molnar
• Linux 11-rc1 to rc8 boot problem, Paweł S
• [PATCH 1/2] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user, Geliang Tang
  • [PATCH 2/2] efi/efi_test: drop useless kfree, Geliang Tang
    • Re: [PATCH 2/2] efi/efi_test: drop useless kfree, ivanhu
      • Re: [PATCH 2/2] efi/efi_test: drop useless kfree, Geliang Tang
  • Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user, Matt Fleming
    • Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user, ivanhu
      • Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user, Matt Fleming
• [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
  • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Thomas Garnier
  • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Matt Fleming
    • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Bhupesh Sharma
        • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
          • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Borislav Petkov
            • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
            • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
      • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Russ Anderson
    • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
• [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
  • Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
    • Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Thomas Garnier
      • Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
        • Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled, Baoquan He
• [PATCH 1/1 linux-next] efi/capsule: kmap() can't fail, Fabian Frederick
  • Re: [PATCH 1/1 linux-next] efi/capsule: kmap() can't fail, Matt Fleming
• [PATCH 0/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback, Julien Grall
  • [PATCH 2/3 v2] arm/xen: Consolidate calls to shutdown hypercall in a single helper, Julien Grall
    • Re: [PATCH 2/3 v2] arm/xen: Consolidate calls to shutdown hypercall in a single helper, Stefano Stabellini
  • [PATCH 3/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback, Julien Grall
    • Re: [PATCH 3/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback, Boris Ostrovsky
    • Re: [PATCH 3/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback, Stefano Stabellini
  • [PATCH 1/3 v2] xen: Export xen_reboot, Julien Grall
    • Re: [PATCH 1/3 v2] xen: Export xen_reboot, Boris Ostrovsky
      • Re: [PATCH 1/3 v2] xen: Export xen_reboot, Juergen Gross
        • Re: [PATCH 1/3 v2] xen: Export xen_reboot, Juergen Gross
  • Re: [PATCH 0/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback, Julien Grall
    • Re: [PATCH 0/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback, Juergen Gross
      • Re: [PATCH 0/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback, Julien Grall
  • Re: [PATCH 0/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback, Juergen Gross
• [PATCH] efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns, Hans de Goede
  • Re: [PATCH] efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH] efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns, Matt Fleming
  • Re: efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns, Hans de Goede
    • Re: efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns, Matt Fleming
      • Re: efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns, Hans de Goede
• [PATCH v1 1/8] lib/uuid: Introduce uuid_{be|le}_cmp_p{p}() helpers, Andy Shevchenko
  • [PATCH v1 2/8] ASoC: Intel: Skylake: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}(), Andy Shevchenko
    • Re: [PATCH v1 2/8] ASoC: Intel: Skylake: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}(), Vinod Koul
      • Re: [PATCH v1 2/8] ASoC: Intel: Skylake: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}(), Andy Shevchenko
  • [PATCH v1 8/8] ACPI: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers, Andy Shevchenko
    • Re: [PATCH v1 8/8] ACPI: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers, Rafael J. Wysocki
      • Re: [PATCH v1 8/8] ACPI: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers, Borislav Petkov
        • Re: [PATCH v1 8/8] ACPI: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers, Andy Shevchenko
          • Re: [PATCH v1 8/8] ACPI: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH v1 4/8] vfio-mdev: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}(), Andy Shevchenko
  • [PATCH v1 5/8] vmbus: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers, Andy Shevchenko
  • [PATCH v1 7/8] efi: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers, Andy Shevchenko
  • [PATCH v1 6/8] mei: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers, Andy Shevchenko
  • [PATCH v1 3/8] HID: intel_ish-hid: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}(), Andy Shevchenko
  • RE: [PATCH v1 1/8] lib/uuid: Introduce uuid_{be|le}_cmp_p{p}() helpers, Winkler, Tomas
    • Re: [PATCH v1 1/8] lib/uuid: Introduce uuid_{be|le}_cmp_p{p}() helpers, Andy Shevchenko
      • Re: [PATCH v1 1/8] lib/uuid: Introduce uuid_{be|le}_cmp_p{p}() helpers, Winkler, Tomas
        • Re: [PATCH v1 1/8] lib/uuid: Introduce uuid_{be|le}_cmp_p{p}() helpers, Andy Shevchenko
    • Re: [PATCH v1 1/8] lib/uuid: Introduce uuid_{be|le}_cmp_p{p}() helpers, Lukas Wunner
• [PATCH v3 25/29] x86: assembly, make some functions local, Jiri Slaby
• [PATCH v3 27/29] x86_32: assembly, change all ENTRY to SYM_FUNC_START, Jiri Slaby
• [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers, Jan Kiszka
  • [PATCH v2 1/3] efi/capsule-loader: Redirect calls to efi_capsule_setup_info via weak alias, Jan Kiszka
  • [PATCH v2 3/3] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header, Jan Kiszka
    • Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header, Andy Shevchenko
  • [PATCH v2 2/3] efi/capsule-loader: Use page addresses rather than struct page pointers, Jan Kiszka
  • Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers, Bryan O'Donoghue
  • Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers, Bryan O'Donoghue
  • Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers, Matt Fleming
    • Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers, Bryan O'Donoghue
        • Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers, Ard Biesheuvel
          • Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers, Bryan O'Donoghue
            • Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers, Ard Biesheuvel
              • Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH 4.10 22/69] x86/efi: Dont try to reserve runtime regions, Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH 4.10 31/69] efi/libstub: Skip GOP with PIXEL_BLT_ONLY format, Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH 4.10 32/69] efi/fb: Avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer, Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH 4.9 16/69] x86/efi: Dont try to reserve runtime regions, Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH 4.9 25/69] efi/fb: Avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer, Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH 4.9 24/69] efi/libstub: Skip GOP with PIXEL_BLT_ONLY format, Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH V15 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V15 11/11] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V15 11/11] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH V15 11/11] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support, Baicar, Tyler
        • Re: [PATCH V15 11/11] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH V15 10/11] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V15 10/11] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH V15 09/11] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V15 09/11] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section, Borislav Petkov
    • Re: [PATCH V15 09/11] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section, Steven Rostedt
  • [PATCH V15 07/11] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V15 07/11] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH V15 05/11] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V15 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V15 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH V15 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V15 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH V15 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, Baicar, Tyler
        • Re: [PATCH V15 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, Borislav Petkov
    • Re: [PATCH V15 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, James Morse
      • Re: [PATCH V15 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, Baicar, Tyler
        • Re: [PATCH V15 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, James Morse
    • Re: [PATCH V15 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, Xiongfeng Wang
  • [PATCH V15 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V15 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH V15 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption, Baicar, Tyler
        • Re: [PATCH V15 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH V15 04/11] efi: parse ARM processor error, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V15 04/11] efi: parse ARM processor error, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH V15 04/11] efi: parse ARM processor error, Baicar, Tyler
        • Re: [PATCH V15 04/11] efi: parse ARM processor error, Borislav Petkov
          • Re: [PATCH V15 04/11] efi: parse ARM processor error, Baicar, Tyler
            • Re: [PATCH V15 04/11] efi: parse ARM processor error, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH V15 02/11] ras: acpi/apei: cper: add support for generic data v3 structure, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V15 02/11] ras: acpi/apei: cper: add support for generic data v3 structure, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH V15 03/11] cper: add timestamp print to CPER status printing, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V15 03/11] cper: add timestamp print to CPER status printing, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH V15 03/11] cper: add timestamp print to CPER status printing, Baicar, Tyler
        • Re: [PATCH V15 03/11] cper: add timestamp print to CPER status printing, Borislav Petkov
          • Re: [PATCH V15 03/11] cper: add timestamp print to CPER status printing, Baicar, Tyler
            • Re: [PATCH V15 03/11] cper: add timestamp print to CPER status printing, Borislav Petkov
• [PATCH v5 00/32] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD), Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v5 03/32] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v5 05/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v5 04/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v5 02/32] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME), Tom Lendacky
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • [PATCH v5 00/32] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD), Tom Lendacky
    • [PATCH v5 04/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature, Tom Lendacky
    • [PATCH v5 05/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size, Tom Lendacky
      • Re: [PATCH v5 05/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size, Borislav Petkov
        • Re: [PATCH v5 05/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size, Tom Lendacky
          • Re: [PATCH v5 05/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size, Borislav Petkov
    • [PATCH v5 12/32] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly, Tom Lendacky
      • Re: [PATCH v5 12/32] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly, Borislav Petkov
        • Re: [PATCH v5 12/32] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly, Tom Lendacky
    • [PATCH v5 15/32] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0, Tom Lendacky
      • Re: [PATCH v5 15/32] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0, Borislav Petkov
        • Re: [PATCH v5 15/32] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0, Tom Lendacky
    • [PATCH v5 16/32] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME, Tom Lendacky
    • [PATCH v5 21/32] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active, Tom Lendacky
    • [PATCH v5 25/32] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs, Tom Lendacky
    • [PATCH v5 24/32] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU if memory encryption is active, Tom Lendacky
    • [PATCH v5 27/32] kvm: x86: svm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption within KVM, Tom Lendacky
    • [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME, Tom Lendacky
      • Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME, Borislav Petkov
        • Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME, Tom Lendacky
          • Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME, Borislav Petkov
            • Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME, Tom Lendacky
              • Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME, Borislav Petkov
                • Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME, Tom Lendacky
      • Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME, Xunlei Pang
        • Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME, Dave Young
        • Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME, Tom Lendacky
          • Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME, Borislav Petkov
          • Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME, Xunlei Pang
            • Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME, Borislav Petkov
    • [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place, Tom Lendacky
      • Re: [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place, Borislav Petkov
        • Re: [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place, Tom Lendacky
          • Re: [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place, Borislav Petkov
            • Re: [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place, Tom Lendacky
              • Re: [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place, Borislav Petkov
                • Re: [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place, Tom Lendacky
    • [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption, Tom Lendacky
      • Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption, Dave Hansen
        • Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption, Dave Young
          • Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption, Dave Hansen
            • Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption, Dave Young
            • Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption, Tom Lendacky
          • Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption, Tom Lendacky
      • Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption, Borislav Petkov
        • Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption, Dave Young
          • Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption, Xunlei Pang
            • Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption, Tom Lendacky
    • [PATCH v5 30/32] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments, Tom Lendacky
    • [PATCH v5 26/32] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings, Tom Lendacky
      • Re: [PATCH v5 26/32] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings, Borislav Petkov
        • Re: [PATCH v5 26/32] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings, Tom Lendacky
    • [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption, Tom Lendacky
      • Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption, Tom Lendacky
        • Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption, Borislav Petkov
          • Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption, Josh Poimboeuf
            • Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption, Borislav Petkov
            • Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption, Tom Lendacky
              • Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption, Borislav Petkov
          • Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption, Tom Lendacky
      • Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption, Borislav Petkov
        • Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption, Tom Lendacky
          • Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption, Borislav Petkov
            • Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption, Tom Lendacky
              • Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption, Borislav Petkov
                • Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption, Tom Lendacky
                  • Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption, Borislav Petkov
    • [PATCH v5 23/32] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME, Tom Lendacky
      • Re: [PATCH v5 23/32] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME, Borislav Petkov
        • Re: [PATCH v5 23/32] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME, Tom Lendacky
    • [PATCH v5 22/32] x86, swiotlb: DMA support for memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
      • Re: [PATCH v5 22/32] x86, swiotlb: DMA support for memory encryption, Borislav Petkov
        • Re: [PATCH v5 22/32] x86, swiotlb: DMA support for memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
    • [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear, Tom Lendacky
      • Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear, Borislav Petkov
        • Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear, Tom Lendacky
          • Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear, Borislav Petkov
            • Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear, Tom Lendacky
              • Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear, Borislav Petkov
                • Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear, Tom Lendacky
                  • Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear, Borislav Petkov
        • Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear, Matt Fleming
          • Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear, Tom Lendacky
            • Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear, Borislav Petkov
              • Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear, Tom Lendacky
    • [PATCH v5 19/32] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear, Tom Lendacky
      • Re: [PATCH v5 19/32] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear, Borislav Petkov
        • Re: [PATCH v5 19/32] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear, Tom Lendacky
    • [PATCH v5 20/32] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute, Tom Lendacky
    • [PATCH v5 18/32] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data, Tom Lendacky
      • Re: [PATCH v5 18/32] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data, Borislav Petkov
        • Re: [PATCH v5 18/32] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data, Tom Lendacky
          • Re: [PATCH v5 18/32] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data, Borislav Petkov
    • [PATCH v5 13/32] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address, Tom Lendacky
      • Re: [PATCH v5 13/32] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address, Borislav Petkov
        • Re: [PATCH v5 13/32] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address, Ard Biesheuvel
    • [PATCH v5 11/32] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory, Tom Lendacky
    • [PATCH v5 14/32] efi: Add an EFI table address match function, Tom Lendacky
      • Re: [PATCH v5 14/32] efi: Add an EFI table address match function, Borislav Petkov
        • Re: [PATCH v5 14/32] efi: Add an EFI table address match function, Tom Lendacky
    • [PATCH v5 10/32] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs, Tom Lendacky
    • [PATCH v5 08/32] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros, Tom Lendacky
    • [PATCH v5 07/32] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing, Tom Lendacky
      • Re: [PATCH v5 07/32] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing, Borislav Petkov
        • Re: [PATCH v5 07/32] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing, Tom Lendacky
    • [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
      • Re: [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption, Dave Hansen
        • Re: [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
          • Re: [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption, Dave Hansen
            • Re: [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
      • Re: [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption, Borislav Petkov
        • Re: [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption, Tom Lendacky
          • Re: [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption, Borislav Petkov
    • [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support, Tom Lendacky
      • Re: [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support, Borislav Petkov
        • Re: [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support, Tom Lendacky
          • Re: [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support, Borislav Petkov
            • Re: [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support, Tom Lendacky
              • Re: [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support, Borislav Petkov
    • [PATCH v5 03/32] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings, Tom Lendacky
    • [PATCH v5 02/32] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support, Tom Lendacky
    • [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME), Tom Lendacky
      • Re: [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME), Borislav Petkov
        • Re: [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME), Tom Lendacky
          • Re: [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME), Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME), David Howells
• [GIT PULL] EFI fixup for v4.12 queue, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH] efi/libstub/arm: Don't use TASK_SIZE when randomising the RT space, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH v2] efi: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header, Gary Lin
  • Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header, Gary Lin
      • Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header, Roy Franz (HPE)
        • Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header, Gary Lin
• [RFC PATCH] x86: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header, Gary Lin
  • Re: [RFC PATCH] x86: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [RFC PATCH] x86: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header, Gary Lin
  • Re: [RFC PATCH] x86: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header, hpa
    • Re: [RFC PATCH] x86: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header, Gary Lin
      • Re: [RFC PATCH] x86: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header, hpa
• [PATCH] efifb: arm/arm64: validate fb BAR instead of claiming it, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm/arm64: don't use TASK_SIZE when randomising the RT space, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm/arm64: don't use TASK_SIZE when randomising the RT space, Mark Rutland
    • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm/arm64: don't use TASK_SIZE when randomising the RT space, James Morse
  • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm/arm64: don't use TASK_SIZE when randomising the RT space, Catalin Marinas
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback, Mark Rutland
  • Re: [PATCH] arm64: xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback, Matt Fleming
    • Re: [PATCH] arm64: xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback, Daniel Kiper
      • Re: [PATCH] arm64: xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback, Matt Fleming
        • Re: [PATCH] arm64: xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback, Daniel Kiper
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • Re: [PATCH] arm64: xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback, Julien Grall
• [PATCH 1/5] efi: Move the x86 secure boot switch to generic code, David Howells
  • [PATCH 5/5] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode, David Howells
  • [PATCH 4/5] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode, David Howells
  • [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, James Morris
  • [PATCH 2/5] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit, David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 1/5] efi: Move the x86 secure boot switch to generic code, David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 1/5] efi: Move the x86 secure boot switch to generic code, David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 1/5] efi: Move the x86 secure boot switch to generic code, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH 1/5] efi: Move the x86 secure boot switch to generic code, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 1/5] efi: Move the x86 secure boot switch to generic code, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH 4.9 58/72] x86/mm/KASLR: Exclude EFI region from KASLR VA space randomization, Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH 4.10 65/81] x86/mm/KASLR: Exclude EFI region from KASLR VA space randomization, Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown, David Howells
  • [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit, David Howells
  • [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, David Howells
  • [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 08/24] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot, David Howells
  • [PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode, David Howells
  • [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode, David Howells
  • [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown, Justin Forbes
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown, David Howells
    • [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, James Morris
      • Re: [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, James Morris
    • [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit, David Howells
    • [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode, David Howells
    • [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set, David Howells
    • [PATCH 17/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down, David Howells
    • [PATCH 16/24] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • [PATCH 19/24] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • [PATCH 18/24] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • [PATCH 12/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • [PATCH 14/24] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 14/24] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down, Kees Cook
    • [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode, David Howells
    • [PATCH 08/24] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot, David Howells
    • [PATCH 13/24] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • [PATCH 10/24] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • [PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown, James Morris
    • Re: [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown, David Howells
  • [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown, David Howells
    • [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit, David Howells
    • [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, David Howells
    • [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode, David Howells
    • [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode, Thomas Gleixner
        • Re: [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode, David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode, Matt Fleming
    • [PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down, Dave Young
    • [PATCH 10/24] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
    • [PATCH 13/24] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 13/24] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down, Thomas Gleixner
    • [PATCH 21/24] scsi: Lock down the eata driver, David Howells