On Wed, Apr 04, 2018 at 08:57:43AM -0400, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote: > On Wed, Apr 04, 2018 at 04:30:18AM +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > What I'm afraid of is this turning into a "security" feature that ends up > > being circumvented in most scenarios where it's currently deployed - eg, > > module signatures are mostly worthless in the non-lockdown case because you > > can just grab the sig_enforce symbol address and then kexec a preamble that > > flips it back to N regardless of the kernel config. > > Whoa. Why doesn't lockdown prevent kexec? Put another away, why > isn't this a problem for people who are fearful that Linux could be > used as part of a Windows boot virus in a Secure UEFI context? Because no one is afraid of that :) greg k-h -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-efi" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
