On 02/15/2018 10:22 AM, Joe Konno wrote:
From: Joe Konno <joe.konno@xxxxxxxxx>
Efivarfs nodes are created with group and world readable permissions.
Reading certain EFI variables trigger SMIs. So, this is a potential DoS
surface.
Make permissions more restrictive-- only the owner may read or write to
created inodes.
Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Reported-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Jeremy Kerr <jk@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: linux-efi@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Joe Konno <joe.konno@xxxxxxxxx>
The discussion in this thread has gone on too long, so:
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
And yes, this patch will break a couple of minor usecases, but IMO those
usecases deserve to break.
---
fs/efivarfs/super.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/efivarfs/super.c b/fs/efivarfs/super.c
index 5b68e4294faa..ca98c4e31eb7 100644
--- a/fs/efivarfs/super.c
+++ b/fs/efivarfs/super.c
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static int efivarfs_callback(efi_char16_t *name16, efi_guid_t vendor,
name[len + EFI_VARIABLE_GUID_LEN+1] = '\0';
- inode = efivarfs_get_inode(sb, d_inode(root), S_IFREG | 0644, 0,
+ inode = efivarfs_get_inode(sb, d_inode(root), S_IFREG | 0600, 0,
is_removable);
if (!inode)
goto fail_name;
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static int efivarfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
sb->s_d_op = &efivarfs_d_ops;
sb->s_time_gran = 1;
- inode = efivarfs_get_inode(sb, NULL, S_IFDIR | 0755, 0, true);
+ inode = efivarfs_get_inode(sb, NULL, S_IFDIR | 0700, 0, true);
if (!inode)
return -ENOMEM;
inode->i_op = &efivarfs_dir_inode_operations;
--
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