Linux EFI/UEFI Development
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- Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
- From: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
- From: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
- From: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
- From: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
- From: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
- From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 2/2] tpm: surface TPM event log based on EFI table
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/2] tpm: surface TPM event log based on EFI table
- From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/2] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
- From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
- RE: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
- From: "Prakhya, Sai Praneeth" <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
- From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
- From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
- From: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [GIT PULL] EFI changes for v4.14
- From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- RE: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
- From: "Prakhya, Sai Praneeth" <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
- From: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
- From: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] efi: libstub: add support for the Chaoskey RNG USB stick to the stub
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] efi: import USB I/O related declarations from the UEFI spec
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] efi: libstub: add support for the Chaoskey RNG USB stick to the stub
- From: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] efi: import USB I/O related declarations from the UEFI spec
- From: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] efi: libstub: add support for the Chaoskey RNG USB stick to the stub
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] efi: import USB I/O related declarations from the UEFI spec
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] efi: libstub: add support for the Chaoskey RNG USB stick to the stub
- From: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] efi: import USB I/O related declarations from the UEFI spec
- From: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
- From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC 00/11] KVM, EFI, arm64: EFI Runtime Services Sandboxing
- From: Christoffer Dall <cdall@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC 04/11] KVM, arm, arm64: Offer PAs to IPAs idmapping to internal VMs
- From: Christoffer Dall <cdall@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 00/14] EFI capsule update support for IOT2000 devices
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 00/14] EFI capsule update support for IOT2000 devices
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 00/14] EFI capsule update support for IOT2000 devices
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 02/14] efi: Add 'capsule' update support
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 03/14] x86/efi: Force EFI reboot to process pending capsules
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 06/14] efi/capsule: Allocate whole capsule into virtual memory
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 05/14] efi/capsule: Move 'capsule' to the stack in efi_capsule_supported()
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 04/14] efi: Add misc char driver interface to update EFI firmware
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 01/14] efi: Move efi_status_to_err() to drivers/firmware/efi/
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 00/14] EFI capsule update support for IOT2000 devices
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 09/14] efi/capsule: Clean up pr_err/_info() messages
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 11/14] efi/capsule-loader: Use a cached copy of the capsule header
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 10/14] efi/capsule: Adjust return type of efi_capsule_setup_info()
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 08/14] efi/capsule: Remove pr_debug() on ENOMEM or EFAULT
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 07/14] efi/capsule: Fix return code on failing kmap/vmap
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 14/14] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 12/14] efi/capsule-loader: Redirect calls to efi_capsule_setup_info() via weak alias
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 13/14] efi/capsule-loader: Use page addresses rather than struct page pointers
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 1/6] efi: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V2 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with %cr3
- From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V2 1/3] efi: Use efi_mm in x86 as well as ARM
- From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V2 2/3] x86/efi: Replace efi_pgd with efi_mm.pgd
- From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
- From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 5/5] efi: bgrt: use efi_mem_type()
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/5] efi/libstub: Enable reset attack mitigation
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 3/5] efi/reboot: Make function pointer orig_pm_power_off static
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [GIT PULL 0/5] more EFI changes for v4.14
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/5] efi/random: Increase size of firmware supplied randomness
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4/5] efi: move efi_mem_type() to common code
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
- From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
- From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC 00/11] KVM, EFI, arm64: EFI Runtime Services Sandboxing
- From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 2/2] EFI/BGRT: use efi_mem_type()
- From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 1/2] EFI: move efi_mem_type() to common code
- From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
- [RFC 01/11] arm64: Add an SMCCC function IDs header
- From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC 02/11] KVM: arm64: Return an Unknown ID on unhandled HVC
- From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC 03/11] KVM: Allow VM lifecycle management without userspace
- From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC 06/11] KVM, arm64: Expose a VCPU initialization function
- From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC 04/11] KVM, arm, arm64: Offer PAs to IPAs idmapping to internal VMs
- From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC 07/11] KVM: Allow initialization before the module target
- From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC 05/11] KVM: Expose VM/VCPU creation functions
- From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC 08/11] KVM, arm, arm64: Initialize KVM's core earlier
- From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC 10/11] efi, arm64: Sandbox Runtime Services in a VM
- From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC 11/11] KVM, arm64: Don't trap internal VMs SMC calls
- From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC 09/11] EFI, arm, arm64: Enable EFI Runtime Services later
- From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC 00/11] KVM, EFI, arm64: EFI Runtime Services Sandboxing
- From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
- From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] EFI: move efi_mem_type() to common code
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] EFI: move efi_mem_type() to common code
- From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] EFI: move efi_mem_type() to common code
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] EFI: move efi_mem_type() to common code
- From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] EFI: move efi_mem_type() to common code
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] EFI: move efi_mem_type() to common code
- From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/2] EFI/BGRT: use efi_mem_type()
- From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/2] EFI: move efi_mem_type() to common code
- From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 2/2] EFI/BGRT: use efi_mem_type()
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] EFI: move efi_mem_type() to common code
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/2] x86_64: boot, extract efi_pe_entry from startup_64
- From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/2] x86_32: boot, extract efi_pe_entry from startup_32
- From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
- From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- [efi:next 2/3] drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c:163:21: error: 'RANDOM_SEED_SIZE' undeclared
- From: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH][next] efi/reboot: make function pointer orig_pm_power_off static
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH][next] efi/reboot: make function pointer orig_pm_power_off static
- From: Colin King <colin.king@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
- From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
- From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
- From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
- From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
- From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
- From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [GIT PULL 00/14] EFI changes for v4.14
- From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Thinkpad e545 woes
- From: Evgeny Laktanov <anulap4lists@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] efi: random: increase size of firmware supplied randomness
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH 2/2] efi: libstub: add support for the Chaoskey RNG USB stick to the stub
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH 1/2] efi: import USB I/O related declarations from the UEFI spec
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 2/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
- From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
- From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [GIT PULL 00/14] EFI changes for v4.14
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 01/14] efi: arm: Don't mark ACPI reclaim memory as MEMBLOCK_NOMAP
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 03/14] efi/libstub: arm64: force 'hidden' visibility for section markers
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 02/14] efi/libstub: arm64: use hidden attribute for struct screen_info reference
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 04/14] efi/libstub: arm64: set -fpie when building the EFI stub
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 07/14] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 08/14] arm: efi: remove forbidden values from the PE/COFF header
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 06/14] efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 10/14] arm: efi: replace open coded constants with symbolic ones
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 12/14] firmware: dcdbas: constify attribute_group structures.
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 11/14] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 13/14] firmware: efi: constify attribute_group structures.
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 14/14] firmware: efi: esrt: constify attribute_group structures.
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 09/14] arm: efi: remove pointless dummy .reloc section
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 05/14] efi: arm/arm64: Add missing assignment of efi.config_table
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
- From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 2/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/3] firmware: dcdbas: constify attribute_group structures.
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
- From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 2/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
- From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- RE: [PATCH v5 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support
- From: "Zhuo, Qiuxu" <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
- From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
- From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 1/2] efi: Introduce efi_early_memdesc_ptr to get pointer to memmap descriptor
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 1/2] efi: Introduce efi_early_memdesc_ptr to get pointer to memmap descriptor
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 1/2] efi: Introduce efi_early_memdesc_ptr to get pointer to memmap descriptor
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
- From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
- From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
- From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
- From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
- From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
- From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/3] efi: Use efi_mm in x86 as well as ARM
- From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
- From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/3] x86/efi: Replace efi_pgd with efi_mm.pgd
- From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
- From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 1/2] efi: Introduce efi_early_memdesc_ptr to get pointer to memmap descriptor
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 2/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
- From: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges
- From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges
- From: Stuart Hayes <stuart.w.hayes@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges
- From: Stuart Hayes <stuart.w.hayes@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges
- From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area under SEV
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
- From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
- From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
- From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 RESEND] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 RESEND] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 RESEND] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 RESEND] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
- From: Chao Fan <fanc.fnst@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
- From: Chao Fan <fanc.fnst@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 1/2] efi: Introduce efi_memdesc_ptr to get pointer to memmap descriptor
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 2/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/3] firmware: dcdbas: constify attribute_group structures.
- From: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 3/3] firmware: efi: esrt: constify attribute_group structures.
- From: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/3] firmware: efi: constify attribute_group structures.
- From: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 0/3] constify firmware attribute_group structures.
- From: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges
- From: Stuart Hayes <stuart.w.hayes@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges
- From: Stuart Hayes <stuart.w.hayes@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- RE: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes
- From: David Laight <David.Laight@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- RE: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
- From: David Laight <David.Laight@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
- From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area under SEV
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 04/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
- From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 1/6] efi: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 1/6] efi: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 1/6] efi: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- RE: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
- From: David Laight <David.Laight@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area under SEV
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 04/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD)
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 5/6] uuid: Kill uapi/uuid.h
- From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 4/6] vmbus: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 5/6] uuid: Kill uapi/uuid.h
- From: kbuild test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 4/6] vmbus: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: kbuild test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 2/6] mei: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: kbuild test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
- From: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
- From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 1/6] efi: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
- From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
- From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 4/6] vmbus: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
- RE: [PATCH v1 4/6] vmbus: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v1 4/6] vmbus: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v1 0/6] uuid: Convert rest users to new API
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v1 1/6] efi: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v1 5/6] uuid: Kill uapi/uuid.h
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v1 2/6] mei: Switch to use new generic UUID API
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
- From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
- From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
- From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4.11 38/88] efi: Process the MEMATTR table only if EFI_MEMMAP is enabled
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4.12 27/84] efi: Process the MEMATTR table only if EFI_MEMMAP is enabled
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v10 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v10 37/38] compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __nostackp function attribute
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v10 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
- From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v10 37/38] compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __nostackp function attribute
- From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 01/38] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 02/38] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 05/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 03/38] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 06/38] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 08/38] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 10/38] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 09/38] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 11/38] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa()
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 13/38] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 14/38] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 12/38] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 17/38] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 18/38] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 19/38] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 22/38] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 21/38] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 23/38] x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 26/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 25/38] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 29/38] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 30/38] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 28/38] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 33/38] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 31/38] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 35/38] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 34/38] x86/mm: Create native_make_p4d() for PGTABLE_LEVELS <= 4
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 32/38] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 38/38] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 36/38] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 37/38] compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __nostackp function attribute
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 24/38] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 16/38] efi: Add an EFI table address match function
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 15/38] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] efi: add gpt_overprovisioned kernel command line parameter
- From: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
- From: Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
- From: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
- From: Brian Gerst <brgerst@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
- From: Brian Gerst <brgerst@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
- From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
- From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
- From: Brian Gerst <brgerst@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
- From: Brian Gerst <brgerst@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
- From: Brian Gerst <brgerst@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
- From: Brian Gerst <brgerst@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
- From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 01/38] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 02/38] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 03/38] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 05/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 08/38] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 06/38] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 11/38] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa()
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 13/38] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 12/38] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 14/38] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 17/38] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 19/38] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 22/38] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 23/38] x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 26/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 25/38] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 24/38] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 29/38] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 28/38] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 30/38] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 33/38] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 36/38] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 35/38] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 38/38] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 37/38] compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __nostackp function attribute
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 34/38] x86/mm: Create native_make_p4d() for PGTABLE_LEVELS <= 4
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 32/38] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 31/38] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 21/38] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 18/38] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 16/38] efi: Add an EFI table address match function
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 15/38] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 10/38] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 09/38] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v1] efivarfs: define integrity_read method
- From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH] efivarfs: define integrity_read method
- From: Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH] efivarfs: define integrity_read method
- From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 11/18] x86/efi: Move asmlinkage before return type
- From: Joe Perches <joe@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 00/18] treewide: Move storage class before return type
- From: Joe Perches <joe@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [GIT PULL] EFI changes for v4.13
- From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V17 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V17 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
- From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 7/7] arm: efi: add PE/COFF debug table to EFI header
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 6/7] arm: compressed: put zImage header and EFI header in dedicated section
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 4/7] arm: compressed: discard ksymtab/kcrctab sections
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 3/7] arm: efi: replace open coded constants with symbolic ones
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 2/7] arm: efi: remove pointless dummy .reloc section
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 1/7] arm: efi: remove forbidden values from the PE/COFF header
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 0/7] ARM: efi: PE/COFF cleanup/hardening
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 RESEND 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 RESEND 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
- From: Joerg Roedel <joro@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
- From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 32/38] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 34/38] x86/mm: Create native_make_p4d() for PGTABLE_LEVELS <= 4
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 36/38] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 35/38] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 37/38] compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __nostackp function attribute
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 38/38] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 33/38] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 31/38] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 30/38] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 29/38] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 28/38] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 23/38] x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 21/38] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 25/38] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 26/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 28/38] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 29/38] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 30/38] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 26/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 24/38] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 25/38] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 06/38] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 08/38] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 09/38] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 21/38] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 23/38] x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 12/38] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 22/38] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 13/38] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 14/38] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 15/38] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 19/38] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 17/38] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 11/38] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa()
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 18/38] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 16/38] efi: Add an EFI table address match function
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 10/38] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 05/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 01/38] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 02/38] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 RESEND 03/38] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 24/38] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 22/38] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 16/38] efi: Add an EFI table address match function
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 19/38] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 18/38] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 17/38] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 10/38] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 11/38] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa()
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 12/38] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 13/38] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 15/38] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 14/38] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 09/38] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 08/38] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 06/38] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 02/38] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 05/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 03/38] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 01/38] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- RE: [PATCH v4 2/2] eif/capsule-pstore: Add capsule pstore backend
- From: "Zhuo, Qiuxu" <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
- RE: [PATCH v4 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support
- From: "Zhuo, Qiuxu" <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 2/2] eif/capsule-pstore: Add capsule pstore backend
- From: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 1/2] efi: Add 'nr_config_table' variable in efi structure
- From: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support
- From: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v4 2/2] eif/capsule-pstore: Add capsule pstore backend
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 34/36] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 34/36] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v4 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- RE: [PATCH v4 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support
- From: "Zhuo, Qiuxu" <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC] memory corruption caused by efi driver?
- From: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC] memory corruption caused by efi driver?
- From: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v4 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC] memory corruption caused by efi driver?
- From: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC] memory corruption caused by efi driver?
- From: Yisheng Xie <xieyisheng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v4 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v4 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 34/36] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 36/36] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 35/36] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 34/36] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 33/36] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 32/36] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 31/36] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v4 2/2] eif/capsule-pstore: Add capsule pstore backend
- From: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v4 1/2] efi: Add 'nr_config_table' variable in efi structure
- From: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v4 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support
- From: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen
- From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 27/36] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 19/36] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 18/36] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 16/36] efi: Add an EFI table address match function
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 27/36] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen
- From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 1/2] efi: Process MEMATTR table only if EFI_MEMMAP
- From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 0/2] xen/efi: Fixes
- From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns
- From: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 17/36] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 26/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- RE: [PATCH v3 2/2] eif/capsule-pstore: Add capsule pstore backend
- From: "Zhuo, Qiuxu" <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
- RE: [PATCH v3 1/2] efi: Add 'nr_config_table' variable in efi structure
- From: "Zhuo, Qiuxu" <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] eif/capsule-pstore: Add capsule pstore backend
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
- From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
- From: Joerg Roedel <joro@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
- From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 25/36] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 07/36] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 07/36] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 06/36] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns
- From: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64
- From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Problem with new X.509 is_hash_blacklisted() interface
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64
- From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Problem with new X.509 is_hash_blacklisted() interface
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Problem with new X.509 is_hash_blacklisted() interface
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/7] ARM: efi: PE/COFF cleanup/hardening
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] efi: Add 'nr_config_table' variable in efi structure
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 25/36] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 24/36] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 23/36] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen
- From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/2] x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen
- From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen
- From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- RE: [PATCH v3 2/2] eif/capsule-pstore: Add capsule pstore backend
- From: "Zhuo, Qiuxu" <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 20/36] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- RE: [PATCH v3 1/2] efi: Add 'nr_config_table' variable in efi structure
- From: "Zhuo, Qiuxu" <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 10/36] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/2] x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen
- From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: Process MEMATTR table only if EFI_MEMMAP
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 07/36] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active
- From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 10/36] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
- From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
- From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] efi: Add 'nr_config_table' variable in efi structure
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] eif/capsule-pstore: Add capsule pstore backend
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 07/36] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active
- From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 06/36] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
- From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 19/36] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/2] x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen
- From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/2] efi: Process MEMATTR table only if EFI_MEMMAP
- From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 0/2] xen/efi: Fixes
- From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 11/36] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa()
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 11/36] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa()
- From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Problem with new X.509 is_hash_blacklisted() interface
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 14/36] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64
- From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 2/2] eif/capsule-pstore: Add capsule pstore backend
- From: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 1/2] efi: Add 'nr_config_table' variable in efi structure
- From: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support
- From: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 11/36] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa()
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 03/36] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 18/31] efi-stub.txt: standardize document format
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64
- From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 18/31] efi-stub.txt: standardize document format
- From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 29/36] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
- From: kbuild test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 32/36] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests
- From: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 01/36] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 03/36] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 05/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 10/36] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 09/36] x86/mm: Simplify p[gum]d_page() macros
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 11/36] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa()
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 12/36] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 13/36] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 16/36] efi: Add an EFI table address match function
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 19/36] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 17/36] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 18/36] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 20/36] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 21/36] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 23/36] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 24/36] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 29/36] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 30/36] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 31/36] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 33/36] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 36/36] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 34/36] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 35/36] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 32/36] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 28/36] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 27/36] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 26/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 25/36] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 22/36] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 15/36] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 14/36] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 07/36] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 04/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 06/36] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 02/36] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 00/36] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
- From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4.11 05/13] efi: Fix boot panic because of invalid BGRT image address
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 30/34] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 30/34] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 29/34] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4.11 049/150] efi/bgrt: Skip efi_bgrt_init() in case of non-EFI boot
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4.11 049/150] efi/bgrt: Skip efi_bgrt_init() in case of non-EFI boot
- From: Maniaxx <tripleshiftone@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
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