On Tue, 2018-03-06 at 15:05 +0100, Jiri Slaby wrote: > On 11/16/2016, 07:10 PM, David Howells wrote: > > Here are two sets of patches. Firstly, the first three patches provide a > > blacklist, making the following changes: > ... > > Secondly, the remaining patches allow the UEFI database to be used to load > > the system keyrings: > ... > > Dave Howells (2): > > efi: Add EFI signature data types > > efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser > > > > David Howells (5): > > KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring > > X.509: Allow X.509 certs to be blacklisted > > PKCS#7: Handle blacklisted certificates > > KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring > > efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions > > > > Josh Boyer (2): > > MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot > > MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed > > Hi, > > what's the status of this please? Distributors (I checked SUSE, RedHat > and Ubuntu) have to carry these patches and every of them have to > forward-port the patches to new kernels. So are you going to resend the > PR to have this merged? With secure boot enabled, we establish a signature chain of trust, rooted in HW, up to the kernel and then transition from those keys to a new set of keys builtin the kernel and loaded onto the builtin_trusted_keys (builtin). Enabling the secondary_builtin_keys (secondary) allows keys signed by a key on the builtin keyring to be added to the secondary keyring. Any key, signed by a key on either the builtin or secondary keyring, can be added to the IMA trusted keyring. The "KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring" patch loads the platform keys directly onto the secondary keyring, without requiring them to be signed by a key on the builtin or secondary keyring. With this change, any key signed by a platfrom key on the secondary, can be loaded onto the .ima trusted keyring. Just because I trust the platform keys prior to booting the kernel, doesn't mean that I *want* to trust those keys once booted. There are, however, places where we need access to those keys to verify a signature (eg. kexec kernel image). Nayna Jain's "certs: define a trusted platform keyring" patch set introduces a new, separate keyring for these platform keys. Mimi -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-efi" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
