Linux EFI/UEFI Development
[Prev Page][Next Page]
- Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 24/34] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 20/34] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 20/34] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 24/34] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 23/34] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 23/34] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 22/34] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 23/34] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 20/34] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4.11 048/150] efi: Dont issue error message when booted under Xen
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4.11 049/150] efi/bgrt: Skip efi_bgrt_init() in case of non-EFI boot
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4.9 034/119] efi: Dont issue error message when booted under Xen
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 14/34] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 18/34] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 14/34] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 13/34] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 09/34] x86/mm: Simplify p[gum]d_page() macros
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- [GIT PULL] EFI fix
- From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
- From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
- From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
- From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
- From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 06/34] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 05/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 04/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/3] efi: arm64: use -fpie for building the stub
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: arm: Don't mark ACPI reclaim memory as MEMBLOCK_NOMAP
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [GIT PULL] Another EFI BGRT fix for v4.12
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2] efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address
- From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address
- From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
- From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
- From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
- From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3] efi/libstub: arm64: set -fpie when building the EFI stub
- From: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3] efi/libstub: arm64: set -fpie when building the EFI stub
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3] efi/libstub: arm64: set -fpie when building the EFI stub
- From: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 2/3] efi/libstub: arm64: force 'hidden' visibility for section markers
- From: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/3] efi/libstub: arm64: use hidden attribute for struct screen_info reference
- From: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 00/34] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address
- From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address
- From: Maniaxx <tripleshiftone@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
- From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
- From: kbuild test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
- From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
- From: kbuild test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address
- From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] x86/efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address
- From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 19/34] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: kbuild test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 00/34] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
- From: Nick Sarnie <commendsarnex@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
- From: Nick Sarnie <commendsarnex@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
- From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 20/34] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 03/34] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 00/34] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 02/34] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 04/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 07/34] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 09/34] x86/mm: Simplify p[gum]d_page() macros
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 08/34] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 12/34] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 11/34] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 13/34] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 14/34] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 17/34] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 18/34] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 21/34] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 23/34] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 22/34] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 27/34] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 28/34] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 30/34] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 32/34] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 33/34] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 34/34] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 31/34] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 29/34] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 24/34] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 19/34] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 16/34] efi: Add an EFI table address match function
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 15/34] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 05/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 06/34] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 01/34] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64
- From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
- Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression]
- From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 01/13] x86/efi: Clean up efi CR3 save/restore
- From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 10/13] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
- From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 01/13] x86/efi: Clean up efi CR3 save/restore
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 10/13] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [GIT PULL 00/13] First batch of EFI updates for v4.13
- From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 10/13] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
- From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 01/13] x86/efi: Clean up efi CR3 save/restore
- From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [GIT PULL 00/13] First batch of EFI updates for v4.13
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: arm: Don't mark ACPI reclaim memory as MEMBLOCK_NOMAP
- From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [GIT PULL 00/13] First batch of EFI updates for v4.13
- From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [GIT PULL 00/13] First batch of EFI updates for v4.13
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] efi: arm: Don't mark ACPI reclaim memory as MEMBLOCK_NOMAP
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V17 02/11] ras: acpi/apei: cper: add support for generic data v3 structure
- From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
- [GIT PULL 00/13] First batch of EFI updates for v4.13
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 02/13] efi/capsule: Fix return code on failing kmap/vmap
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 04/13] efi/capsule: Clean up pr_err/info messages
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 05/13] efi/capsule: Adjust return type of efi_capsule_setup_info
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 06/13] efi/capsule-loader: Use a cached copy of the capsule header
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 08/13] efi/capsule-loader: Redirect calls to efi_capsule_setup_info via weak alias
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 10/13] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 12/13] x86/efi: Add EFI_PGT_DUMP support for x86_32 and kexec
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 11/13] efi/efi_test: Use memdup_user() helper
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 13/13] efi: arm: enable DMI/SMBIOS
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 09/13] efi/capsule-loader: Use page addresses rather than struct page pointers
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 07/13] efi/capsule: Remove NULL test on kmap()
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 03/13] efi/capsule: Remove pr_debug on ENOMEM or EFAULT
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 01/13] x86/efi: Clean up efi CR3 save/restore
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [GIT PULL] EFI fixes
- From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression]
- From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression]
- From: Maniaxx <tripleshiftone@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] efi: arm: enable DMI/SMBIOS
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] efi: arm: enable DMI/SMBIOS
- From: Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] efi: arm: enable DMI/SMBIOS
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2] efi: arm: enable DMI/SMBIOS
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression]
- From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression]
- From: Maniaxx <tripleshiftone@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
- From: Xunlei Pang <xpang@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 26/32] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 0/7] ARM: efi: PE/COFF cleanup/hardening
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4/7] arm: compressed: discard ksymtab/kcrctab sections
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 7/7] arm: efi: add PE/COFF debug table to EFI header
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/7] arm: efi: remove pointless dummy .reloc section
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 6/7] arm: compressed: put zImage header and EFI header in dedicated section
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 3/7] arm: efi: replace open coded constants with symbolic ones
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/7] arm: efi: remove forbidden values from the PE/COFF header
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 5/5] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode
- From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Problem with new X.509 is_hash_blacklisted() interface
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Problem with new X.509 is_hash_blacklisted() interface
- From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression]
- From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression]
- From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 5/5] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode
- From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
- From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
- From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/5] efi: Don't issue error message when booted under xen
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 5/5] efi/bgrt: Skip efi_bgrt_init in case of non-efi boot
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4/5] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 3/5] x86/efi: Disable runtime services on kexec kernel if booted with efi=old_map
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/5] efi: Remove duplicate 'const' specifiers
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [GIT PULL 0/5] EFI urgent fixes
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/5] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
- From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
- From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 2/5] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
- From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
- From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/5] efi: Move the x86 secure boot switch to generic code
- From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Xunlei Pang <xpang@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
- From: Xunlei Pang <xpang@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression]
- From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v4] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4.11 00/28] 4.11.1-stable review
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
- From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Disable runtime services on kexec kernel if booted with efi=old_map
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4.11 00/28] 4.11.1-stable review
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v4] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
- From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
- From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4/5] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 5/5] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/5] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/5] efi: Move the x86 secure boot switch to generic code
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/5] efi: Move the x86 secure boot switch to generic code
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/5] efi: Move the x86 secure boot switch to generic code
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v4] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- RE: [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix write/erase id tracking
- From: "Lofstedt, Marta" <marta.lofstedt@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error
- From: gengdongjiu <gengdj.1984@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error
- From: gengdongjiu <gengdj.1984@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
- From: Heyi Guo <heyi.guo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 2/2] efifb: Avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 2/2] efifb: Avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
- From: Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V17 02/11] ras: acpi/apei: cper: add support for generic data v3 structure
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V17 04/11] efi: parse ARM processor error
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V17 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V17 05/11] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V17 09/11] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V17 07/11] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V17 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V17 11/11] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V17 10/11] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V17 03/11] cper: add timestamp print to CPER status printing
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V17 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 23/32] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 22/32] x86, swiotlb: DMA support for memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 19/32] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix write/erase id tracking
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 2/2] efifb: Avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 2/2] efifb: Avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
- From: Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/5] efi: Move the x86 secure boot switch to generic code
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix read iter after pstore API refactor
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64
- From: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix read iter after pstore API refactor
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix read iter after pstore API refactor
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
- From: Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix read iter after pstore API refactor
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix read iter after pstore API refactor
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/bgrt: skip efi_bgrt_init in case non-efi boot
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 3/3] efi/libstub: arm64: set -fpie when building the EFI stub
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/3] efi/libstub: arm64: force 'hidden' visibility for section markers
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/3] efi/libstub: arm64: use hidden attribute for struct screen_info reference
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 0/3] efi: arm64: use -fpie for building the stub
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 18/32] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v4] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64
- From: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 18/32] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64
- From: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Disable runtime services on kexec kernel if booted with efi=old_map
- From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
- From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Disable runtime services on kexec kernel if booted with efi=old_map
- From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Disable runtime services on kexec kernel if booted with efi=old_map
- From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Disable runtime services on kexec kernel if booted with efi=old_map
- From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 14/32] efi: Add an EFI table address match function
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 26/32] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V16 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V16 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V16 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 23/32] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V16 10/11] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V16 09/11] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V16 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 22/32] x86, swiotlb: DMA support for memory encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 19/32] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 18/32] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Fix kexec kernel panic when efi=old_map is enabled
- From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] efi/bgrt: skip efi_bgrt_init in case non-efi boot
- From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V16 02/11] ras: acpi/apei: cper: add support for generic data v3 structure
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V16 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V16 05/11] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V16 03/11] cper: add timestamp print to CPER status printing
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V16 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V16 07/11] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V16 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V16 10/11] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V16 11/11] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V16 09/11] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V16 04/11] efi: parse ARM processor error
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V16 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 14/32] efi: Add an EFI table address match function
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4.11 00/28] 4.11.1-stable review
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V2] x86/efi: Add EFI_PGT_DUMP support for x86_32, kexec
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: remove duplicate 'const' specifiers
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 08/10] efi/x86: Move EFI BGRT init code to early init code
- From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Fix kexec kernel panic when efi=old_map is enabled
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 08/10] efi/x86: Move EFI BGRT init code to early init code
- From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: don't issue error message when booted under xen
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 08/10] efi/x86: Move EFI BGRT init code to early init code
- From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 08/10] efi/x86: Move EFI BGRT init code to early init code
- From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 08/10] efi/x86: Move EFI BGRT init code to early init code
- From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix read iter after pstore API refactor
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Fix kexec kernel panic when efi=old_map is enabled
- From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error
- From: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error
- From: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
- From: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Fix kexec kernel panic when efi=old_map is enabled
- From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V2] x86/efi: Add EFI_PGT_DUMP support for x86_32, kexec
- From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Add EFI_PGT_DUMP support for x86_32, kexec and efi=old_map
- From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: remove duplicate 'const' specifiers
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
- From: David Daney <ddaney@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: remove duplicate 'const' specifiers
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] efi: remove duplicate 'const' specifiers
- From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Add EFI_PGT_DUMP support for x86_32, kexec and efi=old_map
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] x86/efi: Add EFI_PGT_DUMP support for x86_32, kexec and efi=old_map
- From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64
- From: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64
- From: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error
- From: gengdongjiu <gengdongjiu@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error
- From: Christoffer Dall <cdall@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error
- From: gengdongjiu <gengdongjiu@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] arm64: kvm: support kvmtool to detect RAS extension feature
- From: gengdongjiu <gengdongjiu@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error
- From: gengdongjiu <gengdongjiu@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
- From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64
- From: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64
- From: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64
- From: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error
- From: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] x86/boot/32: Fix UP boot on Quark and possibly other platforms
- From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [tip:x86/mm] x86/boot/32: Defer resyncing initial_page_table until per-cpu is set up
- From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 11/11] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 11/11] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] x86/efi: Fix kexec kernel panic when efi=old_map is enabled
- From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [tip:x86/mm] x86/boot/32: Defer resyncing initial_page_table until per-cpu is set up
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error
- From: Christoffer Dall <cdall@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 11/11] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 10/11] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] arm64: kvm: support kvmtool to detect RAS extension feature
- From: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
- From: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error
- From: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [tip:x86/mm] x86/boot/32: Defer resyncing initial_page_table until per-cpu is set up
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [tip:x86/mm] x86/boot/32: Defer resyncing initial_page_table until per-cpu is set up
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 15/32] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] efi: don't issue error message when booted under xen
- From: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [tip:x86/mm] x86/boot/32: Defer resyncing initial_page_table until per-cpu is set up
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [tip:x86/mm] x86/boot/32: Defer resyncing initial_page_table until per-cpu is set up
- From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [tip:x86/mm] x86/boot/32: Defer resyncing initial_page_table until per-cpu is set up
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user
- From: ivanhu <ivan.hu@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [tip:x86/mm] x86/boot/32: Defer resyncing initial_page_table until per-cpu is set up
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
- From: Russ Anderson <rja@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
- From: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 15/32] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 13/32] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/1 linux-next] efi/capsule: kmap() can't fail
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] rtc: rtc-efi: Add an enable parameter and make it false for X86 by default
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 09/11] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section
- From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 09/11] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 13/32] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error
- From: gengdongjiu <gengdj.1984@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] arm64: kvm: support kvmtool to detect RAS extension feature
- From: gengdongjiu <gengdj.1984@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error
- From: gengdongjiu <gengdj.1984@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 12/32] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 12/32] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
- From: Heyi Guo <heyi.guo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
- From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [GIT PULL] Hardware module parameter annotation for secure boot
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 2/2] efi/efi_test: drop useless kfree
- From: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback
- From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback
- From: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback
- From: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/5] efi: Move the x86 secure boot switch to generic code
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback
- From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 2/2] efi/efi_test: drop useless kfree
- From: ivanhu <ivan.hu@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
- From: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [GIT PULL] EFI changes for v4.12
- From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Linux 11-rc1 to rc8 boot problem
- From: Paweł S <pawel.pc44@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/2] efi/efi_test: drop useless kfree
- From: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/2] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user
- From: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
- From: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/3 v2] xen: Export xen_reboot
- From: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 07/11] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 8/8] ACPI: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 8/8] ACPI: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 8/8] ACPI: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
- From: "Bryan O'Donoghue" <pure.logic@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
- From: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
- From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/1 linux-next] efi/capsule: kmap() can't fail
- From: Fabian Frederick <fabf@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 04/11] efi: parse ARM processor error
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 04/11] efi: parse ARM processor error
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
- From: "Bryan O'Donoghue" <pure.logic@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/3 v2] xen: Export xen_reboot
- From: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback
- From: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 2/3 v2] arm/xen: Consolidate calls to shutdown hypercall in a single helper
- From: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback
- From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/3 v2] xen: Export xen_reboot
- From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/3 v2] xen: Export xen_reboot
- From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 3/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback
- From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/3 v2] arm/xen: Consolidate calls to shutdown hypercall in a single helper
- From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 0/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback
- From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 04/11] efi: parse ARM processor error
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 1/8] lib/uuid: Introduce uuid_{be|le}_cmp_p{p}() helpers
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 1/8] lib/uuid: Introduce uuid_{be|le}_cmp_p{p}() helpers
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 2/8] ASoC: Intel: Skylake: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}()
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 2/8] ASoC: Intel: Skylake: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}()
- From: Vinod Koul <vinod.koul@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 1/8] lib/uuid: Introduce uuid_{be|le}_cmp_p{p}() helpers
- From: "Winkler, Tomas" <tomas.winkler@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 1/8] lib/uuid: Introduce uuid_{be|le}_cmp_p{p}() helpers
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns
- From: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
- RE: [PATCH v1 1/8] lib/uuid: Introduce uuid_{be|le}_cmp_p{p}() helpers
- From: "Winkler, Tomas" <tomas.winkler@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
- From: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
- From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 07/32] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 8/8] ACPI: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers
- From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v1 3/8] HID: intel_ish-hid: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}()
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v1 6/8] mei: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 03/11] cper: add timestamp print to CPER status printing
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 07/32] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 04/11] efi: parse ARM processor error
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 04/11] efi: parse ARM processor error
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 03/11] cper: add timestamp print to CPER status printing
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 03/11] cper: add timestamp print to CPER status printing
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 03/11] cper: add timestamp print to CPER status printing
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v1 7/8] efi: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v1 5/8] vmbus: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v1 1/8] lib/uuid: Introduce uuid_{be|le}_cmp_p{p}() helpers
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v1 4/8] vfio-mdev: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}()
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v1 8/8] ACPI: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v1 2/8] ASoC: Intel: Skylake: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}()
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 25/29] x86: assembly, make some functions local
- From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 27/29] x86_32: assembly, change all ENTRY to SYM_FUNC_START
- From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 03/11] cper: add timestamp print to CPER status printing
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 05/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback
- From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 05/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 05/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
- From: "Bryan O'Donoghue" <pure.logic@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 02/11] ras: acpi/apei: cper: add support for generic data v3 structure
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
- From: "Bryan O'Donoghue" <pure.logic@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback
- From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback
- From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 2/3] efi/capsule-loader: Use page addresses rather than struct page pointers
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 3/3] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 1/3] efi/capsule-loader: Redirect calls to efi_capsule_setup_info via weak alias
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V15 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4.10 22/69] x86/efi: Dont try to reserve runtime regions
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4.10 31/69] efi/libstub: Skip GOP with PIXEL_BLT_ONLY format
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4.10 32/69] efi/fb: Avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4.9 16/69] x86/efi: Dont try to reserve runtime regions
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4.9 25/69] efi/fb: Avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4.9 24/69] efi/libstub: Skip GOP with PIXEL_BLT_ONLY format
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V15 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V15 03/11] cper: add timestamp print to CPER status printing
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V15 02/11] ras: acpi/apei: cper: add support for generic data v3 structure
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V15 04/11] efi: parse ARM processor error
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V15 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V15 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V15 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V15 05/11] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V15 07/11] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V15 09/11] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V15 10/11] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V15 11/11] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 02/32] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 03/32] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 07/32] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 08/32] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 10/32] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 14/32] efi: Add an EFI table address match function
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 11/32] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 13/32] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 18/32] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 20/32] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 19/32] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 22/32] x86, swiotlb: DMA support for memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 23/32] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 26/32] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 30/32] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 27/32] kvm: x86: svm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption within KVM
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 24/32] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU if memory encryption is active
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 25/32] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 21/32] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 16/32] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 15/32] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 12/32] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 05/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 04/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 00/32] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 02/32] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 04/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 05/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 03/32] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 00/32] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 8/8] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 12/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down
- From: Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
- From: Ben Hutchings <ben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 8/8] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/8] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/8] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
- From: "Bryan O'Donoghue" <pure.logic@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/8] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/8] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
- From: "Bryan O'Donoghue" <pure.logic@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
- From: Ben Hutchings <ben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
- From: Ben Hutchings <ben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 8/8] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 8/8] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 7/8] efi/capsule-loader: use page addresses rather than struct page pointers
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 7/8] efi/capsule-loader: use page addresses rather than struct page pointers
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 8/8] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
- From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 7/8] efi/capsule-loader: use page addresses rather than struct page pointers
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 8/8] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 8/8] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 6/8] efi/capsule-loader: indirect calls to efi_capsule_setup_info via weak alias
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 5/8] efi/capsule-loader: use cached copy of capsule header
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/8] efi/capsule: Adjust return type of efi_capsule_setup_info
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/8] efi/capsule: Clean up pr_err/info messages
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 2/8] efi/capsule: Remove pr_debug on ENOMEM or EFAULT
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/8] efi/capsule: Fix return code on failing kmap/vmap
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header
- From: Gary Lin <glin@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: linux-efi archive
- From: Konstantin Ryabitsev <konstantin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header
- From: "Roy Franz (HPE)" <roy.lists@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] efi/libstub/arm: Don't use TASK_SIZE when randomising the RT space
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [GIT PULL] EFI fixup for v4.12 queue
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 14/24] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
- From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 13/24] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
- From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode
- From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- linux-efi archive
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH] x86: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header
- Re: [RFC PATCH] x86: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header
- From: Gary Lin <glin@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH] x86: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header
- Re: [PATCH V14 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V14 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V14 03/10] efi: parse ARM processor error
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V14 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V14 01/10] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 20/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header
- From: Gary Lin <glin@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2] efi: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header
- From: Gary Lin <glin@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V14 03/10] efi: parse ARM processor error
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V14 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
- From: Joe Perches <joe@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] x86/efi: Don't try to reserve runtime regions
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [GIT PULL] EFI urgent fix
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 20/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
- From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
- From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V14 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH] x86: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header
- From: Gary Lin <glin@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH] x86: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V14 01/10] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
[Index of Archives]
[Linux Kernel Development]
[Security]
[Linux ARM Kernel]
[Tools]
[Linux MIPS]
[Linux S390]
[Bugtraq]
[Share Photos]>
[Fedora ARM]