Linux EFI/UEFI Development

• Thread Index

• Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub
  • From: Gary Lin <glin@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub
  • From: Gary Lin <glin@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4.4 05/27] x86/efi: Build our own page table structures
  • From: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V2 1/2] efi: move ARM CPER code to new file
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V2 1/2] efi: move ARM CPER code to new file
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V2 2/2] efi: parse ARM error information value
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V2 1/2] efi: move ARM CPER code to new file
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V2 0/2] CPER ARM error information parsing
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Alan Cox <gnomes@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub
  • From: Alan Cox <gnomes@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub
  • From: Gary Lin <glin@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub
  • From: Gary Lin <glin@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub
  • From: Gary Lin <glin@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL 0/3] EFI fixes for v4.15
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/3] efi: move some sysfs files to be read-only by root
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/3] efi/esrt: use memunmap rather kfree to free the remapping
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/3] efi: add comment to avoid future expanding of sysfs systab
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL 0/3] EFI fixes for v4.15
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: move some sysfs files to be read-only by root
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub
  • From: Gary Lin <glin@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub
  • From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: move some sysfs files to be read-only by root
  • From: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] efi: move some sysfs files to be read-only by root
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: efi/esrt: use memunmap rather kfree to free the remapping
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2] efi: move some sysfs files to be read-only by root
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: move some sysfs files to be read-only by root
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Pavel Machek <pavel@xxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: move some sysfs files to be read-only by root
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: add comment to avoid future expanding of sysfs systab
  • From: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi: move some sysfs files to be read-only by root
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC v3 PATCH 2/2] arm64/efi: Introduce Security Version to ARM64
  • From: Gary Lin <glin@xxxxxxxx>
• [RFC v3 PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Introduce Security Version to x86
  • From: Gary Lin <glin@xxxxxxxx>
• [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub
  • From: Gary Lin <glin@xxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi: add comment to avoid future expanding of sysfs systab
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 2/2] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4.4 03/27] x86/mm/pat: Ensure cpa->pfn only contains page frame numbers
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4.4 05/27] x86/efi: Build our own page table structures
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4.4 04/27] x86/efi: Hoist page table switching code into efi_call_virt()
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: David Laight <David.Laight@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Joe Perches <joe@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 2/2] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] fix system_state checking in early_ioremap
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] fix system_state checking in early_ioremap
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 2/2] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/4] MODSIGN: do not load mok when secure boot disabled
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/4] MODSIGN: do not load mok when secure boot disabled
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local
  • From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 26/27] x86_32: assembly, change all ENTRY+ENDPROC to SYM_FUNC_*
  • From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 23/27] x86_64: assembly, change all ENTRY+ENDPROC to SYM_FUNC_*
  • From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] x86: move parse_early_param to earlier code for add_efi_memmap
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] hash addresses printed with %p
  • From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/4] MODSIGN: print appropriate status message when getting UEFI certificates list
  • From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4/4] MODSIGN: checking the blacklisted hash before loading a kernel module
  • From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/4] MODSIGN: load blacklist from MOKx
  • From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/4] MODSIGN: do not load mok when secure boot disabled
  • From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 0/4] Using the hash in MOKx to blacklist kernel module
  • From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 0/4] Using the hash in MOKx to blacklist kernel module
  • From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi: Use PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO()
  • From: Vasyl Gomonovych <gomonovych@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 1/2] arm64: Define cputype macros for Falkor CPU
  • From: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 2/2] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 0/2] Implement a software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP
  • From: Bhupesh SHARMA <bhupesh.linux@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP
  • From: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: Timur Tabi <timur@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown
  • From: Pavel Machek <pavel@xxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [v3,2/2] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: Manoj Iyer <manoj.iyer@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: Manoj Iyer <manoj.iyer@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP
  • From: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Alan Cox <gnomes@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Alan Cox <gnomes@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP
  • From: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 1/2] arm64: Define cputype macros for Falkor CPU
  • From: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 2/2] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 0/2] Implement a software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 1/2] arm64: Define cputype macros for Falkor CPU
  • From: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 2/2] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 0/2] Implement a software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Alan Cox <gnomes@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: Manoj Iyer <manoj.iyer@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP
  • From: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@xxxxxxxxxx>
• arm64 crashkernel fails to boot on acpi-only machines due to ACPI regions being no longer mapped as NOMAP
  • From: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 26/30] Lock down ftrace
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 26/30] Lock down ftrace
  • From: Jiri Kosina <jikos@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 26/30] Lock down ftrace
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 26/30] Lock down ftrace
  • From: Jiri Kosina <jikos@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 26/30] Lock down ftrace
  • From: Jiri Kosina <jikos@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 26/30] Lock down ftrace
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 00/30] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 01/30] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 06/30] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 05/30] Restrict /dev/{mem, kmem, port} when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 03/30] ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 07/30] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 11/30] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 10/30] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 13/30] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 12/30] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 15/30] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 14/30] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 16/30] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 17/30] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 19/30] scsi: Lock down the eata driver
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 18/30] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 21/30] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 20/30] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 22/30] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 24/30] debugfs: Disallow use of debugfs files when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 23/30] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 25/30] Lock down /proc/kcore
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 26/30] Lock down ftrace
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 27/30] Lock down kprobes
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 28/30] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 29/30] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 30/30] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 09/30] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 04/30] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 02/30] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: Manoj Iyer <manoj.iyer@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: Manoj Iyer <manoj.iyer@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: Manoj Iyer <manoj.iyer@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: "AKASHI, Takahiro" <takahiro.akashi@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: "AKASHI, Takahiro" <takahiro.akashi@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: Manoj Iyer <manoj.iyer@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: "AKASHI, Takahiro" <takahiro.akashi@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown
  • From: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v10 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
  • From: Tomeu Vizoso <tomeu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v10 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] Call GetEventLog before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v10 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
  • From: Tomeu Vizoso <tomeu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/3] arm64: Define cputype macros for Falkor CPU
  • From: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/3] arm64: Add software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/3] arm64: Prepare SCTLR_ELn accesses to handle Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 0/3] Implement a software workaround for Falkor erratum 1041
  • From: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• efi/esrt: use memunmap rather kfree to free the remapping
  • From: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi: setting secure boot flag in EFI stub when the sentinel is tainted.
  • From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL] EFI fixes
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map
  • From: Matthias Brugger <mbrugger@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map
  • From: Matthias Brugger <mbrugger@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map
  • From: Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map
  • From: Matthias Brugger <mbrugger@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map
  • From: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Multiple Acer laptops hang on ACPI poweroff
  • From: Daniel Drake <drake@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Multiple Acer laptops hang on ACPI poweroff
  • From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Multiple Acer laptops hang on ACPI poweroff
  • From: Daniel Drake <drake@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot
  • From: James Morris <james.l.morris@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local
  • From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local
  • From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local
  • From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/2] arm64: efi: ignore EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute if RP and/or WP are set
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/2] efi/capsule-loader: pr_err() strings should end with newlines
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI updates for v4.15
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/2] efi/efi_test: Prevent an Oops in efi_runtime_query_capsulecaps()
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/2] efi/libstub: arm: don't randomize runtime regions when CONFIG_HIBERNATION=y
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI fixes for v4.14
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map
  • From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map
  • From: Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down
  • From: Ethan Zhao <ethan.kernel@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map
  • From: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 26/27] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 25/27] Lock down /proc/kcore
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: don't randomize runtime regions when CONFIG_HIBERNATION=y
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map
  • From: jeffy <jeffy.chen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm: omit sorting of the UEFI memory map
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 26/27] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode
  • From: James Morris <james.l.morris@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 25/27] Lock down /proc/kcore
  • From: James Morris <james.l.morris@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 09/27] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
  • From: James Morris <james.l.morris@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: James Morris <james.l.morris@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 05/27] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down
  • From: James Morris <james.l.morris@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down
  • From: James Morris <james.l.morris@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
  • From: James Morris <james.l.morris@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
  • From: James Morris <james.l.morris@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: Alan Cox <gnomes@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
  • From: jlee@xxxxxxxx
• Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
  • From: jlee@xxxxxxxx
• [Part1 PATCH v7 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 17/27] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 16/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 15/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 14/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 13/27] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 11/27] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 10/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 09/27] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 08/27] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 06/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 05/27] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
  • From: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
  • From: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown
  • From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 05/27] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 06/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 10/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 09/27] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 08/27] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 11/27] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 13/27] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 15/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 16/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 17/27] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 19/27] scsi: Lock down the eata driver
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 21/27] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 20/27] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 22/27] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 23/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 24/27] debugfs: Disallow use of debugfs files when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 25/27] Lock down /proc/kcore
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 26/27] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 27/27] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 14/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: parse ARM error information value
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown
  • From: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: parse ARM error information value
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi: parse ARM error information value
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC 00/11] KVM, EFI, arm64: EFI Runtime Services Sandboxing
  • From: Christoffer Dall <cdall@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC 04/11] KVM, arm, arm64: Offer PAs to IPAs idmapping to internal VMs
  • From: Christoffer Dall <cdall@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [Part1 PATCH v6 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javier@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: ACK: [PATCH] efi/efi_test: Prevent an Oops in efi_runtime_query_capsulecaps()
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• ACK: [PATCH] efi/efi_test: Prevent an Oops in efi_runtime_query_capsulecaps()
  • From: ivanhu <ivan.hu@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local
  • From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local
  • From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/efi_test: Prevent an Oops in efi_runtime_query_capsulecaps()
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/capsule-loader: pr_err() strings should end with newlines
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown
  • From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown
  • From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown
  • From: Johannes Berg <johannes@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local
  • From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 23/27] x86_64: assembly, change all ENTRY+ENDPROC to SYM_FUNC_*
  • From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 23/27] x86_64: assembly, change all ENTRY+ENDPROC to SYM_FUNC_*
  • From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local
  • From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 26/27] x86_32: assembly, change all ENTRY+ENDPROC to SYM_FUNC_*
  • From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 23/27] x86_64: assembly, change all ENTRY+ENDPROC to SYM_FUNC_*
  • From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi/efi_test: Prevent an Oops in efi_runtime_query_capsulecaps()
  • From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [0-Day CI notification] 0-Day kernel test service will be shut down from Sep 30 3PM to Oct 5
  • From: Philip Li <philip.li@xxxxxxxxx>
• [Part1 PATCH v5 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC 00/11] KVM, EFI, arm64: EFI Runtime Services Sandboxing
  • From: Florent Revest <revestflo@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC 00/11] KVM, EFI, arm64: EFI Runtime Services Sandboxing
  • From: Florent Revest <revestflo@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC 04/11] KVM, arm, arm64: Offer PAs to IPAs idmapping to internal VMs
  • From: Florent Revest <revestflo@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 0/5] Call GetEventLog before ExitBootServices
  • From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 2/5] tpm: rename event log provider files
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi/capsule-loader: pr_err() strings should end with newlines
  • From: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: efi: ignore EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute if RP and/or WP are set
  • From: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC 00/11] KVM, EFI, arm64: EFI Runtime Services Sandboxing
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 0/5] Call GetEventLog before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 5/5] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table
  • From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 2/5] tpm: rename event log provider files
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 3/5] tpm: add event log format version
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 5/5] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 1/5] tpm: move tpm_eventlog.h outside of drivers folder
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 0/5] Call GetEventLog before ExitBootServices
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table
  • From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Part1 PATCH v4 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• [Part1 PATCH v4 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: efi: ignore EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute if RP and/or WP are set
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: efi: ignore EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute if RP and/or WP are set
  • From: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 RESEND 1/2] x86/UV: Introduce a helper function to check UV system at earlier stage
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: efi: ignore EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute if RP and/or WP are set
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] arm64: efi: ignore EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute if RP and/or WP are set
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v2 0/3] Call GetEventLog before ExitBootServices
  • From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] Call GetEventLog before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table
  • From: kbuild test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: kbuild test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table
  • From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 1/3] tpm: move tpm_eventlog.h outside of drivers folder
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 0/3] Call GetEventLog before ExitBootServices
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
  • From: "Prakhya, Sai Praneeth" <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
  • From: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
  • From: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
  • From: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
  • From: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
  • From: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/2] tpm: surface TPM event log based on EFI table
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/2] tpm: surface TPM event log based on EFI table
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/2] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
  • From: "Prakhya, Sai Praneeth" <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
  • From: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL] EFI changes for v4.14
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
  • From: "Prakhya, Sai Praneeth" <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
  • From: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
  • From: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] efi: libstub: add support for the Chaoskey RNG USB stick to the stub
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] efi: import USB I/O related declarations from the UEFI spec
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] efi: libstub: add support for the Chaoskey RNG USB stick to the stub
  • From: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] efi: import USB I/O related declarations from the UEFI spec
  • From: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] efi: libstub: add support for the Chaoskey RNG USB stick to the stub
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] efi: import USB I/O related declarations from the UEFI spec
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] efi: libstub: add support for the Chaoskey RNG USB stick to the stub
  • From: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] efi: import USB I/O related declarations from the UEFI spec
  • From: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC 00/11] KVM, EFI, arm64: EFI Runtime Services Sandboxing
  • From: Christoffer Dall <cdall@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC 04/11] KVM, arm, arm64: Offer PAs to IPAs idmapping to internal VMs
  • From: Christoffer Dall <cdall@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/14] EFI capsule update support for IOT2000 devices
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/14] EFI capsule update support for IOT2000 devices
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/14] EFI capsule update support for IOT2000 devices
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 02/14] efi: Add 'capsule' update support
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 03/14] x86/efi: Force EFI reboot to process pending capsules
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 06/14] efi/capsule: Allocate whole capsule into virtual memory
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 05/14] efi/capsule: Move 'capsule' to the stack in efi_capsule_supported()
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 04/14] efi: Add misc char driver interface to update EFI firmware
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 01/14] efi: Move efi_status_to_err() to drivers/firmware/efi/
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 00/14] EFI capsule update support for IOT2000 devices
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 09/14] efi/capsule: Clean up pr_err/_info() messages
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 11/14] efi/capsule-loader: Use a cached copy of the capsule header
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 10/14] efi/capsule: Adjust return type of efi_capsule_setup_info()
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 08/14] efi/capsule: Remove pr_debug() on ENOMEM or EFAULT
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 07/14] efi/capsule: Fix return code on failing kmap/vmap
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 14/14] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 12/14] efi/capsule-loader: Redirect calls to efi_capsule_setup_info() via weak alias
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 13/14] efi/capsule-loader: Use page addresses rather than struct page pointers
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 1/6] efi: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V2 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with %cr3
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V2 1/3] efi: Use efi_mm in x86 as well as ARM
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V2 2/3] x86/efi: Replace efi_pgd with efi_mm.pgd
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 5/5] efi: bgrt: use efi_mem_type()
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/5] efi/libstub: Enable reset attack mitigation
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/5] efi/reboot: Make function pointer orig_pm_power_off static
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL 0/5] more EFI changes for v4.14
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/5] efi/random: Increase size of firmware supplied randomness
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4/5] efi: move efi_mem_type() to common code
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC 00/11] KVM, EFI, arm64: EFI Runtime Services Sandboxing
  • From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 2/2] EFI/BGRT: use efi_mem_type()
  • From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 1/2] EFI: move efi_mem_type() to common code
  • From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
• [RFC 01/11] arm64: Add an SMCCC function IDs header
  • From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC 02/11] KVM: arm64: Return an Unknown ID on unhandled HVC
  • From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC 03/11] KVM: Allow VM lifecycle management without userspace
  • From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC 06/11] KVM, arm64: Expose a VCPU initialization function
  • From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC 04/11] KVM, arm, arm64: Offer PAs to IPAs idmapping to internal VMs
  • From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC 07/11] KVM: Allow initialization before the module target
  • From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC 05/11] KVM: Expose VM/VCPU creation functions
  • From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC 08/11] KVM, arm, arm64: Initialize KVM's core earlier
  • From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC 10/11] efi, arm64: Sandbox Runtime Services in a VM
  • From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC 11/11] KVM, arm64: Don't trap internal VMs SMC calls
  • From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC 09/11] EFI, arm, arm64: Enable EFI Runtime Services later
  • From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC 00/11] KVM, EFI, arm64: EFI Runtime Services Sandboxing
  • From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] EFI: move efi_mem_type() to common code
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] EFI: move efi_mem_type() to common code
  • From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] EFI: move efi_mem_type() to common code
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] EFI: move efi_mem_type() to common code
  • From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] EFI: move efi_mem_type() to common code
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] EFI: move efi_mem_type() to common code
  • From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/2] EFI/BGRT: use efi_mem_type()
  • From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/2] EFI: move efi_mem_type() to common code
  • From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/2] EFI/BGRT: use efi_mem_type()
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] EFI: move efi_mem_type() to common code
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/2] x86_64: boot, extract efi_pe_entry from startup_64
  • From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/2] x86_32: boot, extract efi_pe_entry from startup_32
  • From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• [efi:next 2/3] drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c:163:21: error: 'RANDOM_SEED_SIZE' undeclared
  • From: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH][next] efi/reboot: make function pointer orig_pm_power_off static
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH][next] efi/reboot: make function pointer orig_pm_power_off static
  • From: Colin King <colin.king@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL 00/14] EFI changes for v4.14
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Thinkpad e545 woes
  • From: Evgeny Laktanov <anulap4lists@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi: random: increase size of firmware supplied randomness
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 2/2] efi: libstub: add support for the Chaoskey RNG USB stick to the stub
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 1/2] efi: import USB I/O related declarations from the UEFI spec
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 2/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
  • From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
  • From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL 00/14] EFI changes for v4.14
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 01/14] efi: arm: Don't mark ACPI reclaim memory as MEMBLOCK_NOMAP
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 03/14] efi/libstub: arm64: force 'hidden' visibility for section markers
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 02/14] efi/libstub: arm64: use hidden attribute for struct screen_info reference
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 04/14] efi/libstub: arm64: set -fpie when building the EFI stub
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 07/14] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 08/14] arm: efi: remove forbidden values from the PE/COFF header
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 06/14] efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 10/14] arm: efi: replace open coded constants with symbolic ones
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 12/14] firmware: dcdbas: constify attribute_group structures.
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 11/14] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 13/14] firmware: efi: constify attribute_group structures.
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 14/14] firmware: efi: esrt: constify attribute_group structures.
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 09/14] arm: efi: remove pointless dummy .reloc section
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 05/14] efi: arm/arm64: Add missing assignment of efi.config_table
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
  • From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 2/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/3] firmware: dcdbas: constify attribute_group structures.
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 2/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH v5 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support
  • From: "Zhuo, Qiuxu" <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 1/2] efi: Introduce efi_early_memdesc_ptr to get pointer to memmap descriptor
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 1/2] efi: Introduce efi_early_memdesc_ptr to get pointer to memmap descriptor
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 1/2] efi: Introduce efi_early_memdesc_ptr to get pointer to memmap descriptor
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/3] efi: Use efi_mm in x86 as well as ARM
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/3] x86/efi: Replace efi_pgd with efi_mm.pgd
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 1/2] efi: Introduce efi_early_memdesc_ptr to get pointer to memmap descriptor
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 2/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
  • From: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges
  • From: Stuart Hayes <stuart.w.hayes@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges
  • From: Stuart Hayes <stuart.w.hayes@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area under SEV
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
  • From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
  • From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
  • From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 RESEND] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 RESEND] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 RESEND] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 RESEND] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>