Linux EFI/UEFI Development

• Thread Index

• Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
  • From: jlee@xxxxxxxx
• Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
  • From: jlee@xxxxxxxx
• [Part1 PATCH v7 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 17/27] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 16/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 15/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 14/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 13/27] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 11/27] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 10/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 09/27] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 08/27] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 06/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 05/27] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
  • From: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
  • From: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown
  • From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 05/27] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 02/27] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 06/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 10/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 09/27] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 08/27] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 11/27] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 13/27] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 15/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 16/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 17/27] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 19/27] scsi: Lock down the eata driver
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 21/27] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 20/27] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 22/27] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 23/27] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 24/27] debugfs: Disallow use of debugfs files when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 25/27] Lock down /proc/kcore
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 26/27] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 27/27] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 14/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: parse ARM error information value
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown
  • From: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: parse ARM error information value
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi: parse ARM error information value
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC 00/11] KVM, EFI, arm64: EFI Runtime Services Sandboxing
  • From: Christoffer Dall <cdall@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC 04/11] KVM, arm, arm64: Offer PAs to IPAs idmapping to internal VMs
  • From: Christoffer Dall <cdall@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [Part1 PATCH v6 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javier@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: ACK: [PATCH] efi/efi_test: Prevent an Oops in efi_runtime_query_capsulecaps()
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• ACK: [PATCH] efi/efi_test: Prevent an Oops in efi_runtime_query_capsulecaps()
  • From: ivanhu <ivan.hu@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local
  • From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local
  • From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/efi_test: Prevent an Oops in efi_runtime_query_capsulecaps()
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/capsule-loader: pr_err() strings should end with newlines
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown
  • From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown
  • From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown
  • From: Johannes Berg <johannes@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Draft manpage explaining kernel lockdown
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local
  • From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 23/27] x86_64: assembly, change all ENTRY+ENDPROC to SYM_FUNC_*
  • From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 23/27] x86_64: assembly, change all ENTRY+ENDPROC to SYM_FUNC_*
  • From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: assembly, make some functions local
  • From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 26/27] x86_32: assembly, change all ENTRY+ENDPROC to SYM_FUNC_*
  • From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 23/27] x86_64: assembly, change all ENTRY+ENDPROC to SYM_FUNC_*
  • From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi/efi_test: Prevent an Oops in efi_runtime_query_capsulecaps()
  • From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [0-Day CI notification] 0-Day kernel test service will be shut down from Sep 30 3PM to Oct 5
  • From: Philip Li <philip.li@xxxxxxxxx>
• [Part1 PATCH v5 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC 00/11] KVM, EFI, arm64: EFI Runtime Services Sandboxing
  • From: Florent Revest <revestflo@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC 00/11] KVM, EFI, arm64: EFI Runtime Services Sandboxing
  • From: Florent Revest <revestflo@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC 04/11] KVM, arm, arm64: Offer PAs to IPAs idmapping to internal VMs
  • From: Florent Revest <revestflo@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v3 0/5] Call GetEventLog before ExitBootServices
  • From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 2/5] tpm: rename event log provider files
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi/capsule-loader: pr_err() strings should end with newlines
  • From: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: efi: ignore EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute if RP and/or WP are set
  • From: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC 00/11] KVM, EFI, arm64: EFI Runtime Services Sandboxing
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 0/5] Call GetEventLog before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 5/5] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table
  • From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 2/5] tpm: rename event log provider files
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 4/5] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 3/5] tpm: add event log format version
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 5/5] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 1/5] tpm: move tpm_eventlog.h outside of drivers folder
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 0/5] Call GetEventLog before ExitBootServices
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table
  • From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Part1 PATCH v4 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• [Part1 PATCH v4 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: efi: ignore EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute if RP and/or WP are set
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: efi: ignore EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute if RP and/or WP are set
  • From: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 RESEND 1/2] x86/UV: Introduce a helper function to check UV system at earlier stage
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: efi: ignore EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute if RP and/or WP are set
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] arm64: efi: ignore EFI_MEMORY_XP attribute if RP and/or WP are set
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tpmdd-devel] [PATCH v2 0/3] Call GetEventLog before ExitBootServices
  • From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] Call GetEventLog before ExitBootServices
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table
  • From: kbuild test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: kbuild test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table
  • From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 1/3] tpm: move tpm_eventlog.h outside of drivers folder
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 2/3] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 0/3] Call GetEventLog before ExitBootServices
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
  • From: "Prakhya, Sai Praneeth" <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
  • From: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
  • From: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
  • From: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
  • From: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
  • From: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/2] tpm: surface TPM event log based on EFI table
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/2] tpm: surface TPM event log based on EFI table
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/2] efi: call get_event_log before ExitBootServices
  • From: Thiebaud Weksteen <tweek@xxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
  • From: "Prakhya, Sai Praneeth" <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
  • From: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL] EFI changes for v4.14
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
  • From: "Prakhya, Sai Praneeth" <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
  • From: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
  • From: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] efi: libstub: add support for the Chaoskey RNG USB stick to the stub
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] efi: import USB I/O related declarations from the UEFI spec
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] efi: libstub: add support for the Chaoskey RNG USB stick to the stub
  • From: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] efi: import USB I/O related declarations from the UEFI spec
  • From: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] efi: libstub: add support for the Chaoskey RNG USB stick to the stub
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] efi: import USB I/O related declarations from the UEFI spec
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] efi: libstub: add support for the Chaoskey RNG USB stick to the stub
  • From: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] efi: import USB I/O related declarations from the UEFI spec
  • From: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC 00/11] KVM, EFI, arm64: EFI Runtime Services Sandboxing
  • From: Christoffer Dall <cdall@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC 04/11] KVM, arm, arm64: Offer PAs to IPAs idmapping to internal VMs
  • From: Christoffer Dall <cdall@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/14] EFI capsule update support for IOT2000 devices
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/14] EFI capsule update support for IOT2000 devices
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/14] EFI capsule update support for IOT2000 devices
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 02/14] efi: Add 'capsule' update support
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 03/14] x86/efi: Force EFI reboot to process pending capsules
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 06/14] efi/capsule: Allocate whole capsule into virtual memory
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 05/14] efi/capsule: Move 'capsule' to the stack in efi_capsule_supported()
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 04/14] efi: Add misc char driver interface to update EFI firmware
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 01/14] efi: Move efi_status_to_err() to drivers/firmware/efi/
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 00/14] EFI capsule update support for IOT2000 devices
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 09/14] efi/capsule: Clean up pr_err/_info() messages
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 11/14] efi/capsule-loader: Use a cached copy of the capsule header
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 10/14] efi/capsule: Adjust return type of efi_capsule_setup_info()
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 08/14] efi/capsule: Remove pr_debug() on ENOMEM or EFAULT
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 07/14] efi/capsule: Fix return code on failing kmap/vmap
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 14/14] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 12/14] efi/capsule-loader: Redirect calls to efi_capsule_setup_info() via weak alias
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 13/14] efi/capsule-loader: Use page addresses rather than struct page pointers
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 1/6] efi: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V2 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with %cr3
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V2 1/3] efi: Use efi_mm in x86 as well as ARM
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V2 2/3] x86/efi: Replace efi_pgd with efi_mm.pgd
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V2 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 5/5] efi: bgrt: use efi_mem_type()
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/5] efi/libstub: Enable reset attack mitigation
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/5] efi/reboot: Make function pointer orig_pm_power_off static
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL 0/5] more EFI changes for v4.14
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/5] efi/random: Increase size of firmware supplied randomness
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4/5] efi: move efi_mem_type() to common code
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC 00/11] KVM, EFI, arm64: EFI Runtime Services Sandboxing
  • From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 2/2] EFI/BGRT: use efi_mem_type()
  • From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 1/2] EFI: move efi_mem_type() to common code
  • From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
• [RFC 01/11] arm64: Add an SMCCC function IDs header
  • From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC 02/11] KVM: arm64: Return an Unknown ID on unhandled HVC
  • From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC 03/11] KVM: Allow VM lifecycle management without userspace
  • From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC 06/11] KVM, arm64: Expose a VCPU initialization function
  • From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC 04/11] KVM, arm, arm64: Offer PAs to IPAs idmapping to internal VMs
  • From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC 07/11] KVM: Allow initialization before the module target
  • From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC 05/11] KVM: Expose VM/VCPU creation functions
  • From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC 08/11] KVM, arm, arm64: Initialize KVM's core earlier
  • From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC 10/11] efi, arm64: Sandbox Runtime Services in a VM
  • From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC 11/11] KVM, arm64: Don't trap internal VMs SMC calls
  • From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC 09/11] EFI, arm, arm64: Enable EFI Runtime Services later
  • From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC 00/11] KVM, EFI, arm64: EFI Runtime Services Sandboxing
  • From: Florent Revest <florent.revest@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] EFI: move efi_mem_type() to common code
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] EFI: move efi_mem_type() to common code
  • From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] EFI: move efi_mem_type() to common code
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] EFI: move efi_mem_type() to common code
  • From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] EFI: move efi_mem_type() to common code
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] EFI: move efi_mem_type() to common code
  • From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/2] EFI/BGRT: use efi_mem_type()
  • From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/2] EFI: move efi_mem_type() to common code
  • From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/2] EFI/BGRT: use efi_mem_type()
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] EFI: move efi_mem_type() to common code
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/2] x86_64: boot, extract efi_pe_entry from startup_64
  • From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/2] x86_32: boot, extract efi_pe_entry from startup_32
  • From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• [efi:next 2/3] drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c:163:21: error: 'RANDOM_SEED_SIZE' undeclared
  • From: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH][next] efi/reboot: make function pointer orig_pm_power_off static
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH][next] efi/reboot: make function pointer orig_pm_power_off static
  • From: Colin King <colin.king@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL 00/14] EFI changes for v4.14
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Thinkpad e545 woes
  • From: Evgeny Laktanov <anulap4lists@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi: random: increase size of firmware supplied randomness
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 2/2] efi: libstub: add support for the Chaoskey RNG USB stick to the stub
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 1/2] efi: import USB I/O related declarations from the UEFI spec
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 2/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
  • From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
  • From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL 00/14] EFI changes for v4.14
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 01/14] efi: arm: Don't mark ACPI reclaim memory as MEMBLOCK_NOMAP
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 03/14] efi/libstub: arm64: force 'hidden' visibility for section markers
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 02/14] efi/libstub: arm64: use hidden attribute for struct screen_info reference
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 04/14] efi/libstub: arm64: set -fpie when building the EFI stub
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 07/14] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 08/14] arm: efi: remove forbidden values from the PE/COFF header
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 06/14] efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 10/14] arm: efi: replace open coded constants with symbolic ones
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 12/14] firmware: dcdbas: constify attribute_group structures.
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 11/14] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 13/14] firmware: efi: constify attribute_group structures.
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 14/14] firmware: efi: esrt: constify attribute_group structures.
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 09/14] arm: efi: remove pointless dummy .reloc section
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 05/14] efi: arm/arm64: Add missing assignment of efi.config_table
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
  • From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 2/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/3] firmware: dcdbas: constify attribute_group structures.
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 2/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH v5 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support
  • From: "Zhuo, Qiuxu" <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 1/2] efi: Introduce efi_early_memdesc_ptr to get pointer to memmap descriptor
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 1/2] efi: Introduce efi_early_memdesc_ptr to get pointer to memmap descriptor
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 1/2] efi: Introduce efi_early_memdesc_ptr to get pointer to memmap descriptor
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/3] efi: Use efi_mm in x86 as well as ARM
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/3] x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with cr3
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/3] x86/efi: Replace efi_pgd with efi_mm.pgd
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 0/3] Use mm_struct and switch_mm() instead of manually
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 1/2] efi: Introduce efi_early_memdesc_ptr to get pointer to memmap descriptor
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 2/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
  • From: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges
  • From: Stuart Hayes <stuart.w.hayes@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges
  • From: Stuart Hayes <stuart.w.hayes@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area under SEV
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
  • From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
  • From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation
  • From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 RESEND] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 RESEND] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 RESEND] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 RESEND] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v8 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v8 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Chao Fan <fanc.fnst@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v8 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Chao Fan <fanc.fnst@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v8 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v8 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 1/2] efi: Introduce efi_memdesc_ptr to get pointer to memmap descriptor
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 2/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/3] firmware: dcdbas: constify attribute_group structures.
  • From: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/3] firmware: efi: esrt: constify attribute_group structures.
  • From: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/3] firmware: efi: constify attribute_group structures.
  • From: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 0/3] constify firmware attribute_group structures.
  • From: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges
  • From: Stuart Hayes <stuart.w.hayes@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges
  • From: Stuart Hayes <stuart.w.hayes@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes
  • From: David Laight <David.Laight@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: David Laight <David.Laight@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area under SEV
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 04/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 1/6] efi: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 1/6] efi: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 1/6] efi: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: David Laight <David.Laight@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area under SEV
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 04/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD)
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 5/6] uuid: Kill uapi/uuid.h
  • From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 4/6] vmbus: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 5/6] uuid: Kill uapi/uuid.h
  • From: kbuild test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 4/6] vmbus: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: kbuild test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 2/6] mei: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: kbuild test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
  • From: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
  • From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 1/6] efi: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 4/6] vmbus: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH v1 4/6] vmbus: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v1 4/6] vmbus: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v1 0/6] uuid: Convert rest users to new API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v1 1/6] efi: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v1 5/6] uuid: Kill uapi/uuid.h
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v1 2/6] mei: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
  • From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
  • From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
  • From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4.11 38/88] efi: Process the MEMATTR table only if EFI_MEMMAP is enabled
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4.12 27/84] efi: Process the MEMATTR table only if EFI_MEMMAP is enabled
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v10 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v10 37/38] compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __nostackp function attribute
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v10 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
  • From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v10 37/38] compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __nostackp function attribute
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 01/38] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 02/38] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 05/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 03/38] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 06/38] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 08/38] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 10/38] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 09/38] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 11/38] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa()
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 13/38] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 14/38] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 12/38] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 17/38] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 18/38] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 19/38] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 22/38] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 21/38] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 23/38] x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 26/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 25/38] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 29/38] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 30/38] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 28/38] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 33/38] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 31/38] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 35/38] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 34/38] x86/mm: Create native_make_p4d() for PGTABLE_LEVELS <= 4
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 32/38] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 38/38] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 36/38] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 37/38] compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __nostackp function attribute
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 24/38] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 16/38] efi: Add an EFI table address match function
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 15/38] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi: add gpt_overprovisioned kernel command line parameter
  • From: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
  • From: Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
  • From: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
  • From: Brian Gerst <brgerst@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
  • From: Brian Gerst <brgerst@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
  • From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
  • From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
  • From: Brian Gerst <brgerst@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
  • From: Brian Gerst <brgerst@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
  • From: Brian Gerst <brgerst@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
  • From: Brian Gerst <brgerst@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 01/38] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 02/38] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 03/38] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 05/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 08/38] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 06/38] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 11/38] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa()
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 13/38] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 12/38] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 14/38] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 17/38] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 19/38] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 22/38] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 23/38] x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 26/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 25/38] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 24/38] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 29/38] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 28/38] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 30/38] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 33/38] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 36/38] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 35/38] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 38/38] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 37/38] compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __nostackp function attribute
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 34/38] x86/mm: Create native_make_p4d() for PGTABLE_LEVELS <= 4
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 32/38] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 31/38] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 21/38] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 18/38] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 16/38] efi: Add an EFI table address match function
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 15/38] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 10/38] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 09/38] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v1] efivarfs: define integrity_read method
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH] efivarfs: define integrity_read method
  • From: Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH] efivarfs: define integrity_read method
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 11/18] x86/efi: Move asmlinkage before return type
  • From: Joe Perches <joe@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 00/18] treewide: Move storage class before return type
  • From: Joe Perches <joe@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL] EFI changes for v4.13
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V17 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V17 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
  • From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 7/7] arm: efi: add PE/COFF debug table to EFI header
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 6/7] arm: compressed: put zImage header and EFI header in dedicated section
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 4/7] arm: compressed: discard ksymtab/kcrctab sections
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 3/7] arm: efi: replace open coded constants with symbolic ones
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 2/7] arm: efi: remove pointless dummy .reloc section
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 1/7] arm: efi: remove forbidden values from the PE/COFF header
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 0/7] ARM: efi: PE/COFF cleanup/hardening
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v8 RESEND 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v8 RESEND 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Joerg Roedel <joro@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
  • From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 32/38] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 34/38] x86/mm: Create native_make_p4d() for PGTABLE_LEVELS <= 4
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 36/38] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 35/38] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 37/38] compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __nostackp function attribute
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 38/38] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 33/38] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 31/38] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 30/38] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 29/38] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 28/38] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 23/38] x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 21/38] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 25/38] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 26/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 28/38] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 29/38] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 30/38] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 26/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 24/38] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 25/38] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 06/38] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 08/38] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 09/38] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 21/38] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 23/38] x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 12/38] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 22/38] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 13/38] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 14/38] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 15/38] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 19/38] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 17/38] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 11/38] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa()
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 18/38] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 16/38] efi: Add an EFI table address match function
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 10/38] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 05/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 01/38] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 02/38] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 03/38] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 24/38] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 22/38] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 16/38] efi: Add an EFI table address match function
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 19/38] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 18/38] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 17/38] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 10/38] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 11/38] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa()
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 12/38] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 13/38] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 15/38] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 14/38] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 09/38] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 08/38] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 06/38] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 02/38] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 05/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>