Linux EFI/UEFI Development

• Thread Index

• Re: [PATCH v8 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v8 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Chao Fan <fanc.fnst@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v8 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Chao Fan <fanc.fnst@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v8 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v8 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 1/2] efi: Introduce efi_memdesc_ptr to get pointer to memmap descriptor
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 2/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 0/2] x86/boot/KASLR: Restrict kernel to be randomized in mirror regions
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/3] firmware: dcdbas: constify attribute_group structures.
  • From: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/3] firmware: efi: esrt: constify attribute_group structures.
  • From: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/3] firmware: efi: constify attribute_group structures.
  • From: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 0/3] constify firmware attribute_group structures.
  • From: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges
  • From: Stuart Hayes <stuart.w.hayes@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] x86/efi: page align EFI ROM image ranges
  • From: Stuart Hayes <stuart.w.hayes@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes
  • From: David Laight <David.Laight@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: David Laight <David.Laight@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area under SEV
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 04/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 1/6] efi: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 1/6] efi: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 1/6] efi: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: David Laight <David.Laight@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 14/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 15/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 16/17] X86/KVM: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 11/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 12/17] x86/mm: DMA support for SEV memory encryption
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 10/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 09/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 05/17] x86, realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area under SEV
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 06/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 07/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 08/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 04/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 02/17] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 03/17] x86/mm: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) descrption
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC Part1 PATCH v3 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD)
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 5/6] uuid: Kill uapi/uuid.h
  • From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 4/6] vmbus: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 5/6] uuid: Kill uapi/uuid.h
  • From: kbuild test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 4/6] vmbus: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: kbuild test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 2/6] mei: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: kbuild test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
  • From: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
  • From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 1/6] efi: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 4/6] vmbus: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH v1 4/6] vmbus: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v1 6/6] device property: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v1 3/6] staging: unisys: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v1 4/6] vmbus: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v1 0/6] uuid: Convert rest users to new API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v1 1/6] efi: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v1 5/6] uuid: Kill uapi/uuid.h
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v1 2/6] mei: Switch to use new generic UUID API
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
  • From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
  • From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
  • From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4.11 38/88] efi: Process the MEMATTR table only if EFI_MEMMAP is enabled
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4.12 26/84] x86/xen/efi: Initialize only the EFI struct members used by Xen
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4.12 27/84] efi: Process the MEMATTR table only if EFI_MEMMAP is enabled
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v10 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v10 37/38] compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __nostackp function attribute
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v10 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
  • From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v10 37/38] compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __nostackp function attribute
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 01/38] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 02/38] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 05/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 03/38] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 06/38] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 08/38] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 10/38] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 09/38] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 11/38] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa()
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 13/38] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 14/38] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 12/38] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 17/38] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 18/38] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 19/38] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 22/38] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 21/38] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 23/38] x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 26/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 25/38] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 29/38] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 30/38] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 28/38] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 33/38] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 31/38] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 35/38] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 34/38] x86/mm: Create native_make_p4d() for PGTABLE_LEVELS <= 4
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 32/38] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 38/38] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 36/38] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 37/38] compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __nostackp function attribute
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 24/38] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 16/38] efi: Add an EFI table address match function
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 15/38] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi: add gpt_overprovisioned kernel command line parameter
  • From: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
  • From: Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
  • From: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
  • From: Brian Gerst <brgerst@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
  • From: Brian Gerst <brgerst@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
  • From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
  • From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
  • From: Brian Gerst <brgerst@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
  • From: Brian Gerst <brgerst@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
  • From: Brian Gerst <brgerst@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
  • From: Brian Gerst <brgerst@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 01/38] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 02/38] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 03/38] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 05/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 08/38] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 06/38] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 11/38] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa()
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 13/38] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 12/38] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 14/38] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 17/38] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 19/38] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 22/38] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 23/38] x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 26/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 25/38] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 24/38] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 29/38] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 28/38] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 30/38] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 33/38] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 36/38] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 35/38] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 38/38] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 37/38] compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __nostackp function attribute
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 34/38] x86/mm: Create native_make_p4d() for PGTABLE_LEVELS <= 4
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 32/38] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 31/38] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 21/38] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 18/38] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 16/38] efi: Add an EFI table address match function
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 15/38] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 10/38] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v9 09/38] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v1] efivarfs: define integrity_read method
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH] efivarfs: define integrity_read method
  • From: Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH] efivarfs: define integrity_read method
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 11/18] x86/efi: Move asmlinkage before return type
  • From: Joe Perches <joe@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 00/18] treewide: Move storage class before return type
  • From: Joe Perches <joe@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL] EFI changes for v4.13
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V17 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V17 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
  • From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 7/7] arm: efi: add PE/COFF debug table to EFI header
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 6/7] arm: compressed: put zImage header and EFI header in dedicated section
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 4/7] arm: compressed: discard ksymtab/kcrctab sections
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 3/7] arm: efi: replace open coded constants with symbolic ones
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 2/7] arm: efi: remove pointless dummy .reloc section
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 1/7] arm: efi: remove forbidden values from the PE/COFF header
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 0/7] ARM: efi: PE/COFF cleanup/hardening
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v8 RESEND 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v8 RESEND 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Joerg Roedel <joro@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
  • From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] drivers/fbdev: efifb: allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 32/38] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 34/38] x86/mm: Create native_make_p4d() for PGTABLE_LEVELS <= 4
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 36/38] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 35/38] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 37/38] compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __nostackp function attribute
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 38/38] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 33/38] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 31/38] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 30/38] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 29/38] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 28/38] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 23/38] x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 21/38] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 25/38] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 26/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 28/38] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 29/38] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 30/38] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 26/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 24/38] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 25/38] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 06/38] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 08/38] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 09/38] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 21/38] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 23/38] x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 12/38] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 22/38] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 13/38] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 14/38] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 15/38] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 19/38] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 17/38] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 11/38] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa()
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 18/38] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 16/38] efi: Add an EFI table address match function
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 10/38] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 05/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 01/38] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 02/38] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 RESEND 03/38] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 24/38] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 22/38] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 16/38] efi: Add an EFI table address match function
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 19/38] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 18/38] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 17/38] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 10/38] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 11/38] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa()
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 12/38] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 13/38] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 15/38] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 14/38] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 09/38] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 08/38] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 06/38] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 02/38] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 05/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 03/38] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 01/38] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH v4 2/2] eif/capsule-pstore: Add capsule pstore backend
  • From: "Zhuo, Qiuxu" <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH v4 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support
  • From: "Zhuo, Qiuxu" <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 2/2] eif/capsule-pstore: Add capsule pstore backend
  • From: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 1/2] efi: Add 'nr_config_table' variable in efi structure
  • From: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support
  • From: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 2/2] eif/capsule-pstore: Add capsule pstore backend
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 34/36] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 34/36] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH v4 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support
  • From: "Zhuo, Qiuxu" <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC] memory corruption caused by efi driver?
  • From: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC] memory corruption caused by efi driver?
  • From: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC] memory corruption caused by efi driver?
  • From: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC] memory corruption caused by efi driver?
  • From: Yisheng Xie <xieyisheng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 34/36] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 36/36] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 35/36] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 34/36] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 33/36] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 32/36] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 31/36] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 2/2] eif/capsule-pstore: Add capsule pstore backend
  • From: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 1/2] efi: Add 'nr_config_table' variable in efi structure
  • From: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support
  • From: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen
  • From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 27/36] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 19/36] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 18/36] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 16/36] efi: Add an EFI table address match function
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 27/36] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen
  • From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 1/2] efi: Process MEMATTR table only if EFI_MEMMAP
  • From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 0/2] xen/efi: Fixes
  • From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns
  • From: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 17/36] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 26/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH v3 2/2] eif/capsule-pstore: Add capsule pstore backend
  • From: "Zhuo, Qiuxu" <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH v3 1/2] efi: Add 'nr_config_table' variable in efi structure
  • From: "Zhuo, Qiuxu" <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] eif/capsule-pstore: Add capsule pstore backend
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
  • From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Joerg Roedel <joro@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
  • From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 25/36] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 07/36] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 07/36] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 06/36] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns
  • From: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64
  • From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Problem with new X.509 is_hash_blacklisted() interface
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64
  • From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Problem with new X.509 is_hash_blacklisted() interface
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Problem with new X.509 is_hash_blacklisted() interface
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/7] ARM: efi: PE/COFF cleanup/hardening
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] efi: Add 'nr_config_table' variable in efi structure
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 25/36] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 24/36] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 23/36] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen
  • From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/2] x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen
  • From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH v3 2/2] eif/capsule-pstore: Add capsule pstore backend
  • From: "Zhuo, Qiuxu" <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 20/36] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH v3 1/2] efi: Add 'nr_config_table' variable in efi structure
  • From: "Zhuo, Qiuxu" <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 10/36] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/2] x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen
  • From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: Process MEMATTR table only if EFI_MEMMAP
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 07/36] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active
  • From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 10/36] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
  • From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] efi: Add 'nr_config_table' variable in efi structure
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] eif/capsule-pstore: Add capsule pstore backend
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 07/36] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active
  • From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 06/36] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
  • From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 19/36] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/2] x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen
  • From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/2] efi: Process MEMATTR table only if EFI_MEMMAP
  • From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 0/2] xen/efi: Fixes
  • From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 11/36] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa()
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 11/36] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa()
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Problem with new X.509 is_hash_blacklisted() interface
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 14/36] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64
  • From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 2/2] eif/capsule-pstore: Add capsule pstore backend
  • From: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 1/2] efi: Add 'nr_config_table' variable in efi structure
  • From: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 0/2] Add EFI capsule pstore backend support
  • From: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 11/36] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa()
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 03/36] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 18/31] efi-stub.txt: standardize document format
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64
  • From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 18/31] efi-stub.txt: standardize document format
  • From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 29/36] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
  • From: kbuild test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 32/36] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests
  • From: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 01/36] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 03/36] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 05/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 10/36] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 09/36] x86/mm: Simplify p[gum]d_page() macros
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 11/36] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa()
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 12/36] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 13/36] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 16/36] efi: Add an EFI table address match function
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 19/36] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 17/36] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 18/36] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 20/36] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 21/36] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 23/36] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 24/36] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 29/36] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 30/36] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 31/36] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 33/36] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 36/36] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 34/36] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 35/36] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 32/36] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 28/36] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 27/36] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 26/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 25/36] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 22/36] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 15/36] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 14/36] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 07/36] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 04/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 06/36] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 02/36] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 00/36] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4.11 05/13] efi: Fix boot panic because of invalid BGRT image address
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 30/34] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 30/34] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 29/34] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4.11 049/150] efi/bgrt: Skip efi_bgrt_init() in case of non-EFI boot
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4.11 049/150] efi/bgrt: Skip efi_bgrt_init() in case of non-EFI boot
  • From: Maniaxx <tripleshiftone@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 24/34] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 20/34] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 20/34] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 24/34] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 23/34] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 23/34] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 22/34] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 23/34] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 20/34] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4.11 048/150] efi: Dont issue error message when booted under Xen
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4.11 049/150] efi/bgrt: Skip efi_bgrt_init() in case of non-EFI boot
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4.9 034/119] efi: Dont issue error message when booted under Xen
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 14/34] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 18/34] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 14/34] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 13/34] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 09/34] x86/mm: Simplify p[gum]d_page() macros
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL] EFI fix
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
  • From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
  • From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
  • From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 06/34] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 05/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 04/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/3] efi: arm64: use -fpie for building the stub
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: arm: Don't mark ACPI reclaim memory as MEMBLOCK_NOMAP
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL] Another EFI BGRT fix for v4.12
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2] efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
  • From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
  • From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
  • From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] efi/libstub: arm64: set -fpie when building the EFI stub
  • From: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] efi/libstub: arm64: set -fpie when building the EFI stub
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] efi/libstub: arm64: set -fpie when building the EFI stub
  • From: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/3] efi/libstub: arm64: force 'hidden' visibility for section markers
  • From: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/3] efi/libstub: arm64: use hidden attribute for struct screen_info reference
  • From: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 00/34] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address
  • From: Maniaxx <tripleshiftone@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
  • From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
  • From: kbuild test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
  • From: kbuild test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] x86/efi: fix boot panic because of invalid bgrt image address
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 19/34] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: kbuild test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 00/34] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
  • From: Nick Sarnie <commendsarnex@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Nick Sarnie <commendsarnex@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
  • From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 20/34] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 03/34] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 00/34] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 02/34] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 04/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 07/34] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 09/34] x86/mm: Simplify p[gum]d_page() macros
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 08/34] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 10/34] x86, x86/mm, x86/xen, olpc: Use __va() against just the physical address in cr3
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 12/34] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 11/34] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 13/34] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 14/34] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 17/34] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 18/34] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 21/34] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 23/34] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 22/34] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 25/34] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 27/34] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 26/34] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 28/34] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 30/34] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 32/34] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 33/34] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 34/34] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 31/34] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 29/34] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 24/34] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 19/34] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 16/34] efi: Add an EFI table address match function
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 15/34] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 05/34] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 06/34] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 01/34] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64
  • From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
• Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression]
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 01/13] x86/efi: Clean up efi CR3 save/restore
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 10/13] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 01/13] x86/efi: Clean up efi CR3 save/restore
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 10/13] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL 00/13] First batch of EFI updates for v4.13
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 10/13] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 01/13] x86/efi: Clean up efi CR3 save/restore
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL 00/13] First batch of EFI updates for v4.13
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: arm: Don't mark ACPI reclaim memory as MEMBLOCK_NOMAP
  • From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL 00/13] First batch of EFI updates for v4.13
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL 00/13] First batch of EFI updates for v4.13
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi: arm: Don't mark ACPI reclaim memory as MEMBLOCK_NOMAP
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V17 02/11] ras: acpi/apei: cper: add support for generic data v3 structure
  • From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL 00/13] First batch of EFI updates for v4.13
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 02/13] efi/capsule: Fix return code on failing kmap/vmap
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 04/13] efi/capsule: Clean up pr_err/info messages
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 05/13] efi/capsule: Adjust return type of efi_capsule_setup_info
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 06/13] efi/capsule-loader: Use a cached copy of the capsule header
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 08/13] efi/capsule-loader: Redirect calls to efi_capsule_setup_info via weak alias
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 10/13] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 12/13] x86/efi: Add EFI_PGT_DUMP support for x86_32 and kexec
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 11/13] efi/efi_test: Use memdup_user() helper
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 13/13] efi: arm: enable DMI/SMBIOS
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 09/13] efi/capsule-loader: Use page addresses rather than struct page pointers
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 07/13] efi/capsule: Remove NULL test on kmap()
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 03/13] efi/capsule: Remove pr_debug on ENOMEM or EFAULT
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 01/13] x86/efi: Clean up efi CR3 save/restore
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL] EFI fixes
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression]
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression]
  • From: Maniaxx <tripleshiftone@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] efi: arm: enable DMI/SMBIOS
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] efi: arm: enable DMI/SMBIOS
  • From: Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] efi: arm: enable DMI/SMBIOS
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2] efi: arm: enable DMI/SMBIOS
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression]
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression]
  • From: Maniaxx <tripleshiftone@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
  • From: Xunlei Pang <xpang@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 26/32] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 0/7] ARM: efi: PE/COFF cleanup/hardening
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4/7] arm: compressed: discard ksymtab/kcrctab sections
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 5/7] arm: efi: split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 7/7] arm: efi: add PE/COFF debug table to EFI header
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/7] arm: efi: remove pointless dummy .reloc section
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 6/7] arm: compressed: put zImage header and EFI header in dedicated section
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/7] arm: efi: replace open coded constants with symbolic ones
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/7] arm: efi: remove forbidden values from the PE/COFF header
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 5/5] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode
  • From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Problem with new X.509 is_hash_blacklisted() interface
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Problem with new X.509 is_hash_blacklisted() interface
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression]
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression]
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 5/5] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/5] efi: Don't issue error message when booted under xen
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 5/5] efi/bgrt: Skip efi_bgrt_init in case of non-efi boot
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4/5] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/5] x86/efi: Disable runtime services on kexec kernel if booted with efi=old_map
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/5] efi: Remove duplicate 'const' specifiers
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL 0/5] EFI urgent fixes
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4/5] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/5] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
  • From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/5] efi: Move the x86 secure boot switch to generic code
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Xunlei Pang <xpang@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
  • From: Xunlei Pang <xpang@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>