Linux EFI/UEFI Development

• Thread Index

• Re: PROBLEM: Kernel panic on EFI BGRT early init code (kernel 4.11/4.12rc2) [regression]
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4.11 00/28] 4.11.1-stable review
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Disable runtime services on kexec kernel if booted with efi=old_map
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4.11 00/28] 4.11.1-stable review
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4/5] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 5/5] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/5] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/5] efi: Move the x86 secure boot switch to generic code
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 0/5] security, efi: Set lockdown if in secure boot mode
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/5] efi: Move the x86 secure boot switch to generic code
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/5] efi: Move the x86 secure boot switch to generic code
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix write/erase id tracking
  • From: "Lofstedt, Marta" <marta.lofstedt@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error
  • From: gengdongjiu <gengdj.1984@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error
  • From: gengdongjiu <gengdj.1984@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Heyi Guo <heyi.guo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/2] efifb: Avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/2] efifb: Avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V17 02/11] ras: acpi/apei: cper: add support for generic data v3 structure
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V17 04/11] efi: parse ARM processor error
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V17 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V17 05/11] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V17 09/11] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V17 07/11] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V17 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V17 11/11] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V17 10/11] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V17 03/11] cper: add timestamp print to CPER status printing
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V17 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V17 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 23/32] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 22/32] x86, swiotlb: DMA support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 19/32] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix write/erase id tracking
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/2] efifb: Avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/2] efifb: Avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/5] efi: Move the x86 secure boot switch to generic code
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix read iter after pstore API refactor
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64
  • From: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix read iter after pstore API refactor
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix read iter after pstore API refactor
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix read iter after pstore API refactor
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix read iter after pstore API refactor
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/bgrt: skip efi_bgrt_init in case non-efi boot
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/3] efi/libstub: arm64: set -fpie when building the EFI stub
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/3] efi/libstub: arm64: force 'hidden' visibility for section markers
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/3] efi/libstub: arm64: use hidden attribute for struct screen_info reference
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 0/3] efi: arm64: use -fpie for building the stub
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 18/32] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64
  • From: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 18/32] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64
  • From: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Disable runtime services on kexec kernel if booted with efi=old_map
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Disable runtime services on kexec kernel if booted with efi=old_map
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Disable runtime services on kexec kernel if booted with efi=old_map
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Disable runtime services on kexec kernel if booted with efi=old_map
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 14/32] efi: Add an EFI table address match function
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 26/32] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V16 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V16 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V16 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 23/32] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V16 10/11] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V16 09/11] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V16 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 22/32] x86, swiotlb: DMA support for memory encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 19/32] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 18/32] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Fix kexec kernel panic when efi=old_map is enabled
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi/bgrt: skip efi_bgrt_init in case non-efi boot
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V16 02/11] ras: acpi/apei: cper: add support for generic data v3 structure
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V16 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V16 05/11] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V16 03/11] cper: add timestamp print to CPER status printing
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V16 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V16 07/11] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V16 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V16 10/11] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V16 11/11] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V16 09/11] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V16 04/11] efi: parse ARM processor error
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V16 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 14/32] efi: Add an EFI table address match function
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4.11 00/28] 4.11.1-stable review
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V2] x86/efi: Add EFI_PGT_DUMP support for x86_32, kexec
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: remove duplicate 'const' specifiers
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 08/10] efi/x86: Move EFI BGRT init code to early init code
  • From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Fix kexec kernel panic when efi=old_map is enabled
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 08/10] efi/x86: Move EFI BGRT init code to early init code
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: don't issue error message when booted under xen
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 08/10] efi/x86: Move EFI BGRT init code to early init code
  • From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 08/10] efi/x86: Move EFI BGRT init code to early init code
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 08/10] efi/x86: Move EFI BGRT init code to early init code
  • From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi-pstore: Fix read iter after pstore API refactor
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Fix kexec kernel panic when efi=old_map is enabled
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error
  • From: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error
  • From: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
  • From: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Fix kexec kernel panic when efi=old_map is enabled
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V2] x86/efi: Add EFI_PGT_DUMP support for x86_32, kexec
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Add EFI_PGT_DUMP support for x86_32, kexec and efi=old_map
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: remove duplicate 'const' specifiers
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
  • From: David Daney <ddaney@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: remove duplicate 'const' specifiers
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi: remove duplicate 'const' specifiers
  • From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Add EFI_PGT_DUMP support for x86_32, kexec and efi=old_map
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] x86/efi: Add EFI_PGT_DUMP support for x86_32, kexec and efi=old_map
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64
  • From: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64
  • From: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error
  • From: gengdongjiu <gengdongjiu@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error
  • From: Christoffer Dall <cdall@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error
  • From: gengdongjiu <gengdongjiu@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] arm64: kvm: support kvmtool to detect RAS extension feature
  • From: gengdongjiu <gengdongjiu@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error
  • From: gengdongjiu <gengdongjiu@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
  • From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64
  • From: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64
  • From: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi/libstub: Indicate clang the relocation mode for arm64
  • From: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error
  • From: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] x86/boot/32: Fix UP boot on Quark and possibly other platforms
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tip:x86/mm] x86/boot/32: Defer resyncing initial_page_table until per-cpu is set up
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 11/11] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 11/11] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] x86/efi: Fix kexec kernel panic when efi=old_map is enabled
  • From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tip:x86/mm] x86/boot/32: Defer resyncing initial_page_table until per-cpu is set up
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error
  • From: Christoffer Dall <cdall@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 11/11] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 10/11] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] arm64: kvm: support kvmtool to detect RAS extension feature
  • From: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
  • From: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error
  • From: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [tip:x86/mm] x86/boot/32: Defer resyncing initial_page_table until per-cpu is set up
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tip:x86/mm] x86/boot/32: Defer resyncing initial_page_table until per-cpu is set up
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 15/32] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi: don't issue error message when booted under xen
  • From: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tip:x86/mm] x86/boot/32: Defer resyncing initial_page_table until per-cpu is set up
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tip:x86/mm] x86/boot/32: Defer resyncing initial_page_table until per-cpu is set up
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tip:x86/mm] x86/boot/32: Defer resyncing initial_page_table until per-cpu is set up
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user
  • From: ivanhu <ivan.hu@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tip:x86/mm] x86/boot/32: Defer resyncing initial_page_table until per-cpu is set up
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
  • From: Russ Anderson <rja@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
  • From: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 15/32] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 13/32] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/1 linux-next] efi/capsule: kmap() can't fail
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] rtc: rtc-efi: Add an enable parameter and make it false for X86 by default
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 09/11] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section
  • From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi/cper: Fix endianness of PCI class code
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 09/11] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 13/32] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error
  • From: gengdongjiu <gengdj.1984@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] arm64: kvm: support kvmtool to detect RAS extension feature
  • From: gengdongjiu <gengdj.1984@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] arm/arm64: signal SIBGUS and inject SEA Error
  • From: gengdongjiu <gengdj.1984@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 12/32] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 12/32] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Heyi Guo <heyi.guo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL] Hardware module parameter annotation for secure boot
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/2] efi/efi_test: drop useless kfree
  • From: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback
  • From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback
  • From: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback
  • From: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/5] efi: Move the x86 secure boot switch to generic code
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback
  • From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/2] efi/efi_test: drop useless kfree
  • From: ivanhu <ivan.hu@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
  • From: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL] EFI changes for v4.12
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Linux 11-rc1 to rc8 boot problem
  • From: Paweł S <pawel.pc44@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/2] efi/efi_test: drop useless kfree
  • From: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/2] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user
  • From: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/3 v2] xen: Export xen_reboot
  • From: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 07/11] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 8/8] ACPI: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 8/8] ACPI: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 8/8] ACPI: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
  • From: "Bryan O'Donoghue" <pure.logic@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
  • From: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Correct ident mapping of efi old_map when kalsr enabled
  • From: Baoquan He <bhe@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/1 linux-next] efi/capsule: kmap() can't fail
  • From: Fabian Frederick <fabf@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 04/11] efi: parse ARM processor error
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 04/11] efi: parse ARM processor error
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
  • From: "Bryan O'Donoghue" <pure.logic@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/3 v2] xen: Export xen_reboot
  • From: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback
  • From: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/3 v2] arm/xen: Consolidate calls to shutdown hypercall in a single helper
  • From: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback
  • From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/3 v2] xen: Export xen_reboot
  • From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/3 v2] xen: Export xen_reboot
  • From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback
  • From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/3 v2] arm/xen: Consolidate calls to shutdown hypercall in a single helper
  • From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 0/3 v2] xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback
  • From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 04/11] efi: parse ARM processor error
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 1/8] lib/uuid: Introduce uuid_{be|le}_cmp_p{p}() helpers
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 1/8] lib/uuid: Introduce uuid_{be|le}_cmp_p{p}() helpers
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 2/8] ASoC: Intel: Skylake: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}()
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 2/8] ASoC: Intel: Skylake: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}()
  • From: Vinod Koul <vinod.koul@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 1/8] lib/uuid: Introduce uuid_{be|le}_cmp_p{p}() helpers
  • From: "Winkler, Tomas" <tomas.winkler@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 1/8] lib/uuid: Introduce uuid_{be|le}_cmp_p{p}() helpers
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns
  • From: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@xxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH v1 1/8] lib/uuid: Introduce uuid_{be|le}_cmp_p{p}() helpers
  • From: "Winkler, Tomas" <tomas.winkler@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 07/32] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 8/8] ACPI: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers
  • From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v1 3/8] HID: intel_ish-hid: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}()
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v1 6/8] mei: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 03/11] cper: add timestamp print to CPER status printing
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 07/32] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 04/11] efi: parse ARM processor error
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 04/11] efi: parse ARM processor error
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 03/11] cper: add timestamp print to CPER status printing
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 03/11] cper: add timestamp print to CPER status printing
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 03/11] cper: add timestamp print to CPER status printing
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v1 7/8] efi: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v1 5/8] vmbus: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v1 1/8] lib/uuid: Introduce uuid_{be|le}_cmp_p{p}() helpers
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v1 4/8] vfio-mdev: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}()
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v1 8/8] ACPI: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}() helpers
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v1 2/8] ASoC: Intel: Skylake: Use recently introduced uuid_le_cmp_p{p}()
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 25/29] x86: assembly, make some functions local
  • From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 27/29] x86_32: assembly, change all ENTRY to SYM_FUNC_START
  • From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 03/11] cper: add timestamp print to CPER status printing
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 05/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback
  • From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 05/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 05/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
  • From: "Bryan O'Donoghue" <pure.logic@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 02/11] ras: acpi/apei: cper: add support for generic data v3 structure
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
  • From: "Bryan O'Donoghue" <pure.logic@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback
  • From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback
  • From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 2/3] efi/capsule-loader: Use page addresses rather than struct page pointers
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 3/3] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 1/3] efi/capsule-loader: Redirect calls to efi_capsule_setup_info via weak alias
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V15 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4.10 22/69] x86/efi: Dont try to reserve runtime regions
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4.10 31/69] efi/libstub: Skip GOP with PIXEL_BLT_ONLY format
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4.10 32/69] efi/fb: Avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4.9 16/69] x86/efi: Dont try to reserve runtime regions
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4.9 25/69] efi/fb: Avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4.9 24/69] efi/libstub: Skip GOP with PIXEL_BLT_ONLY format
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V15 00/11] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V15 03/11] cper: add timestamp print to CPER status printing
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V15 02/11] ras: acpi/apei: cper: add support for generic data v3 structure
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V15 04/11] efi: parse ARM processor error
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V15 01/11] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V15 06/11] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V15 08/11] efi: print unrecognized CPER section
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V15 05/11] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V15 07/11] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V15 09/11] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V15 10/11] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V15 11/11] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 01/32] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 02/32] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 03/32] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 07/32] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 08/32] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 10/32] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 14/32] efi: Add an EFI table address match function
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 11/32] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 13/32] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 18/32] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 20/32] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 19/32] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 17/32] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 22/32] x86, swiotlb: DMA support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 23/32] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 32/32] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 26/32] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 30/32] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 31/32] x86: Add sysfs support for Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 29/32] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 28/32] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 27/32] kvm: x86: svm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption within KVM
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 24/32] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU if memory encryption is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 25/32] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 21/32] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 16/32] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 15/32] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 12/32] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 05/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 04/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 00/32] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 02/32] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 04/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 05/32] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 06/32] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 03/32] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 00/32] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 8/8] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 12/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
  • From: Ben Hutchings <ben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 8/8] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/8] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/8] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
  • From: "Bryan O'Donoghue" <pure.logic@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/8] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/8] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
  • From: "Bryan O'Donoghue" <pure.logic@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
  • From: Ben Hutchings <ben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
  • From: Ben Hutchings <ben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 8/8] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 8/8] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 7/8] efi/capsule-loader: use page addresses rather than struct page pointers
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 7/8] efi/capsule-loader: use page addresses rather than struct page pointers
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 8/8] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 7/8] efi/capsule-loader: use page addresses rather than struct page pointers
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 8/8] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 8/8] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 6/8] efi/capsule-loader: indirect calls to efi_capsule_setup_info via weak alias
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 5/8] efi/capsule-loader: use cached copy of capsule header
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4/8] efi/capsule: Adjust return type of efi_capsule_setup_info
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/8] efi/capsule: Clean up pr_err/info messages
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/8] efi/capsule: Remove pr_debug on ENOMEM or EFAULT
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/8] efi/capsule: Fix return code on failing kmap/vmap
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header
  • From: Gary Lin <glin@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: linux-efi archive
  • From: Konstantin Ryabitsev <konstantin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header
  • From: "Roy Franz (HPE)" <roy.lists@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi/libstub/arm: Don't use TASK_SIZE when randomising the RT space
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL] EFI fixup for v4.12 queue
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 14/24] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 13/24] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode
  • From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• linux-efi archive
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH] x86: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header
  • From: hpa@xxxxxxxxx
• Re: [RFC PATCH] x86: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header
  • From: Gary Lin <glin@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH] x86: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header
  • From: hpa@xxxxxxxxx
• Re: [PATCH V14 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V14 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V14 03/10] efi: parse ARM processor error
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V14 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V14 01/10] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 20/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header
  • From: Gary Lin <glin@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] efi: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2] efi: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header
  • From: Gary Lin <glin@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V14 03/10] efi: parse ARM processor error
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V14 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
  • From: Joe Perches <joe@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] x86/efi: Don't try to reserve runtime regions
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL] EFI urgent fix
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 20/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
  • From: joeyli <jlee@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V14 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH] x86: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header
  • From: Gary Lin <glin@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH] x86: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V14 01/10] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH] x86: Config options to assign versions in the PE-COFF header
  • From: Gary Lin <glin@xxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efifb: arm/arm64: validate fb BAR instead of claiming it
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 11/12] efi/libstub: arm/arm64: Disable debug prints on 'quiet' cmdline arg
  • From: Jon Masters <jcm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Why kernel lockdown?
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Sinan Kaya <okaya@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/8] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm/arm64: don't use TASK_SIZE when randomising the RT space
  • From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm/arm64: don't use TASK_SIZE when randomising the RT space
  • From: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm/arm64: don't use TASK_SIZE when randomising the RT space
  • From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm/arm64: don't use TASK_SIZE when randomising the RT space
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4/4] ef/libstub: arm/arm64: randomize the base of the UEFI rt services region
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4/4] ef/libstub: arm/arm64: randomize the base of the UEFI rt services region
  • From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
  • From: poma <pomidorabelisima@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown
  • From: Justin Forbes <jmforbes@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown
  • From: Justin Forbes <jmforbes@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4/4] ef/libstub: arm/arm64: randomize the base of the UEFI rt services region
  • From: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 12/12] ef/libstub: arm/arm64: Randomize the base of the UEFI rt services region
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown
  • From: "Austin S. Hemmelgarn" <ahferroin7@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 12/12] ef/libstub: arm/arm64: Randomize the base of the UEFI rt services region
  • From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4/4] ef/libstub: arm/arm64: randomize the base of the UEFI rt services region
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4/4] ef/libstub: arm/arm64: randomize the base of the UEFI rt services region
  • From: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 14/32] x86: mm: Provide support to use memblock when spliting large pages
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 14/32] x86: mm: Provide support to use memblock when spliting large pages
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
  • From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 17/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 17/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 17/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
  • From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
  • From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
  • From: Jiri Kosina <jikos@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
  • From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
  • From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
  • From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 17/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
  • From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 14/32] x86: mm: Provide support to use memblock when spliting large pages
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 14/32] x86: mm: Provide support to use memblock when spliting large pages
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V14 00/10] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64
  • From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback
  • From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 14/32] x86: mm: Provide support to use memblock when spliting large pages
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/5] efi: Move the x86 secure boot switch to generic code
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/5] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/5] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4/5] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 5/5] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/5] efi: Move the x86 secure boot switch to generic code
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 20/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 20/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
  • From: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4.9 58/72] x86/mm/KASLR: Exclude EFI region from KASLR VA space randomization
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
  • From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4.10 65/81] x86/mm/KASLR: Exclude EFI region from KASLR VA space randomization
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown
  • From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
  • From: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
  • From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 14/24] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 17/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 18/24] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 16/24] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 12/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 08/24] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 19/24] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 20/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 24/24] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 22/24] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 23/24] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 21/24] scsi: Lock down the eata driver
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 13/24] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 10/24] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 14/24] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 10/24] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 13/24] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 08/24] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 14/24] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 12/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 18/24] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 19/24] acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 16/24] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 17/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 08/24] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI fixes for v4.11
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI fixes for v4.11
  • From: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI fixes for v4.11
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI fixes for v4.11
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI fixes for v4.11
  • From: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI fixes for v4.11
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 7/8] efi/capsule-loader: use page addresses rather than struct page pointers
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 8/8] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 5/8] efi/capsule-loader: use cached copy of capsule header
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4/8] efi/capsule: Adjust return type of efi_capsule_setup_info
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 6/8] efi/capsule-loader: indirect calls to efi_capsule_setup_info via weak alias
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/8] efi/capsule: Clean up pr_err/info messages
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/8] efi/capsule: Remove pr_debug on ENOMEM or EFAULT
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/8] efi/capsule: Fix return code on failing kmap/vmap
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 0/8] efi: add support for non-standard capsule headers
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: kexec regression since 4.9 caused by efi
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] efi/capsule: Prepare for loading images with security header
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 12/12] ef/libstub: arm/arm64: Randomize the base of the UEFI rt services region
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 11/12] efi/libstub: arm/arm64: Disable debug prints on 'quiet' cmdline arg
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 10/12] efi/libstub: Unify command line param parsing
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL 00/12] EFI updates for v4.12
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL 00/12] EFI updates for v4.12
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 01/12] x86/efi: Clean up efi CR3 save/restore
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 06/12] pstore: return error code (if any) from efi_pstore_write
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 04/12] x86/efi-bgrt: Move efi-bgrt handling out of arch/x86
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 03/12] efi: arm-stub: Round up FDT allocation to mapping size
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 02/12] efi: arm-stub: Correct FDT and initrd allocation rules for arm64
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 05/12] efi: bgrt: Enable ACPI BGRT handling on arm64
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 08/12] efi/arm32-stub: Allow boottime allocations in the vmlinux region
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 07/12] x86/efi: Clean up a minor mistake in code comment
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 09/12] efi/libstub: Fix harmless command line parsing bug
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/2] efifb: Avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/2] efi/libstub: Skip GOP with PIXEL_BLT_ONLY format
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/2] efifb: Avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/2] efi/libstub: Skip GOP with PIXEL_BLT_ONLY format
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI fixes for v4.11
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: kexec regression since 4.9 caused by efi
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: skip GOP with PIXEL_BLT_ONLY format
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: kexec regression since 4.9 caused by efi
  • From: Omar Sandoval <osandov@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v35 14/14] efi/libstub/arm*: Set default address and size cells values for an empty dtb
  • From: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Sinan Kaya <okaya@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: okaya@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
• Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] efi/capsule: Prepare for loading images with security header
  • From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 18/32] kvm: svm: Use the hardware provided GPA instead of page walk
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 16/32] x86: kvm: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 16/32] x86: kvm: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
  • From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 18/32] kvm: svm: Use the hardware provided GPA instead of page walk
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V14 10/10] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
  • From: Christoffer Dall <cdall@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Sinan Kaya <okaya@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V14 10/10] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] efifb: avoid reconfiguration of BAR that covers the framebuffer
  • From: Sinan Kaya <okaya@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V14 10/10] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
  • From: Christoffer Dall <cdall@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V14 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V14 01/10] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V14 03/10] efi: parse ARM processor error
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V14 00/10] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V14 06/10] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V14 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V14 10/10] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V14 07/10] efi: print unrecognized CPER section
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V14 09/10] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V14 08/10] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V14 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 16/32] x86: kvm: Provide support to create Guest and HV shared per-CPU variables
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>