Linux EFI/UEFI Development
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- [PATCH 3/4] efi: efi_memmap_insert(): don't insert a region more than once
- From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/4] efi: efi_print_memmap(): Call out invalid entries in the memory map early.
- From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/4] UEFI: EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE support for x86
- From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/4] UEFI: EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE support for x86
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/4] UEFI: EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE support for x86
- From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Does anything ever enter through startup_64 in head_64.S?
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Does anything ever enter through startup_64 in head_64.S?
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Does anything ever enter through startup_64 in head_64.S?
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/4] UEFI: EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE support for x86
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/4] efi: Skip parsing of EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE if EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE is detected
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/4] efi: Make EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE initialization common across all architectures
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/4] UEFI: EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE support for x86
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/8] efi: use typed function pointers for runtime services table [ver #5]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/8] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #5]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 3/8] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #5]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4/8] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions [ver #5]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #5]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 6/8] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode [ver #5]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 7/8] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit [ver #5]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 8/8] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 [ver #5]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 10/20] Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 0/8] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #5]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #4]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 8/8] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 [ver #4]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 7/8] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit [ver #4]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #4]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 6/8] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode [ver #4]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 0/8] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #4]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/8] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #4]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 3/8] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #4]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4/8] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions [ver #4]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/8] efi: use typed function pointers for runtime services table [ver #4]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/4] efi: Introduce EFI_MEM_ATTR bit and set it from memory attributes table
- From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 3/4] x86/efi: Add support for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE
- From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/4] efi: Make EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE initialization common across all architectures
- From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4/4] efi: Skip parsing of EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE if EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE is detected
- From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 0/4] UEFI: EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE support for x86
- From: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/2] Honey, I shrunk the EFI stub
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 8/9] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
- From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 8/9] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
- From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- linux kernel support for logitech g502 proteus
- From: Samuel Bernardo <samuelbernardo.mail@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed
- From: One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown
- From: One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 20/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 19/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 20/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2]
- From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 15/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V5 03/10] efi: parse ARMv8 processor error
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed
- From: Corey Minyard <minyard@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed
- From: Corey Minyard <minyard@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed
- From: Corey Minyard <minyard@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V5 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 20/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V5 03/10] efi: parse ARMv8 processor error
- From: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V5 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
- From: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V5 01/10] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
- From: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3]
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3]
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3]
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3]
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3]
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3]
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: use typed function pointers for runtime services table
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed
- From: Dominik Brodowski <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3]
- From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 8/9] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
- From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 8/9] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
- From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] efi/libstub: Make efi_random_alloc() allocate below 4 GB on 32-bit
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [GIT PULL] one more EFI patch for v4.10
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 19/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed
- From: Dominik Brodowski <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2]
- From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2]
- From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #2]
- From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode [ver #2]
- From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 7/7] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit [ver #3]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 6/7] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode [ver #3]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4/7] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions [ver #3]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 3/7] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #3]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/7] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #3]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/7] efi: use typed function pointers for runtime services table [ver #3]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 0/7] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #3]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #2]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #2]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2]
- From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] efi: use typed function pointers for runtime services table
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #2]
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #2]
- From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit [ver #2]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2]
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit [ver #2]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #2]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2]
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit [ver #2]
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #2]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode [ver #2]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 0/6] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #2]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 3/6] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions [ver #2]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit [ver #2]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #2]
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
- From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 15/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 20/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V5 00/10] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
- From: Joe Perches <joe@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
- From: Joe Perches <joe@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
- From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
- From: Joe Perches <joe@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V5 00/10] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64
- From: John Garry <john.garry@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2] efi/libstub: Make efi_random_alloc() allocate below 4 GB on 32-bit
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed
- From: Dominik Brodowski <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 3/6] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V5 03/10] efi: parse ARMv8 processor error
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V5 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V5 07/10] efi: print unrecognized CPER section
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V5 09/10] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V5 08/10] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V5 10/10] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V5 06/10] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V5 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V5 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V5 01/10] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V5 00/10] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 9/9] MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 9/9] MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed
- From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 9/9] MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 9/9] MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed
- From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 9/9] MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 9/9] MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed
- From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring
- From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 8/9] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
- From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 9/9] MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 8/9] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 6/9] efi: Add EFI signature data types
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 5/9] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring
- From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 11/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 10/20] Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 12/20] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 11/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 10/20] Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 09/20] x86: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 05/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 05/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 05/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
- From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 05/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 12/20] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 10/20] Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 11/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 09/20] x86: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring
- From: Petko Manolov <petkan@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 6/9] efi: Add EFI signature data types
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring
- From: Petko Manolov <petkan@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 6/9] efi: Add EFI signature data types
- From: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 01/16] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown
- From: Justin Forbes <jmforbes@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown
- From: One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 01/16] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 01/16] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 03/16] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 05/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 04/16] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 06/16] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 07/16] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 08/16] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 09/16] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 11/16] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 10/16] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 12/16] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 13/16] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 15/16] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 16/16] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 14/16] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 08/20] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/9] KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/9] X.509: Allow X.509 certs to be blacklisted
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 3/9] PKCS#7: Handle blacklisted certificates
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 6/9] efi: Add EFI signature data types
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 5/9] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 7/9] efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 9/9] MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 8/9] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 0/9] KEYS: Blacklisting & UEFI database load
- From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 08/20] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
- From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
- From: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] efi/libstub: Make efi_random_alloc() allocate below 4 GB on 32-bit
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] efi/libstub: add random.c to ARM build
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
- From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] efi/libstub: add random.c to ARM build
- From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
- From: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME
- From: Joerg Roedel <joro@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 06/20] x86: Add support to enable SME during early boot processing
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 06/20] x86: Add support to enable SME during early boot processing
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 06/20] x86: Add support to enable SME during early boot processing
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 02/20] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 14/20] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU if memory encryption is active
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 10/20] Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 14/20] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU if memory encryption is active
- From: Joerg Roedel <joro@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/2] Honey, I shrunk the EFI stub
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 5/9] efi/arm*: libstub: Invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 5/9] efi/arm*: libstub: Invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 5/9] efi/arm*: libstub: Invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table
- From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 5/9] efi/arm*: libstub: Invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/2] Honey, I shrunk the EFI stub
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 5/9] efi/arm*: libstub: Invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table
- From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [efi:master 9/10] drivers/firmware/efi/apple-properties.c:149:3: error: implicit declaration of function 'efi_get_device_by_path'
- From: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/9] MAINTAINERS: Add ARM and arm64 EFI specific files to EFI subsystem
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/9] efi/libstub: Fix allocation size calculations
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4/9] efi/libstub: Add random.c to ARM build
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 5/9] efi/arm*: libstub: Invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 3/9] efi: Add support for seeding the RNG from a UEFI config table
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 6/9] efi: Add device path parser
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 7/9] efi: Allow bitness-agnostic protocol calls
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 9/9] thunderbolt: Use Device ROM retrieved from EFI
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 8/9] x86/efi: Retrieve and assign Apple device properties
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [GIT PULL 0/9] EFI changes for v4.10
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI urgent fixes
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Fix EFI memmap pointer size warning
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/2] x86/efi: Prevent mixed mode boot corruption with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 0/2] Honey, I shrunk the EFI stub
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v4 0/4] Apple device properties
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v4 2/4] efi: Allow bitness-agnostic protocol calls
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 10/20] Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: "Kani, Toshimitsu" <toshi.kani@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 03/20] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 02/20] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
- From: "Kani, Toshimitsu" <toshi.kani@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 02/20] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 00/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 11/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 09/20] x86: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 08/20] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 15/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 20/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 19/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 18/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 17/20] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 12/20] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 14/20] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU if memory encryption is active
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 05/20] x86: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 06/20] x86: Add support to enable SME during early boot processing
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 03/20] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 02/20] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 16/20] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 10/20] Add support to access boot related data in the clear
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCHv4 0/4] WX checking for arm64
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCHv4 0/4] WX checking for arm64
- From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [tip:x86/asm] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks (CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK=y)
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 0/4] WX checking for arm64
- From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 0/4] WX checking for arm64
- From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 0/4] WX checking for arm64
- From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] thunderbolt: Use Device ROM retrieved from EFI
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/2] x86/efi: Deduplicate efi_char16_printk()
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/2] efi: Deduplicate efi_file_size() / _read() / _close()
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 0/2] Honey, I shrunk the EFI stub
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 2/3] x86/efi: Retrieve and assign Apple device properties
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v4 4/4] thunderbolt: Use Device ROM retrieved from EFI
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v4 3/4] x86/efi: Retrieve and assign Apple device properties
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v4 2/4] efi: Allow bitness-agnostic protocol calls
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v4 1/4] efi: Add device path parser
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v4 0/4] Apple device properties
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Fix EFI memmap pointer size warning
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 0/3] Apple device properties
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 0/3] Apple device properties
- From: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] thunderbolt: Use Device ROM retrieved from EFI
- From: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] x86/efi: Fix EFI memmap pointer size warning
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 0/3] Apple device properties
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 2/3] x86/efi: Retrieve and assign Apple device properties
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 3/3] thunderbolt: Use Device ROM retrieved from EFI
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 2/3] x86/efi: Retrieve and assign Apple device properties
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 1/3] efi: Add device path parser
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 0/3] Apple device properties
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
- From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
- From: "Neri, Ricardo" <ricardo.neri@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] EFI loader: remove pointless "if" statement
- From: Eugene Korenevsky <ekorenevsky@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] EFI loader: remove redundant code
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] EFI loader: remove redundant code
- From: Eugene Korenevsky <ekorenevsky@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] efi/libstub: add random.c to ARM build
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] EFI loader: remove redundant code
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] EFI loader: remove dead code
- From: Eugene Korenevsky <ekorenevsky@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2] EFI loader: remove redundant code
- From: Eugene Korenevsky <ekorenevsky@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] EFI loader: remove dead code
- From: Linn Crosetto <linn@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] EFI loader: remove dead code
- From: Eugene Korenevsky <ekorenevsky@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V4 10/10] arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
- From: Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V4 10/10] arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 2/2] MAINTAINERS: add ARM and arm64 EFI specific files to EFI subsystem
- From: Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V4 10/10] arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
- From: Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3] Fix allocation size calculations
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 0/4] WX checking for arm64
- From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [tip:x86/asm] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks (CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK=y)
- From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
- From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
- From: Thorsten Leemhuis <regressions@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 2/2] MAINTAINERS: add ARM and arm64 EFI specific files to EFI subsystem
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv4 4/4] arm64: dump: Add checking for writable and exectuable pages
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv4 1/4] arm64: dump: Make ptdump debugfs a separate option
- From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv4 0/4] WX checking for arm64
- From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv4 3/4] arm64: dump: Remove max_addr
- From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv4 4/4] arm64: dump: Add checking for writable and exectuable pages
- From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv4 2/4] arm64: dump: Make the page table dumping seq_file optional
- From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] efi: Add device path parser
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4.8 104/140] x86/platform/UV: Fix support for EFI_OLD_MEMMAP after BIOS callback updates
- From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
- From: David Daney <ddaney@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
- From: David Daney <ddaney@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
- From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3] Fix allocation size calculations
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
- From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
- From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3] Fix allocation size calculations
- From: Roy Franz <roy.franz@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] efi: Add device path parser
- From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] efi: Add device path parser
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] efi: Add device path parser
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] Fix allocation size calculations
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V4 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V4 01/10] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [REGRESSION] EFI mixed mode patch triggers boot failure
- From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2] Fix allocation size calculations
- From: Roy Franz <roy.franz@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V4 09/10] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [tip:x86/asm] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks (CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK=y)
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V4 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
- From: Suzuki K Poulose <Suzuki.Poulose@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V4 01/10] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
- From: Suzuki K Poulose <Suzuki.Poulose@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Fix allocation size calculations
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
- From: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] efi: Add device path parser
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [tip:x86/asm] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks (CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK=y)
- From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
- From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V4 09/10] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event
- From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] Fix allocation size calculations
- From: Roy Franz <roy.franz@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] Fix allocation size calculations
- From: Roy Franz <roy.franz@xxxxxxx>
- Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
- From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V4 00/10] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V4 01/10] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V4 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V4 07/10] efi: print unrecognized CPER section
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V4 06/10] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V4 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V4 09/10] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V4 08/10] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V4 10/10] arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V4 03/10] efi: parse ARMv8 processor error
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V4 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] efi: Add device path parser
- From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [tip:x86/asm] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks (CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK=y)
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
- From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
- From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for seeding the kernel RNG from UEFI
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
- From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv3 4/4] arm64: dump: Add checking for writable and exectuable pages
- From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [REGRESSION] EFI mixed mode patch triggers boot failure
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] efi: add support for seeding the RNG from a UEFI config table
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 3/3] efi/arm*: libstub: invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 2/3] efi/libstub: add random.c to ARM build
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 1/3] efi: add support for seeding the RNG from a UEFI config table
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for seeding the kernel RNG from UEFI
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv3 4/4] arm64: dump: Add checking for writable and exectuable pages
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCHv3 1/4] arm64: dump: Make ptdump debugfs a separate option
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
- From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
- From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: add support for seeding the RNG from a UEFI config table
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: add support for seeding the RNG from a UEFI config table
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: add support for seeding the RNG from a UEFI config table
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: add support for seeding the RNG from a UEFI config table
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [REGRESSION] EFI mixed mode patch triggers boot failure
- From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
- From: "Abdulhamid, Harb" <harba@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
- From: "Abdulhamid, Harb" <harba@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: add support for seeding the RNG from a UEFI config table
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: add support for seeding the RNG from a UEFI config table
- From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH 0/2] efi/arm64: add vmlinux link to PE/COFF debug table
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH 2/2] efi: arm64: add vmlinux debug link to the Image binary
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- RE: [RFC PATCH 1/2] efi: libstub: preserve .debug sections after absolute relocation check
- From: "Cohen, Eugene" <eugene@xxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: add support for seeding the RNG from a UEFI config table
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: add support for seeding the RNG from a UEFI config table
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [GIT PULL] urgent EFI fix for v4.9
- From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH 1/2] efi: libstub: preserve .debug sections after absolute relocation check
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] efi: Add device path parser
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] efi: Add device path parser
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv3 3/4] arm64: dump: Remove max_addr
- From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv3 1/4] arm64: dump: Make ptdump debugfs a separate option
- From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv3 2/4] arm64: dump: Make the page table dumping seq_file optional
- From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv3 4/4] arm64: dump: Add checking for writable and exectuable pages
- From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCHv3 0/4] WX checking for arm64
- From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] KVM: introduce KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl
- From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] KVM: introduce KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] efi/arm: Fix absolute relocation detection for older toolchains
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [GIT PULL] urgent EFI fix for v4.9
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [GIT PULL 0/8] EFI changes for v4.10
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [GIT PULL 0/8] EFI changes for v4.10
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [GIT PULL 0/8] EFI changes for v4.10
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [GIT PULL 0/8] EFI changes for v4.10
- From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 8/8] efi: efivar_ssdt_load: Don't return success on allocation failure
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 7/8] efifb: show framebuffer layout as device attributes
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 3/8] efi/arm*: efi_init() error handling fix
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 4/8] efi/efi_test: Fix the uninitialized value datasize
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 5/8] efi/efi_test: Fix the uninitialized value rv
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/8] MAINTAINERS: add myself as EFI maintainer
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/8] efi: Remove unused including <linux/version.h>
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 6/8] efi/efi_test: Use memdup_user() as a cleanup
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [GIT PULL 0/8] EFI changes for v4.10
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
- From: Hanjun Guo <hanjun.guo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
- From: Hanjun Guo <hanjun.guo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] partitions/efi: Ignore errors when alternate GPT is not at the end of disk
- From: Hannes Reinecke <hare@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] partitions/efi: Ignore errors when alternate GPT is not at the end of disk
- From: Karel Zak <kzak@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] KVM: introduce KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl
- From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] KVM: introduce KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Robert Richter <rric@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD)
- From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 3/3] thunderbolt: Use Device ROM retrieved from EFI
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 2/3] x86/efi: Retrieve and assign Apple device properties
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 1/3] efi: Add device path parser
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 0/3] Apple device properties
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] partitions/efi: Ignore errors when alternate GPT is not at the end of disk
- From: Hannes Reinecke <hare@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 10/10] arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
- From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
- From: Suzuki K Poulose <Suzuki.Poulose@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
- From: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 10/10] arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
- From: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 06/10] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 08/10] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 10/10] arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 01/10] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 10/10] arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
- From: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 06/10] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block
- From: Suzuki K Poulose <Suzuki.Poulose@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 20/28] KVM: SVM: prepare for SEV guest management API support
- From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD)
- From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 24/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH command
- From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 22/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV launch start command
- From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [patch] efi: fix an error code
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] KVM: introduce KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl
- From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 08/10] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section
- From: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 19/28] KVM: SVM: prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest
- From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [patch] efi: fix an error code
- From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
- From: Suzuki K Poulose <Suzuki.Poulose@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 09/10] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event
- From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
- From: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort
- From: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 01/10] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
- From: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: Use LocateHandleBuffer instead of LocateHandle
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
- From: Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
- From: Suzuki K Poulose <Suzuki.Poulose@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: David Daney <ddaney.cavm@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/arm: fix absolute relocation detection for older toolchains
- From: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH V3 09/10] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event
- From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V3 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V3 08/10] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V3 09/10] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V3 10/10] arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V3 07/10] efi: print unrecognized CPER section
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V3 06/10] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V3 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V3 03/10] efi: parse ARMv8 processor error
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V3 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V3 01/10] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH V3 00/10] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64
- From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: arm64: kernel BUG at mm/page_alloc.c:1844!
- From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/2] efi/arm*: libstub: invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/2] efi: add support for seeding the RNG from a UEFI config table
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 0/2] efi: add support for seeding the kernel RNG from UEFI
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Robert Richter <rrichter@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: Use LocateHandleBuffer instead of LocateHandle
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efifb: show framebuffer layout as device attributes
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/arm: fix absolute relocation detection for older toolchains
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: Use LocateHandleBuffer instead of LocateHandle
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- arm64: kernel BUG at mm/page_alloc.c:1844!
- From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/3 V2] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user() as a cleanup
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/3 V2] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user() as a cleanup
- From: Ivan Hu <ivan.hu@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/3] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user() as a cleanup
- From: ivanhu <ivan.hu@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/3] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user() as a cleanup
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: Use LocateHandleBuffer instead of LocateHandle
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/arm: fix absolute relocation detection for older toolchains
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efifb: show framebuffer layout as device attributes
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: Use LocateHandleBuffer instead of LocateHandle
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efifb: show framebuffer layout as device attributes
- From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efifb: show framebuffer layout as device attributes
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: Use LocateHandleBuffer instead of LocateHandle
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/arm: fix absolute relocation detection for older toolchains
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/arm: fix absolute relocation detection for older toolchains
- From: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/3] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user() as a cleanup
- From: ivanhu <ivan.hu@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi/arm: fix absolute relocation detection for older toolchains
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 3/3] efi/efi_test: fix the uninitialized value rv
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 2/3] efi/efi_test: fix the uninitialized value datasize
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/3] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user() as a cleanup
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH -next v2] arm*/efi: efi_init error handling fix
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH -next] efi: Remove unused including <linux/version.h>
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] efi: Use LocateHandleBuffer instead of LocateHandle
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] efifb: show framebuffer layout as device attributes
- From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] efi/arm: fix absolute relocation detection for older toolchains
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] efi: MMC proxy support for the UEFI varstore
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] efi: MMC proxy support for the UEFI varstore
- From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] efi: MMC proxy support for the UEFI varstore
- From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 3/3] efi/efi_test: fix the uninitialized value rv
- From: Ivan Hu <ivan.hu@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/3] efi/efi_test: fix the uninitialized value datasize
- From: Ivan Hu <ivan.hu@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/3] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user() as a cleanup
- From: Ivan Hu <ivan.hu@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 0/3] efi_test: fix Coccinelle warning and CoverityScan issues
- From: Ivan Hu <ivan.hu@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
- From: Kai Huang <kaih.linux@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] efi: MMC proxy support for the UEFI varstore
- From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
- From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
- From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
- From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
- From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
- From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
- From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 04/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
- From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 05/28] KVM: SVM: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] efi: MMC proxy support for the UEFI varstore
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] efi: MMC proxy support for the UEFI varstore
- From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH 2/3] efi/arm: add SIMD stash/unstash operations
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH 1/3] efi/arm64: add SIMD stash/unstash operations
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH 3/3] efi: implement MMC proxy support for the UEFI variable store
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH 0/3] efi: MMC proxy support for the UEFI varstore
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: EFI co-maintainer
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: EFI co-maintainer
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: EFI co-maintainer
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: EFI co-maintainer
- From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 03/28] kvm: svm: Use the hardware provided GPA instead of page walk
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 2/2] MAINTAINERS: add ARM and arm64 EFI specific files to EFI subsystem
- From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] MAINTAINERS: add myself as EFI maintainer
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] MAINTAINERS: add myself as EFI maintainer
- From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/2] MAINTAINERS: add myself as EFI maintainer
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/2] MAINTAINERS: add ARM and arm64 EFI specific files to EFI subsystem
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: EFI co-maintainer
- From: Grant Likely <grant.likely@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- EFI co-maintainer
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v1 02/28] kvm: svm: Add kvm_fast_pio_in support
- From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI urgent fixes
- From: Waiman Long <waiman.long@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI urgent fixes
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fix for v4.9 queue
- From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI urgent fixes
- From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 1/2] x86/mm/pat: Prevent hang during boot when mapping pages
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 2/2] x86/efi: Only map RAM into EFI page tables if in mixed-mode
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI urgent fixes
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] x86/efi: Round EFI memmap reservations to EFI_PAGE_SIZE
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [GIT PULL] EFI fix for v4.9 queue
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH -next v2] arm*/efi: efi_init error handling fix
- From: Yisheng Xie <xieyisheng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Add necessary checks before iterating over efi.memmap
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Add necessary checks before iterating over efi.memmap
- From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] arm64/efi: efi_init error handling fix
- From: Yisheng Xie <xieyisheng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Cannot load linux after recent efi-related changes
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Cannot load linux after recent efi-related changes
- From: Mike Krinkin <krinkin.m.u@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [tip regression] efi: Allow drivers to reserve boot services forever == toxic
- From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
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