Security Enhanced Linux (SELINUX)

• Date Index

• Re: [PATCH] selinux: reduce the use of hard-coded hash sizes, (continued)
  • Re: [PATCH] selinux: reduce the use of hard-coded hash sizes, Ondrej Mosnacek
• [PATCH v7 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability, Alexey Budankov
  • [PATCH v7 01/12] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Alexey Budankov
    • Re: [PATCH v7 01/12] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [PATCH v7 01/12] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, James Morris
      • Re: [PATCH v7 01/12] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Alexey Budankov
  • [PATCH v7 02/12] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
    • Re: [PATCH v7 02/12] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, James Morris
  • [PATCH v7 03/12] perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
    • Re: [PATCH v7 03/12] perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, James Morris
  • [PATCH v7 04/12] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support, Alexey Budankov
    • Re: [PATCH v7 04/12] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support, James Morris
  • [PATCH v7 05/12] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
    • Re: [PATCH v7 05/12] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, James Morris
  • [PATCH v7 06/12] trace/bpf_trace: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
    • Re: [PATCH v7 06/12] trace/bpf_trace: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, James Morris
  • [PATCH v7 07/12] powerpc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
    • Re: [PATCH v7 07/12] powerpc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, James Morris
  • [PATCH v7 08/12] parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
    • Re: [PATCH v7 08/12] parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, James Morris
  • [PATCH v7 09/12] drivers/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
    • Re: [PATCH v7 09/12] drivers/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, James Morris
  • [PATCH v7 10/12] drivers/oprofile: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
    • Re: [PATCH v7 10/12] drivers/oprofile: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, James Morris
  • [PATCH v7 11/12] doc/admin-guide: update perf-security.rst with CAP_PERFMON information, Alexey Budankov
  • [PATCH v7 12/12] doc/admin-guide: update kernel.rst with CAP_PERFMON information, Alexey Budankov
  • Re: [PATCH v7 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability, Alexey Budankov
    • Re: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v7 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability, Serge Hallyn
      • Re: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v7 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability, James Morris
      • Re: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v7 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability, James Morris
• Duplicate hashtab code in libsepol vs. policycoreutils/newrole?, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • Re: Duplicate hashtab code in libsepol vs. policycoreutils/newrole?, Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH v15 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v15 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security, Casey Schaufler
    • Re: [PATCH v15 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security, Paul Moore
  • [PATCH v15 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match, Casey Schaufler
    • Re: [PATCH v15 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match, Mimi Zohar
  • [PATCH v15 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure., Casey Schaufler
    • Re: [PATCH v15 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure., Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [PATCH v15 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure., Mimi Zohar
  • [PATCH v15 04/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as, Casey Schaufler
    • Re: [PATCH v15 04/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as, Paul Moore
  • [PATCH v15 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking, Casey Schaufler
    • Re: [PATCH v15 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking, Paul Moore
      • Re: [PATCH v15 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking, Casey Schaufler
        • Re: [PATCH v15 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking, Paul Moore
  • [PATCH v15 06/23] Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid, Casey Schaufler
    • Re: [PATCH v15 06/23] Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid, Paul Moore
      • Re: [PATCH v15 06/23] Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v15 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v15 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v15 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v15 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v15 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v15 12/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v15 13/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display, Casey Schaufler
    • Re: [PATCH v15 13/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display, Paul Moore
  • [PATCH v15 14/23] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v15 15/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v15 17/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter, Casey Schaufler
    • Re: [PATCH v15 17/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter, Paul Moore
  • [PATCH v15 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v15 19/23] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v15 18/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob, Casey Schaufler
    • Re: [PATCH v15 18/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob, Paul Moore
      • Re: [PATCH v15 18/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v15 20/23] Audit: Add subj_LSM fields when necessary, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v15 21/23] Audit: Include object data for all security modules, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v15 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag, Casey Schaufler
    • Re: [PATCH v15 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag, Stephen Smalley
  • [PATCH v15 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, Casey Schaufler
    • Re: [PATCH v15 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, Stephen Smalley
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • [PATCH v15 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v15 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure., Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 04/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 06/23] Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v15 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure., Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 04/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 06/23] Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v15 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure., Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 04/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 06/23] Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v15 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure., Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 04/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 06/23] Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v16 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid, Casey Schaufler
• Re: [RFC PATCH 1/1] selinux-testsuite: Use native filesystem for fs tests, Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [RFC PATCH 1/1] selinux-testsuite: Use native filesystem for fs tests, Richard Haines
    • Re: [RFC PATCH 1/1] selinux-testsuite: Use native filesystem for fs tests, Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.5 182/542] selinux: fall back to ref-walk if audit is required, Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.5 181/542] selinux: revert "stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK to the AVC upon follow_link", Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.5 190/542] selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in avc_insert(), Sasha Levin
  • Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.5 190/542] selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in avc_insert(), Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.5 190/542] selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in avc_insert(), Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.5 249/542] selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in avc_update(), Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.5 417/542] selinux: fix regression introduced by move_mount(2) syscall, Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 157/459] selinux: revert "stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK to the AVC upon follow_link", Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 158/459] selinux: fall back to ref-walk if audit is required, Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 216/459] selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in avc_update(), Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 357/459] selinux: fix regression introduced by move_mount(2) syscall, Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 080/252] selinux: fall back to ref-walk if audit is required, Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 085/252] selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in avc_insert(), Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 115/252] selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in avc_update(), Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 166/459] selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in avc_insert(), Sasha Levin
• [RFC PATCH] security,anon_inodes,kvm: enable security support for anon inodes, Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [RFC PATCH] security,anon_inodes,kvm: enable security support for anon inodes, Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [RFC PATCH] security,anon_inodes,kvm: enable security support for anon inodes, Paul Moore
    • Re: [RFC PATCH] security,anon_inodes,kvm: enable security support for anon inodes, Casey Schaufler
      • Re: [RFC PATCH] security,anon_inodes,kvm: enable security support for anon inodes, Daniel Colascione
        • Re: [RFC PATCH] security,anon_inodes,kvm: enable security support for anon inodes, Daniel Colascione
          • Re: [RFC PATCH] security,anon_inodes,kvm: enable security support for anon inodes, Stephen Smalley
            • Re: [RFC PATCH] security,anon_inodes,kvm: enable security support for anon inodes, Daniel Colascione
              • Re: [RFC PATCH] security,anon_inodes,kvm: enable security support for anon inodes, Stephen Smalley
• [RFC PATCH 0/1] selinux-testsuite: Use native filesystem for fs tests, Richard Haines
  • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/1] selinux-testsuite: Use native filesystem for fs tests, Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/1] selinux-testsuite: Use native filesystem for fs tests, Stephen Smalley
      • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/1] selinux-testsuite: Use native filesystem for fs tests, Paul Moore
• [PATCH userspace v2] libsepol: cache ebitmap cardinality value, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • Re: [PATCH userspace v2] libsepol: cache ebitmap cardinality value, Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [PATCH userspace v2] libsepol: cache ebitmap cardinality value, Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [PATCH userspace v2] libsepol: cache ebitmap cardinality value, Ondrej Mosnacek
      • Re: [PATCH userspace v2] libsepol: cache ebitmap cardinality value, Stephen Smalley
      • Re: [PATCH userspace v2] libsepol: cache ebitmap cardinality value, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • Re: [PATCH userspace v2] libsepol: cache ebitmap cardinality value, Ondrej Mosnacek
    • Re: [PATCH userspace v2] libsepol: cache ebitmap cardinality value, Stephen Smalley
      • Re: [PATCH userspace v2] libsepol: cache ebitmap cardinality value, Ondrej Mosnacek
        • Re: [PATCH userspace v2] libsepol: cache ebitmap cardinality value, Nicolas Iooss
          • Re: [PATCH userspace v2] libsepol: cache ebitmap cardinality value, William Roberts
            • Re: [PATCH userspace v2] libsepol: cache ebitmap cardinality value, Ondrej Mosnacek
              • Re: [PATCH userspace v2] libsepol: cache ebitmap cardinality value, William Roberts
• FYI: selinux/working-selinuxns branch has been updated, Paul Moore
• [PATCH userspace] libsepol: cache ebitmap cardinality value, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • Re: [PATCH userspace] libsepol: cache ebitmap cardinality value, Ondrej Mosnacek
• [PATCH v2 0/2] Optimize storage of filename transitions, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • [PATCH v2 1/2] selinux: factor out loop body from filename_trans_read(), Ondrej Mosnacek
    • Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] selinux: factor out loop body from filename_trans_read(), Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] selinux: factor out loop body from filename_trans_read(), Paul Moore
  • [PATCH v2 2/2] selinux: optimize storage of filename transitions, Ondrej Mosnacek
    • Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] selinux: optimize storage of filename transitions, Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] selinux: optimize storage of filename transitions, Paul Moore
      • Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] selinux: optimize storage of filename transitions, Ondrej Mosnacek
        • Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] selinux: optimize storage of filename transitions, Paul Moore
• [PATCH v2 0/6] Harden userfaultfd, Daniel Colascione
  • [PATCH v2 1/6] Add a new flags-accepting interface for anonymous inodes, Daniel Colascione
    • Re: [PATCH v2 1/6] Add a new flags-accepting interface for anonymous inodes, Stephen Smalley
      • Re: [PATCH v2 1/6] Add a new flags-accepting interface for anonymous inodes, Daniel Colascione
  • [PATCH v2 3/6] Teach SELinux about a new userfaultfd class, Daniel Colascione
    • Re: [PATCH v2 3/6] Teach SELinux about a new userfaultfd class, Stephen Smalley
      • Re: [PATCH v2 3/6] Teach SELinux about a new userfaultfd class, Daniel Colascione
        • Re: [PATCH v2 3/6] Teach SELinux about a new userfaultfd class, Stephen Smalley
          • Re: [PATCH v2 3/6] Teach SELinux about a new userfaultfd class, Stephen Smalley
            • Re: [PATCH v2 3/6] Teach SELinux about a new userfaultfd class, Daniel Colascione
              • Re: [PATCH v2 3/6] Teach SELinux about a new userfaultfd class, Stephen Smalley
                • Re: [PATCH v2 3/6] Teach SELinux about a new userfaultfd class, Daniel Colascione
                • Re: [PATCH v2 3/6] Teach SELinux about a new userfaultfd class, Stephen Smalley
  • [PATCH v2 6/6] Add a new sysctl for limiting userfaultfd to user mode faults, Daniel Colascione
  • [PATCH v2 4/6] Wire UFFD up to SELinux, Daniel Colascione
  • [PATCH v2 5/6] Let userfaultfd opt out of handling kernel-mode faults, Daniel Colascione
  • [PATCH v2 2/6] Add a concept of a "secure" anonymous file, Daniel Colascione
    • Re: [PATCH v2 2/6] Add a concept of a "secure" anonymous file, Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [PATCH v2 2/6] Add a concept of a "secure" anonymous file, kbuild test robot
  • Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] Harden userfaultfd, Casey Schaufler
    • Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] Harden userfaultfd, Daniel Colascione
      • Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] Harden userfaultfd, Stephen Smalley
      • Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] Harden userfaultfd, James Morris
  • Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] Harden userfaultfd, Kees Cook
    • Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] Harden userfaultfd, Jann Horn
      • Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] Harden userfaultfd, Peter Xu
        • Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] Harden userfaultfd, Andrea Arcangeli
          • Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] Harden userfaultfd, Daniel Colascione
            • Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] Harden userfaultfd, Andrea Arcangeli
    • Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] Harden userfaultfd, Daniel Colascione
  • [PATCH 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD, Daniel Colascione
    • [PATCH 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes, Daniel Colascione
      • Re: [PATCH 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes, Stephen Smalley
        • Re: [PATCH 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes, Daniel Colascione
          • Re: [PATCH 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes, Stephen Smalley
            • Re: [PATCH 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes, Stephen Smalley
              • Re: [PATCH 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes, Stephen Smalley
    • [PATCH 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface, Daniel Colascione
    • [PATCH 3/3] Wire UFFD up to SELinux, Daniel Colascione
    • [PATCH v2 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD, Daniel Colascione
    • [PATCH v2 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface, Daniel Colascione
      • Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface, Stephen Smalley
    • [PATCH v2 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes, Daniel Colascione
      • Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes, Stephen Smalley
        • Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes, Daniel Colascione
      • Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes, Stephen Smalley
    • [PATCH v2 3/3] Wire UFFD up to SELinux, Daniel Colascione
      • Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] Wire UFFD up to SELinux, Casey Schaufler
    • [PATCH v3 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD, Daniel Colascione
      • [PATCH v3 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface, Daniel Colascione
        • Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface, Stephen Smalley
      • [PATCH v3 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes, Daniel Colascione
        • Re: [PATCH v3 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes, Stephen Smalley
      • [PATCH v3 3/3] Wire UFFD up to SELinux, Daniel Colascione
      • [PATCH v4 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD, Daniel Colascione
        • [PATCH v4 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface, Daniel Colascione
          • Re: [PATCH v4 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface, Stephen Smalley
        • [PATCH v4 3/3] Wire UFFD up to SELinux, Daniel Colascione
        • [PATCH v4 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes, Daniel Colascione
          • Re: [PATCH v4 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes, Stephen Smalley
        • [PATCH v5 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD, Daniel Colascione
          • [PATCH v5 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface, Daniel Colascione
            • Re: [PATCH v5 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface, James Morris
            • Re: [PATCH v5 1/3] Add a new LSM-supporting anonymous inode interface, Eric Biggers
          • [PATCH v5 3/3] Wire UFFD up to SELinux, Daniel Colascione
            • Re: [PATCH v5 3/3] Wire UFFD up to SELinux, Eric Biggers
          • [PATCH v5 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes, Daniel Colascione
          • Re: [PATCH v5 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD, Daniel Colascione
            • Re: [PATCH v5 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD, James Morris
              • Re: [PATCH v5 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD, Casey Schaufler
                • Re: [PATCH v5 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD, Casey Schaufler
                  • Re: [PATCH v5 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD, Casey Schaufler
                    • Re: [PATCH v5 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD, Stephen Smalley
                      • Re: [PATCH v5 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD, Casey Schaufler
                      • Re: [PATCH v5 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD, Stephen Smalley
              • Re: [PATCH v5 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD, Casey Schaufler
                • Re: [PATCH v5 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD, Stephen Smalley
          • Re: [PATCH v5 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD, James Morris
            • Re: [PATCH v5 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD, Stephen Smalley
              • Re: [PATCH v5 0/3] SELinux support for anonymous inodes and UFFD, Lokesh Gidra
• [PATCH 0/2] Optimize storage of filename transitions, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • [PATCH 1/2] selinux: factor out loop body from filename_trans_read(), Ondrej Mosnacek
  • [PATCH 2/2] selinux: optimize storage of filename transitions, Ondrej Mosnacek
    • Re: [PATCH 2/2] selinux: optimize storage of filename transitions, Stephen Smalley
      • Re: [PATCH 2/2] selinux: optimize storage of filename transitions, Ondrej Mosnacek
• [PATCH] selinux-testsuite: add the quota package to the list of deps in README.md, Paul Moore
  • Re: [PATCH] selinux-testsuite: add the quota package to the list of deps in README.md, Paul Moore
  • Re: [PATCH] selinux-testsuite: add the quota package to the list of deps in README.md, Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [PATCH] selinux-testsuite: add the quota package to the list of deps in README.md, Paul Moore
• [PATCH v5] libselinux: Eliminate use of security_compute_user(), Petr Lautrbach
  • Re: [PATCH v5] libselinux: Eliminate use of security_compute_user(), Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH v5] libselinux: Eliminate use of security_compute_user(), Ondrej Mosnacek
    • Re: [PATCH v5] libselinux: Eliminate use of security_compute_user(), Petr Lautrbach
    • Re: [PATCH v5] libselinux: Eliminate use of security_compute_user(), Petr Lautrbach
  • Re: [PATCH v5] libselinux: Eliminate use of security_compute_user(), Stephen Smalley
• [GIT PULL] SELinux fixes for v5.6 (#1), Paul Moore
  • Re: [GIT PULL] SELinux fixes for v5.6 (#1), pr-tracker-bot
• [PATCH v4] libselinux: Eliminate use of security_compute_user(), Petr Lautrbach
  • Re: [PATCH v4] libselinux: Eliminate use of security_compute_user(), Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [PATCH v4] libselinux: Eliminate use of security_compute_user(), Petr Lautrbach
• [PATCH v3] libselinux: Eliminate use of security_compute_user(), Petr Lautrbach
  • Re: [PATCH v3] libselinux: Eliminate use of security_compute_user(), Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH v3] libselinux: Eliminate use of security_compute_user(), Ondrej Mosnacek
    • Re: [PATCH v3] libselinux: Eliminate use of security_compute_user(), Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH] label_file.c: Fix MAC build, Nick Kralevich
  • Re: [PATCH] label_file.c: Fix MAC build, Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [PATCH] label_file.c: Fix MAC build, Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH v3] security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for bpffs, Steven Moreland
  • Re: [PATCH v3] security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for bpffs, Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH v3] security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for bpffs, Paul Moore
• [PATCH userspace] libsepol/cil: remove unnecessary hash tables, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • Re: [Non-DoD Source] [PATCH userspace] libsepol/cil: remove unnecessary hash tables, jwcart2
    • Re: [Non-DoD Source] [PATCH userspace] libsepol/cil: remove unnecessary hash tables, jwcart2
      • Re: [Non-DoD Source] [PATCH userspace] libsepol/cil: remove unnecessary hash tables, Ondrej Mosnacek
• [PATCH] libselinux: drop error return from is_selinux_enabled.3, Christian Göttsche
  • Re: [PATCH] libselinux: drop error return from is_selinux_enabled.3, Petr Lautrbach
    • Re: [PATCH] libselinux: drop error return from is_selinux_enabled.3, Stephen Smalley
      • Re: [PATCH] libselinux: drop error return from is_selinux_enabled.3, Christian Göttsche
        • Re: [PATCH] libselinux: drop error return from is_selinux_enabled.3, Stephen Smalley
  • [PATCH] libselinux: drop error return from is_selinux_enabled documentation, Christian Göttsche
    • Re: [PATCH] libselinux: drop error return from is_selinux_enabled documentation, Stephen Smalley
      • Re: [PATCH] libselinux: drop error return from is_selinux_enabled documentation, Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH v2] security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for bpffs, Steven Moreland
  • Re: [PATCH v2] security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for bpffs, Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH] security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for bpffs, Steven Moreland
  • Re: [PATCH] security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for bpffs, Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [PATCH] security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for bpffs, Stephen Smalley
      • Re: [PATCH] security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for bpffs, Steven Moreland
        • Re: [PATCH] security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for bpffs, Stephen Smalley
          • Re: [PATCH] security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for bpffs, Paul Moore
            • Re: [PATCH] security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for bpffs, Steven Moreland
              • Re: [PATCH] security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for bpffs, Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH 0/2] userspace: Fix DEBUG=1 build, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • [PATCH 1/2] libsemanage: preserve parent Makefile's flags in debug mode, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • [PATCH 2/2] Travis-CI: test that DEBUG build works, Ondrej Mosnacek
    • Re: [PATCH 2/2] Travis-CI: test that DEBUG build works, Stephen Smalley
      • Re: [PATCH 2/2] Travis-CI: test that DEBUG build works, Stephen Smalley
• [RFC PATCH 0/2] userspace: Allow changing version of kernel policy built by semodule, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • [RFC PATCH 1/2] libsemanage: support changing policy version via API, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • [RFC PATCH 2/2] semodule: support changing policyvers via command line, Ondrej Mosnacek
    • Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] semodule: support changing policyvers via command line, Stephen Smalley
      • Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] semodule: support changing policyvers via command line, Ondrej Mosnacek
        • Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] semodule: support changing policyvers via command line, Stephen Smalley
          • Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] semodule: support changing policyvers via command line, Ondrej Mosnacek
            • Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] semodule: support changing policyvers via command line, Stephen Smalley
              • Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] semodule: support changing policyvers via command line, Stephen Smalley
                • Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] semodule: support changing policyvers via command line, Stephen Smalley
• Test to trace kernel bug in fsconfig(2) with nfs, Richard Haines
  • Re: Test to trace kernel bug in fsconfig(2) with nfs, Richard Haines
• Test to trace kernel bug in fsconfig(2) with btrfs, Richard Haines
• IPv6 netmask in nodecon statement, Christian Göttsche
  • Re: IPv6 netmask in nodecon statement, Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH v2] libselinux: Eliminate use of security_compute_user(), Petr Lautrbach
  • Re: [PATCH v2] libselinux: Eliminate use of security_compute_user(), Stephen Smalley
• [RFC PATCH 0/1] selinux-testsuite: Test all mount option context types, Richard Haines
  • [RFC PATCH 1/1] selinux-testsuite: Test all mount option context types, Richard Haines
  • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/1] selinux-testsuite: Test all mount option context types, Stephen Smalley
• [ANNOUNCE][CFP] Linux Security Summit North America 2020, James Morris
  • Message not available
    • [ANNOUNCE][CFP] Linux Security Summit Europe 2020, Elena Reshetova
• security/selinux: Add support for new key permissions, Richard Haines
  • Re: security/selinux: Add support for new key permissions, Stephen Smalley
    • Re: security/selinux: Add support for new key permissions, Richard Haines
      • Re: security/selinux: Add support for new key permissions, Stephen Smalley
        • Re: security/selinux: Add support for new key permissions, Richard Haines
• rangetranstion in cil fails and doesn't produce explanatory output, Denis Obrezkov
  • Re: [Non-DoD Source] rangetranstion in cil fails and doesn't produce explanatory output, jwcart2
• [PATCH v3 0/5] selinux: Assorted simplifications and cleanups, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • [PATCH v3 1/5] selinux: simplify evaluate_cond_node(), Ondrej Mosnacek
    • Re: [PATCH v3 1/5] selinux: simplify evaluate_cond_node(), Paul Moore
  • [PATCH v3 3/5] selinux: convert cond_av_list to array, Ondrej Mosnacek
    • Re: [PATCH v3 3/5] selinux: convert cond_av_list to array, Paul Moore
  • [PATCH v3 4/5] selinux: convert cond_expr to array, Ondrej Mosnacek
    • Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] selinux: convert cond_expr to array, Paul Moore
  • [PATCH v3 2/5] selinux: convert cond_list to array, Ondrej Mosnacek
    • Re: [PATCH v3 2/5] selinux: convert cond_list to array, Paul Moore
  • [PATCH v3 5/5] selinux: generalize evaluate_cond_node(), Ondrej Mosnacek
    • Re: [PATCH v3 5/5] selinux: generalize evaluate_cond_node(), Paul Moore
• [PATCH] selinux: fix sidtab string cache locking, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • Re: [PATCH] selinux: fix sidtab string cache locking, Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH] selinux: fix sidtab string cache locking, Paul Moore
• [RFC PATCH] libsepol: Add 'key_perms' policy capability, Richard Haines
  • Re: [RFC PATCH] libsepol: Add 'key_perms' policy capability, Stephen Smalley
• [RFC PATCH 0/1] selinux-testsuite: Add additional key permission tests, Richard Haines
  • [RFC PATCH 1/1] selinux-testsuite: Add additional key permission tests, Richard Haines
    • Re: [RFC PATCH 1/1] selinux-testsuite: Add additional key permission tests, Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH] selinux: Fix typo in filesystem name, Hridya Valsaraju
  • Re: [PATCH] selinux: Fix typo in filesystem name, Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH] selinux: Fix typo in filesystem name, Paul Moore
    • Re: [PATCH] selinux: Fix typo in filesystem name, Hridya Valsaraju
• [PATCH] selinux-testsuite: Binder goto brexit fix, Richard Haines
  • Re: [PATCH] selinux-testsuite: Binder goto brexit fix, Paul Moore
    • Re: [PATCH] selinux-testsuite: Binder goto brexit fix, Paul Moore
• [PATCH] libsepol/cil: Rewrite verification of map classes and classpermissionsets, James Carter
  • Re: [PATCH] libsepol/cil: Rewrite verification of map classes and classpermissionsets, Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [PATCH] libsepol/cil: Rewrite verification of map classes and classpermissionsets, jwcart2
• [PATCH] libsepol: add support for new polcap genfs_seclabel_symlinks, Christian Göttsche
  • Re: [PATCH] libsepol: add support for new polcap genfs_seclabel_symlinks, Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [PATCH] libsepol: add support for new polcap genfs_seclabel_symlinks, Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH v3 1/2] testsuite: provide support for testing labeled NFS, Stephen Smalley
  • [PATCH v3 2/2] testsuite: add further nfs tests, Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] testsuite: add further nfs tests, Stephen Smalley
      • Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] testsuite: add further nfs tests, Stephen Smalley
        • Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] testsuite: add further nfs tests, Paul Moore
          • Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] testsuite: add further nfs tests, Stephen Smalley
            • Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] testsuite: add further nfs tests, Paul Moore
• [PATCH v2 1/2] testsuite: provide support for testing labeled NFS, Stephen Smalley
  • [PATCH v2 2/2] testsuite: add further nfs tests, Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] testsuite: add further nfs tests, Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH] testsuite: add further nfs tests, Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH] testsuite: add further nfs tests, Paul Moore
• [PATCH 0/1] selinux-testsuite: Add watch_sb and watch_mount checks, Richard Haines
  • [PATCH 1/1] selinux-testsuite: Add watch_sb and watch_mount checks, Richard Haines
    • Re: [PATCH 1/1] selinux-testsuite: Add watch_sb and watch_mount checks, Stephen Smalley
      • Re: [PATCH 1/1] selinux-testsuite: Add watch_sb and watch_mount checks, Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH] testsuite: provide support for testing labeled NFS, Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH] testsuite: provide support for testing labeled NFS, Paul Moore
• [PATCH] testsuite: enable running over labeled NFS, Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH] testsuite: enable running over labeled NFS, Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH v2] selinux: remove unused initial SIDs and improve handling, Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: remove unused initial SIDs and improve handling, Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: remove unused initial SIDs and improve handling, Paul Moore
      • Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: remove unused initial SIDs and improve handling, Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: remove unused initial SIDs and improve handling, Dominick Grift
  • Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: remove unused initial SIDs and improve handling, Ondrej Mosnacek
    • Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: remove unused initial SIDs and improve handling, Stephen Smalley
      • Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: remove unused initial SIDs and improve handling, Ondrej Mosnacek
      • Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: remove unused initial SIDs and improve handling, Paul Moore
        • Message not available
          • Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: remove unused initial SIDs and improve handling, Paul Moore
• [PATCH v2] libsepol,checkpolicy: support omitting unused initial sid contexts, Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH v2] libsepol,checkpolicy: support omitting unused initial sid contexts, Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH v2] libsepol,checkpolicy: support omitting unused initial sid contexts, jwcart2
  • Re: [PATCH v2] libsepol,checkpolicy: support omitting unused initial sid contexts, Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH] libsepol,checkpolicy: support omitting unused initial sid contexts, Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH] libsepol,checkpolicy: support omitting unused initial sid contexts, Dominick Grift
  • Re: [PATCH] libsepol, checkpolicy: support omitting unused initial sid contexts, jwcart2
    • Re: [PATCH] libsepol, checkpolicy: support omitting unused initial sid contexts, Stephen Smalley
• CIL: another segfault producer, Dominick Grift
  • Re: CIL: another segfault producer, Lawrence, Stephen
    • Re: CIL: another segfault producer, Dominick Grift
• [PATCH v6 00/10] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability, Alexey Budankov
  • [PATCH v6 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Alexey Budankov
    • Re: [PATCH v6 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, James Morris
  • [PATCH v6 02/10] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
  • [PATCH v6 03/10] perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
    • Re: [PATCH v6 03/10] perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, James Morris
  • [PATCH v6 04/10] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support, Alexey Budankov
  • [PATCH v6 05/10] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
  • [PATCH v6 06/10] trace/bpf_trace: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
    • Re: [PATCH v6 06/10] trace/bpf_trace: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, James Morris
  • [PATCH v6 07/10] powerpc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
    • Re: [PATCH v6 07/10] powerpc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, James Morris
  • [PATCH v6 08/10] parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
    • Re: [PATCH v6 08/10] parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, James Morris
  • [PATCH v6 09/10] drivers/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
    • Re: [PATCH v6 09/10] drivers/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, James Morris
  • [PATCH v6 10/10] drivers/oprofile: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
    • Re: [PATCH v6 10/10] drivers/oprofile: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, James Morris
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • [PATCH v6 00/10] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability, Alexey Budankov
    • [PATCH v6 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Alexey Budankov
      • Re: [PATCH v6 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Stephen Smalley
        • Re: [PATCH v6 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Alexey Budankov
          • Re: [PATCH v6 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Stephen Smalley
            • Re: [PATCH v6 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Alexey Budankov
    • [PATCH v6 02/10] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
    • [PATCH v6 03/10] perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
    • [PATCH v6 04/10] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support, Alexey Budankov
    • [PATCH v6 05/10] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
    • [PATCH v6 06/10] trace/bpf_trace: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
    • [PATCH v6 07/10] powerpc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
    • [PATCH v6 08/10] parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
    • [PATCH v6 09/10] drivers/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
    • [PATCH v6 10/10] drivers/oprofile: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
• possible deadlock in sidtab_sid2str_put, syzbot
  • Re: possible deadlock in sidtab_sid2str_put, syzbot
    • Re: possible deadlock in sidtab_sid2str_put, Paul Moore
      • Re: possible deadlock in sidtab_sid2str_put, Stephen Smalley
        • Re: possible deadlock in sidtab_sid2str_put, Ondrej Mosnacek
          • Re: possible deadlock in sidtab_sid2str_put, Paul Moore
            • Message not available
              • Re: possible deadlock in sidtab_sid2str_put, Paul Moore
                • Re: possible deadlock in sidtab_sid2str_put, Ondrej Mosnacek
      • Re: possible deadlock in sidtab_sid2str_put, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • Re: possible deadlock in sidtab_sid2str_put, syzbot
• [GIT PULL] SELinux patches for v5.6, Paul Moore
  • Re: [GIT PULL] SELinux patches for v5.6, pr-tracker-bot
• [PATCH] selinux: remove unused initial SIDs and improve handling, Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH] selinux: remove unused initial SIDs and improve handling, Stephen Smalley
• question about fs sid, Dominick Grift
  • Re: question about fs sid, Stephen Smalley
    • Re: question about fs sid, Dominick Grift
• [PATCH V2 0/2] selinux-testsuite: Add fs*(2) API filesystem tests, Richard Haines
  • [PATCH V2 1/2] selinux-testsuite: Prepare for adding fs*(2) API tests, Richard Haines
  • [PATCH V2 2/2] selinux-testsuite: Add fs*(2) API filesystem tests, Richard Haines
    • Re: [PATCH V2 2/2] selinux-testsuite: Add fs*(2) API filesystem tests, Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH V2 0/2] selinux-testsuite: Add fs*(2) API filesystem tests, Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [PATCH V2 0/2] selinux-testsuite: Add fs*(2) API filesystem tests, Richard Haines
      • Re: [PATCH V2 0/2] selinux-testsuite: Add fs*(2) API filesystem tests, Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH] selinux: allow kernfs symlinks to inherit parent directory context, Christian Göttsche
  • Re: [PATCH] selinux: allow kernfs symlinks to inherit parent directory context, Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [PATCH] selinux: allow kernfs symlinks to inherit parent directory context, Christian Göttsche
      • Re: [PATCH] selinux: allow kernfs symlinks to inherit parent directory context, Stephen Smalley
  • [PATCH v2] selinux: allow kernfs symlinks to inherit parent directory context, Christian Göttsche
    • Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: allow kernfs symlinks to inherit parent directory context, Stephen Smalley
      • Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: allow kernfs symlinks to inherit parent directory context, Christian Göttsche
        • Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: allow kernfs symlinks to inherit parent directory context, Paul Moore
• [PATCH 1/1] sel_avc_get_stat_idx should increase position index, Vasily Averin
  • Re: [PATCH 1/1] sel_avc_get_stat_idx should increase position index, Paul Moore
    • [PATCH v2] selinux: sel_avc_get_stat_idx should increase position index, Vasily Averin
      • Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: sel_avc_get_stat_idx should increase position index, Stephen Smalley
      • Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: sel_avc_get_stat_idx should increase position index, Paul Moore
• [PATCH] selinux: seq_file .next functions should increase position index, Vasily Averin
• [PATCH v14 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v14 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v14 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v14 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure., Casey Schaufler
    • Re: [PATCH v14 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure., Stephen Smalley
  • [PATCH v14 04/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v14 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v14 06/23] Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid, Casey Schaufler
    • Re: [PATCH v14 06/23] Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid, Stephen Smalley
  • [PATCH v14 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v14 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v14 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v14 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v14 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v14 13/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v14 12/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v14 14/23] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v14 15/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v14 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v14 17/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v14 18/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob, Casey Schaufler
    • Re: [PATCH v14 18/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob, Stephen Smalley
  • [PATCH v14 19/23] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v14 21/23] Audit: Include object data for all security modules, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v14 20/23] Audit: Add subj_LSM fields when necessary, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, Casey Schaufler
    • Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, Stephen Smalley
      • Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, Stephen Smalley
        • Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, Casey Schaufler
          • Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, Stephen Smalley
            • Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, Simon McVittie
              • Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, John Johansen
            • Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, Casey Schaufler
            • Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, Casey Schaufler
              • Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, Stephen Smalley
                • Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, Stephen Smalley
                  • Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, Casey Schaufler
                    • Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, Stephen Smalley
                      • Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, Casey Schaufler
                • Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, Simon McVittie
                  • Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, Stephen Smalley
                    • Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, Stephen Smalley
                      • Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, Casey Schaufler
                        • Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, John Johansen
                          • Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, Stephen Smalley
                            • Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, John Johansen
                              • Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, Casey Schaufler
                                • Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, John Johansen
                      • Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, John Johansen
            • Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, John Johansen
              • Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, Casey Schaufler
                • Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, John Johansen
          • Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context, John Johansen
  • [PATCH v14 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag, Casey Schaufler
  • Re: [PATCH v14 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor, Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH v14 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor, Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [PATCH v14 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor, Casey Schaufler
      • Re: [PATCH v14 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor, Stephen Smalley
        • KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in tun_chr_open/sock_init_data (Was: Re: [PATCH v14 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor), Stephen Smalley
          • Re: KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in tun_chr_open/sock_init_data (Was: Re: [PATCH v14 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor), Casey Schaufler
        • Re: [PATCH v14 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor, Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH] selinux-testsuite: move variable definitions out of binder_common.h, Paul Moore
  • Re: [PATCH] selinux-testsuite: move variable definitions out of binder_common.h, Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [PATCH] selinux-testsuite: move variable definitions out of binder_common.h, Paul Moore
• Problems with the selinux-testsuite and GCC v10?, Paul Moore
  • Re: Problems with the selinux-testsuite and GCC v10?, Paul Moore
    • Re: Problems with the selinux-testsuite and GCC v10?, Paul Moore
• [PATCH] libsepol/cil: Fix bug in cil_copy_avrule() in extended permission handling, James Carter
  • Re: [PATCH] libsepol/cil: Fix bug in cil_copy_avrule() in extended permission handling, Ondrej Mosnacek
    • Re: [PATCH] libsepol/cil: Fix bug in cil_copy_avrule() in extended permission handling, Ondrej Mosnacek
• [PATCH] testsuite/policy: fixes for running on a labeled NFS mount, Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH] testsuite/policy: fixes for running on a labeled NFS mount, Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [PATCH] testsuite/policy: fixes for running on a labeled NFS mount, Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH userspace v2 0/4] Fix build with -fno-common, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • [PATCH userspace v2 1/4] libsepol: fix CIL_KEY_* build errors with -fno-common, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • [PATCH userspace v2 3/4] checkpolicy: remove unused te_assertions, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • [PATCH userspace v2 2/4] libsepol: remove leftovers of cil_mem_error_handler, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • [PATCH userspace v2 4/4] Makefile: always build with -fno-common, Ondrej Mosnacek
    • Re: [Non-DoD Source] [PATCH userspace v2 4/4] Makefile: always build with -fno-common, jwcart2
    • Re: [PATCH userspace v2 4/4] Makefile: always build with -fno-common, Petr Lautrbach
  • Re: [PATCH userspace v2 0/4] Fix build with -fno-common, Jason Zaman
    • Re: [PATCH userspace v2 0/4] Fix build with -fno-common, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • Re: [Non-DoD Source] [PATCH userspace v2 0/4] Fix build with -fno-common, jwcart2
• SELinux issue with 'keys-acl' patch in kernel.org's 'linux-next' tree, Richard Haines
  • SELinux: How to split permissions for keys?, David Howells
    • Re: SELinux: How to split permissions for keys?, Stephen Smalley
      • Re: SELinux: How to split permissions for keys?, Stephen Smalley
        • Re: SELinux: How to split permissions for keys?, Richard Haines
          • Re: SELinux: How to split permissions for keys?, Stephen Smalley
            • Re: SELinux: How to split permissions for keys?, Richard Haines
              • Re: SELinux: How to split permissions for keys?, Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH userspace 0/4] Fix build with -fno-common, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • [PATCH userspace 2/4] libsepol: remove unused cil_mem_error_handler, Ondrej Mosnacek
    • Re: [Non-DoD Source] [PATCH userspace 2/4] libsepol: remove unused cil_mem_error_handler, jwcart2
      • Re: [Non-DoD Source] [PATCH userspace 2/4] libsepol: remove unused cil_mem_error_handler, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • [PATCH userspace 1/4] libsepol: fix CIL_KEY_* build errors with -fno-common, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • [PATCH userspace 3/4] checkpolicy: remove unused te_assertions, Ondrej Mosnacek
    • Re: [PATCH userspace 3/4] checkpolicy: remove unused te_assertions, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • [PATCH userspace 4/4] Makefile: always build with -fno-common, Ondrej Mosnacek
• [PATCH v4] libsepol,checkpolicy: remove use of hardcoded security class values, Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH v4] libsepol,checkpolicy: remove use of hardcoded security class values, Petr Lautrbach
    • Re: [PATCH v4] libsepol, checkpolicy: remove use of hardcoded security class values, Stephen Smalley
      • Re: [PATCH v4] libsepol, checkpolicy: remove use of hardcoded security class values, Petr Lautrbach
        • Message not available
          • Re: [PATCH v4] libsepol, checkpolicy: remove use of hardcoded security class values, Petr Lautrbach
• [PATCH] libselinux: export flush_class_cache(), call it on policyload, Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH] libselinux: export flush_class_cache(), call it on policyload, Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH v5 0/10] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability, Alexey Budankov
  • [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Alexey Budankov
    • Re: [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Stephen Smalley
      • Re: [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Alexey Budankov
        • Re: [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Alexei Starovoitov
          • Re: [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Alexey Budankov
            • Re: [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Alexey Budankov
              • Re: [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Stephen Smalley
                • Re: [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Alexey Budankov
                  • Re: [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Alexey Budankov
                    • Re: [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Thomas Gleixner
                      • Re: [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Alexey Budankov
                        • Re: [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Alexey Budankov
                • Re: [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Alexey Budankov
                  • Re: [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Stephen Smalley
                    • Re: [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Alexey Budankov
                      • Re: [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Stephen Smalley
                        • Re: [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Stephen Smalley
                          • Re: [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Alexey Budankov
                            • Re: [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Stephen Smalley
                              • Re: [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Alexey Budankov
                        • Re: [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space, Alexey Budankov
  • [PATCH v5 02/10] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
  • [PATCH v5 03/10] perf/core: open access to anon probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
  • [PATCH v5 04/10] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support, Alexey Budankov
  • [PATCH v5 05/10] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
  • [PATCH v5 06/10] trace/bpf_trace: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
  • [PATCH v5 07/10] powerpc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
    • Re: [PATCH v5 07/10] powerpc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Anju T Sudhakar
  • [PATCH v5 08/10] parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
  • [PATCH v5 09/10] drivers/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
  • [PATCH v5 10/10] drivers/oprofile: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process, Alexey Budankov
• [PATCH 0/2] selinux-testsuite: Add fs*(2) API filesystem tests, Richard Haines
  • [PATCH 2/2] selinux-testsuite: Add fs*(2) API filesystem tests, Richard Haines
    • Re: [PATCH 2/2] selinux-testsuite: Add fs*(2) API filesystem tests, Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [PATCH 2/2] selinux-testsuite: Add fs*(2) API filesystem tests, Stephen Smalley
      • Re: [PATCH 2/2] selinux-testsuite: Add fs*(2) API filesystem tests, Paul Moore
        • Re: [PATCH 2/2] selinux-testsuite: Add fs*(2) API filesystem tests, Stephen Smalley
        • Re: [PATCH 2/2] selinux-testsuite: Add fs*(2) API filesystem tests, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • [PATCH 1/2] selinux-testsuite: Prepare for adding fs*(2) API tests, Richard Haines
    • Re: [PATCH 1/2] selinux-testsuite: Prepare for adding fs*(2) API tests, Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH V7 0/1] selinux-testsuite: Add filesystem tests, Richard Haines
  • [PATCH V7 1/1] selinux-testsuite: Add filesystem tests, Richard Haines
    • Re: [PATCH V7 1/1] selinux-testsuite: Add filesystem tests, Stephen Smalley
      • Re: [PATCH V7 1/1] selinux-testsuite: Add filesystem tests, Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH v2] selinux: fix regression introduced by move_mount(2) syscall, Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: fix regression introduced by move_mount(2) syscall, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: fix regression introduced by move_mount(2) syscall, Paul Moore
    • Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: fix regression introduced by move_mount(2) syscall, Stephen Smalley
      • Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: fix regression introduced by move_mount(2) syscall, Stephen Smalley
        • Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: fix regression introduced by move_mount(2) syscall, Stephen Smalley
      • Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: fix regression introduced by move_mount(2) syscall, Paul Moore
  • Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: fix regression introduced by move_mount(2) syscall, David Howells
• [PATCH v3] libsepol,checkpolicy: remove use of hardcoded security class values, Stephen Smalley
• any reason why a class mapping is not able to solve permissionx?, Dominick Grift
  • Re: any reason why a class mapping is not able to solve permissionx?, Dominick Grift
    • Re: [Non-DoD Source] Re: any reason why a class mapping is not able to solve permissionx?, jwcart2
    • Re: [Non-DoD Source] Re: any reason why a class mapping is not able to solve permissionx?, jwcart2
      • Re: [Non-DoD Source] Re: any reason why a class mapping is not able to solve permissionx?, jwcart2
        • Re: [Non-DoD Source] Re: any reason why a class mapping is not able to solve permissionx?, Dominick Grift
• [PATCH] libselinux: update man pages for userspace policy enforcers, Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH] libselinux: update man pages for userspace policy enforcers, William Roberts
    • Re: [PATCH] libselinux: update man pages for userspace policy enforcers, Stephen Smalley
• [PATCH] selinux: move status variables out of selinux_ss, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • Re: [PATCH] selinux: move status variables out of selinux_ss, Stephen Smalley
  • Re: [PATCH] selinux: move status variables out of selinux_ss, Paul Moore
• [PATCH v3] selinux: map RTM_GETLINK to a privileged permission, Jeff Vander Stoep
• [PATCH v2 0/5] selinux: Assorted simplifications and cleanups, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • [PATCH v2 1/5] selinux: simplify evaluate_cond_node(), Ondrej Mosnacek
    • Re: [PATCH v2 1/5] selinux: simplify evaluate_cond_node(), Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [PATCH v2 1/5] selinux: simplify evaluate_cond_node(), Paul Moore
  • [PATCH v2 2/5] selinux: convert cond_list to array, Ondrej Mosnacek
    • Re: [PATCH v2 2/5] selinux: convert cond_list to array, Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [PATCH v2 2/5] selinux: convert cond_list to array, Paul Moore
      • Re: [PATCH v2 2/5] selinux: convert cond_list to array, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • [PATCH v2 5/5] selinux: generalize evaluate_cond_node(), Ondrej Mosnacek
    • Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] selinux: generalize evaluate_cond_node(), Stephen Smalley
    • Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] selinux: generalize evaluate_cond_node(), Paul Moore
  • [PATCH v2 4/5] selinux: convert cond_expr to array, Ondrej Mosnacek
    • Re: [PATCH v2 4/5] selinux: convert cond_expr to array, Paul Moore
  • [PATCH v2 3/5] selinux: convert cond_av_list to array, Ondrej Mosnacek
    • Re: [PATCH v2 3/5] selinux: convert cond_av_list to array, Paul Moore
      • Re: [PATCH v2 3/5] selinux: convert cond_av_list to array, Ondrej Mosnacek
• [PATCH RFC] selinux: policydb - convert filename trans hash to rhashtable, Lucas Stach