On 2/11/2020 2:55 PM, Daniel Colascione wrote: > Userfaultfd in unprivileged contexts could be potentially very > useful. We'd like to harden userfaultfd to make such unprivileged use > less risky. This patch series allows SELinux to manage userfaultfd > file descriptors and allows administrators to limit userfaultfd to > servicing user-mode faults, increasing the difficulty of using > userfaultfd in exploit chains invoking delaying kernel faults. > > A new anon_inodes interface allows callers to opt into SELinux > management of anonymous file objects. In this mode, anon_inodes > creates new ephemeral inodes for anonymous file objects instead of > reusing a singleton dummy inode. A new LSM hook gives security modules > an opportunity to configure and veto these ephemeral inodes. > > Existing anon_inodes users must opt into the new functionality. > > Daniel Colascione (6): > Add a new flags-accepting interface for anonymous inodes > Add a concept of a "secure" anonymous file > Teach SELinux about a new userfaultfd class > Wire UFFD up to SELinux > Let userfaultfd opt out of handling kernel-mode faults > Add a new sysctl for limiting userfaultfd to user mode faults This must be posted to the linux Security Module list <linux-security-module@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst | 13 ++++ > fs/anon_inodes.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++-------- > fs/userfaultfd.c | 29 ++++++-- > include/linux/anon_inodes.h | 27 ++++++-- > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 8 +++ > include/linux/security.h | 2 + > include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h | 3 + > include/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h | 9 +++ > kernel/sysctl.c | 9 +++ > security/security.c | 8 +++ > security/selinux/hooks.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++ > security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 + > 12 files changed, 229 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) >
