On Tue, Feb 11, 2020 at 3:13 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On 2/11/2020 2:55 PM, Daniel Colascione wrote: > > Userfaultfd in unprivileged contexts could be potentially very > > useful. We'd like to harden userfaultfd to make such unprivileged use > > less risky. This patch series allows SELinux to manage userfaultfd > > file descriptors and allows administrators to limit userfaultfd to > > servicing user-mode faults, increasing the difficulty of using > > userfaultfd in exploit chains invoking delaying kernel faults. > > > > A new anon_inodes interface allows callers to opt into SELinux > > management of anonymous file objects. In this mode, anon_inodes > > creates new ephemeral inodes for anonymous file objects instead of > > reusing a singleton dummy inode. A new LSM hook gives security modules > > an opportunity to configure and veto these ephemeral inodes. > > > > Existing anon_inodes users must opt into the new functionality. > > > > Daniel Colascione (6): > > Add a new flags-accepting interface for anonymous inodes > > Add a concept of a "secure" anonymous file > > Teach SELinux about a new userfaultfd class > > Wire UFFD up to SELinux > > Let userfaultfd opt out of handling kernel-mode faults > > Add a new sysctl for limiting userfaultfd to user mode faults > > This must be posted to the linux Security Module list > <linux-security-module@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Added. I thought selinux@ was sufficient.
