On 2/11/20 6:27 PM, Daniel Colascione wrote:
On Tue, Feb 11, 2020 at 3:13 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On 2/11/2020 2:55 PM, Daniel Colascione wrote:
Userfaultfd in unprivileged contexts could be potentially very
useful. We'd like to harden userfaultfd to make such unprivileged use
less risky. This patch series allows SELinux to manage userfaultfd
file descriptors and allows administrators to limit userfaultfd to
servicing user-mode faults, increasing the difficulty of using
userfaultfd in exploit chains invoking delaying kernel faults.
A new anon_inodes interface allows callers to opt into SELinux
management of anonymous file objects. In this mode, anon_inodes
creates new ephemeral inodes for anonymous file objects instead of
reusing a singleton dummy inode. A new LSM hook gives security modules
an opportunity to configure and veto these ephemeral inodes.
Existing anon_inodes users must opt into the new functionality.
Daniel Colascione (6):
Add a new flags-accepting interface for anonymous inodes
Add a concept of a "secure" anonymous file
Teach SELinux about a new userfaultfd class
Wire UFFD up to SELinux
Let userfaultfd opt out of handling kernel-mode faults
Add a new sysctl for limiting userfaultfd to user mode faults
This must be posted to the linux Security Module list
<linux-security-module@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Added. I thought selinux@ was sufficient.
scripts/get_maintainer.pl can be helpful in identifying relevant lists
and maintainers for each patch. I don't use its output blindly as it
tends to over-approximate but since your patches span the VFS, LSM
framework, and selinux, you do need to include relevant
maintainers/lists for each.
