Re: [PATCH v14 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context

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On 1/23/20 7:23 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
Add an entry /proc/.../attr/context which displays the full
process security "context" in compound format:'
         lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0...
This entry is not writable.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: linux-api@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

As previously discussed, there are issues with AppArmor's implementation of getprocattr() particularly around the trailing newline that dbus-daemon and perhaps others would like to see go away in any new interface. Hence, I don't think we should implement this new API using the existing getprocattr() hook lest it also be locked into the current behavior forever.

---
  Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 14 ++++++++
  fs/proc/base.c                 |  1 +
  security/security.c            | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  3 files changed, 78 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
index aadf47c808c0..a4979060f5d3 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/lsm.rst
@@ -199,3 +199,17 @@ capability-related fields:
  -  ``fs/nfsd/auth.c``::c:func:`nfsd_setuser()`
- ``fs/proc/array.c``::c:func:`task_cap()`
+
+LSM External Interfaces
+=======================
+
+The LSM infrastructure does not generally provide external interfaces.
+The individual security modules provide what external interfaces they
+require. The infrastructure does provide an interface for the special
+case where multiple security modules provide a process context. This
+is provided in compound context format.
+
+-  `lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0`
+
+The special file ``/proc/pid/attr/context`` provides the security
+context of the identified process.
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 950c200cb9ad..d13c2cf50e4b 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2653,6 +2653,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {
  	ATTR(NULL, "keycreate",		0666),
  	ATTR(NULL, "sockcreate",	0666),
  	ATTR(NULL, "display",		0666),
+	ATTR(NULL, "context",		0666),
  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
  	DIR("smack",			0555,
  	    proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 6a77c8b2ffbc..fdd0c85df89e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -722,6 +722,42 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
  		panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
  }
+/**
+ * append_ctx - append a lsm/context pair to a compound context
+ * @ctx: the existing compound context
+ * @ctxlen: size of the old context, including terminating nul byte
+ * @lsm: new lsm name, nul terminated
+ * @new: new context, possibly nul terminated
+ * @newlen: maximum size of @new
+ *
+ * replace @ctx with a new compound context, appending @newlsm and @new
+ * to @ctx. On exit the new data replaces the old, which is freed.
+ * @ctxlen is set to the new size, which includes a trailing nul byte.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM if no memory is available.
+ */
+static int append_ctx(char **ctx, int *ctxlen, const char *lsm, char *new,
+		      int newlen)
+{
+	char *final;
+	int llen;
+
+	llen = strlen(lsm) + 1;
+	newlen = strnlen(new, newlen) + 1;
+
+	final = kzalloc(*ctxlen + llen + newlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (final == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (*ctxlen)
+		memcpy(final, *ctx, *ctxlen);
+	memcpy(final + *ctxlen, lsm, llen);
+	memcpy(final + *ctxlen + llen, new, newlen);
+	kfree(*ctx);
+	*ctx = final;
+	*ctxlen = *ctxlen + llen + newlen;
+	return 0;
+}
+
  /*
   * Hook list operation macros.
   *
@@ -2041,6 +2077,10 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
  				char **value)
  {
  	struct security_hook_list *hp;
+	char *final = NULL;
+	char *cp;
+	int rc = 0;
+	int finallen = 0;
  	int display = lsm_task_display(current);
  	int slot = 0;
@@ -2068,6 +2108,29 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
  		return -ENOMEM;
  	}
+ if (!strcmp(name, "context")) {
+		hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr,
+				     list) {
+			rc = hp->hook.getprocattr(p, "current", &cp);
+			if (rc == -EINVAL || rc == -ENOPROTOOPT)
+				continue;
+			if (rc < 0) {
+				kfree(final);
+				return rc;
+			}
+			rc = append_ctx(&final, &finallen, hp->lsmid->lsm,
+					cp, rc);
+			if (rc < 0) {
+				kfree(final);
+				return rc;
+			}
+		}
+		if (final == NULL)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		*value = final;
+		return finallen;
+	}
+
  	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
  		if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsmid->lsm))
  			continue;





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