Re: [PATCH 2/3] Teach SELinux about anonymous inodes

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On 2/14/20 1:02 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
It shouldn't fire for non-anon inodes because on a (non-anon) file creation, security_transition_sid() is passed the parent directory SID as the second argument and we only assign task SIDs to /proc/pid directories, which don't support (userspace) file creation anyway.

However, in the absence of a matching type_transition rule, we'll end up defaulting to the task SID on the anon inode, and without a separate class we won't be able to distinguish it from a /proc/pid inode.  So that might justify a separate anoninode or similar class.

This however reminded me that for the context_inode case, we not only want to inherit the SID but also the sclass from the context_inode. That is so that anon inodes created via device node ioctls inherit the same SID/class pair as the device node and a single allowx rule can govern all ioctl commands on that device.

At least that's the way our patch worked with the /dev/kvm example. However, if we are introducing a separate anoninode class for the type_transition case, maybe we should apply that to all anon inodes regardless of how they are labeled (based on context_inode or transition) and then we'd need to write two allowx rules, one for ioctls on the original device node and one for those on anon inodes created from it. Not sure how Android wants to handle that as the original developer and primary user of SELinux ioctl whitelisting.



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