Linux Integrity

• Date Index

• [GIT PULL] KEYS-TRUSTED: keys-trusted-next-6.11-rc4, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [GIT PULL] KEYS-TRUSTED: keys-trusted-next-6.11-rc4, pr-tracker-bot
• [RFC] [PATCH] tpm: Clean up TPM space after command failure, Jonathan McDowell
  • Re: [RFC] [PATCH] tpm: Clean up TPM space after command failure, Jarkko Sakkinen
    • [PATCH v2] tpm: Clean up TPM space after command failure, Jonathan McDowell
      • Re: [PATCH v2] tpm: Clean up TPM space after command failure, Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH][next] integrity: Use static_assert() to check struct sizes, Gustavo A. R. Silva
  • Re: [PATCH][next] integrity: Use static_assert() to check struct sizes, Roberto Sassu
  • Re: [PATCH][next] integrity: Use static_assert() to check struct sizes, Mimi Zohar
• [ima-evm-utils PATCH] Add copies of the license text, Mimi Zohar
  • Re: [ima-evm-utils PATCH] Add copies of the license text, Petr Vorel
• [PATCH v2] ima: fix buffer overrun in ima_eventdigest_init_common, Samasth Norway Ananda
  • Re: [PATCH v2] ima: fix buffer overrun in ima_eventdigest_init_common, Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH v5] tpm: Add new device/vendor ID 0x50666666, Jett Rink
  • Re: [PATCH v5] tpm: Add new device/vendor ID 0x50666666, Jett Rink
• [PATCH] evm: stop avoidably reading i_writecount in evm_file_release, Mateusz Guzik
  • Re: [PATCH] evm: stop avoidably reading i_writecount in evm_file_release, Roberto Sassu
    • Re: [PATCH] evm: stop avoidably reading i_writecount in evm_file_release, Mateusz Guzik
      • Re: [PATCH] evm: stop avoidably reading i_writecount in evm_file_release, Roberto Sassu
  • Re: [PATCH] evm: stop avoidably reading i_writecount in evm_file_release, Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH v20 00/20] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE), Fan Wu
  • [PATCH v20 05/20] initramfs|security: Add a security hook to do_populate_rootfs(), Fan Wu
  • [PATCH v20 06/20] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider, Fan Wu
  • [PATCH v20 07/20] security: add new securityfs delete function, Fan Wu
  • [PATCH v20 08/20] ipe: add userspace interface, Fan Wu
  • [PATCH v20 14/20] security: add security_inode_setintegrity() hook, Fan Wu
  • [PATCH v20 09/20] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support, Fan Wu
  • [PATCH v20 15/20] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs, Fan Wu
    • Re: [PATCH v20 15/20] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs, Eric Biggers
  • [PATCH v20 16/20] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider, Fan Wu
  • [PATCH v20 20/20] MAINTAINERS: ipe: add ipe maintainer information, Fan Wu
    • Re: [PATCH v20 20/20] MAINTAINERS: ipe: add ipe maintainer information, Paul Menzel
      • Re: [PATCH v20 20/20] MAINTAINERS: ipe: add ipe maintainer information, Paul Moore
        • Re: [PATCH v20 20/20] MAINTAINERS: ipe: add ipe maintainer information, Paul Menzel
          • Re: [PATCH v20 20/20] MAINTAINERS: ipe: add ipe maintainer information, Fan Wu
            • Re: [PATCH v20 20/20] MAINTAINERS: ipe: add ipe maintainer information, Paul Moore
  • [PATCH v20 11/20] block|lsm: Add LSM blob and new LSM hooks for block devices, Fan Wu
  • [PATCH v20 18/20] ipe: kunit test for parser, Fan Wu
  • [PATCH v20 10/20] ipe: add permissive toggle, Fan Wu
  • [PATCH v20 13/20] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider, Fan Wu
  • [PATCH v20 12/20] dm verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs, Fan Wu
    • Re: [PATCH v20 12/20] dm verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs, Fan Wu
      • Re: [PATCH v20 12/20] dm verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs, Paul Moore
        • Re: [PATCH v20 12/20] dm verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs, Mikulas Patocka
          • Re: [PATCH v20 12/20] dm verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs, Fan Wu
            • Re: [PATCH v20 12/20] dm verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs, Paul Moore
              • Re: [PATCH v20 12/20] dm verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs, Fan Wu
                • Re: [PATCH v20 12/20] dm verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs, Paul Moore
  • [PATCH v20 17/20] scripts: add boot policy generation program, Fan Wu
  • [PATCH v20 19/20] Documentation: add ipe documentation, Fan Wu
  • [PATCH v20 03/20] ipe: add evaluation loop, Fan Wu
    • Re: [PATCH v20 03/20] ipe: add evaluation loop, Serge E. Hallyn
  • [PATCH v20 02/20] ipe: add policy parser, Fan Wu
    • Re: [PATCH v20 02/20] ipe: add policy parser, Serge E. Hallyn
      • Re: [PATCH v20 02/20] ipe: add policy parser, Fan Wu
        • Re: [PATCH v20 02/20] ipe: add policy parser, Paul Moore
          • Re: [PATCH v20 02/20] ipe: add policy parser, Fan Wu
            • Re: [PATCH v20 02/20] ipe: add policy parser, Paul Moore
  • [PATCH v20 04/20] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read, Fan Wu
  • [PATCH v20 01/20] security: add ipe lsm, Fan Wu
  • Re: [PATCH v20 00/20] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE), Paul Moore
    • Re: [PATCH v20 00/20] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE), Paul Moore
• [PATCH v4] tpm: Add new device/vendor ID 0x50666666, Jett Rink
  • Re: [PATCH v4] tpm: Add new device/vendor ID 0x50666666, Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v3] tpm: Add new device/vendor ID 0x50666666, Jett Rink
• [PATCH 0/8] openssl_tpm2_engine: Add attestation functions for primary keys, James Bottomley
  • [PATCH 1/8] tss: Fix handling of TPM_RH_NULL in intel-tss, James Bottomley
    • Re: [PATCH 1/8] tss: Fix handling of TPM_RH_NULL in intel-tss, Jarkko Sakkinen
      • Re: [PATCH 1/8] tss: Fix handling of TPM_RH_NULL in intel-tss, James Bottomley
        • Re: [PATCH 1/8] tss: Fix handling of TPM_RH_NULL in intel-tss, Jarkko Sakkinen
          • Re: [PATCH 1/8] tss: Fix handling of TPM_RH_NULL in intel-tss, James Bottomley
            • Re: [PATCH 1/8] tss: Fix handling of TPM_RH_NULL in intel-tss, Jarkko Sakkinen
              • [PATCH v2 1/8] tss: Fix handling of TPM_RH_NULL in intel-tss, James Bottomley
                • Re: [openssl-tpm2-engine] [PATCH v2 1/8] tss: Fix handling of TPM_RH_NULL in intel-tss, James Bottomley
                • Re: [PATCH v2 1/8] tss: Fix handling of TPM_RH_NULL in intel-tss, Jarkko Sakkinen
                  • Re: [openssl-tpm2-engine] [PATCH v2 1/8] tss: Fix handling of TPM_RH_NULL in intel-tss, James Bottomley
                    • Re: [openssl-tpm2-engine] [PATCH v2 1/8] tss: Fix handling of TPM_RH_NULL in intel-tss, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH 2/8] libcommon: add ability to create a signing primary key, James Bottomley
  • [PATCH 3/8] libcommon: add bin2hex and tmp2_get_hexname, James Bottomley
    • Re: [PATCH 3/8] libcommon: add bin2hex and tmp2_get_hexname, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH 4/8] libcommon: add primary creation from template, James Bottomley
  • [PATCH 5/8] tss: add tpm2_Certify, tpm2_ActivateCredential and tpm2_PolicyOR, James Bottomley
  • [PATCH 6/8] tools: add new attest_tpm2_primary command, James Bottomley
  • [PATCH 7/8] attest_tpm2_primary: add man page, James Bottomley
  • [PATCH 8/8] tests: add tests for attest_tpm2_primary, James Bottomley
• [PATCH v2] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support, Stefan Berger
  • Re: [PATCH v2] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [PATCH v2] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [PATCH v2] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support, Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v1 0/2] Refactor return value of two lsm hooks, Xu Kuohai
  • [PATCH v1 1/2] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook vm_enough_memory, Xu Kuohai
  • [PATCH v1 2/2] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_copy_up_xattr, Xu Kuohai
  • Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] Refactor return value of two lsm hooks, Casey Schaufler
    • Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] Refactor return value of two lsm hooks, Paul Moore
      • Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] Refactor return value of two lsm hooks, Paul Moore
• [PATCH v2] tpm: Add new device/vendor ID 0x50666666, Jett Rink
  • Re: [PATCH v2] tpm: Add new device/vendor ID 0x50666666, Jett Rink
    • Re: [PATCH v2] tpm: Add new device/vendor ID 0x50666666, Jarkko Sakkinen
• [GIT PULL] TPM DEVICE DRIVER: tpmdd-next-6.11-rc1-roundtwo, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [GIT PULL] TPM DEVICE DRIVER: tpmdd-next-6.11-rc1-roundtwo, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [GIT PULL] TPM DEVICE DRIVER: tpmdd-next-6.11-rc1-roundtwo, pr-tracker-bot
• [PATCH v2 1/2] KEYS: trusted: fix DCP blob payload length assignment, David Gstir
  • [PATCH v2 2/2] KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key, David Gstir
  • Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] KEYS: trusted: fix DCP blob payload length assignment, Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v3] tpm: Relocate buf->handles to appropriate place, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [PATCH v3] tpm: Relocate buf->handles to appropriate place, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [PATCH v3] tpm: Relocate buf->handles to appropriate place, James Bottomley
    • Re: [PATCH v3] tpm: Relocate buf->handles to appropriate place, Jarkko Sakkinen
      • Re: [PATCH v3] tpm: Relocate buf->handles to appropriate place, Jarkko Sakkinen
        • Re: [PATCH v3] tpm: Relocate buf->handles to appropriate place, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [PATCH v3] tpm: Relocate buf->handles to appropriate place, Jonathan McDowell
    • Re: [PATCH v3] tpm: Relocate buf->handles to appropriate place, Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v2] tpm: Relocate buf->handles to appropriate place, Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH] tpm: Fix alignment of buf->handles, Jarkko Sakkinen
• [bug report] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_hmac_session*(), Dan Carpenter
• [PATCH bpf-next v4 13/20] bpf, lsm: Add check for BPF LSM return value, Xu Kuohai
  • [PATCH bpf-next v4 15/20] bpf: Fix compare error in function retval_range_within, Xu Kuohai
  • [PATCH bpf-next v4 14/20] bpf: Prevent tail call between progs attached to different hooks, Xu Kuohai
  • [PATCH bpf-next v4 16/20] bpf: Add a special case for bitwise AND on range [-1, 0], Xu Kuohai
  • [PATCH bpf-next v4 17/20] selftests/bpf: Avoid load failure for token_lsm.c, Xu Kuohai
  • [PATCH bpf-next v4 18/20] selftests/bpf: Add return value checks for failed tests, Xu Kuohai
  • [PATCH bpf-next v4 19/20] selftests/bpf: Add test for lsm tail call, Xu Kuohai
  • [PATCH bpf-next v4 20/20] selftests/bpf: Add verifier tests for bpf lsm, Xu Kuohai
• [PATCH bpf-next v4 00/20] Add return value range check for BPF LSM, Xu Kuohai
  • [PATCH bpf-next v4 02/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_need_killpriv, Xu Kuohai
    • Re: [PATCH bpf-next v4 02/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_need_killpriv, Serge Hallyn
      • Re: [PATCH bpf-next v4 02/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_need_killpriv, Xu Kuohai
    • Re: [PATCH v4 2/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_need_killpriv, Paul Moore
      • Re: [PATCH v4 2/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_need_killpriv, Xu Kuohai
  • [PATCH bpf-next v4 05/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_copy_up_xattr, Xu Kuohai
    • Re: [PATCH v4 5/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_copy_up_xattr, Paul Moore
      • Re: [PATCH v4 5/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_copy_up_xattr, Xu Kuohai
  • [PATCH bpf-next v4 08/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook getprocattr, Xu Kuohai
    • Re: [PATCH v4 8/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook getprocattr, Paul Moore
      • Re: [PATCH v4 8/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook getprocattr, Xu Kuohai
  • [PATCH bpf-next v4 11/20] bpf, lsm: Add disabled BPF LSM hook list, Xu Kuohai
    • Re: [PATCH bpf-next v4 11/20] bpf, lsm: Add disabled BPF LSM hook list, Alexei Starovoitov
      • Re: [PATCH bpf-next v4 11/20] bpf, lsm: Add disabled BPF LSM hook list, Xu Kuohai
  • [PATCH bpf-next v4 04/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_listsecurity, Xu Kuohai
    • Re: [PATCH v4 4/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_listsecurity, Paul Moore
      • Re: [PATCH v4 4/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_listsecurity, Xu Kuohai
  • [PATCH bpf-next v4 03/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_getsecurity, Xu Kuohai
    • Re: [PATCH bpf-next v4 03/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_getsecurity, Simon Horman
      • Re: [PATCH bpf-next v4 03/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_getsecurity, Xu Kuohai
    • Re: [PATCH v4 3/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_getsecurity, Paul Moore
      • Re: [PATCH v4 3/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_getsecurity, Xu Kuohai
  • [PATCH bpf-next v4 01/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook vm_enough_memory, Xu Kuohai
    • Re: [PATCH bpf-next v4 01/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook vm_enough_memory, Serge Hallyn
    • Re: [PATCH v4 1/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook vm_enough_memory, Paul Moore
  • [PATCH bpf-next v4 07/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook setprocattr, Xu Kuohai
    • Re: [PATCH v4 7/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook setprocattr, Paul Moore
      • Re: [PATCH v4 7/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook setprocattr, Xu Kuohai
  • [PATCH bpf-next v4 06/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook getselfattr, Xu Kuohai
    • Re: [PATCH v4 6/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook getselfattr, Paul Moore
      • Re: [PATCH v4 6/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook getselfattr, Xu Kuohai
  • [PATCH bpf-next v4 10/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook audit_rule_match, Xu Kuohai
    • Re: [PATCH v4 10/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook audit_rule_match, Paul Moore
      • Re: [PATCH v4 10/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook audit_rule_match, Xu Kuohai
  • [PATCH bpf-next v4 09/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook key_getsecurity, Xu Kuohai
    • Re: [PATCH v4 9/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook key_getsecurity, Paul Moore
      • Re: [PATCH v4 9/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook key_getsecurity, Xu Kuohai
        • Re: [PATCH v4 9/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook key_getsecurity, Paul Moore
          • Re: [PATCH v4 9/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook key_getsecurity, Xu Kuohai
            • Re: [PATCH v4 9/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook key_getsecurity, Paul Moore
  • [PATCH bpf-next v4 12/20] bpf, lsm: Enable BPF LSM prog to read/write return value parameters, Xu Kuohai
  • Re: [PATCH bpf-next v4 00/20] Add return value range check for BPF LSM, Paul Moore
    • Re: [PATCH bpf-next v4 00/20] Add return value range check for BPF LSM, Paul Moore
  • Re: [PATCH bpf-next v4 00/20] Add return value range check for BPF LSM, Paul Moore
    • Re: [PATCH bpf-next v4 00/20] Add return value range check for BPF LSM, Paul Moore
      • Re: [PATCH bpf-next v4 00/20] Add return value range check for BPF LSM, Xu Kuohai
• [PATCH] tpm: Move dereference after NULL check in tpm_buf_check_hmac_response, Hao Ge
  • Re: [PATCH] tpm: Move dereference after NULL check in tpm_buf_check_hmac_response, Markus Elfring
  • Re: [PATCH] tpm: Move dereference after NULL check in tpm_buf_check_hmac_response, Jarkko Sakkinen
    • [PATCH v2] tpm: Move dereference after NULL check in tpm_buf_check_hmac_response, Hao Ge
    • Re: [PATCH] tpm: Move dereference after NULL check in tpm_buf_check_hmac_response, Hao Ge
  • Re: [PATCH] tpm: Move dereference after NULL check in tpm_buf_check_hmac_response, Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH] tpm: Move dereference after NULL check in tpm_buf_check_hmac_response, James Bottomley
      • Re: [PATCH] tpm: Move dereference after NULL check in tpm_buf_check_hmac_response, Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH] tpm: Move dereference after NULL check in tpm_buf_check_hmac_response, Hao Ge
      • Re: [PATCH] tpm: Move dereference after NULL check in tpm_buf_check_hmac_response, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [PATCH] tpm: Move dereference after NULL check in tpm_buf_check_hmac_response, Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH] tpm: Move dereference after NULL check in tpm_buf_check_hmac_response, Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH] tpm: Move dereference after NULL check in tpm_buf_check_hmac_response, Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH] tpm: validate object type in tpm2_handle_mso(), Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [PATCH] tpm: validate object type in tpm2_handle_mso(), Jarkko Sakkinen
• [GIT PULL] integrity: subsystem update for v6.10-rcX, Mimi Zohar
  • Re: [GIT PULL] integrity: subsystem update for v6.10-rcX, pr-tracker-bot
• [GIT PULL] TPM DEVICE DRIVER: tpmdd-next-6.10-rc7, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [GIT PULL] TPM DEVICE DRIVER: tpmdd-next-6.10-rc7, pr-tracker-bot
• [RFC PATCH v19 0/5] Script execution control (was O_MAYEXEC), Mickaël Salaün
  • [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Kees Cook
      • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Mickaël Salaün
        • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Kees Cook
          • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Jarkko Sakkinen
            • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Mickaël Salaün
              • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Jarkko Sakkinen
          • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Mickaël Salaün
            • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Roberto Sassu
              • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Jeff Xu
      • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Jeff Xu
        • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Mickaël Salaün
          • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Jeff Xu
            • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Steve Dower
              • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Jeff Xu
                • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Mickaël Salaün
                  • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Jeff Xu
                    • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Mickaël Salaün
                      • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Kees Cook
                        • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Mickaël Salaün
                          • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Jeff Xu
                            • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Steve Dower
                            • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Mickaël Salaün
                              • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Jeff Xu
                      • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Steve Dower
    • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Andy Lutomirski
      • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits, Mickaël Salaün
  • [RFC PATCH v19 4/5] selftests/landlock: Add tests for execveat + AT_CHECK, Mickaël Salaün
  • [RFC PATCH v19 5/5] samples/should-exec: Add set-should-exec, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 5/5] samples/should-exec: Add set-should-exec, Mimi Zohar
      • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 5/5] samples/should-exec: Add set-should-exec, Mickaël Salaün
  • [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Kees Cook
      • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Mickaël Salaün
        • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Kees Cook
    • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Florian Weimer
      • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Mickaël Salaün
        • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Florian Weimer
          • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Mickaël Salaün
            • [PATCH] binfmt_elf: Fail execution of shared objects with ELIBEXEC (was: Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)), Florian Weimer
              • Re: [PATCH] binfmt_elf: Fail execution of shared objects with ELIBEXEC, Eric W. Biederman
                • Re: [PATCH] binfmt_elf: Fail execution of shared objects with ELIBEXEC, Florian Weimer
              • Re: [PATCH] binfmt_elf: Fail execution of shared objects with ELIBEXEC (was: Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)), Mickaël Salaün
      • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Jeff Xu
        • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Florian Weimer
          • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Jeff Xu
            • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Mickaël Salaün
            • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Florian Weimer
              • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Jeff Xu
                • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Mickaël Salaün
                  • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Florian Weimer
                    • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Mickaël Salaün
                  • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Jeff Xu
                    • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Andy Lutomirski
      • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Jeff Xu
      • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Steve Dower
        • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Mickaël Salaün
          • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Andy Lutomirski
            • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Mickaël Salaün
              • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Andy Lutomirski
                • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Jarkko Sakkinen
                  • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Mickaël Salaün
                • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Mickaël Salaün
          • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Jeff Xu
            • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Mickaël Salaün
              • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Jeff Xu
      • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Mickaël Salaün
        • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Jeff Xu
          • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Mickaël Salaün
            • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), James Bottomley
              • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Mickaël Salaün
            • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Jeff Xu
              • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Mickaël Salaün
                • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Jeff Xu
                  • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Mickaël Salaün
                    • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Jeff Xu
                      • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Mickaël Salaün
                        • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Jeff Xu
                          • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Mickaël Salaün
                            • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Jeff Xu
            • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Jeff Xu
              • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Mickaël Salaün
                • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Jeff Xu
                  • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Mickaël Salaün
          • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), enh
            • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2), Mickaël Salaün
  • [RFC PATCH v19 3/5] selftests/exec: Add tests for AT_CHECK and related securebits, Mickaël Salaün
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 0/5] Script execution control (was O_MAYEXEC), Mimi Zohar
    • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 0/5] Script execution control (was O_MAYEXEC), Mickaël Salaün
      • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 0/5] Script execution control (was O_MAYEXEC), Roberto Sassu
        • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 0/5] Script execution control (was O_MAYEXEC), James Bottomley
          • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 0/5] Script execution control (was O_MAYEXEC), Mickaël Salaün
            • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 0/5] Script execution control (was O_MAYEXEC), Mickaël Salaün
          • Message not available
            • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 0/5] Script execution control (was O_MAYEXEC), Mickaël Salaün
              • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 0/5] Script execution control (was O_MAYEXEC), Boris Lukashev
                • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 0/5] Script execution control (was O_MAYEXEC), Mickaël Salaün
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 0/5] Script execution control (was O_MAYEXEC), Jonathan Corbet
    • Re: [RFC PATCH v19 0/5] Script execution control (was O_MAYEXEC), Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH v4 0/3] Address !chip->auth, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v4 1/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm2_*_auth_session(), Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v4 2/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_name(), Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v4 3/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_hmac_session*(), Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v3 0/3] Address !chip->auth, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v3 1/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm2_*_auth_session(), Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v3 2/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_name(), Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v3 3/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_hmac_session*(), Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v2 0/3] Address !chip->auth, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v2 1/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm2_*_auth_session(), Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v2 2/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_name(), Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_name(), James Bottomley
      • Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_name(), Jarkko Sakkinen
      • Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_name(), Linus Torvalds
        • Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_name(), James Bottomley
          • Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_name(), Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_hmac_session*(), Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_hmac_session*(), Stefan Berger
      • Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_hmac_session*(), Jarkko Sakkinen
        • Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_hmac_session*(), Stefan Berger
          • Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_hmac_session*(), Jarkko Sakkinen
            • Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_hmac_session*(), Jarkko Sakkinen
      • Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_hmac_session*(), Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH 0/3] Address !chip->auth, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH 1/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm2_*_auth_session(), Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH 2/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_name(), Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH 3/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_hmac_session*(), Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [PATCH 0/3] Address !chip->auth, Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH 0/3] Address !chip->auth, Michael Ellerman
      • Re: [PATCH 0/3] Address !chip->auth, Jarkko Sakkinen
• [ima-evm-utils PATCH] Release version 1.6, Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH 1/2] KEYS: trusted: fix DCP blob payload length assignment, David Gstir
  • [PATCH 2/2] KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key, David Gstir
    • Re: [PATCH 2/2] KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [PATCH 1/2] KEYS: trusted: fix DCP blob payload length assignment, Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH 1/2] KEYS: trusted: fix DCP blob payload length assignment, Richard Weinberger
      • Re: [PATCH 1/2] KEYS: trusted: fix DCP blob payload length assignment, Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH 1/2] KEYS: trusted: fix DCP blob payload length assignment, David Gstir
      • Re: [PATCH 1/2] KEYS: trusted: fix DCP blob payload length assignment, Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH] tpm: Limit TCG_TPM2_HMAC to known good drivers, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [PATCH] tpm: Limit TCG_TPM2_HMAC to known good drivers, Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH] tpm: Limit TCG_TPM2_HMAC to known good drivers, Jarkko Sakkinen
• [ima-evm-utils PATCH] Require specifying openssl PKCS11 engine or provider access method, Mimi Zohar
  • Re: [ima-evm-utils PATCH] Require specifying openssl PKCS11 engine or provider access method, Stefan Berger
• [ima-evm-utils PATCH v2] ci: EOL CentOS Stream 8 and CentOS 7, Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH] tpm: atmel: Drop PPC64 specific MMIO setup, Rob Herring (Arm)
  • Re: [PATCH] tpm: atmel: Drop PPC64 specific MMIO setup, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [PATCH] tpm: atmel: Drop PPC64 specific MMIO setup, Michael Ellerman
  • Re: [PATCH] tpm: atmel: Drop PPC64 specific MMIO setup, Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH] tpm: atmel: Drop PPC64 specific MMIO setup, Jarkko Sakkinen
      • Re: [PATCH] tpm: atmel: Drop PPC64 specific MMIO setup, Rob Herring
        • Re: [PATCH] tpm: atmel: Drop PPC64 specific MMIO setup, Jarkko Sakkinen
          • Re: [PATCH] tpm: atmel: Drop PPC64 specific MMIO setup, Rob Herring
            • Re: [PATCH] tpm: atmel: Drop PPC64 specific MMIO setup, Jarkko Sakkinen
              • Re: [PATCH] tpm: atmel: Drop PPC64 specific MMIO setup, Jarkko Sakkinen
                • Re: [PATCH] tpm: atmel: Drop PPC64 specific MMIO setup, Rob Herring
                  • Re: [PATCH] tpm: atmel: Drop PPC64 specific MMIO setup, Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH] tpm: Check non-nullity of chip->auth, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [PATCH] tpm: Check non-nullity of chip->auth, Stefan Berger
• [GIT PULL] TPM DEVICE DRIVER: tpmdd-next-6.11-rc1, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [GIT PULL] TPM DEVICE DRIVER: tpmdd-next-6.11-rc1, Linus Torvalds
    • Re: [GIT PULL] TPM DEVICE DRIVER: tpmdd-next-6.11-rc1, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [GIT PULL] TPM DEVICE DRIVER: tpmdd-next-6.11-rc1, pr-tracker-bot
• [GIT PULL] KEYS: keys-next-6.11-rc1, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [GIT PULL] KEYS: keys-next-6.11-rc1, pr-tracker-bot
• [RFC] integrity: wait for completion of i2c initialization using late_initcall_sync(), Romain Naour
  • Re: [RFC] integrity: wait for completion of i2c initialization using late_initcall_sync(), Paul Menzel
    • Re: [RFC] integrity: wait for completion of i2c initialization using late_initcall_sync(), Romain Naour
      • Re: [RFC] integrity: wait for completion of i2c initialization using late_initcall_sync(), Mimi Zohar
        • Re: [RFC] integrity: wait for completion of i2c initialization using late_initcall_sync(), Mimi Zohar
          • Re: [RFC] integrity: wait for completion of i2c initialization using late_initcall_sync(), Romain Naour
            • Re: [RFC] integrity: wait for completion of i2c initialization using late_initcall_sync(), Mimi Zohar
              • Re: [RFC] integrity: wait for completion of i2c initialization using late_initcall_sync(), Roberto Sassu
• [ima-evm-utils PATCH] ci: EOL CentOS Stream 8 and CentOS 7, Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH v2] char: tpm: Fix possible memory leak in tpm_bios_measurements_open(), Joe Hattori
  • Re: [PATCH v2] char: tpm: Fix possible memory leak in tpm_bios_measurements_open(), Jarkko Sakkinen
• IMA vs TPM (i2c) builtin driver boot order, Romain Naour
  • Re: IMA vs TPM (i2c) builtin driver boot order, Mimi Zohar
• [ima-evm-utils][PATCH v2 0/4] Enable and disable OpenSSL provider tests, Stefan Berger
  • [ima-evm-utils][PATCH v2 1/4] Call OPENSSL_Cleanup before main exit to avoid crashes when engine was used, Stefan Berger
  • [ima-evm-utils][PATCH v2 4/4] Replace Ubuntu mantic with noble, Stefan Berger
  • [ima-evm-utils][PATCH v2 2/4] CI/CD: Disable pkcs11 providers for Debian and AltLinux, Stefan Berger
  • [ima-evm-utils][PATCH v2 3/4] CI/CD: Prepare Ubuntu 24.04 (Noble) to run provider tests, Stefan Berger
• [PATCH v1] tpm_tis_spi: add missing attpm20p SPI device ID entry, Vitor Soares
  • Re: [PATCH v1] tpm_tis_spi: add missing attpm20p SPI device ID entry, Lukas Wunner
  • Re: [PATCH v1] tpm_tis_spi: add missing attpm20p SPI device ID entry, Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH v1] tpm_tis_spi: add missing attpm20p SPI device ID entry, Francesco Dolcini
      • Re: [PATCH v1] tpm_tis_spi: add missing attpm20p SPI device ID entry, Jarkko Sakkinen
        • Re: [PATCH v1] tpm_tis_spi: add missing attpm20p SPI device ID entry, Jarkko Sakkinen
• [ima-evm-utils][PATCH 0/3] Enable and disable OpenSSL provider tests, Stefan Berger
  • [ima-evm-utils][PATCH 1/3] Call OPENSSL_Cleanup before main exit to avoid crashes when engine was used, Stefan Berger
  • [ima-evm-utils][PATCH 3/3] CI/CD: Also enable Ubuntu 24.04 (Noble) and run provider tests, Stefan Berger
    • Re: [ima-evm-utils][PATCH 3/3] CI/CD: Also enable Ubuntu 24.04 (Noble) and run provider tests, Mimi Zohar
  • [ima-evm-utils][PATCH 2/3] CI/CD: Disable pkcs11 providers for Debian and AltLinux, Stefan Berger
    • Re: [ima-evm-utils][PATCH 2/3] CI/CD: Disable pkcs11 providers for Debian and AltLinux, Jonathan McDowell
      • Re: [ima-evm-utils][PATCH 2/3] CI/CD: Disable pkcs11 providers for Debian and AltLinux, Mimi Zohar
        • Re: [ima-evm-utils][PATCH 2/3] CI/CD: Disable pkcs11 providers for Debian and AltLinux, Jonathan McDowell
          • Re: [ima-evm-utils][PATCH 2/3] CI/CD: Disable pkcs11 providers for Debian and AltLinux, Mimi Zohar
            • Re: [ima-evm-utils][PATCH 2/3] CI/CD: Disable pkcs11 providers for Debian and AltLinux, Jonathan McDowell
    • Re: [ima-evm-utils][PATCH 2/3] CI/CD: Disable pkcs11 providers for Debian and AltLinux, Mimi Zohar
• [PATCH ] ima: fix buffer overrun in ima_eventdigest_init_common, Samasth Norway Ananda
  • Re: [PATCH ] ima: fix buffer overrun in ima_eventdigest_init_common, Enrico Bravi
  • Re: [PATCH ] ima: fix buffer overrun in ima_eventdigest_init_common, Mimi Zohar
    • Re: [PATCH ] ima: fix buffer overrun in ima_eventdigest_init_common, samasth . norway . ananda
• [no subject], Unknown
• [PATCH] MAINTAINERS: TPM DEVICE DRIVER: Update the W-tag, Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support, Stefan Berger
  • Re: [PATCH] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support, James Bottomley
    • Re: [PATCH] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support, Stefan Berger
      • Re: [PATCH] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support, James Bottomley
        • Re: [PATCH] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support, Stefan Berger
  • Re: [PATCH] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support, Stefan Berger
    • Re: [PATCH] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support, Linux regression tracking (Thorsten Leemhuis)
      • Re: [PATCH] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support, Jarkko Sakkinen
        • Re: [PATCH] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support, Stefan Berger
          • Re: [PATCH] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support, Jarkko Sakkinen
            • Re: [PATCH] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support, Stefan Berger
              • Re: [PATCH] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support, Jarkko Sakkinen
                • Re: [PATCH] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support, Jarkko Sakkinen
                  • Re: [PATCH] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support, Jarkko Sakkinen
                    • Re: [PATCH] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support, Jarkko Sakkinen
                      • Re: [PATCH] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support, Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [PATCH] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support, Michael Ellerman
    • Re: [PATCH] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support, James Bottomley
      • Re: [PATCH] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support, Stefan Berger
      • Re: [PATCH] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support, Michael Ellerman
  • Re: [PATCH] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support, Jarkko Sakkinen
• [linux-next:master] BUILD REGRESSION 6906a84c482f098d31486df8dc98cead21cce2d0, kernel test robot
• Re: [PATCH v7 4/4] optee: probe RPMB device using RPMB subsystem, Mikko Rapeli
  • Re: [PATCH v7 4/4] optee: probe RPMB device using RPMB subsystem, Jens Wiklander
• [PATCH] tpm: Add new device/vendor ID 0x50666666, Jett Rink
  • Re: [PATCH] tpm: Add new device/vendor ID 0x50666666, Jett Rink
    • Re: [PATCH] tpm: Add new device/vendor ID 0x50666666, Jett Rink
• [PATCH] char: tpm: Fix possible memory leak in tpm_bios_measurements_open(), Joe Hattori
  • Re: [PATCH] char: tpm: Fix possible memory leak in tpm_bios_measurements_open(), Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v3 0/2] KEYS: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() macros, Jeff Johnson
  • [PATCH v3 2/2] KEYS: encrypted: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION(), Jeff Johnson
    • Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] KEYS: encrypted: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION(), Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v3 1/2] KEYS: trusted: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION(), Jeff Johnson
    • Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] KEYS: trusted: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION(), Jarkko Sakkinen
      • Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] KEYS: trusted: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION(), Paul Moore
        • Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] KEYS: trusted: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION(), Jarkko Sakkinen
• [GIT PULL] TPM DEVICE DRIVER: tpmdd-next-6.10-rc3, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [GIT PULL] TPM DEVICE DRIVER: tpmdd-next-6.10-rc3, pr-tracker-bot
• [PATCH v1 1/1] treewide: Align match_string() with sysfs_match_string(), Andy Shevchenko
  • Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] treewide: Align match_string() with sysfs_match_string(), Bjorn Helgaas
  • Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] treewide: Align match_string() with sysfs_match_string(), Damien Le Moal
  • Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] treewide: Align match_string() with sysfs_match_string(), Zhihao Cheng
  • Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] treewide: Align match_string() with sysfs_match_string(), Daniel Bristot de Oliveira
  • Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] treewide: Align match_string() with sysfs_match_string(), Heiko Stübner
  • Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] treewide: Align match_string() with sysfs_match_string(), Jani Nikula
    • Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] treewide: Align match_string() with sysfs_match_string(), Steven Rostedt
    • Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] treewide: Align match_string() with sysfs_match_string(), Linus Walleij
  • Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] treewide: Align match_string() with sysfs_match_string(), Vinod Koul
  • Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] treewide: Align match_string() with sysfs_match_string(), Wolfram Sang
  • Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] treewide: Align match_string() with sysfs_match_string(), Sakari Ailus
  • Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] treewide: Align match_string() with sysfs_match_string(), Hans de Goede
  • Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] treewide: Align match_string() with sysfs_match_string(), Andi Shyti
  • Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] treewide: Align match_string() with sysfs_match_string(), Rodrigo Vivi
    • Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] treewide: Align match_string() with sysfs_match_string(), Linus Torvalds
  • Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] treewide: Align match_string() with sysfs_match_string(), Gautham R. Shenoy
  • Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] treewide: Align match_string() with sysfs_match_string(), AngeloGioacchino Del Regno
• [PATCH] tpm: tpm_crb: Call acpi_put_table() on firmware bug, Joe Hattori
  • Re: [PATCH] tpm: tpm_crb: Call acpi_put_table() on firmware bug, Jarkko Sakkinen
    • [PATCH v2] tpm: tpm_crb: Call acpi_put_table() on firmware bug, Joe Hattori
      • Re: [PATCH v2] tpm: tpm_crb: Call acpi_put_table() on firmware bug, Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH] crypto: sm2 - Remove sm2 algorithm, Herbert Xu
• [PATCH v9 00/19] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support, Ross Philipson
  • [PATCH v9 03/19] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig, Ross Philipson
  • [PATCH v9 19/19] x86: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch, Ross Philipson
    • Re: [PATCH v9 19/19] x86: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH v9 19/19] x86: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch, ross . philipson
  • [PATCH v9 04/19] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file, Ross Philipson
    • Re: [PATCH v9 04/19] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file, Jarkko Sakkinen
      • Re: [PATCH v9 04/19] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file, ross . philipson
        • Re: [PATCH v9 04/19] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file, Jarkko Sakkinen
          • Re: [PATCH v9 04/19] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file, ross . philipson
            • Re: [PATCH v9 04/19] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file, Jarkko Sakkinen
              • Re: [PATCH v9 04/19] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file, Jarkko Sakkinen
              • Re: [PATCH v9 04/19] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file, ross . philipson
                • Re: [PATCH v9 04/19] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file, Jarkko Sakkinen
                  • Re: [PATCH v9 04/19] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file, ross . philipson
                    • Re: [PATCH v9 04/19] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file, Jarkko Sakkinen
                      • Re: [PATCH v9 04/19] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file, ross . philipson
                        • Re: [PATCH v9 04/19] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file, Jarkko Sakkinen
                          • Re: [PATCH v9 04/19] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file, ross . philipson
  • [PATCH v9 01/19] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset, Ross Philipson
    • Re: [PATCH v9 01/19] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset, Jarkko Sakkinen
      • Re: [PATCH v9 01/19] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset, ross . philipson
  • [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Ross Philipson
    • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Eric Biggers
      • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Eric W. Biederman
        • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Daniel P. Smith
          • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Thomas Gleixner
            • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Jarkko Sakkinen
            • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Andrew Cooper
              • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Jarkko Sakkinen
                • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Matthew Garrett
                  • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Jarkko Sakkinen
                    • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Matthew Garrett
                      • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Jarkko Sakkinen
            • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Daniel P. Smith
            • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Andy Lutomirski
              • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Matthew Garrett
                • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Andy Lutomirski
              • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Daniel P. Smith
                • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Daniel P. Smith
                  • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Andy Lutomirski
                    • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Daniel P. Smith
                      • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Andy Lutomirski
                        • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Daniel P. Smith
                          • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, James Bottomley
                            • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Daniel P. Smith
                              • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Andy Lutomirski
                                • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Andy Lutomirski
                                • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, James Bottomley
                                • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Andy Lutomirski
                                • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, ross . philipson
                                • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Andy Lutomirski
                                • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Andy Lutomirski
                                • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, ross . philipson
                                • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Daniel P. Smith
                                • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Andy Lutomirski
                                • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Daniel P. Smith
      • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, ross . philipson
      • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Eric Biggers
        • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, ross . philipson
          • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Eric Biggers
    • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Jarkko Sakkinen
      • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, ross . philipson
        • Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v9 08/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub, Ross Philipson
    • Re: [PATCH v9 08/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH v9 08/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH v9 08/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub, Ard Biesheuvel
          • Re: [PATCH v9 08/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub, Ard Biesheuvel
          • Re: [PATCH v9 08/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub, ross . philipson
        • Re: [PATCH v9 08/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub, ross . philipson
          • Re: [PATCH v9 08/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub, Ard Biesheuvel
            • Re: [PATCH v9 08/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub, ross . philipson
              • Re: [PATCH v9 08/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub, Ard Biesheuvel
                • Re: [PATCH v9 08/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub, ross . philipson
      • Re: [PATCH v9 08/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub, ross . philipson
    • Re: [PATCH v9 08/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub, Jarkko Sakkinen
      • Re: [PATCH v9 08/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub, ross . philipson
        • Re: [PATCH v9 08/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v9 05/19] x86: Secure Launch main header file, Ross Philipson
    • Re: [PATCH v9 05/19] x86: Secure Launch main header file, Jarkko Sakkinen
      • Re: [PATCH v9 05/19] x86: Secure Launch main header file, ross . philipson
  • [PATCH v9 02/19] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation, Ross Philipson
  • [PATCH v9 07/19] x86: Add early SHA-256 support for Secure Launch early measurements, Ross Philipson
  • [PATCH v9 10/19] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support, Ross Philipson
    • Re: [PATCH v9 10/19] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support, Jarkko Sakkinen
      • Re: [PATCH v9 10/19] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support, ross . philipson
        • Re: [PATCH v9 10/19] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v9 12/19] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths, Ross Philipson
  • [PATCH v9 17/19] tpm: Add sysfs interface to allow setting and querying the preferred locality, Ross Philipson
    • Re: [PATCH v9 17/19] tpm: Add sysfs interface to allow setting and querying the preferred locality, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v9 09/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel late boot stub, Ross Philipson
    • Re: [PATCH v9 09/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel late boot stub, Jarkko Sakkinen
      • Re: [PATCH v9 09/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel late boot stub, ross . philipson
        • Re: [PATCH v9 09/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel late boot stub, Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH v9 09/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel late boot stub, Jarkko Sakkinen
      • Re: [PATCH v9 09/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel late boot stub, ross . philipson
      • Re: [PATCH v9 09/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel late boot stub, ross . philipson
        • Re: [PATCH v9 09/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel late boot stub, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v9 13/19] tpm: Protect against locality counter underflow, Ross Philipson
    • Re: [PATCH v9 13/19] tpm: Protect against locality counter underflow, Jarkko Sakkinen
      • Re: [PATCH v9 13/19] tpm: Protect against locality counter underflow, Daniel P. Smith
  • [PATCH v9 11/19] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support, Ross Philipson
  • [PATCH v9 14/19] tpm: Ensure tpm is in known state at startup, Ross Philipson
    • Re: [PATCH v9 14/19] tpm: Ensure tpm is in known state at startup, Jarkko Sakkinen
      • Re: [PATCH v9 14/19] tpm: Ensure tpm is in known state at startup, Daniel P. Smith
  • [PATCH v9 15/19] tpm: Make locality requests return consistent values, Ross Philipson
  • [PATCH v9 16/19] tpm: Add ability to set the preferred locality the TPM chip uses, Ross Philipson
    • Re: [PATCH v9 16/19] tpm: Add ability to set the preferred locality the TPM chip uses, Jarkko Sakkinen
      • Re: [PATCH v9 16/19] tpm: Add ability to set the preferred locality the TPM chip uses, ross . philipson
        • Re: [PATCH v9 16/19] tpm: Add ability to set the preferred locality the TPM chip uses, Jarkko Sakkinen
          • Re: [PATCH v9 16/19] tpm: Add ability to set the preferred locality the TPM chip uses, ross . philipson
  • [PATCH v9 18/19] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module, Ross Philipson
• [RFC PATCH v2 0/8] Clavis LSM, Eric Snowberg
  • [RFC PATCH v2 4/8] clavis: Prevent clavis boot param from changing during kexec, Eric Snowberg
  • [RFC PATCH v2 1/8] certs: Introduce ability to link to a system key, Eric Snowberg
    • Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/8] certs: Introduce ability to link to a system key, Jarkko Sakkinen
      • Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/8] certs: Introduce ability to link to a system key, Eric Snowberg
  • [RFC PATCH v2 2/8] clavis: Introduce a new system keyring called clavis, Eric Snowberg
  • [RFC PATCH v2 5/8] keys: Add new verification type (VERIFYING_CLAVIS_SIGNATURE), Eric Snowberg
  • [RFC PATCH v2 3/8] efi: Make clavis boot param persist across kexec, Eric Snowberg
  • [RFC PATCH v2 6/8] keys: Add ability to track intended usage of the public key, Eric Snowberg
  • [RFC PATCH v2 7/8] clavis: Introduce a new key type called clavis_key_acl, Eric Snowberg
  • [RFC PATCH v2 8/8] clavis: Introduce new LSM called clavis, Eric Snowberg
    • Re: [RFC PATCH v2 8/8] clavis: Introduce new LSM called clavis, Randy Dunlap
      • Re: [RFC PATCH v2 8/8] clavis: Introduce new LSM called clavis, Eric Snowberg
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/8] Clavis LSM, Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/8] Clavis LSM, Eric Snowberg
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/8] Clavis LSM, Mimi Zohar
    • Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/8] Clavis LSM, Eric Snowberg
• [PATCH v2] KEYS: trusted: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION(), Jeff Johnson
  • Re: [PATCH v2] KEYS: trusted: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION(), Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH v2] KEYS: trusted: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION(), Jeff Johnson
• [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: add MODULE_DESCRIPTION(), Jeff Johnson
  • Re: [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: add MODULE_DESCRIPTION(), Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: add MODULE_DESCRIPTION(), Jeff Johnson
• [PATCH] ima: fix wrong zero-assignment during securityfs dentry remove, Enrico Bravi
  • Re: [PATCH] ima: fix wrong zero-assignment during securityfs dentry remove, Roberto Sassu
• [PATCH] tpm: Remove illict WARN's from tpm2-sessions.c, Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: Change -EINVAL to -E2BIG, Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v7 0/5] KEYS: asymmetric: tpm2_key_{rsa,ecdsa}, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v7 1/5] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad: export rsa1_asn_lookup(), Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH v7 1/5] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad: export rsa1_asn_lookup(), Stefan Berger
      • Re: [PATCH v7 1/5] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad: export rsa1_asn_lookup(), Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v7 2/5] KEYS: trusted: Change -EINVAL to -E2BIG, Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH v7 2/5] KEYS: trusted: Change -EINVAL to -E2BIG, Stefan Berger
      • Re: [PATCH v7 2/5] KEYS: trusted: Change -EINVAL to -E2BIG, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v7 3/5] crypto: tpm2_key: Introduce a TPM2 key type, Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH v7 3/5] crypto: tpm2_key: Introduce a TPM2 key type, Stefan Berger
      • Re: [PATCH v7 3/5] crypto: tpm2_key: Introduce a TPM2 key type, Jarkko Sakkinen
        • Re: [PATCH v7 3/5] crypto: tpm2_key: Introduce a TPM2 key type, Stefan Berger
          • Re: [PATCH v7 3/5] crypto: tpm2_key: Introduce a TPM2 key type, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v7 4/5] keys: asymmetric: Add tpm2_key_rsa, Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH v7 4/5] keys: asymmetric: Add tpm2_key_rsa, Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH v7 4/5] keys: asymmetric: Add tpm2_key_rsa, Stefan Berger
      • Re: [PATCH v7 4/5] keys: asymmetric: Add tpm2_key_rsa, Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH v7 4/5] keys: asymmetric: Add tpm2_key_rsa, Herbert Xu
      • Re: [PATCH v7 4/5] keys: asymmetric: Add tpm2_key_rsa, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v7 5/5] keys: asymmetric: Add tpm2_key_ecdsa, Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH v7 5/5] keys: asymmetric: Add tpm2_key_ecdsa, Jarkko Sakkinen
      • Re: [PATCH v7 5/5] keys: asymmetric: Add tpm2_key_ecdsa, Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH v7 5/5] keys: asymmetric: Add tpm2_key_ecdsa, Stefan Berger
      • Re: [PATCH v7 5/5] keys: asymmetric: Add tpm2_key_ecdsa, Jarkko Sakkinen
• [GIT PULL] TPM DEVICE DRIVER: tpmdd-next-6.10-rc2, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [GIT PULL] TPM DEVICE DRIVER: tpmdd-next-6.10-rc2, pr-tracker-bot
• [PATCH 3/3] tpm: Enable TCG_TPM2_HMAC by default only for X86_64, Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v2] tpm: Rename TPM2_OA_TMPL to TPM2_OA_NULL_KEY and make it local, Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH] tpm: Rename TPM2_OA_TMPL to TPM2_OA_NULL_KEY and make it local, Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v6 0/6] KEYS: asymmetric: tpm2_key_{rsa,ecdsa}, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v6 1/6] tpm: Open code tpm_buf_parameters(), Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH v6 1/6] tpm: Open code tpm_buf_parameters(), Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v6 2/6] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad: export rsa1_asn_lookup(), Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v6 3/6] KEYS: trusted: Change -EINVAL to -E2BIG, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v6 4/6] crypto: tpm2_key: Introduce a TPM2 key type, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v6 5/6] keys: asymmetric: Add tpm2_key_rsa, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • [PATCH v6 6/6] keys: asymmetric: Add tpm2_key_ecdsa, Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.6 02/16] ima: Fix use-after-free on a dentry's dname.name, Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.8 03/20] ima: Fix use-after-free on a dentry's dname.name, Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.9 04/23] ima: Fix use-after-free on a dentry's dname.name, Sasha Levin
• [PATCH] tpm: Open code tpm_buf_parameters(), Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [PATCH] tpm: Open code tpm_buf_parameters(), Paul Menzel
    • Re: [PATCH] tpm: Open code tpm_buf_parameters(), Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH] KEYS: trusted_tpm2: Only check options->keyhandle for ASN.1, Jarkko Sakkinen
  • Re: [PATCH] KEYS: trusted_tpm2: Only check options->keyhandle for ASN.1, James Bottomley
    • Re: [PATCH] KEYS: trusted_tpm2: Only check options->keyhandle for ASN.1, Jarkko Sakkinen
• [PATCH v19 00/20] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE), Fan Wu
  • [PATCH v19 03/20] ipe: add evaluation loop, Fan Wu
  • [PATCH v19 04/20] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read, Fan Wu
  • [PATCH v19 01/20] security: add ipe lsm, Fan Wu
  • [PATCH v19 02/20] ipe: add policy parser, Fan Wu
  • [PATCH v19 05/20] initramfs|security: Add a security hook to do_populate_rootfs(), Fan Wu
  • [PATCH v19 06/20] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider, Fan Wu
  • [PATCH v19 07/20] security: add new securityfs delete function, Fan Wu
  • [PATCH v19 10/20] ipe: add permissive toggle, Fan Wu
  • [PATCH v19 12/20] dm verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs, Fan Wu
    • Re: [PATCH v19 12/20] dm verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs, Mikulas Patocka
    • Re: [PATCH v19 12/20] dm verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs, Eric Biggers
  • [PATCH v19 15/20] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs, Fan Wu
    • Re: [PATCH v19 15/20] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs, Paul Moore
      • Re: [PATCH v19 15/20] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs, Jarkko Sakkinen
        • Re: [PATCH v19 15/20] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs, Eric Biggers
          • Re: [PATCH v19 15/20] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs, Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH v19 15/20] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs, Paul Moore
      • Re: [PATCH v19 15/20] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs, Eric Biggers
        • Re: [PATCH v19 15/20] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs, Fan Wu
        • Re: [PATCH v19 15/20] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs, Paul Moore
          • Re: [PATCH v19 15/20] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs, Eric Biggers