Move allocation of chip->auth to tpm2_start_auth_session() so that the field can be used as flag to tell whether auth session is active or not. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx> --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index fc1f3502e6ee..f7746a165695 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -419,7 +419,8 @@ static void tpm2_KDFe(u8 z[EC_PT_SZ], const char *str, u8 *pt_u, u8 *pt_v, sha256_final(&sctx, out); } -static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip) +static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct tpm2_auth *auth) { struct crypto_kpp *kpp; struct kpp_request *req; @@ -478,7 +479,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip) sg_set_buf(&s[0], chip->null_ec_key_x, EC_PT_SZ); sg_set_buf(&s[1], chip->null_ec_key_y, EC_PT_SZ); kpp_request_set_input(req, s, EC_PT_SZ*2); - sg_init_one(d, chip->auth->salt, EC_PT_SZ); + sg_init_one(d, auth->salt, EC_PT_SZ); kpp_request_set_output(req, d, EC_PT_SZ); crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(req); kpp_request_free(req); @@ -489,8 +490,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip) * This works because KDFe fully consumes the secret before it * writes the salt */ - tpm2_KDFe(chip->auth->salt, "SECRET", x, chip->null_ec_key_x, - chip->auth->salt); + tpm2_KDFe(auth->salt, "SECRET", x, chip->null_ec_key_x, auth->salt); out: crypto_free_kpp(kpp); @@ -789,6 +789,8 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, /* manually close the session if it wasn't consumed */ tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle); memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth)); + kfree(auth); + chip->auth = NULL; } else { /* reset for next use */ auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; @@ -817,6 +819,8 @@ void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle); memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth)); + kfree(auth); + chip->auth = NULL; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_end_auth_session); @@ -913,25 +917,29 @@ static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key) */ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) { + struct tpm2_auth *auth; struct tpm_buf buf; - struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; - int rc; u32 null_key; + int rc; - if (!auth) { - dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is not active\n"); + if (chip->auth) { + dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is active\n"); return 0; } + auth = kzalloc(sizeof(*auth), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!auth) + return -ENOMEM; + rc = tpm2_load_null(chip, &null_key); if (rc) - goto out; + goto err; auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESS); if (rc) - goto out; + goto err; /* salt key handle */ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, null_key); @@ -943,7 +951,7 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) tpm_buf_append(&buf, auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce)); /* append encrypted salt and squirrel away unencrypted in auth */ - tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip); + tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip, auth); /* session type (HMAC, audit or policy) */ tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, TPM2_SE_HMAC); @@ -964,10 +972,13 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); - if (rc) - goto out; + if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) { + chip->auth = auth; + return 0; + } - out: +err: + kfree(auth); return rc; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_start_auth_session); @@ -1315,10 +1326,6 @@ int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip) return rc; } - chip->auth = kmalloc(sizeof(*chip->auth), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!chip->auth) - return -ENOMEM; - return rc; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_sessions_init); -- 2.46.0