Re: [PATCH v7 4/5] tpm: Allocate chip->auth in tpm2_start_auth_session()

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On 10/24/24 7:28 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
On Wed Oct 23, 2024 at 10:15 PM EEST, Stefan Berger wrote:


On 10/21/24 1:39 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
Move allocation of chip->auth to tpm2_start_auth_session() so that the
field can be used as flag to tell whether auth session is active or not.

Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx # v6.10+
Fixes: 699e3efd6c64 ("tpm: Add HMAC session start and end functions")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
v5:
- No changes.
v4:
- Change to bug.
v3:
- No changes.
v2:
- A new patch.
---
   drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++-------------
   1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
index 78c650ce4c9f..6e52785de9fd 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
@@ -484,7 +484,8 @@ static void tpm2_KDFe(u8 z[EC_PT_SZ], const char *str, u8 *pt_u, u8 *pt_v,
   	sha256_final(&sctx, out);
   }
-static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip)
+static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip,
+				struct tpm2_auth *auth)
   {
   	struct crypto_kpp *kpp;
   	struct kpp_request *req;
@@ -543,7 +544,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip)
   	sg_set_buf(&s[0], chip->null_ec_key_x, EC_PT_SZ);
   	sg_set_buf(&s[1], chip->null_ec_key_y, EC_PT_SZ);
   	kpp_request_set_input(req, s, EC_PT_SZ*2);
-	sg_init_one(d, chip->auth->salt, EC_PT_SZ);
+	sg_init_one(d, auth->salt, EC_PT_SZ);
   	kpp_request_set_output(req, d, EC_PT_SZ);
   	crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(req);
   	kpp_request_free(req);
@@ -554,8 +555,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip)
   	 * This works because KDFe fully consumes the secret before it
   	 * writes the salt
   	 */
-	tpm2_KDFe(chip->auth->salt, "SECRET", x, chip->null_ec_key_x,
-		  chip->auth->salt);
+	tpm2_KDFe(auth->salt, "SECRET", x, chip->null_ec_key_x, auth->salt);
out:
   	crypto_free_kpp(kpp);
@@ -854,6 +854,8 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
   			/* manually close the session if it wasn't consumed */
   			tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle);
   		memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth));
+		kfree(auth);
+		chip->auth = NULL;
   	} else {
   		/* reset for next use  */
   		auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
@@ -882,6 +884,8 @@ void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle);
   	memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth));
+	kfree(auth);
+	chip->auth = NULL;
   }
   EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_end_auth_session);
@@ -970,25 +974,29 @@ static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key)
    */
   int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
   {
+	struct tpm2_auth *auth;
   	struct tpm_buf buf;
-	struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth;
-	int rc;
   	u32 null_key;
+	int rc;
- if (!auth) {
-		dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is not active\n");
+	if (chip->auth) {
+		dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is active\n");
   		return 0;
   	}
+ auth = kzalloc(sizeof(*auth), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!auth)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
   	rc = tpm2_load_null(chip, &null_key);
   	if (rc)
-		goto out;
+		goto err;
auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESS);
   	if (rc)
-		goto out;
+		goto err;
/* salt key handle */
   	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, null_key);
@@ -1000,7 +1008,7 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
   	tpm_buf_append(&buf, auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce));
/* append encrypted salt and squirrel away unencrypted in auth */
-	tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip);
+	tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip, auth);
   	/* session type (HMAC, audit or policy) */
   	tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, TPM2_SE_HMAC);
@@ -1021,10 +1029,13 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); - if (rc)
-		goto out;
+	if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) {
+		chip->auth = auth;
+		return 0;
+	}
- out:
+err:

like in many other cases before kfree(auth):
memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth));

With this:

Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

Thanks, or should we use kfree_sensitive()?

It has some additional functionality, which is missed now:

https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.11.5/source/mm/slab_common.c#L1339

I.e. kasan_unpoison().

And change the other ones that use memzero_explicit()?


BR, Jarkko





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