On Fri, Jan 3, 2025 at 11:48 PM Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > Regardless, back to Clavis ... reading quickly through the cover > letter again, I do somewhat wonder if this isn't better integrated > into the keyring proper; have you talked to both David and Jarkko > about this? I realize I should probably expand on my thinking a bit, especially since my comment a while regarding LSMs dedicated to enforcing access control on keys is what was given as a reason for making Clavis a LSM. I still stand by my comment from over a year ago that I see no reason why we couldn't support a LSM that enforces access controls on keyrings/keys. What gives me pause with the Clavis LSM is that so much of Clavis is resident in the keyrings themselves, e.g. Clavis policy ACLs and authorization keys, that it really feels like it should be part of the keys subsystem and not a LSM. Yes, existing LSMs do have LSM specific data that resides outside of the LSM and in an object's subsystem, but that is usually limited to security identifiers and similar things, not the LSM's security policy. That's my current thinking, and why I asked about locating Clavis in the keys subsystem directly (although I still think better keyring granularity and a shift towards usage based keyrings is the better option). If David and Jarkko are opposed to integrating Clavis into the keys subsystem we can consider this as a LSM, I'm just not sure it's the best first option. Does that make sense? -- paul-moore.com
