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RE: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation, (continued)
- [RFC PATCH v4 12/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Show line of sight to LSM support SGX2's EAUG, Sean Christopherson
  - RE: [RFC PATCH v4 12/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Show line of sight to LSM support SGX2's EAUG, Xing, Cedric
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v4 12/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Show line of sight to LSM support SGX2's EAUG, Sean Christopherson
- [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX, Sean Christopherson
  - Re: [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX, Jarkko Sakkinen
  - RE: [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX, Xing, Cedric
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX, Stephen Smalley
      - RE: [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX, Sean Christopherson
- [RFC PATCH v4 01/12] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting, Sean Christopherson
  - Re: [RFC PATCH v4 01/12] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting, Jarkko Sakkinen
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v4 01/12] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting, Sean Christopherson
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v4 01/12] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX, Sean Christopherson
  - RE: [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX, Xing, Cedric
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX, Stephen Smalley
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX, Stephen Smalley
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX, Xing, Cedric
- Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks, Cedric Xing
  - [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Cedric Xing
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Casey Schaufler
      - RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Casey Schaufler
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Casey Schaufler
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Stephen Smalley
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Casey Schaufler
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Casey Schaufler
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Casey Schaufler
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Casey Schaufler
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Dr. Greg
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Casey Schaufler
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Dr. Greg
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Casey Schaufler
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Dr. Greg
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Andy Lutomirski
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Stephen Smalley
      - RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Stephen Smalley
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Xing, Cedric
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Andy Lutomirski
      - RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Andy Lutomirski
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Andy Lutomirski
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Andy Lutomirski
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Xing, Cedric
  - [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] x86/sgx: Call LSM hooks from SGX subsystem/module, Cedric Xing
  - [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Cedric Xing
  - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks, Jarkko Sakkinen
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks, Jarkko Sakkinen
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks, Jarkko Sakkinen
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks, Xing, Cedric
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks, Jarkko Sakkinen
  - [RFC PATCH v3 0/4] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks, Cedric Xing
    - [RFC PATCH v3 2/4] x86/64: Call LSM hooks from SGX subsystem/module, Cedric Xing
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 2/4] x86/64: Call LSM hooks from SGX subsystem/module, Sean Christopherson
    - [RFC PATCH v3 1/4] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Cedric Xing
    - [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Cedric Xing
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Xing, Cedric
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Jethro Beekman
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Xing, Cedric
    - [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module, Cedric Xing
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module, Casey Schaufler
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module, Casey Schaufler
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module, Casey Schaufler
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module, Casey Schaufler
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module, Stephen Smalley
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module, Stephen Smalley
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module, Stephen Smalley
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module, Xing, Cedric
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 0/4] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks, Sean Christopherson
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 0/4] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 0/4] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 0/4] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks, Xing, Cedric
- Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Jarkko Sakkinen
  - Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Sean Christopherson
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Xing, Cedric
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Jarkko Sakkinen
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Stephen Smalley
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Xing, Cedric
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Dr. Greg
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Xing, Cedric
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Jethro Beekman
[RFC PATCH] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting, Sean Christopherson
- Re: [RFC PATCH] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting, Jarkko Sakkinen
  - Re: [RFC PATCH] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting, Jarkko Sakkinen
[PATCH] x86/sgx: rip off the refcount from sgx_encl_add_page flow, Jarkko Sakkinen
- Re: [PATCH] x86/sgx: rip off the refcount from sgx_encl_add_page flow, Sean Christopherson
  - Re: [PATCH] x86/sgx: rip off the refcount from sgx_encl_add_page flow, Jarkko Sakkinen
[RFC PATCH v3 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3, Sean Christopherson
- [RFC PATCH v3 03/12] selftests: x86/sgx: Mark the enclave loader as not needing an exec stack, Sean Christopherson
- [RFC PATCH v3 01/12] x86/sgx: Add mm to enclave at mmap(), Sean Christopherson
  - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 01/12] x86/sgx: Add mm to enclave at mmap(), Dave Hansen
  - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 01/12] x86/sgx: Add mm to enclave at mmap(), Andy Lutomirski
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 01/12] x86/sgx: Add mm to enclave at mmap(), Sean Christopherson
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 01/12] x86/sgx: Add mm to enclave at mmap(), Sean Christopherson
  - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 01/12] x86/sgx: Add mm to enclave at mmap(), Jarkko Sakkinen
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 01/12] x86/sgx: Add mm to enclave at mmap(), Jarkko Sakkinen
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 01/12] x86/sgx: Add mm to enclave at mmap(), Jarkko Sakkinen
- [RFC PATCH v3 11/12] security/apparmor: Add enclave_load() implementation, Sean Christopherson
- [RFC PATCH v3 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address, Sean Christopherson
  - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address, Jarkko Sakkinen
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address, Sean Christopherson
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [RFC PATCH v3 12/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Show line of sight to LSM support SGX2's EAUG, Sean Christopherson
- [RFC PATCH v3 05/12] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves, Sean Christopherson
  - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 05/12] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [RFC PATCH v3 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX, Sean Christopherson
- [RFC PATCH v3 06/12] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect(), Sean Christopherson
- [RFC PATCH v3 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation, Sean Christopherson
  - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation, Stephen Smalley
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation, Sean Christopherson
- [RFC PATCH v3 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX, Sean Christopherson
  - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX, Jarkko Sakkinen
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX, James Morris
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX, Dr. Greg
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX, Jarkko Sakkinen
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX, Dr. Greg
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX, James Morris
- [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits, Sean Christopherson
  - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits, Jarkko Sakkinen
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits, Sean Christopherson
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits, Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits, Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits, Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [RFC PATCH v3 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_EXECMEM to map enclave page WX, Sean Christopherson
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3, Stephen Smalley
  - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3, Sean Christopherson
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3, Stephen Smalley
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3, Jarkko Sakkinen
[PATCH RFC] x86/sgx: Check that the address is within ELRANGE, Jarkko Sakkinen
- Re: [PATCH RFC] x86/sgx: Check that the address is within ELRANGE, Sean Christopherson
  - Re: [PATCH RFC] x86/sgx: Check that the address is within ELRANGE, Jarkko Sakkinen
[PATCH RFC] x86/sgx: Do not increase encl->refcount for VMAs, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH RFC] x86/sgx: Do not increase encl->refcount for VMAs, Jarkko Sakkinen
- Re: [PATCH RFC] x86/sgx: Do not increase encl->refcount for VMAs, Jarkko Sakkinen
  - Re: [PATCH RFC] x86/sgx: Do not increase encl->refcount for VMAs, Sean Christopherson
    - Re: [PATCH RFC] x86/sgx: Do not increase encl->refcount for VMAs, Jarkko Sakkinen
      - Re: [PATCH RFC] x86/sgx: Do not increase encl->refcount for VMAs, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [PATCH RFC] x86/sgx: Do not increase encl->refcount for VMAs, Jarkko Sakkinen
[RFC PATCH v2 0/5] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Sean Christopherson
- [RFC PATCH v2 3/5] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves, Sean Christopherson
  - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/5] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves, Jarkko Sakkinen
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/5] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves, Andy Lutomirski
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/5] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves, Stephen Smalley
- [RFC PATCH v2 4/5] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX, Sean Christopherson
  - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 4/5] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX, Stephen Smalley
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 4/5] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX, Sean Christopherson
  - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 4/5] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits, Sean Christopherson
  - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits, Jarkko Sakkinen
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits, Sean Christopherson
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits, Jarkko Sakkinen
  - RE: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits, Xing, Cedric
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits, Andy Lutomirski
      - RE: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits, Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits, Sean Christopherson
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits, Xing, Cedric
- [RFC PATCH v2 5/5] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation, Sean Christopherson
  - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 5/5] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation, Stephen Smalley
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 5/5] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation, Sean Christopherson
  - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 5/5] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect(), Sean Christopherson
  - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect(), Jarkko Sakkinen
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect(), Sean Christopherson
      - RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect(), Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect(), Sean Christopherson
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect(), Xing, Cedric
- [RFC PATCH v1 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks, Cedric Xing
  - [RFC PATCH v1 1/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks, Cedric Xing
  - [RFC PATCH v1 3/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Call new LSM hooks from SGX subsystem, Cedric Xing
  - [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Cedric Xing
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Stephen Smalley
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Dr. Greg
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Dr. Greg
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Sean Christopherson
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Xing, Cedric
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Stephen Smalley
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Sean Christopherson
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Dr. Greg
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Dr. Greg
      - RE: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Stephen Smalley
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Sean Christopherson
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Xing, Cedric
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux, Sean Christopherson
  - Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks, Jarkko Sakkinen
[PATCH 0/7] x86/sgx: Clean up and enhance add pages ioctl, Sean Christopherson
- [PATCH 1/7] x86/sgx: Remove dead code to handle non-existent IOR ioctl, Sean Christopherson
- [PATCH 2/7] x86/sgx: Remove unnecessary @cmd parameter from ioctl helpers, Sean Christopherson
- [PATCH 5/7] x86/sgx: Add flag to zero added region instead of copying from source, Sean Christopherson
  - Re: [PATCH 5/7] x86/sgx: Add flag to zero added region instead of copying from source, Andy Lutomirski
    - Re: [PATCH 5/7] x86/sgx: Add flag to zero added region instead of copying from source, Sean Christopherson
      - Re: [PATCH 5/7] x86/sgx: Add flag to zero added region instead of copying from source, Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: [PATCH 5/7] x86/sgx: Add flag to zero added region instead of copying from source, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        RE: [PATCH 5/7] x86/sgx: Add flag to zero added region instead of copying from source, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [PATCH 5/7] x86/sgx: Add flag to zero added region instead of copying from source, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [PATCH 5/7] x86/sgx: Add flag to zero added region instead of copying from source, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [PATCH 5/7] x86/sgx: Add flag to zero added region instead of copying from source, Jethro Beekman
        
        Re: [PATCH 5/7] x86/sgx: Add flag to zero added region instead of copying from source, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [PATCH 5/7] x86/sgx: Add flag to zero added region instead of copying from source, Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: [PATCH 5/7] x86/sgx: Add flag to zero added region instead of copying from source, Sean Christopherson
- [PATCH 7/7] x86/sgx: Add a reserved field to sgx_enclave_add_region to drop 'packed', Sean Christopherson
  - Re: [PATCH 7/7] x86/sgx: Add a reserved field to sgx_enclave_add_region to drop 'packed', Dave Hansen
    - Re: [PATCH 7/7] x86/sgx: Add a reserved field to sgx_enclave_add_region to drop 'packed', Andy Lutomirski
  - Re: [PATCH 7/7] x86/sgx: Add a reserved field to sgx_enclave_add_region to drop 'packed', Jarkko Sakkinen
    - Re: [PATCH 7/7] x86/sgx: Add a reserved field to sgx_enclave_add_region to drop 'packed', Sean Christopherson
      - Re: [PATCH 7/7] x86/sgx: Add a reserved field to sgx_enclave_add_region to drop 'packed', Jarkko Sakkinen
      - Re: [PATCH 7/7] x86/sgx: Add a reserved field to sgx_enclave_add_region to drop 'packed', Jethro Beekman
- [PATCH 3/7] x86/sgx: Let ioctl helpers do copy to/from user, Sean Christopherson
- [PATCH 4/7] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl(), Sean Christopherson
  - Re: [PATCH 4/7] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl(), Jarkko Sakkinen
  - Re: [PATCH 4/7] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl(), Jethro Beekman
    - Re: [PATCH 4/7] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl(), Sean Christopherson
      - Re: [PATCH 4/7] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl(), Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: [PATCH 4/7] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl(), Sean Christopherson
      - RE: [PATCH 4/7] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl(), Xing, Cedric
- [PATCH 6/7] x86/sgx: Use the actual zero page as the source when adding zero pages, Sean Christopherson
- Re: [PATCH 0/7] x86/sgx: Clean up and enhance add pages ioctl, Jarkko Sakkinen
  - Re: [PATCH 0/7] x86/sgx: Clean up and enhance add pages ioctl, Jarkko Sakkinen
[RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Sean Christopherson
- [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX, Sean Christopherson
  - RE: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX, Xing, Cedric
  - Re: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX, Stephen Smalley
    - Re: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX, Sean Christopherson
      - Re: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX, Stephen Smalley
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX, Dave Hansen
  - Re: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX, Andy Lutomirski
    - Re: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX, Sean Christopherson
      - RE: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX, Sean Christopherson
- [RFC PATCH 9/9] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation, Sean Christopherson
  - Re: [RFC PATCH 9/9] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation, Stephen Smalley
    - Re: [RFC PATCH 9/9] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation, Sean Christopherson
- [RFC PATCH 5/9] x86/sgx: Restrict mapping without an enclave page to PROT_NONE, Sean Christopherson
  - RE: [RFC PATCH 5/9] x86/sgx: Restrict mapping without an enclave page to PROT_NONE, Xing, Cedric
  - Re: [RFC PATCH 5/9] x86/sgx: Restrict mapping without an enclave page to PROT_NONE, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves, Sean Christopherson
  - RE: [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves, Xing, Cedric
    - Re: [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves, Andy Lutomirski
  - Re: [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves, Jarkko Sakkinen
    - Re: [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves, Andy Lutomirski
      - Re: [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves, Sean Christopherson
      - RE: [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves, Xing, Cedric
      - Re: [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves, Sean Christopherson
- [RFC PATCH 4/9] mm: Introduce vm_ops->mprotect(), Sean Christopherson
  - RE: [RFC PATCH 4/9] mm: Introduce vm_ops->mprotect(), Xing, Cedric
  - Re: [RFC PATCH 4/9] mm: Introduce vm_ops->mprotect(), Jarkko Sakkinen
  - Re: [RFC PATCH 4/9] mm: Introduce vm_ops->mprotect(), Andy Lutomirski
- [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl(), Sean Christopherson
  - RE: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl(), Xing, Cedric
    - Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl(), Sean Christopherson
      - Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl(), Sean Christopherson
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl(), Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl(), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl(), Andy Lutomirski
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl(), Xing, Cedric
  - Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl(), Dave Hansen
    - Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl(), Sean Christopherson
      - Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl(), Dave Hansen
      - RE: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl(), Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl(), Sean Christopherson
  - Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl(), Jarkko Sakkinen
- [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES, Sean Christopherson
  - RE: [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES, Xing, Cedric
  - Re: [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES, Jarkko Sakkinen
    - Re: [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES, Sean Christopherson
      - Re: [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES, Jarkko Sakkinen
  - Re: [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES, Andy Lutomirski
  - RE: [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES, Ayoun, Serge
    - Re: [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES, Sean Christopherson
- [RFC PATCH 1/9] x86/sgx: Remove unused local variable in sgx_encl_release(), Sean Christopherson
  - Re: [RFC PATCH 1/9] x86/sgx: Remove unused local variable in sgx_encl_release(), Jarkko Sakkinen
- [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address, Sean Christopherson
  - Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address, Jarkko Sakkinen
    - Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address, Andy Lutomirski
      - RE: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address, Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address, Sean Christopherson
      - Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address, Jarkko Sakkinen
- RE: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Xing, Cedric
  - Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Sean Christopherson
    - RE: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Xing, Cedric
      - Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Sean Christopherson
      - Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Stephen Smalley
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Sean Christopherson
        
        RE: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Xing, Cedric
  - Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Stephen Smalley
    - RE: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Xing, Cedric
- Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, Jarkko Sakkinen
[PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH v20 01/28] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel-defined SGX feature bit, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH v20 03/28] x86/msr: Add IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL.SGX_ENABLE definition, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH v20 04/28] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel-defined SGX_LC feature bit, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH v20 05/28] x86/msr: Add SGX Launch Control MSR definitions, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH v20 06/28] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Add new 'PF_SGX' page fault error code bit, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH v20 07/28] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV for userspace #PFs w/ PF_SGX, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH v20 08/28] x86/cpu/intel: Detect SGX support and update caps appropriately, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH v20 09/28] x86/sgx: Add ENCLS architectural error codes, Jarkko Sakkinen
  - Re: [PATCH v20 09/28] x86/sgx: Add ENCLS architectural error codes, Sean Christopherson
- [PATCH v20 10/28] x86/sgx: Add SGX1 and SGX2 architectural data structures, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH v20 11/28] x86/sgx: Add wrappers for ENCLS leaf functions, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH v20 12/28] x86/sgx: Enumerate and track EPC sections, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH v20 13/28] x86/sgx: Add functions to allocate and free EPC pages, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH v20 14/28] x86/sgx: Add sgx_einit() for initializing enclaves, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH v20 15/28] x86/sgx: Add the Linux SGX Enclave Driver, Jarkko Sakkinen
  - Re: [PATCH v20 15/28] x86/sgx: Add the Linux SGX Enclave Driver, Sean Christopherson
    - Re: [PATCH v20 15/28] x86/sgx: Add the Linux SGX Enclave Driver, Jethro Beekman
      - Re: [PATCH v20 15/28] x86/sgx: Add the Linux SGX Enclave Driver, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 15/28] x86/sgx: Add the Linux SGX Enclave Driver, Jethro Beekman
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 15/28] x86/sgx: Add the Linux SGX Enclave Driver, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 15/28] x86/sgx: Add the Linux SGX Enclave Driver, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 15/28] x86/sgx: Add the Linux SGX Enclave Driver, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 15/28] x86/sgx: Add the Linux SGX Enclave Driver, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 15/28] x86/sgx: Add the Linux SGX Enclave Driver, Dr. Greg
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 15/28] x86/sgx: Add the Linux SGX Enclave Driver, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 15/28] x86/sgx: Add the Linux SGX Enclave Driver, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH v20 16/28] x86/sgx: Add provisioning, Jarkko Sakkinen
  - Re: [PATCH v20 16/28] x86/sgx: Add provisioning, Huang, Kai
    - Re: [PATCH v20 16/28] x86/sgx: Add provisioning, Jarkko Sakkinen
  - Re: [PATCH v20 16/28] x86/sgx: Add provisioning, Jethro Beekman
    - Re: [PATCH v20 16/28] x86/sgx: Add provisioning, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH v20 17/28] x86/sgx: Add swapping code to the core and SGX driver, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH v20 18/28] x86/sgx: ptrace() support for the SGX driver, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH v20 19/28] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH v20 20/28] x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH v20 21/28] x86/fault: Attempt to fixup unhandled #PF in vDSO before signaling, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH v20 22/28] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling, Jarkko Sakkinen
  - Re: [PATCH v20 22/28] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling, Jarkko Sakkinen
    - RE: [PATCH v20 22/28] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling, Xing, Cedric
      - Re: [PATCH v20 22/28] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 22/28] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling, Xing, Cedric
    - Re: [PATCH v20 22/28] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling, Sean Christopherson
      - Re: [PATCH v20 22/28] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH v20 23/28] x86/vdso: Add __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to wrap SGX enclave transitions, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH v20 24/28] selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SGX, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH v20 25/28] x86/sgx: Update MAINTAINERS, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH v20 26/28] docs: x86/sgx: Add Architecture documentation, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH v20 27/28] docs: x86/sgx: Document kernel internals, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH v20 28/28] docs: x86/sgx: Document the enclave API, Jarkko Sakkinen
- [PATCH v20 02/28] x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX sub-features (as Linux-defined bits), Jarkko Sakkinen
- Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Dr. Greg
  - Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Dave Hansen
    - Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Dr. Greg
      - Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Dave Hansen
  - Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Andy Lutomirski
  - Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Dave Hansen
    - Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Dr. Greg
      - Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Jethro Beekman
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Thomas Gleixner
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Jethro Beekman
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Thomas Gleixner
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Jethro Beekman
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Jethro Beekman
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Jethro Beekman
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Thomas Gleixner
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Jethro Beekman
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Thomas Gleixner
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Dr. Greg
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Dr. Greg
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Linus Torvalds
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Dr. Greg
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Jethro Beekman
        
        RE: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Jethro Beekman
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Dave Hansen
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Jethro Beekman
        
        RE: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Jethro Beekman
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Andy Lutomirski
        
        RE: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Message not available
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Andy Lutomirski
        
        RE: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Sean Christopherson
        
        SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), James Morris
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), James Morris
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Stephen Smalley
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Stephen Smalley
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Stephen Smalley
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Stephen Smalley
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Stephen Smalley
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Stephen Smalley
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Stephen Smalley
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Linus Torvalds
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Linus Torvalds
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Stephen Smalley
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Stephen Smalley
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), James Morris
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Dr. Greg
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Haitao Huang
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Jethro Beekman
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Stephen Smalley
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Stephen Smalley
        
        RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Stephen Smalley
        
        RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Stephen Smalley
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Stephen Smalley
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Dr. Greg
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Dr. Greg
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Stephen Smalley
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support), Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Haitao Huang
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Haitao Huang
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Haitao Huang
        
        RE: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Haitao Huang
        
        RE: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Thomas Gleixner
        
        Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Jethro Beekman
      - Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support, Dave Hansen
- [RFC PATCH v1 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack, Cedric Xing
  - [RFC PATCH v1 1/3] selftests/x86: Fixed Makefile for SGX selftest, Cedric Xing
  - [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack, Cedric Xing
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack, Sean Christopherson
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack, Andy Lutomirski
      - RE: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack, Xing, Cedric
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack, Sean Christopherson
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack, Andy Lutomirski
  - [RFC PATCH v1 3/3] selftests/x86: Augment SGX selftest to test new __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() and its callback interface, Cedric Xing
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v1 3/3] selftests/x86: Augment SGX selftest to test new __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() and its callback interface, Andy Lutomirski
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v1 3/3] selftests/x86: Augment SGX selftest to test new __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() and its callback interface, Sean Christopherson
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v1 3/3] selftests/x86: Augment SGX selftest to test new __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() and its callback interface, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v1 3/3] selftests/x86: Augment SGX selftest to test new __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() and its callback interface, Andy Lutomirski
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v1 3/3] selftests/x86: Augment SGX selftest to test new __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() and its callback interface, Sean Christopherson
  - Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack, Sean Christopherson
  - [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack, Cedric Xing
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack, Jarkko Sakkinen
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack, Xing, Cedric
    - [RFC PATCH v3 0/3] x86/sgx: Amend vDSO API to allow enclave/host parameter passing on untrusted stack, Cedric Xing
      - [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] selftests/x86: Fixed Makefile for SGX selftest, Cedric Xing
      - [RFC PATCH v3 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack, Cedric Xing
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v3 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack, Xing, Cedric
      - [RFC PATCH v3 3/3] selftests/x86: Augment SGX selftest to test new __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() and its callback interface, Cedric Xing
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 0/3] x86/sgx: Amend vDSO API to allow enclave/host parameter passing on untrusted stack, Jarkko Sakkinen
      - [RFC PATCH v4 0/3] x86/sgx: Amend vDSO API to allow enclave/host parameter passing on untrusted stack, Cedric Xing
        
        [RFC PATCH v4 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack, Cedric Xing
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v4 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v4 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        [RFC PATCH v4 3/3] selftests/x86/sgx: Augment SGX selftest to test vDSO API, Cedric Xing
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v4 3/3] selftests/x86/sgx: Augment SGX selftest to test vDSO API, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v4 3/3] selftests/x86/sgx: Augment SGX selftest to test vDSO API, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v4 3/3] selftests/x86/sgx: Augment SGX selftest to test vDSO API, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v4 3/3] selftests/x86/sgx: Augment SGX selftest to test vDSO API, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v4 3/3] selftests/x86/sgx: Augment SGX selftest to test vDSO API, Xing, Cedric
        
        [RFC PATCH v4 1/3] selftests/x86/sgx: Fix Makefile for SGX selftest, Cedric Xing
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v4 1/3] selftests/x86/sgx: Fix Makefile for SGX selftest, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v4 1/3] selftests/x86/sgx: Fix Makefile for SGX selftest, Jarkko Sakkinen
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v4 1/3] selftests/x86/sgx: Fix Makefile for SGX selftest, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v4 1/3] selftests/x86/sgx: Fix Makefile for SGX selftest, Jarkko Sakkinen
  - [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack, Cedric Xing
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack, Sean Christopherson
      - RE: [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack, Xing, Cedric
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack, Sean Christopherson
        
        Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack, Jarkko Sakkinen
  - [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] selftests/x86: Augment SGX selftest to test new __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() and its callback interface, Cedric Xing
    - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] selftests/x86: Augment SGX selftest to test new __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() and its callback interface, Jarkko Sakkinen
      - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] selftests/x86: Augment SGX selftest to test new __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() and its callback interface, Xing, Cedric

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