Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits

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On Mon, Jul 08, 2019 at 09:19:32AM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > 2. Probably some "user story" type of examples would help with the
> > discussion overall [1] i.e. how one would use this for
> > her own good.
> 
> The compelling story is Andy's original concern that userspace could
> circumvent existing security policies by running code in an enclave.
> 
> AIUI, closing the LSM loophole is the minimal requirement to get SGX
> upstreamed.  The extensive discussion has largely been focused on
> ensuring that whatever mechanism is used to close the loophole will
> play nice with future SGX functionality and/or LSM security policies.

OK, might be getting here where I fall out of the wagon so:

Doesn't Andy's example anyway require a process that has privileges to
make pages executable i.e. it could run arbitrary code even without an
enclave?

/Jarkko



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