On Tue, Jun 11, 2019 at 09:40:25AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> I haven't looked at this code closely, but it feels like a lot of
> SGX-specific logic embedded into SELinux that will have to be repeated or
> reused for every security module. Does SGX not track this state itself?
SGX does track equivalent state.
There are three proposals on the table (I think):
1. Require userspace to explicitly specificy (maximal) enclave page
permissions at build time. The enclave page permissions are provided
to, and checked by, LSMs at enclave build time.
Pros: Low-complexity kernel implementation, straightforward auditing
Cons: Sullies the SGX UAPI to some extent, may increase complexity of
SGX2 enclave loaders.
2. Pre-check LSM permissions and dynamically track mappings to enclave
pages, e.g. add an SGX mprotect() hook to restrict W->X and WX
based on the pre-checked permissions.
Pros: Does not impact SGX UAPI, medium kernel complexity
Cons: Auditing is complex/weird, requires taking enclave-specific
lock during mprotect() to query/update tracking.
3. Implement LSM hooks in SGX to allow LSMs to track enclave regions
from cradle to grave, but otherwise defer everything to LSMs.
Pros: Does not impact SGX UAPI, maximum flexibility, precise auditing
Cons: Most complex and "heaviest" kernel implementation of the three,
pushes more SGX details into LSMs.
My RFC series[1] implements #1. My understanding is that Andy (Lutomirski)
prefers #2. Cedric's RFC series implements #3.
Perhaps the easiest way to make forward progress is to rule out the
options we absolutely *don't* want by focusing on the potentially blocking
issue with each option:
#1 - SGX UAPI funkiness
#2 - Auditing complexity, potential enclave lock contention
#3 - Pushing SGX details into LSMs and complexity of kernel implementation
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190606021145.12604-1-sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx
