On Tue, Jun 04, 2019 at 01:25:10PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Tue, Jun 4, 2019 at 9:26 AM Jarkko Sakkinen > <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > > On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 04:31:57PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote: > > > Do not allow an enclave page to be mapped with PROT_EXEC if the source > > > page is backed by a file on a noexec file system. > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx> > > > > Why don't you just check in sgx_encl_add_page() that whether the path > > comes from noexec and deny if SECINFO contains X? > > > > SECINFO seems almost entirely useless for this kind of thing because > of SGX2. I'm thinking that SECINFO should be completely ignored for > anything other than its required architectural purpose. Not exactly sure why using it to pass the RWX bits to EADD ioctl would cause anything to SGX2 support. /Jarkko
