Linux Integrity

• Thread Index

• Re: [PATCH 1/3] ima: Remove inode lock
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 05/13] clavis: Introduce a new key type called clavis_key_acl
  • From: Ben Boeckel <me@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/13] keys: Add new verification type (VERIFYING_CLAVIS_SIGNATURE)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/13] keys: Add new verification type (VERIFYING_CLAVIS_SIGNATURE)
  • From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 03/13] clavis: Introduce a new system keyring called clavis
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 03/13] clavis: Introduce a new system keyring called clavis
  • From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 06/13] clavis: Populate clavis keyring acl with kernel module signature
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/13] keys: Add new verification type (VERIFYING_CLAVIS_SIGNATURE)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 01/13] certs: Remove CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING check
  • From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 02/13] certs: Introduce ability to link to a system key
  • From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 03/13] clavis: Introduce a new system keyring called clavis
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 02/13] certs: Introduce ability to link to a system key
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 01/13] certs: Remove CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING check
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 01/13] certs: Remove CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING check
  • From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 08/13] clavis: Introduce new LSM called clavis
  • From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 13/13] clavis: Kunit support
  • From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 07/13] keys: Add ability to track intended usage of the public key
  • From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 09/13] clavis: Allow user to define acl at build time
  • From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 10/13] efi: Make clavis boot param persist across kexec
  • From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 02/13] certs: Introduce ability to link to a system key
  • From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 11/13] clavis: Prevent boot param change during kexec
  • From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 05/13] clavis: Introduce a new key type called clavis_key_acl
  • From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 03/13] clavis: Introduce a new system keyring called clavis
  • From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 06/13] clavis: Populate clavis keyring acl with kernel module signature
  • From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 12/13] clavis: Add function redirection for Kunit support
  • From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 04/13] keys: Add new verification type (VERIFYING_CLAVIS_SIGNATURE)
  • From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Clavis LSM
  • From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/3] ima: Ensure lock is held when setting iint pointer in inode security blob
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/3] ima: Remove inode lock
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] tpm: ibmvtpm: Set TPM_OPS_AUTO_STARTUP flag on driver
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH] tpm: Allow the TPM2 pcr_extend HMAC capability to be disabled on boot
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH] tpm: Allow the TPM2 pcr_extend HMAC capability to be disabled on boot
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] tpm: ibmvtpm: Set TPM_OPS_AUTO_STARTUP flag on driver
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 5/5] tpm: flush the auth session only when /dev/tpm0 is open
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 4/5] tpm: Allocate chip->auth in tpm2_start_auth_session()
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 3/5] tpm: flush the null key only when /dev/tpm0 is accessed
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 2/5] tpm: Implement tpm2_load_null() rollback
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6 1/5] tpm: Return on tpm2_create_null_primary() failure
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH] tpm: Allow the TPM2 pcr_extend HMAC capability to be disabled on boot
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 1/6] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
  • From: sergeh@xxxxxxxxxx
• Re: [PATCH v20 2/6] security: Add EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits
  • From: sergeh@xxxxxxxxxx
• Re: [PATCH v20 1/6] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
  • From: sergeh@xxxxxxxxxx
• Re: [PATCH v20 2/6] security: Add EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits
  • From: sergeh@xxxxxxxxxx
• [PATCH v2 1/6] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] tpm: ibmvtpm: Set TPM_OPS_AUTO_STARTUP flag on driver
  • From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/3] ima: Ensure lock is held when setting iint pointer in inode security blob
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 1/6] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
  • From: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 2/6] security: Add EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 1/6] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 1/6] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [syzbot] [integrity?] [lsm?] KMSAN: uninit-value in ima_add_template_entry (2)
  • From: syzbot <syzbot+91ae49e1c1a2634d20c0@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 1/6] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
  • From: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 1/6] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
  • From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 2/6] security: Add EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits
  • From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/3] ima: Ensure lock is held when setting iint pointer in inode security blob
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 6/6] samples/check-exec: Add an enlighten "inc" interpreter and 28 tests
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 4/6] selftests/landlock: Add tests for execveat + AT_CHECK
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 3/6] selftests/exec: Add 32 tests for AT_CHECK and exec securebits
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 5/6] samples/check-exec: Add set-exec
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 2/6] security: Add EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 1/6] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 0/6] Script execution control (was O_MAYEXEC)
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] ima: Suspend PCR extends and log appends when rebooting
  • From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] ima: Suspend PCR extends and log appends when rebooting
  • From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/3] ima: Remove inode lock
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V3 1/2] char: tpm: cr50: Use generic request/relinquish locality ops
  • From: Grzegorz Bernacki <bernacki@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V3 2/2] char: tpm: cr50: Move i2c locking to request/relinquish locality ops
  • From: Grzegorz Bernacki <bernacki@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V3 0/2] char: tpm: Adjust cr50_i2c locking mechanism
  • From: Grzegorz Bernacki <bernacki@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] evm: stop avoidably reading i_writecount in evm_file_release
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH][next] integrity: Use static_assert() to check struct sizes
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [syzbot] [integrity?] [lsm?] possible deadlock in process_measurement (4)
  • From: syzbot <syzbot+1cd571a672400ef3a930@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 10/13] LSM: Create new security_cred_getlsmprop LSM hook
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 08/13] LSM: Use lsm_prop in security_inode_getsecid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 07/13] LSM: Use lsm_prop in security_current_getsecid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/3] ima: Remove inode lock
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/3] ima: Remove inode lock
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/3] ima: Remove inode lock
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/3] ima: Remove inode lock
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [syzbot] [integrity?] [lsm?] possible deadlock in process_measurement (4)
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Possible overflow of TPM log
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V2 2/2] char: tpm: cr50: Move i2c locking to request/relinquish locality ops
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V2 1/2] char: tpm: cr50: Use generic request/relinquish locality ops
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/3] ima: Remove inode lock
  • From: Shu Han <ebpqwerty472123@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/3] ima: Ensure lock is held when setting iint pointer in inode security blob
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/3] ima: Ensure lock is held when setting iint pointer in inode security blob
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/3] ima: Remove inode lock
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/3] ima: Remove inode lock
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] ima: Fix OOB read when violation occurs with ima template.
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Possible overflow of TPM log
  • From: Usama Arif <usamaarif642@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] ima: Fix OOB read when violation occurs with ima template.
  • From: David Fernandez Gonzalez <david.fernandez.gonzalez@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC] efi/tpm: add efi.tpm_log as a reserved region in 820_table_firmware
  • From: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC] efi/tpm: add efi.tpm_log as a reserved region in 820_table_firmware
  • From: Breno Leitao <leitao@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V2 2/2] char: tpm: cr50: Move i2c locking to request/relinquish locality ops
  • From: Grzegorz Bernacki <bernacki@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V2 1/2] char: tpm: cr50: Use generic request/relinquish locality ops
  • From: Grzegorz Bernacki <bernacki@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V2 0/2] char: tpm: Adjust cr50_i2c locking mechanism
  • From: Grzegorz Bernacki <bernacki@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC] efi/tpm: add efi.tpm_log as a reserved region in 820_table_firmware
  • From: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@xxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/3] ima: Mark concurrent accesses to the iint pointer in the inode security blob
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/3] ima: Remove inode lock
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/3] ima: Ensure lock is held when setting iint pointer in inode security blob
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 1/5] tpm: Return on tpm2_create_null_primary() failure
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/3] char: tpm: cr50: Use generic request/relinquish locality ops
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] hwrng: core - Add WARN_ON for buggy read return values
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] tpm_tis_spi: Pass in ACPI handle during init
  • From: Jamie Nguyen <jamien@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [syzbot] [integrity?] [lsm?] possible deadlock in process_measurement (4)
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [syzbot] [integrity?] [lsm?] possible deadlock in process_measurement (4)
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [syzbot] [integrity?] [lsm?] possible deadlock in process_measurement (4)
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [syzbot] [integrity?] [lsm?] possible deadlock in process_measurement (4)
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH] tpm: Workaround failed command reception on Infineon devices
  • From: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH] tpm: Workaround failed command reception on Infineon devices
  • From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH] tpm: Workaround failed command reception on Infineon devices
  • From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 2/5] tpm: Implement tpm2_load_null() rollback
  • From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 1/5] tpm: Return on tpm2_create_null_primary() failure
  • From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [syzbot] [integrity?] [lsm?] possible deadlock in process_measurement (4)
  • From: Shu Han <ebpqwerty472123@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [syzbot] [integrity?] [lsm?] possible deadlock in process_measurement (4)
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Problems with TPM timeouts
  • From: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: Problems with TPM timeouts
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Problems with TPM timeouts
  • From: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@xxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH] tpm: Workaround failed command reception on Infineon devices
  • From: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [syzbot] [integrity?] [lsm?] KMSAN: uninit-value in ima_add_template_entry (2)
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [syzbot] [integrity?] [lsm?] KMSAN: uninit-value in ima_add_template_entry (2)
  • From: syzbot <syzbot+91ae49e1c1a2634d20c0@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: TPM HMAC (really) bad performance
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [no subject]
  • From: Unknown
• Re: TPM HMAC (really) bad performance
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: TPM HMAC (really) bad performance
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: TPM HMAC (really) bad performance
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: TPM HMAC (really) bad performance
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/3] char: tpm: cr50: Use generic request/relinquish locality ops
  • From: bernacki@xxxxxxxxxxxx
• Re: [syzbot] [integrity?] [lsm?] possible deadlock in process_measurement (4)
  • From: Shu Han <ebpqwerty472123@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [syzbot] [integrity?] [lsm?] possible deadlock in process_measurement (4)
  • From: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [syzbot] [integrity?] [lsm?] possible deadlock in process_measurement (4)
  • From: syzbot <syzbot+1cd571a672400ef3a930@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: TPM HMAC (really) bad performance
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: TPM HMAC (really) bad performance
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] dm verity: fallback to platform keyring also if key in trusted keyring is rejected
  • From: Milan Broz <gmazyland@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] hwrng: core - Add WARN_ON for buggy read return values
  • From: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] dm verity: fallback to platform keyring also if key in trusted keyring is rejected
  • From: Luca Boccassi <luca.boccassi@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] dm verity: fallback to platform keyring also if key in trusted keyring is rejected
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] dm verity: fallback to platform keyring also if key in trusted keyring is rejected
  • From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] dm verity: fallback to platform keyring also if key in trusted keyring is rejected
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] dm verity: fallback to platform keyring also if key in trusted keyring is rejected
  • From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] dm verity: fallback to platform keyring also if key in trusted keyring is rejected
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] dm verity: fallback to platform keyring also if key in trusted keyring is rejected
  • From: Milan Broz <gmazyland@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 5/5] tpm: flush the auth session only when /dev/tpm0 is open
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] dm verity: fallback to platform keyring also if key in trusted keyring is rejected
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 5/5] tpm: flush the auth session only when /dev/tpm0 is open
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 5/5] tpm: flush the auth session only when /dev/tpm0 is open
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] dm verity: fallback to platform keyring also if key in trusted keyring is rejected
  • From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 5/5] tpm: flush the auth session only when /dev/tpm0 is open
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] dm verity: fallback to platform keyring also if key in trusted keyring is rejected
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 5/5] tpm: flush the auth session only when /dev/tpm0 is open
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 5/5] tpm: flush the auth session only when /dev/tpm0 is open
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] dm verity: fallback to platform keyring also if key in trusted keyring is rejected
  • From: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 4/5] tpm: Allocate chip->auth in tpm2_start_auth_session()
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 5/5] tpm: flush the auth session only when /dev/tpm0 is open
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] KEYS: keys-next-6.12-rc1
  • From: pr-tracker-bot@xxxxxxxxxx
• Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] hwrng: core - Add WARN_ON for buggy read return values
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 5/5] tpm: flush the auth session only when /dev/tpm0 is open
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 4/5] tpm: Allocate chip->auth in tpm2_start_auth_session()
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] hwrng: core - Add WARN_ON for buggy read return values
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] dm verity: fallback to platform keyring also if key in trusted keyring is rejected
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 5/5] tpm: flush the auth session only when /dev/tpm0 is open
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 4/5] tpm: Allocate chip->auth in tpm2_start_auth_session()
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] evm: stop avoidably reading i_writecount in evm_file_release
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] hwrng: core - Add WARN_ON for buggy read return values
  • From: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] hwrng: core - Add WARN_ON for buggy read return values
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] hwrng: core - Add WARN_ON for buggy read return values
  • From: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] hwrng: core - Add WARN_ON for buggy read return values
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] hwrng: core - Add WARN_ON for buggy read return values
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] dm verity: fallback to platform keyring also if key in trusted keyring is rejected
  • From: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] hwrng: core - Add WARN_ON for buggy read return values
  • From: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] hwrng: core - Add WARN_ON for buggy read return values
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] hwrng: core - Add WARN_ON for buggy read return values
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] hwrng: core - Add WARN_ON for buggy read return values
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] hwrng: core - Add WARN_ON for buggy read return values
  • From: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] evm: stop avoidably reading i_writecount in evm_file_release
  • From: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements
  • From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 5/5] tpm: flush the auth session only when /dev/tpm0 is open
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 4/5] tpm: Allocate chip->auth in tpm2_start_auth_session()
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 3/5] tpm: flush the null key only when /dev/tpm0 is accessed
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 2/5] tpm: Implement tpm2_load_null() rollback
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 1/5] tpm: Return on tpm2_create_null_primary() failure
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL] KEYS: keys-next-6.12-rc1
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] MAINTAINERS: Add Google Security Chip entry
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] TPM DEVICE DRIVER: tpmdd-next-6.12-rc1
  • From: pr-tracker-bot@xxxxxxxxxx
• [PATCH] MAINTAINERS: Add Google Security Chip entry
  • From: tzungbi@xxxxxxxxxx
• Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: Pengyu Ma <mapengyu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] TPM DEVICE DRIVER: tpmdd-next-6.12-rc1
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 0/7] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 5/5] tpm: flush the auth session only when /dev/tpm0 is open
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 4/5] tpm: Allocate chip->auth in tpm2_start_auth_session()
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 3/5] tpm: flush the null key only when /dev/tpm0 is accessed
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 2/5] tpm: Return on tpm2_create_primary() failure in tpm2_load_null()
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 1/5] tpm: Return on tpm2_create_null_primary() failure
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 0/5] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC] Proposal: Static SECCOMP Policies
  • From: Maxwell Bland <mbland@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 0/7] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: Pengyu Ma <mapengyu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC] Proposal: Static SECCOMP Policies
  • From: Maxwell Bland <mbland@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL] TPM DEVICE DRIVER: tpmdd-next-6.12-rc1
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 7/7] tpm: open code tpm2_create_null_primary()
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 6/7] tpm: flush the auth session only when /dev/tpm0 is open
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 5/7] tpm: Allocate chip->auth in tpm2_start_auth_session()
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 4/7] tpm: flush the null key only when /dev/tpm0 is accessed
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 3/7] tpm: Return on tpm2_create_primary() failure in tpm2_load_null()
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 2/7] tpm: Return on tpm2_create_null_primary() failure
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 1/7] tpm: Remove the top-level documentation tpm2-sessions.c
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 0/7] Lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 6/6] tpm: flush the auth session only when /dev/tpm0 is open
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 5/6] tpm: Allocate chip->auth in tpm2_start_auth_session()
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 4/6] tpm: flush the null key only when /dev/tpm0 is accessed
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 3/6] tpm: Return on tpm2_create_primary() failure in tpm2_load_null()
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 2/6] tpm: Return on tpm2_create_null_primary() failure
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 1/6] tpm: Remove documentation from the header of tpm2-sessions.c
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 0/6] lazy flush for the auth session
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 00/14] integrity: Introduce the Integrity Digest Cache
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/4] tpm: lazy flush for the session null key
  • From: Pengyu Ma <mapengyu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/4] tpm: lazy flush for the session null key
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/4] tpm: lazy flush for the session null key
  • From: Pengyu Ma <mapengyu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/4] tpm: lazy flush for the session null key
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4/4] tpm: flush the session null key only when required
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/4] tpm: address tpm2_create_primary() failure
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/4] tpm: address tpm2_create_null_primary() return value
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/4] tpm: remove file header documentation from tpm2-sessions.c
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 0/4] tpm: lazy flush for the session null key
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] tpm: remove file header documentation from tpm2-sessions.c
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] tpm: remove file header documentation from tpm2-sessions.c
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxx>
• [PATCH v11 02/20] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v11 00/20] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v11 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v11 19/20] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v11 18/20] tpm: Add sysfs interface to allow setting and querying the default locality
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v11 17/20] tpm: Add ability to set the default locality the TPM chip uses
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v11 16/20] tpm: Make locality requests return consistent values
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v11 15/20] tpm: Ensure tpm is in known state at startup
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v11 14/20] tpm: Protect against locality counter underflow
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v11 13/20] x86/reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v11 12/20] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v11 11/20] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v11 10/20] x86: Secure Launch kernel late boot stub
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v11 09/20] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v11 08/20] x86/boot: Place TXT MLE header in the kernel_info section
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v11 07/20] x86/msr: Add variable MTRR base/mask and x2apic ID registers
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v11 06/20] x86: Add early SHA-256 support for Secure Launch early measurements
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v11 05/20] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v11 04/20] x86: Secure Launch main header file
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v11 01/20] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v11 03/20] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: CFP for the containers and checkpoint-restore micro-conference at LPC 2024 mailing/containers
  • From: Enrico Bravi <enrico.bravi@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements
  • From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 05/14] PGPLIB: Signature parser
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 04/14] PGPLIB: Basic packet parser
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 03/14] PGPLIB: PGP definitions (RFC 9580)
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 02/14] rsa: add parser of raw format
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 01/14] mpi: Introduce mpi_key_length()
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: WARNING in process_measurement
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6] tpm: Add new device/vendor ID 0x50666666
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 14/14] KEYS: Introduce load_pgp_public_keyring()
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 13/14] KEYS: Provide a function to load keys from a PGP keyring blob
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 12/14] PGP: Provide a key type for testing PGP signatures
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 11/14] verification: introduce verify_pgp_signature()
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 10/14] KEYS: Calculate key digest and get signature of the key
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 09/14] KEYS: Retry asym key search with partial ID in restrict_link_by_signature()
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 08/14] KEYS: PGP-based public key signature verification
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 07/14] KEYS: Provide PGP key description autogeneration
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 06/14] KEYS: PGP data parser
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 05/14] PGPLIB: Signature parser
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 04/14] PGPLIB: Basic packet parser
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 03/14] PGPLIB: PGP definitions (RFC 9580)
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 02/14] rsa: add parser of raw format
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 01/14] mpi: Introduce mpi_key_length()
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Trusted keys: DCP: Unable to handle paging request
  • From: David Gstir <david@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] integrity: prevent deadlock during digsig verification.
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v6] tpm: Add new device/vendor ID 0x50666666
  • From: Jett Rink <jettrink@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 07/13] LSM: Use lsm_prop in security_current_getsecid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 10/13] LSM: Create new security_cred_getlsmprop LSM hook
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 08/13] LSM: Use lsm_prop in security_inode_getsecid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@xxxxxxxx>
• Trusted keys: DCP: Unable to handle paging request
  • From: Parthiban <parthiban@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: "Linux regression tracking (Thorsten Leemhuis)" <regressions@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [regression] significant delays when secureboot is enabled since 6.10
  • From: "Linux regression tracking (Thorsten Leemhuis)" <regressions@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH RFC 1/2] tpm: tpm_tis_spi: Ensure SPI mode 0
  • From: Stefan Wahren <wahrenst@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH RFC 1/2] tpm: tpm_tis_spi: Ensure SPI mode 0
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] tpm: Drop explicit initialization of struct i2c_device_id::driver_data to 0
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 RESEND] tpm: export tpm2_sessions_init() to fix ibmvtpm building
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 RESEND] tpm: export tpm2_sessions_init() to fix ibmvtpm building
  • From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] tpm: Drop explicit initialization of struct i2c_device_id::driver_data to 0
  • From: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH RFC 1/2] tpm: tpm_tis_spi: Ensure SPI mode 0
  • From: Stefan Wahren <wahrenst@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH RFC 2/2] tpm: tpm_tis: Provide error messages in tpm_tis_core_init
  • From: Stefan Wahren <wahrenst@xxxxxxx>
• Re: TPM HMAC (really) bad performance
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: TPM HMAC (really) bad performance
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC][PATCH v3 01/10] ima: Introduce hook DIGEST_LIST_CHECK
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• TPM HMAC (really) bad performance
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC][PATCH v3 04/10] ima: Add digest_cache_measure/appraise boot-time built-in policies
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC][PATCH v3 01/10] ima: Introduce hook DIGEST_LIST_CHECK
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH RFC 2/2] tpm: tpm_tis: Provide error messages in tpm_tis_core_init
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH RFC 1/2] tpm: tpm_tis_spi: Ensure SPI mode 0
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC][PATCH v3 04/10] ima: Add digest_cache_measure/appraise boot-time built-in policies
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC][PATCH v3 01/10] ima: Introduce hook DIGEST_LIST_CHECK
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 01/14] lib: Add TLV parser
  • From: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 01/14] lib: Add TLV parser
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 01/14] lib: Add TLV parser
  • From: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 01/14] lib: Add TLV parser
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH RFC 1/2] tpm: tpm_tis_spi: Ensure SPI mode 0
  • From: Stefan Wahren <wahrenst@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH RFC 0/2] tpm: Minor improvements
  • From: Stefan Wahren <wahrenst@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH RFC 2/2] tpm: tpm_tis: Provide error messages in tpm_tis_core_init
  • From: Stefan Wahren <wahrenst@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 01/14] lib: Add TLV parser
  • From: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 13/14] selftests/digest_cache: Add selftests for the Integrity Digest Cache
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 13/14] selftests/digest_cache: Add selftests for the Integrity Digest Cache
  • From: Jeff Johnson <quic_jjohnson@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC][PATCH v3 10/10] ima: Use digest caches for appraisal
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC][PATCH v3 09/10] ima: Use digest caches for measurement
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC][PATCH v3 08/10] ima: Load verified usage from digest cache found from query
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC][PATCH v3 07/10] ima: Store verified usage in digest cache based on integrity metadata flags
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC][PATCH v3 06/10] ima: Retrieve digest cache and check if changed
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC][PATCH v3 05/10] ima: Modify existing boot-time built-in policies with digest cache policies
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC][PATCH v3 04/10] ima: Add digest_cache_measure/appraise boot-time built-in policies
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC][PATCH v3 03/10] ima: Add digest_cache policy keyword
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC][PATCH v3 02/10] ima: Nest iint mutex for DIGEST_LIST_CHECK hook
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC][PATCH v3 01/10] ima: Introduce hook DIGEST_LIST_CHECK
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC][PATCH v3 00/10] ima: Integrate with Integrity Digest Cache
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 02/14] integrity: Introduce the Integrity Digest Cache
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 14/14] docs: Add documentation of the Integrity Digest Cache
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 13/14] selftests/digest_cache: Add selftests for the Integrity Digest Cache
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 12/14] digest_cache: Reset digest cache on file/directory change
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 11/14] digest cache: Prefetch digest lists if requested
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 10/14] digest_cache: Add support for directories
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 09/14] digest_cache: Add management of verification data
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 08/14] digest_cache: Parse rpm digest lists
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 07/14] digest_cache: Parse tlv digest lists
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 06/14] digest_cache: Populate the digest cache from a digest list
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 04/14] digest_cache: Add securityfs interface
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 05/14] digest_cache: Add hash tables and operations
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 03/14] digest_cache: Initialize digest caches
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 01/14] lib: Add TLV parser
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 00/14] integrity: Introduce the Integrity Digest Cache
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 RESEND] tpm: export tpm2_sessions_init() to fix ibmvtpm building
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 RESEND] tpm: export tpm2_sessions_init() to fix ibmvtpm building
  • From: Kexy Biscuit <kexybiscuit@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] fs: don't block i_writecount during exec
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: WARNING in process_measurement
  • From: Xingyu Li <xli399@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements
  • From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] fs: don't block i_writecount during exec
  • From: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: WARNING in process_measurement
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 10/13] LSM: Create new security_cred_getlsmblob LSM hook
  • From: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 10/13] LSM: Create new security_cred_getlsmblob LSM hook
  • From: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 10/13] LSM: Create new security_cred_getlsmblob LSM hook
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 07/13] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_current_getsecid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 08/13] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: WARNING in process_measurement
  • From: Xingyu Li <xli399@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v10 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch
  • From: ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx
• Re: [PATCH v8 01/15] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset
  • From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v10 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch
  • From: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v10 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: WARNING in process_measurement
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: WARNING in process_measurement
  • From: Xingyu Li <xli399@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements
  • From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements
  • From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v10 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch
  • From: ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx
• Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements
  • From: ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx
• Re: [PATCH v8 01/15] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v10 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v10 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch
  • From: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/2] selftests: tpm2: test_smoke: Run only when TPM2 is avaialable.
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/2] MAINTAINERS: Add selftest files to TPM section
  • From: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/2] selftests: tpm2: test_smoke: Run only when TPM2 is avaialable.
  • From: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] TPM DEVICE DRIVER: tpmdd-next-6.11-rc6
  • From: pr-tracker-bot@xxxxxxxxxx
• Re: [PATCH v10 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch
  • From: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL] TPM DEVICE DRIVER: tpmdd-next-6.11-rc6
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements
  • From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v10 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch
  • From: ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx
• Re: [PATCH v5] tpm: Add new device/vendor ID 0x50666666
  • From: Jett Rink <jettrink@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v10 08/20] x86/boot: Place TXT MLE header in the kernel_info section
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v10 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 10/13] LSM: Create new security_cred_getlsmblob LSM hook
  • From: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 04/20] x86: Secure Launch main header file
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 00/20] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 19/20] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 18/20] tpm: Add sysfs interface to allow setting and querying the default locality
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 17/20] tpm: Add ability to set the default locality the TPM chip uses
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 16/20] tpm: Make locality requests return consistent values
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 15/20] tpm: Ensure tpm is in known state at startup
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 14/20] tpm: Protect against locality counter underflow
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 13/20] x86/reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 12/20] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 09/20] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 11/20] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 10/20] x86: Secure Launch kernel late boot stub
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 08/20] x86/boot: Place TXT MLE header in the kernel_info section
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 01/20] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 07/20] x86/msr: Add variable MTRR base/mask and x2apic ID registers
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 06/20] x86: Add early SHA-256 support for Secure Launch early measurements
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 05/20] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 03/20] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v10 02/20] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig
  • From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 07/13] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_current_getsecid
  • From: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
• TPM selftests require TPM2 but do not check for the requirement
  • From: Michal Suchánek <msuchanek@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 10/13] LSM: Create new security_cred_getlsmblob LSM hook
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 08/13] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 07/13] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_current_getsecid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• WARNING in process_measurement
  • From: Xingyu Li <xli399@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements
  • From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/4] tsm: Runtime measurement registers ABI
  • From: Qinkun Bao <qinkun@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/4] tsm: Runtime measurement registers ABI
  • From: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/20] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE)
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/4] tsm: Runtime measurement registers ABI
  • From: Qinkun Bao <qinkun@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 12/20] dm verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements
  • From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 02/14] rsa: add parser of raw format
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 01/14] mpi: Introduce mpi_key_length()
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 12/20] dm verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs
  • From: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 04/14] PGPLIB: Basic packet parser
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 04/14] PGPLIB: Basic packet parser
  • From: Jeff Johnson <quic_jjohnson@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 06/14] KEYS: PGP data parser
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 12/14] PGP: Provide a key type for testing PGP signatures
  • From: Jeff Johnson <quic_jjohnson@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 06/14] KEYS: PGP data parser
  • From: Jeff Johnson <quic_jjohnson@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 12/20] dm verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 14/14] KEYS: Introduce load_pgp_public_keyring()
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 13/14] KEYS: Provide a function to load keys from a PGP keyring blob
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 12/14] PGP: Provide a key type for testing PGP signatures
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 11/14] verification: introduce verify_pgp_signature()
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 10/14] KEYS: Calculate key digest and get signature of the key
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 08/14] KEYS: PGP-based public key signature verification
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 09/14] KEYS: Retry asym key search with partial ID in restrict_link_by_signature()
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 07/14] KEYS: Provide PGP key description autogeneration
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 06/14] KEYS: PGP data parser
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 05/14] PGPLIB: Signature parser
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 04/14] PGPLIB: Basic packet parser
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 03/14] PGPLIB: PGP definitions (RFC 4880)
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 01/14] mpi: Introduce mpi_key_length()
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 02/14] rsa: add parser of raw format
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 00/14] KEYS: Add support for PGP keys and signatures
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 12/20] dm verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs
  • From: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements
  • From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] KEYS-TRUSTED: keys-trusted-next-6.11-rc4
  • From: pr-tracker-bot@xxxxxxxxxx
• Re: [PATCH v2] tpm: Clean up TPM space after command failure
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 12/20] dm verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs
  • From: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC] integrity: wait for completion of i2c initialization using late_initcall_sync()
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH][next] integrity: Use static_assert() to check struct sizes
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2] tpm: Clean up TPM space after command failure
  • From: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] evm: stop avoidably reading i_writecount in evm_file_release
  • From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL] KEYS-TRUSTED: keys-trusted-next-6.11-rc4
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements
  • From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 14/19] tpm: Ensure tpm is in known state at startup
  • From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 12/20] dm verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 02/20] ipe: add policy parser
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements
  • From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 13/19] tpm: Protect against locality counter underflow
  • From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC] [PATCH] tpm: Clean up TPM space after command failure
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 09/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel late boot stub
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 06/19] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements
  • From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 02/20] ipe: add policy parser
  • From: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC] [PATCH] tpm: Clean up TPM space after command failure
  • From: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 02/20] ipe: add policy parser
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 02/20] ipe: add policy parser
  • From: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v9 09/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel late boot stub
  • From: ross.philipson@xxxxxxxxxx
• Re: [ima-evm-utils PATCH] Add copies of the license text
  • From: Petr Vorel <pvorel@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 03/20] ipe: add evaluation loop
  • From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 02/20] ipe: add policy parser
  • From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
  • From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] ima: fix buffer overrun in ima_eventdigest_init_common
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 12/20] dm verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs
  • From: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH][next] integrity: Use static_assert() to check struct sizes
  • From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [ima-evm-utils PATCH] Add copies of the license text
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 20/20] MAINTAINERS: ipe: add ipe maintainer information
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 20/20] MAINTAINERS: ipe: add ipe maintainer information
  • From: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2] ima: fix buffer overrun in ima_eventdigest_init_common
  • From: Samasth Norway Ananda <samasth.norway.ananda@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 20/20] MAINTAINERS: ipe: add ipe maintainer information
  • From: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC] integrity: wait for completion of i2c initialization using late_initcall_sync()
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/20] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE)
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 20/20] MAINTAINERS: ipe: add ipe maintainer information
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5] tpm: Add new device/vendor ID 0x50666666
  • From: Jett Rink <jettrink@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] evm: stop avoidably reading i_writecount in evm_file_release
  • From: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 15/20] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs
  • From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
  • From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [openssl-tpm2-engine] [PATCH v2 1/8] tss: Fix handling of TPM_RH_NULL in intel-tss
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [openssl-tpm2-engine] [PATCH v2 1/8] tss: Fix handling of TPM_RH_NULL in intel-tss
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 1/8] tss: Fix handling of TPM_RH_NULL in intel-tss
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [openssl-tpm2-engine] [PATCH v2 1/8] tss: Fix handling of TPM_RH_NULL in intel-tss
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 1/8] tss: Fix handling of TPM_RH_NULL in intel-tss
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/8] tss: Fix handling of TPM_RH_NULL in intel-tss
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/8] tss: Fix handling of TPM_RH_NULL in intel-tss
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/8] tss: Fix handling of TPM_RH_NULL in intel-tss
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/8] tss: Fix handling of TPM_RH_NULL in intel-tss
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4] tpm: Add new device/vendor ID 0x50666666
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/8] libcommon: add bin2hex and tmp2_get_hexname
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/8] tss: Fix handling of TPM_RH_NULL in intel-tss
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 20/20] MAINTAINERS: ipe: add ipe maintainer information
  • From: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 01/20] security: add ipe lsm
  • From: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 00/20] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE)
  • From: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 04/20] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read
  • From: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 02/20] ipe: add policy parser
  • From: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 03/20] ipe: add evaluation loop
  • From: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 19/20] Documentation: add ipe documentation
  • From: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 17/20] scripts: add boot policy generation program
  • From: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 12/20] dm verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs
  • From: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 13/20] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider
  • From: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 10/20] ipe: add permissive toggle
  • From: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 18/20] ipe: kunit test for parser
  • From: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 11/20] block|lsm: Add LSM blob and new LSM hooks for block devices
  • From: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 20/20] MAINTAINERS: ipe: add ipe maintainer information
  • From: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 16/20] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider
  • From: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 15/20] fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs
  • From: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 09/20] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support
  • From: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 14/20] security: add security_inode_setintegrity() hook
  • From: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 08/20] ipe: add userspace interface
  • From: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 07/20] security: add new securityfs delete function
  • From: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 06/20] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider
  • From: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 05/20] initramfs|security: Add a security hook to do_populate_rootfs()
  • From: Fan Wu <wufan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4] tpm: Add new device/vendor ID 0x50666666
  • From: Jett Rink <jettrink@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3] tpm: Add new device/vendor ID 0x50666666
  • From: Jett Rink <jettrink@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 8/8] tests: add tests for attest_tpm2_primary
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 7/8] attest_tpm2_primary: add man page
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 6/8] tools: add new attest_tpm2_primary command
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 5/8] tss: add tpm2_Certify, tpm2_ActivateCredential and tpm2_PolicyOR
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4/8] libcommon: add primary creation from template
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/8] libcommon: add bin2hex and tmp2_get_hexname
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/8] libcommon: add ability to create a signing primary key
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/8] tss: Fix handling of TPM_RH_NULL in intel-tss
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 0/8] openssl_tpm2_engine: Add attestation functions for primary keys
  • From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] tpm: Add new device/vendor ID 0x50666666
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] tpm: Add new device/vendor ID 0x50666666
  • From: Jett Rink <jettrink@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC] integrity: wait for completion of i2c initialization using late_initcall_sync()
  • From: Romain Naour <romain.naour@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] Refactor return value of two lsm hooks
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2] tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support
  • From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] Refactor return value of two lsm hooks
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] Refactor return value of two lsm hooks
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v1 2/2] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_copy_up_xattr
  • From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v1 1/2] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook vm_enough_memory
  • From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v1 0/2] Refactor return value of two lsm hooks
  • From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 9/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook key_getsecurity
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 9/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook key_getsecurity
  • From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 9/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook key_getsecurity
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v12 02/10] crypto: Add support for ECDSA signature verification
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v12 02/10] crypto: Add support for ECDSA signature verification
  • From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
  • From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 7/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook setprocattr
  • From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 10/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook audit_rule_match
  • From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 9/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook key_getsecurity
  • From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 8/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook getprocattr
  • From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 6/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook getselfattr
  • From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 5/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_copy_up_xattr
  • From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 4/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_listsecurity
  • From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 3/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_getsecurity
  • From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 2/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_need_killpriv
  • From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] TPM DEVICE DRIVER: tpmdd-next-6.11-rc1-roundtwo
  • From: pr-tracker-bot@xxxxxxxxxx
• Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
  • From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
  • From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
  • From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
  • From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/6] tpm: add policy sessions
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/6] tpm: add policy sessions
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH bpf-next v4 00/20] Add return value range check for BPF LSM
  • From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH bpf-next v4 00/20] Add return value range check for BPF LSM
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 10/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook audit_rule_match
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 9/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook key_getsecurity
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 8/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook getprocattr
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 7/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook setprocattr
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 6/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook getselfattr
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 5/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_copy_up_xattr
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 4/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_listsecurity
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 2/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_need_killpriv
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 3/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook inode_getsecurity
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 1/20] lsm: Refactor return value of LSM hook vm_enough_memory
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>