Kernel Hardening
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- Re: [PATCH RFC 0/9] PKS write protected page tables
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH RFC 5/9] x86, mm: Use cache of page tables
- From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH RFC 3/9] x86/mm/cpa: Add grouped page allocations
- From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH RFC 5/9] x86, mm: Use cache of page tables
- From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH RFC 3/9] x86/mm/cpa: Add grouped page allocations
- From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH RFC 0/9] PKS write protected page tables
- From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH RFC 0/9] PKS write protected page tables
- From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH RFC 5/9] x86, mm: Use cache of page tables
- From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH RFC 0/9] PKS write protected page tables
- From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH RFC 0/9] PKS write protected page tables
- From: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH RFC 0/9] PKS write protected page tables
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH RFC 7/9] x86/mm/cpa: Add perm callbacks to grouped pages
- From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH RFC 8/9] x86, mm: Protect page tables with PKS
- From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH RFC 9/9] x86, cpa: PKS protect direct map page tables
- From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH RFC 5/9] x86, mm: Use cache of page tables
- From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH RFC 2/9] list: Support list head not in object for list_lru
- From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH RFC 0/9] PKS write protected page tables
- From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH RFC 3/9] x86/mm/cpa: Add grouped page allocations
- From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH RFC 6/9] x86/mm/cpa: Add set_memory_pks()
- From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH RFC 4/9] mm: Explicitly zero page table lock ptr
- From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH RFC 1/9] list: Support getting most recent element in list_lru
- From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] ucounts: Silence warning in dec_rlimit_ucounts
- From: ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx (Eric W. Biederman)
- Re: [PATCH v11 4/9] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts
- From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: 08ed4efad6: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -41.9% regression
- From: Alexey Gladkov <legion@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: 08ed4efad6: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -41.9% regression
- From: Oliver Sang <oliver.sang@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v34 00/13] Landlock LSM
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: 08ed4efad6: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -41.9% regression
- From: Alexey Gladkov <legion@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: 08ed4efad6: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -41.9% regression
- From: Oliver Sang <oliver.sang@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v34 00/13] Landlock LSM
- From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v34 08/13] landlock: Add syscall implementations
- From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v34 13/13] landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v34 12/13] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v34 11/13] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v34 10/13] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v34 09/13] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v34 08/13] landlock: Add syscall implementations
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v34 07/13] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v34 06/13] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v34 05/13] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v34 04/13] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v34 03/13] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v34 02/13] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v34 01/13] landlock: Add object management
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v34 00/13] Landlock LSM
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v11 9/9] ucounts: Set ucount_max to the largest positive value the type can hold
- [PATCH v11 8/9] kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces
- [PATCH v11 7/9] Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts
- [PATCH v11 6/9] Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts
- [PATCH v11 5/9] Reimplement RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE on top of ucounts
- [PATCH v11 4/9] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts
- [PATCH v11 3/9] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting
- [PATCH v11 2/9] Add a reference to ucounts for each cred
- [PATCH v11 0/9] Count rlimits in each user namespace
- [PATCH v11 1/9] Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t
- Re: 08ed4efad6: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -41.9% regression
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Notify special task kill using wait* functions
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- Re: Notify special task kill using wait* functions
- From: "Valdis Klētnieks" <valdis.kletnieks@xxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v12 0/3] Add trusted_for(2) (was O_MAYEXEC)
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v12 0/3] Add trusted_for(2) (was O_MAYEXEC)
- From: bauen1 <j2468h@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Notify special task kill using wait* functions
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v33 00/12] Landlock LSM
- From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Notify special task kill using wait* functions
- From: Andi Kleen <ak@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Notify special task kill using wait* functions
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v33 00/12] Landlock LSM
- From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v33 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: 08ed4efad6: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -41.9% regression
- From: ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx (Eric W. Biederman)
- Re: 08ed4efad6: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -41.9% regression
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: 08ed4efad6: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -41.9% regression
- From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- 08ed4efad6: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -41.9% regression
- From: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Notify special task kill using wait* functions
- From: Andi Kleen <ak@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v10 7/9] Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts
- From: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v10 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
- From: Will Deacon <will@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v10 5/6] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
- From: Will Deacon <will@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Notify special task kill using wait* functions
- From: "Valdis Klētnieks" <valdis.kletnieks@xxxxxx>
- Re: Notify special task kill using wait* functions
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 9/9] ucounts: Set ucount_max to the largest positive value the type can hold
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 8/9] kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 7/9] Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 6/9] Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 5/9] Reimplement RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE on top of ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 4/9] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 3/9] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 2/9] Add a reference to ucounts for each cred
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 1/9] Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 0/9] Count rlimits in each user namespace
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 4/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts
- From: ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx (Eric W. Biederman)
- [PATCH v33 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v33 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v33 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v33 09/12] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v33 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v33 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v33 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v33 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v33 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v33 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v33 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v33 01/12] landlock: Add object management
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v33 00/12] Landlock LSM
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 4/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 0/8] Count rlimits in each user namespace
- From: ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx (Eric W. Biederman)
- Re: [PATCH v9 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting
- From: ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx (Eric W. Biederman)
- Re: [PATCH v9 6/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts
- From: ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx (Eric W. Biederman)
- Re: [PATCH v9 4/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts
- From: ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx (Eric W. Biederman)
- [PATCH v8 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
- From: Roy Yang <royyang@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 6/6] lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 5/6] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 2/6] init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 1/6] jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v10 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
- From: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v32 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v32 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v32 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v32 09/12] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v32 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v32 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v32 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v32 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v32 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v32 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v32 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v32 01/12] landlock: Add object management
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v32 00/12] Landlock LSM
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Where we are for this patch?
- From: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH] Where we are for this patch?
- From: Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH] Where we are for this patch?
- From: Roy Yang <royyang@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v31 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
- From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- RE: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
- From: David Laight <David.Laight@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
- From: Will Deacon <will@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 5/6] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
- From: Will Deacon <will@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
- From: Will Deacon <will@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v31 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
- From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 5/6] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 6/6] lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 1/6] jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 2/6] init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v31 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v31 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
- From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
- From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: two potential randstruct improvements
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 5/6] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 6/6] lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 2/6] init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 1/6] jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: two potential randstruct improvements
- From: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@xxxxxxxxxx>
- two potential randstruct improvements
- From: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
- From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
- From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Askar Safin <safinaskar@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v31 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v31 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
- From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v31 01/12] landlock: Add object management
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v31 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v31 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v31 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v31 09/12] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v31 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v31 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v31 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v31 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v31 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v31 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v31 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v31 01/12] landlock: Add object management
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v31 00/12] Landlock LSM
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 7/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 8/8] kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 5/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE on top of ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 6/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 4/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 2/8] Add a reference to ucounts for each cred
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 1/8] Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 0/8] Count rlimits in each user namespace
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
- From: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 3/8] securtiy/brute: Detect a brute force attack
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM
- From: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 3/8] securtiy/brute: Detect a brute force attack
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 3/8] securtiy/brute: Detect a brute force attack
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 5/8] security/brute: Mitigate a brute force attack
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 4/8] security/brute: Fine tuning the attack detection
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 2/8] security/brute: Define a LSM and manage statistical data
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 3/8] securtiy/brute: Detect a brute force attack
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 6/8] selftests/brute: Add tests for the Brute LSM
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 5/8] security/brute: Mitigate a brute force attack
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 4/8] security/brute: Fine tuning the attack detection
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 3/8] securtiy/brute: Detect a brute force attack
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 2/8] security/brute: Define a LSM and manage statistical data
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v7 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
- From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Fine-grained Forward CFI on top of Intel CET / IBT
- From: Joao Moreira <joao@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Fine-grained Forward CFI on top of Intel CET / IBT
- From: Joao Moreira <joao@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 6/6] lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 5/6] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 1/6] jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 2/6] init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 01/12] landlock: Add object management
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 01/12] landlock: Add object management
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 00/12] Landlock LSM
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 00/12] Landlock LSM
- From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Fine-grained Forward CFI on top of Intel CET / IBT
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 2/6] init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches
- From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 6/8] selftests/brute: Add tests for the Brute LSM
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 5/8] security/brute: Mitigate a brute force attack
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 4/8] security/brute: Fine tuning the attack detection
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 3/8] securtiy/brute: Detect a brute force attack
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 2/8] security/brute: Define a LSM and manage statistical data
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 1/8] security: Add LSM hook at the point where a task gets a fatal signal
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v30 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v30 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v30 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v30 09/12] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v30 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v30 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v30 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v30 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v30 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v30 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v30 01/12] landlock: Add object management
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v30 00/12] Landlock LSM
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 0/1] Unprivileged chroot
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting
- From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v4 0/1] Unprivileged chroot
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting
- From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 2/6] init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 6/6] lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 5/6] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 2/6] init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 1/6] jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 1/7] mm: Restore init_on_* static branch defaults
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 5/8] security/brute: Mitigate a brute force attack
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 5/8] security/brute: Mitigate a brute force attack
- From: peter enderborg <peter.enderborg@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM
- From: Andi Kleen <ak@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM
- From: Andi Kleen <ak@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v3 0/1] Unprivileged chroot
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 0/1] Unprivileged chroot
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- RE: [PATCH v2 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: David Laight <David.Laight@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 1/7] mm: Restore init_on_* static branch defaults
- From: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting
- From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 3/7] init_on_alloc: Unpessimize default-on builds
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 0/1] Unprivileged chroot
- From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx (Eric W. Biederman)
- [PATCH v2 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v2 0/1] Unprivileged chroot
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 0/1] Unprivileged chroot
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 0/1] Unprivileged chroot
- From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx (Eric W. Biederman)
- [PATCH v1 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v1 0/1] Unprivileged chroot
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 3/7] init_on_alloc: Unpessimize default-on builds
- From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 8/8] kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 7/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 6/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 5/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE on top of ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 4/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 2/8] Add a reference to ucounts for each cred
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 1/8] Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v8 0/8] Count rlimits in each user namespace
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 4/7] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 7/7] lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 0/7] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 6/7] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 5/7] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 2/7] jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 3/7] init_on_alloc: Unpessimize default-on builds
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 1/7] mm: Restore init_on_* static branch defaults
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM
- From: Andi Kleen <ak@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM
- From: Andi Kleen <ak@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM
- From: Andi Kleen <ak@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 8/8] MAINTAINERS: Add a new entry for the Brute LSM
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 6/8] selftests/brute: Add tests for the Brute LSM
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 5/8] security/brute: Mitigate a brute force attack
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 4/8] security/brute: Fine tuning the attack detection
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 3/8] securtiy/brute: Detect a brute force attack
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 2/8] security/brute: Define a LSM and manage statistical data
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 1/8] security: Add LSM hook at the point where a task gets a fatal signal
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 0/8] Fork brute force attack mitigation
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- Re: d28296d248: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -82.7% regression
- From: ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx (Eric W. Biederman)
- Re: [PATCH 02/20] crypto: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 02/20] crypto: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [security/brute] cfe92ab6a3: WARNING:inconsistent_lock_state
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 06/20] ima: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 07/20] SUNRPC: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- [security/brute] cfe92ab6a3: WARNING:inconsistent_lock_state
- From: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 07/20] SUNRPC: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@xxxxxxxxxx>
- e1e57d56fe: stress-ng.access.ops_per_sec -41.6% regression
- From: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@xxxxxxxxx>
- 5b5c35b757: BUG:KASAN:use-after-free_in_dec_rlimit_ucounts
- From: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM
- From: Andi Kleen <ak@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 19/20] usbip: usbip_host: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 11/20] hwmon: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Joe Perches <joe@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 19/20] usbip: usbip_host: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Sergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtylyov@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v4 0/8] Fork brute force attack mitigation
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v5 0/8] Fork brute force attack mitigation
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 8/8] MAINTAINERS: Add a new entry for the Brute LSM
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 6/8] selftests/brute: Add tests for the Brute LSM
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 5/8] security/brute: Mitigate a brute force attack
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 4/8] security/brute: Fine tuning the attack detection
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 3/8] securtiy/brute: Detect a brute force attack
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 2/8] security/brute: Define a LSM and manage statistical data
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 1/8] security: Add LSM hook at the point where a task gets a fatal signal
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 0/8] Fork brute force attack mitigation
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v4 0/8] Fork brute force attack mitigation
- From: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 17/20] vt: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 17/20] vt: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: d28296d248: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -82.7% regression
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v29 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v29 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v29 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v29 09/12] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v29 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v29 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v29 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v29 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v29 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v29 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v29 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v29 01/12] landlock: Add object management
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v29 00/12] Landlock LSM
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Kernel Config to make randomize_va_space read-only.
- From: Greg KH <greg@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v1 1/1] Kernel Config to make randomize_va_space read-only.
- From: "Lan Zheng (lanzheng)" <lanzheng@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 16/20] tracing/probe: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 01/16] tracing: move function tracer options to Kconfig (causing parisc build failures)
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 01/16] tracing: move function tracer options to Kconfig (causing parisc build failures)
- From: Guenter Roeck <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 01/16] tracing: move function tracer options to Kconfig (causing parisc build failures)
- From: Guenter Roeck <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 01/16] tracing: move function tracer options to Kconfig (causing parisc build failures)
- From: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 01/16] tracing: move function tracer options to Kconfig (causing parisc build failures)
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 01/16] tracing: move function tracer options to Kconfig (causing parisc build failures)
- From: Guenter Roeck <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: d28296d248: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -82.7% regression
- From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: d28296d248: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -82.7% regression
- From: ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx (Eric W. Biederman)
- Re: d28296d248: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -82.7% regression
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: d28296d248: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -82.7% regression
- From: ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx (Eric W. Biederman)
- Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Kernel Config to make randomize_va_space read-only.
- From: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- d28296d248: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -82.7% regression
- From: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v1 1/1] Kernel Config to make randomize_va_space read-only.
- From: "Lan Zheng (lanzheng)" <lanzheng@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 01/20] cgroup: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 01/20] cgroup: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@xxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 11/20] hwmon: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 00/20] Manual replacement of all strlcpy in favor of strscpy
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 0/7] Count rlimits in each user namespace
- From: ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx (Eric W. Biederman)
- Re: [PATCH 03/20] devlink: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 14/20] target: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 16/20] tracing/probe: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 00/20] Manual replacement of all strlcpy in favor of strscpy
- From: Shuah Khan <skhan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 19/20] usbip: usbip_host: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Shuah Khan <skhan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 13/20] scsi: zfcp: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Benjamin Block <bblock@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 14/20] target: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Bodo Stroesser <bostroesser@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 20/20] s390/watchdog: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Guenter Roeck <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 11/20] hwmon: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Guenter Roeck <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 15/20] ALSA: usb-audio: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@xxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 20/20] s390/watchdog: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 19/20] usbip: usbip_host: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 18/20] usb: gadget: f_midi: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 17/20] vt: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 16/20] tracing/probe: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 15/20] ALSA: usb-audio: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 14/20] target: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 13/20] scsi: zfcp: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 12/20] s390/hmcdrv: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 11/20] hwmon: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 10/20] module: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 09/20] m68k/atari: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 08/20] kernfs: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 07/20] SUNRPC: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 06/20] ima: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 05/20] kobject: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 04/20] dma-buf: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 03/20] devlink: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 02/20] crypto: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 01/20] cgroup: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 00/20] Manual replacement of all strlcpy in favor of strscpy
- From: Romain Perier <romain.perier@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 3/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts
- From: Jens Axboe <axboe@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 0/7] Count rlimits in each user namespace
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 3/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 7/7] kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 6/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 5/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 4/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE on top of ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 3/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 2/7] Add a reference to ucounts for each cred
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 1/7] Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 0/7] Count rlimits in each user namespace
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 3/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts
- From: Jens Axboe <axboe@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 0/7] Count rlimits in each user namespace
- From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v28 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
- f009495a8d: BUG:KASAN:use-after-free_in_user_shm_unlock
- From: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 05/16] kbuild: lto: merge module sections
- From: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v7 6/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 6/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts
- From: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 6/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts
- From: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 6/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 7/7] kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 5/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 4/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE on top of ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 3/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 2/7] Add a reference to ucounts for each cred
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 1/7] Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v6 0/7] Count rlimits in each user namespace
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- Fine-grained Forward CFI on top of Intel CET / IBT
- From: Joao Moreira <joao@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v28 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v28 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [ANNOUNCE][CFP] Linux Security Summit 2021
- From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v28 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
- From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] arm64/acpi: disallow writeable AML opregion mapping for EFI code regions
- From: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] arm64/acpi: disallow writeable AML opregion mapping for EFI code regions
- From: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] arm64/acpi: disallow writeable AML opregion mapping for EFI code regions
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] arm64/acpi: disallow writeable AML opregion mapping for EFI code regions
- From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Joining the general Linux kernel hardening mailing list
- From: Guy L <guylevanon1@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v28 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
- From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v28 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
- From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v28 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v28 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
- From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v28 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
- From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v28 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
- From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
- c632dadc10: BUG:KASAN:null-ptr-deref_in_is_ucounts_overlimit
- From: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@xxxxxxxxx>
- 0ac0c30c8f: WARNING:at_kernel/ucount.c:#dec_rlimit_ucounts
- From: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v28 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
- From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v28 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
- From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v28 01/12] landlock: Add object management
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v28 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations
- From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v28 01/12] landlock: Add object management
- From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v28 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v28 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v28 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v28 09/12] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v28 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v28 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v28 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v28 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v28 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v28 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v28 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v28 01/12] landlock: Add object management
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v28 00/12] Landlock LSM
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- RE: forkat(int pidfd), execveat(int pidfd), other awful things?
- From: David Laight <David.Laight@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: forkat(int pidfd), execveat(int pidfd), other awful things?
- From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: forkat(int pidfd), execveat(int pidfd), other awful things?
- From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: forkat(int pidfd), execveat(int pidfd), other awful things?
- From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: forkat(int pidfd), execveat(int pidfd), other awful things?
- From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@xxxxxxxxx>
- forkat(int pidfd), execveat(int pidfd), other awful things?
- From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 7/7] kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 6/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 5/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 4/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE on top of ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 3/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 2/7] Add a reference to ucounts for each cred
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 1/7] Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v5 0/7] Count rlimits in each user namespace
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v27 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v4 00/10] Function Granular KASLR
- From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v27 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v4 00/10] Function Granular KASLR
- From: Fangrui Song <maskray@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH kspp-next] kbuild: prevent CC_FLAGS_LTO self-bloating on recursive rebuilds
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v4 7/7] kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v4 6/7] Move RLIMIT_NPROC check to the place where we increment the counter
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v4 5/7] Move RLIMIT_MEMLOCK counter to ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v4 3/7] Move RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE counter to ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v4 4/7] Move RLIMIT_SIGPENDING counter to ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v4 2/7] Move RLIMIT_NPROC counter to ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v4 1/7] Add a reference to ucounts for each cred
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v4 0/7] Count rlimits in each user namespace
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v27 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v27 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
- From: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v27 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v27 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v27 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v27 09/12] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v27 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v27 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v27 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v27 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v27 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v27 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v27 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v27 01/12] landlock: Add object management
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v27 00/12] Landlock LSM
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH kspp-next] kbuild: prevent CC_FLAGS_LTO self-bloating on recursive rebuilds
- From: Alexander Lobakin <alobakin@xxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/8] Use refcount_t for ucounts reference counting
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/8] Use refcount_t for ucounts reference counting
- From: ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx (Eric W. Biederman)
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/8] Use refcount_t for ucounts reference counting
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/8] Use refcount_t for ucounts reference counting
- From: ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx (Eric W. Biederman)
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/8] Use refcount_t for ucounts reference counting
- From: ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx (Eric W. Biederman)
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/8] Use refcount_t for ucounts reference counting
- From: Kaiwan N Billimoria <kaiwan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/8] Use refcount_t for ucounts reference counting
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/8] Use refcount_t for ucounts reference counting
- From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/8] Use refcount_t for ucounts reference counting
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/8] Use refcount_t for ucounts reference counting
- From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- 14c3c8a27f: kernel_BUG_at_kernel/cred.c
- From: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@xxxxxxxxx>
- c25050162e: WARNING:at_lib/refcount.c:#refcount_warn_saturate
- From: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@xxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v4 2/8] Add a reference to ucounts for each cred
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v26 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v26 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 7/8] Move RLIMIT_NPROC check to the place where we increment the counter
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 8/8] kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 6/8] Move RLIMIT_MEMLOCK counter to ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 5/8] Move RLIMIT_SIGPENDING counter to ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 3/8] Move RLIMIT_NPROC counter to ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 4/8] Move RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE counter to ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 2/8] Add a reference to ucounts for each cred
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 1/8] Use refcount_t for ucounts reference counting
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v3 0/8] Count rlimits in each user namespace
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v26 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v26 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v26 00/12] Landlock LSM
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v26 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v26 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v26 00/12] Landlock LSM
- From: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v26 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
- From: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v26 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
- From: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v26 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
- From: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/8] Use atomic type for ucounts reference counting
- From: ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx (Eric W. Biederman)
- Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/8] Add a reference to ucounts for each user
- From: ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx (Eric W. Biederman)
- Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/8] Use atomic type for ucounts reference counting
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- 59ebc79722: kernel_BUG_at_kernel/cred.c
- From: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/8] Count rlimits in each user namespace
- From: ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx (Eric W. Biederman)
- linux-hardening list archive
- From: Solar Designer <solar@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/8] Count rlimits in each user namespace
- From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v2 8/8] Move RLIMIT_NPROC check to the place where we increment the counter
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v2 5/8] Move RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE counter to ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v2 7/8] Move RLIMIT_MEMLOCK counter to ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v2 6/8] Move RLIMIT_SIGPENDING counter to ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v2 3/8] Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v2 1/8] Use atomic type for ucounts reference counting
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v2 4/8] Move RLIMIT_NPROC counter to ucounts
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v2 2/8] Add a reference to ucounts for each user
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- [RFC PATCH v2 0/8] Count rlimits in each user namespace
- From: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO
- From: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO
- From: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO
- From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO
- From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO
- From: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO
- From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO
- From: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO
- From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO
- From: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO
- From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO
- From: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 2/3] io_uring: add IOURING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS opcode
- From: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2] bug: further enhance use of CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION
- From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v6 2/3] io_uring: add IOURING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS opcode
- From: Daurnimator <quae@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH 04/13] x86/extable: Introduce _ASM_EXTABLE_UA for uaccess fixups
- From: wetp <wetp.zy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH 04/13] x86/extable: Introduce _ASM_EXTABLE_UA for uaccess fixups
- From: Wetp Zhang <wetp.zy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Kernel complexity
- From: Sandy Harris <sandyinchina@xxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Kernel complexity
- From: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: Kernel complexity
- From: stefan.bavendiek@xxxxxxxxxxx
- Re: Kernel complexity
- From: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Kernel complexity
- From: stefan.bavendiek@xxxxxxxxxxx
- Re: [PATCH v9 06/16] kbuild: lto: add a default list of used symbols
- From: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 06/16] kbuild: lto: add a default list of used symbols
- From: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v9 06/16] kbuild: lto: add a default list of used symbols
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 16/16] arm64: allow LTO to be selected
- From: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 15/16] arm64: disable recordmcount with DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS
- From: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 14/16] arm64: vdso: disable LTO
- From: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 13/16] drivers/misc/lkdtm: disable LTO for rodata.o
- From: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 12/16] efi/libstub: disable LTO
- From: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 11/16] scripts/mod: disable LTO for empty.c
- From: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 10/16] modpost: lto: strip .lto from module names
- From: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 09/16] PCI: Fix PREL32 relocations for LTO
- From: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 08/16] init: lto: fix PREL32 relocations
- From: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 07/16] init: lto: ensure initcall ordering
- From: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 06/16] kbuild: lto: add a default list of used symbols
- From: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 05/16] kbuild: lto: merge module sections
- From: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 04/16] kbuild: lto: limit inlining
- From: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 03/16] kbuild: lto: fix module versioning
- From: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 02/16] kbuild: add support for Clang LTO
- From: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 01/16] tracing: move function tracer options to Kconfig
- From: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@xxxxxxxxxx>
- [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO
- From: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Re: [PATCH v2 3/6] elf: Fix failure handling in _dl_map_object_from_fd
- From: Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@xxxxxxx>
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