Re: [PATCH v31 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control

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Jann, Kees, are you OK with this patch and the next one?

On 24/03/2021 20:15, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> 
> Using Landlock objects and ruleset, it is possible to tag inodes
> according to a process's domain.  To enable an unprivileged process to
> express a file hierarchy, it first needs to open a directory (or a file)
> and pass this file descriptor to the kernel through
> landlock_add_rule(2).  When checking if a file access request is
> allowed, we walk from the requested dentry to the real root, following
> the different mount layers.  The access to each "tagged" inodes are
> collected according to their rule layer level, and ANDed to create
> access to the requested file hierarchy.  This makes possible to identify
> a lot of files without tagging every inodes nor modifying the
> filesystem, while still following the view and understanding the user
> has from the filesystem.
> 
> Add a new ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES for UML because it currently does not
> keep the same struct inodes for the same inodes whereas these inodes are
> in use.
> 
> This commit adds a minimal set of supported filesystem access-control
> which doesn't enable to restrict all file-related actions.  This is the
> result of multiple discussions to minimize the code of Landlock to ease
> review.  Thanks to the Landlock design, extending this access-control
> without breaking user space will not be a problem.  Moreover, seccomp
> filters can be used to restrict the use of syscall families which may
> not be currently handled by Landlock.
> 
> Cc: Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@xxxxxx>
> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210324191520.125779-8-mic@xxxxxxxxxxx
> ---
> 
> Changes since v30:
> * Fix a (theoretical) data race in get_inode_object() (spotted by Jann
>   Horn) and update the related comments.  Also move the ihold() call to
>   better reflect the logical order (opposite to release_inode() and
>   hook_sb_delete()), even if it is still protected by inode->i_lock.
> * Improve comments related to inode and superblock management.
> 
> Changes since v29:
> * Remove a useless unlock/lock for the first loop walk in
>   hook_sb_delete().  This also makes the code clearer but doesn't change
>   the garantees for iput().
> * Rename iput_inode to prev_inode, which shows its origin.
> 
> Changes since v28:
> * Fix race conditions that could be caused by concurrent calls to
>   release_inode() and hook_sb_delete().
> * Avoid livelock when a lot of inodes are tagged.
> * Improve concurrency locking and add comments to explain the specific
>   lock rules.
> * Add an inode_free_security hook to check that release_inode() and
>   hook_sb_delete() do their job.
> * Add early return to check_access_path() to check if the access request
>   is empty.  This doesn't change the semantic.
> * Reword the first description sentence (suggested by Serge Hallyn).
> 
> Changes since v27:
> * Fix domains with layers of non-overlapping access rights (cf.
>   layout1.non_overlapping_accesses test) thanks to a stack of access
>   rights per layer (replacing ORed access rights).  This avoids
>   too-restrictive domains.
> * Cosmetic fixes and updates in comments and Kconfig.
> 
> Changes since v26:
> * Check each rule of a path to enable a more permissive and pragmatic
>   access control per layer.  Suggested by Jann Horn:
>   https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez1O0VTwEiRd3KqexoF78WR+cmP5bGk5Kh5Cs7aPepiDVg@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
> * Rename check_access_path_continue() to unmask_layers() and make it
>   return the new layer mask.
> * Avoid double domain check in hook_file_open().
> * In the documentation, add utime(2) as another example of unhandled
>   syscalls.  Indeed, using `touch` to test write access may be tempting.
> * Remove outdated comment about OverlayFS.
> * Rename the landlock.h ifdef to align with most similar files.
> * Fix spelling.
> 
> Changes since v25:
> * Move build_check_layer() to ruleset.c, and add built-time checks for
>   the fs_access_mask and access variables according to
>   _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MASK.
> * Move limits to a dedicated file and rename them:
>   _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_LAST and _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MASK.
> * Set build_check_layer() as non-inline to trigger a warning if it is
>   not called.
> * Use BITS_PER_TYPE() macro.
> * Rename function to landlock_add_fs_hooks().
> * Cosmetic variable renames.
> 
> Changes since v24:
> * Use the new struct landlock_rule and landlock_layer to not mix
>   accesses from different layers.  Revert "Enforce deterministic
>   interleaved path rules" from v24, and fix the layer check.  This
>   enables to follow a sane semantic: an access is granted if, for each
>   policy layer, at least one rule encountered on the pathwalk grants the
>   access, regardless of their position in the layer stack (suggested by
>   Jann Horn).  See layout1.interleaved_masked_accesses tests from
>   tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c for corner cases.
> * Add build-time checks for layers.
> * Use the new landlock_insert_rule() API.
> 
> Changes since v23:
> * Enforce deterministic interleaved path rules.  To have consistent
>   layered rules, granting access to a path implies that all accesses
>   tied to inodes, from the requested file to the real root, must be
>   checked.  Otherwise, stacked rules may result to overzealous
>   restrictions.  By excluding the ability to add exceptions in the same
>   layer (e.g. /a allowed, /a/b denied, and /a/b/c allowed), we get
>   deterministic interleaved path rules.  This removes an optimization
>   which could be replaced by a proper cache mechanism.  This also
>   further simplifies and explain check_access_path_continue().
> * Fix memory allocation error handling in landlock_create_object()
>   calls.  This prevent to inadvertently hold an inode.
> * In get_inode_object(), improve comments, make code more readable and
>   move kfree() call out of the lock window.
> * Use the simplified landlock_insert_rule() API.
> 
> Changes since v22:
> * Simplify check_access_path_continue() (suggested by Jann Horn).
> * Remove prefetch() call for now (suggested by Jann Horn).
> * Fix spelling and remove superfluous comment (spotted by Jann Horn).
> * Cosmetic variable renaming.
> 
> Changes since v21:
> * Rename ARCH_EPHEMERAL_STATES to ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES (suggested by
>   James Morris).
> * Remove the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_CHROOT right because chroot(2) (which
>   requires CAP_SYS_CHROOT) doesn't enable to bypass Landlock (as tests
>   demonstrate it), and because it is often used by sandboxes, it would
>   be counterproductive to forbid it.  This also reduces the code size.
> * Clean up documentation.
> 
> Changes since v19:
> * Fix spelling (spotted by Randy Dunlap).
> 
> Changes since v18:
> * Remove useless include.
> * Fix spelling.
> 
> Changes since v17:
> * Replace landlock_release_inodes() with security_sb_delete() (requested
>   by James Morris).
> * Replace struct super_block->s_landlock_inode_refs with the LSM
>   infrastructure management of the superblock (requested by James
>   Morris).
> * Fix mknod restriction with a zero mode (spotted by Vincent Dagonneau).
> * Minimize executed code in path_mknod and file_open hooks when the
>   current tasks is not sandboxed.
> * Remove useless checks on the file pointer and inode in
>   hook_file_open() .
> * Constify domain pointers.
> * Rename inode_landlock() to landlock_inode().
> * Import include/uapi/linux/landlock.h and _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_* from
>   the ruleset and domain management patch.
> * Explain the rational of this minimal set of access-control.
>   https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@xxxxxxxxxxx/
> 
> Changes since v16:
> * Add ARCH_EPHEMERAL_STATES and enable it for UML.
> 
> Changes since v15:
> * Replace layer_levels and layer_depth with a bitfield of layers: this
>   enables to properly manage superset and subset of access rights,
>   whatever their order in the stack of layers.
>   Cf. https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/e07fe473-1801-01cc-12ae-b3167f95250e@xxxxxxxxxxx/
> * Allow to open pipes and similar special files through /proc/self/fd/.
> * Properly handle internal filesystems such as nsfs: always allow these
>   kind of roots because disconnected path cannot be evaluated.
> * Remove the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_LINK_TO and
>   LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RENAME_{TO,FROM}, but use the
>   LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_{FILE,DIR} and LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_*
>   instead.  Indeed, it is not possible for now (and not really useful)
>   to express the semantic of a source and a destination.
> * Check access rights to remove a directory or a file with rename(2).
> * Forbid reparenting when linking or renaming.  This is needed to easily
>   protect against possible privilege escalation by changing the place of
>   a file or directory in relation to an enforced access policy (from the
>   set of layers).  This will be relaxed in the future.
> * Update hooks to take into account replacement of the object's self and
>   beneath access bitfields with one.  Simplify the code.
> * Check file related access rights.
> * Check d_is_negative() instead of !d_backing_inode() in
>   check_access_path_continue(), and continue the path walk while there
>   is no mapped inode e.g., with rename(2).
> * Check private inode in check_access_path().
> * Optimize get_file_access() when dealing with a directory.
> * Add missing atomic.h .
> 
> Changes since v14:
> * Simplify the object, rule and ruleset management at the expense of a
>   less aggressive memory freeing (contributed by Jann Horn, with
>   additional modifications):
>   - Rewrite release_inode() to use inode->sb->s_landlock_inode_refs.
>   - Remove useless checks in landlock_release_inodes(), clean object
>     pointer according to the new struct landlock_object and wait for all
>     iput() to complete.
>   - Rewrite get_inode_object() according to the new struct
>     landlock_object.  If there is a race-condition when cleaning up an
>     object, we retry until the concurrent thread finished the object
>     cleaning.
>   Cf. https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez21bEn0wL1bbmTiiu8j9jP5iEWtHOwz4tURUJ+ki0ydYw@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
> * Fix nested domains by implementing a notion of layer level and depth:
>   - Check for matching level ranges when walking through a file path.
>   - Only allow access if every layer granted the access request.
> * Handles files without mount points (e.g. pipes).
> * Hardens path walk by checking inode pointer values.
> * Prefetches d_parent when walking to the root directory.
> * Remove useless inode_alloc_security hook() (suggested by Jann Horn):
>   already initialized by lsm_inode_alloc().
> * Remove the inode_free_security hook.
> * Remove access checks that may be required for FD-only requests:
>   truncate, getattr, lock, chmod, chown, chgrp, ioctl.  This will be
>   handle in a future evolution of Landlock, but right now the goal is to
>   lighten the code to ease review.
> * Constify variables.
> * Move ABI checks into syscall.c .
> * Cosmetic variable renames.
> 
> Changes since v11:
> * Add back, revamp and make a fully working filesystem access-control
>   based on paths and inodes.
> * Remove the eBPF dependency.
> 
> Previous changes:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190721213116.23476-6-mic@xxxxxxxxxxx/
> ---
>  MAINTAINERS                   |   1 +
>  arch/Kconfig                  |   7 +
>  arch/um/Kconfig               |   1 +
>  include/uapi/linux/landlock.h |  75 ++++
>  security/landlock/Kconfig     |   2 +-
>  security/landlock/Makefile    |   2 +-
>  security/landlock/fs.c        | 693 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  security/landlock/fs.h        |  70 ++++
>  security/landlock/limits.h    |   4 +
>  security/landlock/ruleset.c   |   4 +
>  security/landlock/setup.c     |   7 +
>  security/landlock/setup.h     |   2 +
>  12 files changed, 866 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
>  create mode 100644 security/landlock/fs.c
>  create mode 100644 security/landlock/fs.h
> 
> diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
> index 87a2738dfdec..70ec117efa8a 100644
> --- a/MAINTAINERS
> +++ b/MAINTAINERS
> @@ -10003,6 +10003,7 @@ L:	linux-security-module@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>  S:	Supported
>  W:	https://landlock.io
>  T:	git https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux.git
> +F:	include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
>  F:	security/landlock/
>  K:	landlock
>  K:	LANDLOCK
> diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
> index ecfd3520b676..8160ab7e3e03 100644
> --- a/arch/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/Kconfig
> @@ -1013,6 +1013,13 @@ config COMPAT_32BIT_TIME
>  config ARCH_NO_PREEMPT
>  	bool
>  
> +config ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES
> +	def_bool n
> +	help
> +	  An arch should select this symbol if it doesn't keep track of inode
> +	  instances on its own, but instead relies on something else (e.g. the
> +	  host kernel for an UML kernel).
> +
>  config ARCH_SUPPORTS_RT
>  	bool
>  
> diff --git a/arch/um/Kconfig b/arch/um/Kconfig
> index c3030db3325f..57cfd9a1c082 100644
> --- a/arch/um/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/um/Kconfig
> @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ menu "UML-specific options"
>  config UML
>  	bool
>  	default y
> +	select ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES
>  	select ARCH_HAS_KCOV
>  	select ARCH_NO_PREEMPT
>  	select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..f69877099c8e
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */
> +/*
> + * Landlock - User space API
> + *
> + * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H
> +#define _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H
> +
> +/**
> + * DOC: fs_access
> + *
> + * A set of actions on kernel objects may be defined by an attribute (e.g.
> + * &struct landlock_path_beneath_attr) including a bitmask of access.
> + *
> + * Filesystem flags
> + * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> + *
> + * These flags enable to restrict a sandboxed process to a set of actions on
> + * files and directories.  Files or directories opened before the sandboxing
> + * are not subject to these restrictions.
> + *
> + * A file can only receive these access rights:
> + *
> + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE: Execute a file.
> + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE: Open a file with write access.
> + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE: Open a file with read access.
> + *
> + * A directory can receive access rights related to files or directories.  The
> + * following access right is applied to the directory itself, and the
> + * directories beneath it:
> + *
> + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR: Open a directory or list its content.
> + *
> + * However, the following access rights only apply to the content of a
> + * directory, not the directory itself:
> + *
> + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR: Remove an empty directory or rename one.
> + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE: Unlink (or rename) a file.
> + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR: Create (or rename or link) a character
> + *   device.
> + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR: Create (or rename) a directory.
> + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG: Create (or rename or link) a regular file.
> + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK: Create (or rename or link) a UNIX domain
> + *   socket.
> + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO: Create (or rename or link) a named pipe.
> + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK: Create (or rename or link) a block device.
> + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM: Create (or rename or link) a symbolic link.
> + *
> + * .. warning::
> + *
> + *   It is currently not possible to restrict some file-related actions
> + *   accessible through these syscall families: :manpage:`chdir(2)`,
> + *   :manpage:`truncate(2)`, :manpage:`stat(2)`, :manpage:`flock(2)`,
> + *   :manpage:`chmod(2)`, :manpage:`chown(2)`, :manpage:`setxattr(2)`,
> + *   :manpage:`utime(2)`, :manpage:`ioctl(2)`, :manpage:`fcntl(2)`.
> + *   Future Landlock evolutions will enable to restrict them.
> + */
> +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE			(1ULL << 0)
> +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE			(1ULL << 1)
> +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE			(1ULL << 2)
> +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR			(1ULL << 3)
> +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR			(1ULL << 4)
> +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE			(1ULL << 5)
> +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR			(1ULL << 6)
> +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR			(1ULL << 7)
> +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG			(1ULL << 8)
> +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK			(1ULL << 9)
> +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO			(1ULL << 10)
> +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK			(1ULL << 11)
> +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM			(1ULL << 12)
> +
> +#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */
> diff --git a/security/landlock/Kconfig b/security/landlock/Kconfig
> index c1e862a38410..8e33c4e8ffb8 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/landlock/Kconfig
> @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
>  
>  config SECURITY_LANDLOCK
>  	bool "Landlock support"
> -	depends on SECURITY
> +	depends on SECURITY && !ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES
>  	select SECURITY_PATH
>  	help
>  	  Landlock is a sandboxing mechanism that enables processes to restrict
> diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile
> index f1d1eb72fa76..92e3d80ab8ed 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/Makefile
> +++ b/security/landlock/Makefile
> @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
>  obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o
>  
>  landlock-y := setup.o object.o ruleset.o \
> -	cred.o ptrace.o
> +	cred.o ptrace.o fs.o
> diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..3f221d0e5c90
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,693 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> +/*
> + * Landlock LSM - Filesystem management and hooks
> + *
> + * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/atomic.h>
> +#include <linux/bitops.h>
> +#include <linux/bits.h>
> +#include <linux/compiler_types.h>
> +#include <linux/dcache.h>
> +#include <linux/err.h>
> +#include <linux/fs.h>
> +#include <linux/init.h>
> +#include <linux/kernel.h>
> +#include <linux/limits.h>
> +#include <linux/list.h>
> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
> +#include <linux/mount.h>
> +#include <linux/namei.h>
> +#include <linux/path.h>
> +#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
> +#include <linux/spinlock.h>
> +#include <linux/stat.h>
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +#include <linux/wait_bit.h>
> +#include <linux/workqueue.h>
> +#include <uapi/linux/landlock.h>
> +
> +#include "common.h"
> +#include "cred.h"
> +#include "fs.h"
> +#include "limits.h"
> +#include "object.h"
> +#include "ruleset.h"
> +#include "setup.h"
> +
> +/* Underlying object management */
> +
> +static void release_inode(struct landlock_object *const object)
> +	__releases(object->lock)
> +{
> +	struct inode *const inode = object->underobj;
> +	struct super_block *sb;
> +
> +	if (!inode) {
> +		spin_unlock(&object->lock);
> +		return;
> +	}
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Protects against concurrent use by hook_sb_delete() of the reference
> +	 * to the underlying inode.
> +	 */
> +	object->underobj = NULL;
> +	/*
> +	 * Makes sure that if the filesystem is concurrently unmounted,
> +	 * hook_sb_delete() will wait for us to finish iput().
> +	 */
> +	sb = inode->i_sb;
> +	atomic_long_inc(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs);
> +	spin_unlock(&object->lock);
> +	/*
> +	 * Because object->underobj was not NULL, hook_sb_delete() and
> +	 * get_inode_object() guarantee that it is safe to reset
> +	 * landlock_inode(inode)->object while it is not NULL.  It is therefore
> +	 * not necessary to lock inode->i_lock.
> +	 */
> +	rcu_assign_pointer(landlock_inode(inode)->object, NULL);
> +	/*
> +	 * Now, new rules can safely be tied to @inode with get_inode_object().
> +	 */
> +
> +	iput(inode);
> +	if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs))
> +		wake_up_var(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs);
> +}
> +
> +static const struct landlock_object_underops landlock_fs_underops = {
> +	.release = release_inode
> +};
> +
> +/* Ruleset management */
> +
> +static struct landlock_object *get_inode_object(struct inode *const inode)
> +{
> +	struct landlock_object *object, *new_object;
> +	struct landlock_inode_security *inode_sec = landlock_inode(inode);
> +
> +	rcu_read_lock();
> +retry:
> +	object = rcu_dereference(inode_sec->object);
> +	if (object) {
> +		if (likely(refcount_inc_not_zero(&object->usage))) {
> +			rcu_read_unlock();
> +			return object;
> +		}
> +		/*
> +		 * We are racing with release_inode(), the object is going
> +		 * away.  Wait for release_inode(), then retry.
> +		 */
> +		spin_lock(&object->lock);
> +		spin_unlock(&object->lock);
> +		goto retry;
> +	}
> +	rcu_read_unlock();
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * If there is no object tied to @inode, then create a new one (without
> +	 * holding any locks).
> +	 */
> +	new_object = landlock_create_object(&landlock_fs_underops, inode);
> +	if (IS_ERR(new_object))
> +		return new_object;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Protects against concurrent calls to get_inode_object() or
> +	 * hook_sb_delete().
> +	 */
> +	spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
> +	if (unlikely(rcu_access_pointer(inode_sec->object))) {
> +		/* Someone else just created the object, bail out and retry. */
> +		spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
> +		kfree(new_object);
> +
> +		rcu_read_lock();
> +		goto retry;
> +	}
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * @inode will be released by hook_sb_delete() on its superblock
> +	 * shutdown, or by release_inode() when no more ruleset references the
> +	 * related object.
> +	 */
> +	ihold(inode);
> +	rcu_assign_pointer(inode_sec->object, new_object);
> +	spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
> +	return new_object;
> +}
> +
> +/* All access rights that can be tied to files. */
> +#define ACCESS_FILE ( \
> +	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \
> +	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
> +	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE)
> +
> +/*
> + * @path: Should have been checked by get_path_from_fd().
> + */
> +int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
> +		const struct path *const path, u32 access_rights)
> +{
> +	int err;
> +	struct landlock_object *object;
> +
> +	/* Files only get access rights that make sense. */
> +	if (!d_is_dir(path->dentry) && (access_rights | ACCESS_FILE) !=
> +			ACCESS_FILE)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ruleset->num_layers != 1))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	/* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */
> +	access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS & ~ruleset->fs_access_masks[0];
> +	object = get_inode_object(d_backing_inode(path->dentry));
> +	if (IS_ERR(object))
> +		return PTR_ERR(object);
> +	mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock);
> +	err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, object, access_rights);
> +	mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock);
> +	/*
> +	 * No need to check for an error because landlock_insert_rule()
> +	 * increments the refcount for the new object if needed.
> +	 */
> +	landlock_put_object(object);
> +	return err;
> +}
> +
> +/* Access-control management */
> +
> +static inline u64 unmask_layers(
> +		const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
> +		const struct path *const path, const u32 access_request,
> +		u64 layer_mask)
> +{
> +	const struct landlock_rule *rule;
> +	const struct inode *inode;
> +	size_t i;
> +
> +	if (d_is_negative(path->dentry))
> +		/* Continues to walk while there is no mapped inode. */
> +		return layer_mask;
> +	inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
> +	rcu_read_lock();
> +	rule = landlock_find_rule(domain,
> +			rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object));
> +	rcu_read_unlock();
> +	if (!rule)
> +		return layer_mask;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * An access is granted if, for each policy layer, at least one rule
> +	 * encountered on the pathwalk grants the requested accesses,
> +	 * regardless of their position in the layer stack.  We must then check
> +	 * the remaining layers for each inode, from the first added layer to
> +	 * the last one.
> +	 */
> +	for (i = 0; i < rule->num_layers; i++) {
> +		const struct landlock_layer *const layer = &rule->layers[i];
> +		const u64 layer_level = BIT_ULL(layer->level - 1);
> +
> +		/* Checks that the layer grants access to the full request. */
> +		if ((layer->access & access_request) == access_request) {
> +			layer_mask &= ~layer_level;
> +
> +			if (layer_mask == 0)
> +				return layer_mask;
> +		}
> +	}
> +	return layer_mask;
> +}
> +
> +static int check_access_path(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
> +		const struct path *const path, u32 access_request)
> +{
> +	bool allowed = false;
> +	struct path walker_path;
> +	u64 layer_mask;
> +	size_t i;
> +
> +	/* Make sure all layers can be checked. */
> +	BUILD_BUG_ON(BITS_PER_TYPE(layer_mask) < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS);
> +
> +	if (!access_request)
> +		return 0;
> +	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain || !path))
> +		return 0;
> +	/*
> +	 * Allows access to pseudo filesystems that will never be mountable
> +	 * (e.g. sockfs, pipefs), but can still be reachable through
> +	 * /proc/<pid>/fd/<file-descriptor> .
> +	 */
> +	if ((path->dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER) ||
> +			(d_is_positive(path->dentry) &&
> +			 unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))))
> +		return 0;
> +	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1))
> +		return -EACCES;
> +
> +	/* Saves all layers handling a subset of requested accesses. */
> +	layer_mask = 0;
> +	for (i = 0; i < domain->num_layers; i++) {
> +		if (domain->fs_access_masks[i] & access_request)
> +			layer_mask |= BIT_ULL(i);
> +	}
> +	/* An access request not handled by the domain is allowed. */
> +	if (layer_mask == 0)
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	walker_path = *path;
> +	path_get(&walker_path);
> +	/*
> +	 * We need to walk through all the hierarchy to not miss any relevant
> +	 * restriction.
> +	 */
> +	while (true) {
> +		struct dentry *parent_dentry;
> +
> +		layer_mask = unmask_layers(domain, &walker_path,
> +				access_request, layer_mask);
> +		if (layer_mask == 0) {
> +			/* Stops when a rule from each layer grants access. */
> +			allowed = true;
> +			break;
> +		}
> +
> +jump_up:
> +		if (walker_path.dentry == walker_path.mnt->mnt_root) {
> +			if (follow_up(&walker_path)) {
> +				/* Ignores hidden mount points. */
> +				goto jump_up;
> +			} else {
> +				/*
> +				 * Stops at the real root.  Denies access
> +				 * because not all layers have granted access.
> +				 */
> +				allowed = false;
> +				break;
> +			}
> +		}
> +		if (unlikely(IS_ROOT(walker_path.dentry))) {
> +			/*
> +			 * Stops at disconnected root directories.  Only allows
> +			 * access to internal filesystems (e.g. nsfs, which is
> +			 * reachable through /proc/<pid>/ns/<namespace>).
> +			 */
> +			allowed = !!(walker_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL);
> +			break;
> +		}
> +		parent_dentry = dget_parent(walker_path.dentry);
> +		dput(walker_path.dentry);
> +		walker_path.dentry = parent_dentry;
> +	}
> +	path_put(&walker_path);
> +	return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
> +}
> +
> +static inline int current_check_access_path(const struct path *const path,
> +		const u32 access_request)
> +{
> +	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
> +		landlock_get_current_domain();
> +
> +	if (!dom)
> +		return 0;
> +	return check_access_path(dom, path, access_request);
> +}
> +
> +/* Inode hooks */
> +
> +static void hook_inode_free_security(struct inode *const inode)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * All inodes must already have been untied from their object by
> +	 * release_inode() or hook_sb_delete().
> +	 */
> +	WARN_ON_ONCE(landlock_inode(inode)->object);
> +}
> +
> +/* Super-block hooks */
> +
> +/*
> + * Release the inodes used in a security policy.
> + *
> + * Cf. fsnotify_unmount_inodes() and invalidate_inodes()
> + */
> +static void hook_sb_delete(struct super_block *const sb)
> +{
> +	struct inode *inode, *prev_inode = NULL;
> +
> +	if (!landlock_initialized)
> +		return;
> +
> +	spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
> +	list_for_each_entry(inode, &sb->s_inodes, i_sb_list) {
> +		struct landlock_object *object;
> +
> +		/* Only handles referenced inodes. */
> +		if (!atomic_read(&inode->i_count))
> +			continue;
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * Protects against concurrent modification of inode (e.g.
> +		 * from get_inode_object()).
> +		 */
> +		spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
> +		/*
> +		 * Checks I_FREEING and I_WILL_FREE  to protect against a race
> +		 * condition when release_inode() just called iput(), which
> +		 * could lead to a NULL dereference of inode->security or a
> +		 * second call to iput() for the same Landlock object.  Also
> +		 * checks I_NEW because such inode cannot be tied to an object.
> +		 */
> +		if (inode->i_state & (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE | I_NEW)) {
> +			spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
> +			continue;
> +		}
> +
> +		rcu_read_lock();
> +		object = rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object);
> +		if (!object) {
> +			rcu_read_unlock();
> +			spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
> +			continue;
> +		}
> +		/* Keeps a reference to this inode until the next loop walk. */
> +		__iget(inode);
> +		spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * If there is no concurrent release_inode() ongoing, then we
> +		 * are in charge of calling iput() on this inode, otherwise we
> +		 * will just wait for it to finish.
> +		 */
> +		spin_lock(&object->lock);
> +		if (object->underobj == inode) {
> +			object->underobj = NULL;
> +			spin_unlock(&object->lock);
> +			rcu_read_unlock();
> +
> +			/*
> +			 * Because object->underobj was not NULL,
> +			 * release_inode() and get_inode_object() guarantee
> +			 * that it is safe to reset
> +			 * landlock_inode(inode)->object while it is not NULL.
> +			 * It is therefore not necessary to lock inode->i_lock.
> +			 */
> +			rcu_assign_pointer(landlock_inode(inode)->object, NULL);
> +			/*
> +			 * At this point, we own the ihold() reference that was
> +			 * originally set up by get_inode_object() and the
> +			 * __iget() reference that we just set in this loop
> +			 * walk.  Therefore the following call to iput() will
> +			 * not sleep nor drop the inode because there is now at
> +			 * least two references to it.
> +			 */
> +			iput(inode);
> +		} else {
> +			spin_unlock(&object->lock);
> +			rcu_read_unlock();
> +		}
> +
> +		if (prev_inode) {
> +			/*
> +			 * At this point, we still own the __iget() reference
> +			 * that we just set in this loop walk.  Therefore we
> +			 * can drop the list lock and know that the inode won't
> +			 * disappear from under us until the next loop walk.
> +			 */
> +			spin_unlock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
> +			/*
> +			 * We can now actually put the inode reference from the
> +			 * previous loop walk, which is not needed anymore.
> +			 */
> +			iput(prev_inode);
> +			cond_resched();
> +			spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
> +		}
> +		prev_inode = inode;
> +	}
> +	spin_unlock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
> +
> +	/* Puts the inode reference from the last loop walk, if any. */
> +	if (prev_inode)
> +		iput(prev_inode);
> +	/* Waits for pending iput() in release_inode(). */
> +	wait_var_event(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs, !atomic_long_read(
> +				&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs));
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Because a Landlock security policy is defined according to the filesystem
> + * layout (i.e. the mount namespace), changing it may grant access to files not
> + * previously allowed.
> + *
> + * To make it simple, deny any filesystem layout modification by landlocked
> + * processes.  Non-landlocked processes may still change the namespace of a
> + * landlocked process, but this kind of threat must be handled by a system-wide
> + * access-control security policy.
> + *
> + * This could be lifted in the future if Landlock can safely handle mount
> + * namespace updates requested by a landlocked process.  Indeed, we could
> + * update the current domain (which is currently read-only) by taking into
> + * account the accesses of the source and the destination of a new mount point.
> + * However, it would also require to make all the child domains dynamically
> + * inherit these new constraints.  Anyway, for backward compatibility reasons,
> + * a dedicated user space option would be required (e.g. as a ruleset command
> + * option).
> + */
> +static int hook_sb_mount(const char *const dev_name,
> +		const struct path *const path, const char *const type,
> +		const unsigned long flags, void *const data)
> +{
> +	if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
> +		return 0;
> +	return -EPERM;
> +}
> +
> +static int hook_move_mount(const struct path *const from_path,
> +		const struct path *const to_path)
> +{
> +	if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
> +		return 0;
> +	return -EPERM;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Removing a mount point may reveal a previously hidden file hierarchy, which
> + * may then grant access to files, which may have previously been forbidden.
> + */
> +static int hook_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *const mnt, const int flags)
> +{
> +	if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
> +		return 0;
> +	return -EPERM;
> +}
> +
> +static int hook_sb_remount(struct super_block *const sb, void *const mnt_opts)
> +{
> +	if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
> +		return 0;
> +	return -EPERM;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * pivot_root(2), like mount(2), changes the current mount namespace.  It must
> + * then be forbidden for a landlocked process.
> + *
> + * However, chroot(2) may be allowed because it only changes the relative root
> + * directory of the current process.  Moreover, it can be used to restrict the
> + * view of the filesystem.
> + */
> +static int hook_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *const old_path,
> +		const struct path *const new_path)
> +{
> +	if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
> +		return 0;
> +	return -EPERM;
> +}
> +
> +/* Path hooks */
> +
> +static inline u32 get_mode_access(const umode_t mode)
> +{
> +	switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
> +	case S_IFLNK:
> +		return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM;
> +	case 0:
> +		/* A zero mode translates to S_IFREG. */
> +	case S_IFREG:
> +		return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG;
> +	case S_IFDIR:
> +		return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR;
> +	case S_IFCHR:
> +		return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR;
> +	case S_IFBLK:
> +		return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK;
> +	case S_IFIFO:
> +		return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO;
> +	case S_IFSOCK:
> +		return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK;
> +	default:
> +		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
> +		return 0;
> +	}
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Creating multiple links or renaming may lead to privilege escalations if not
> + * handled properly.  Indeed, we must be sure that the source doesn't gain more
> + * privileges by being accessible from the destination.  This is getting more
> + * complex when dealing with multiple layers.  The whole picture can be seen as
> + * a multilayer partial ordering problem.  A future version of Landlock will
> + * deal with that.
> + */
> +static int hook_path_link(struct dentry *const old_dentry,
> +		const struct path *const new_dir,
> +		struct dentry *const new_dentry)
> +{
> +	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
> +		landlock_get_current_domain();
> +
> +	if (!dom)
> +		return 0;
> +	/* The mount points are the same for old and new paths, cf. EXDEV. */
> +	if (old_dentry->d_parent != new_dir->dentry)
> +		/* For now, forbids reparenting. */
> +		return -EACCES;
> +	if (unlikely(d_is_negative(old_dentry)))
> +		return -EACCES;
> +	return check_access_path(dom, new_dir,
> +			get_mode_access(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode));
> +}
> +
> +static inline u32 maybe_remove(const struct dentry *const dentry)
> +{
> +	if (d_is_negative(dentry))
> +		return 0;
> +	return d_is_dir(dentry) ? LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR :
> +		LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE;
> +}
> +
> +static int hook_path_rename(const struct path *const old_dir,
> +		struct dentry *const old_dentry,
> +		const struct path *const new_dir,
> +		struct dentry *const new_dentry)
> +{
> +	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
> +		landlock_get_current_domain();
> +
> +	if (!dom)
> +		return 0;
> +	/* The mount points are the same for old and new paths, cf. EXDEV. */
> +	if (old_dir->dentry != new_dir->dentry)
> +		/* For now, forbids reparenting. */
> +		return -EACCES;
> +	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(d_is_negative(old_dentry)))
> +		return -EACCES;
> +	/* RENAME_EXCHANGE is handled because directories are the same. */
> +	return check_access_path(dom, old_dir, maybe_remove(old_dentry) |
> +			maybe_remove(new_dentry) |
> +			get_mode_access(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode));
> +}
> +
> +static int hook_path_mkdir(const struct path *const dir,
> +		struct dentry *const dentry, const umode_t mode)
> +{
> +	return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR);
> +}
> +
> +static int hook_path_mknod(const struct path *const dir,
> +		struct dentry *const dentry, const umode_t mode,
> +		const unsigned int dev)
> +{
> +	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
> +		landlock_get_current_domain();
> +
> +	if (!dom)
> +		return 0;
> +	return check_access_path(dom, dir, get_mode_access(mode));
> +}
> +
> +static int hook_path_symlink(const struct path *const dir,
> +		struct dentry *const dentry, const char *const old_name)
> +{
> +	return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM);
> +}
> +
> +static int hook_path_unlink(const struct path *const dir,
> +		struct dentry *const dentry)
> +{
> +	return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE);
> +}
> +
> +static int hook_path_rmdir(const struct path *const dir,
> +		struct dentry *const dentry)
> +{
> +	return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR);
> +}
> +
> +/* File hooks */
> +
> +static inline u32 get_file_access(const struct file *const file)
> +{
> +	u32 access = 0;
> +
> +	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) {
> +		/* A directory can only be opened in read mode. */
> +		if (S_ISDIR(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
> +			return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR;
> +		access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE;
> +	}
> +	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
> +		access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE;
> +	/* __FMODE_EXEC is indeed part of f_flags, not f_mode. */
> +	if (file->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC)
> +		access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE;
> +	return access;
> +}
> +
> +static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file)
> +{
> +	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
> +		landlock_get_current_domain();
> +
> +	if (!dom)
> +		return 0;
> +	/*
> +	 * Because a file may be opened with O_PATH, get_file_access() may
> +	 * return 0.  This case will be handled with a future Landlock
> +	 * evolution.
> +	 */
> +	return check_access_path(dom, &file->f_path, get_file_access(file));
> +}
> +
> +static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, hook_inode_free_security),
> +
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_delete, hook_sb_delete),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, hook_sb_mount),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, hook_move_mount),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, hook_sb_umount),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, hook_sb_remount),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, hook_sb_pivotroot),
> +
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, hook_path_link),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, hook_path_rename),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, hook_path_mkdir),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, hook_path_mknod),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, hook_path_symlink),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, hook_path_unlink),
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, hook_path_rmdir),
> +
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, hook_file_open),
> +};
> +
> +__init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void)
> +{
> +	security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
> +			LANDLOCK_NAME);
> +}
> diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.h b/security/landlock/fs.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..187284b421c9
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/landlock/fs.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
> +/*
> + * Landlock LSM - Filesystem management and hooks
> + *
> + * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_FS_H
> +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_FS_H
> +
> +#include <linux/fs.h>
> +#include <linux/init.h>
> +#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
> +
> +#include "ruleset.h"
> +#include "setup.h"
> +
> +/**
> + * struct landlock_inode_security - Inode security blob
> + *
> + * Enable to reference a &struct landlock_object tied to an inode (i.e.
> + * underlying object).
> + */
> +struct landlock_inode_security {
> +	/**
> +	 * @object: Weak pointer to an allocated object.  All assignments of a
> +	 * new object are protected by the underlying inode->i_lock.  However,
> +	 * atomically disassociating @object from the inode is only protected
> +	 * by @object->lock, from the time @object's usage refcount drops to
> +	 * zero to the time this pointer is nulled out (cf. release_inode() and
> +	 * hook_sb_delete()).  Indeed, such disassociation doesn't require
> +	 * inode->i_lock thanks to the careful rcu_access_pointer() check
> +	 * performed by get_inode_object().
> +	 */
> +	struct landlock_object __rcu *object;
> +};
> +
> +/**
> + * struct landlock_superblock_security - Superblock security blob
> + *
> + * Enable hook_sb_delete() to wait for concurrent calls to release_inode().
> + */
> +struct landlock_superblock_security {
> +	/**
> +	 * @inode_refs: Number of pending inodes (from this superblock) that
> +	 * are being released by release_inode().
> +	 * Cf. struct super_block->s_fsnotify_inode_refs .
> +	 */
> +	atomic_long_t inode_refs;
> +};
> +
> +static inline struct landlock_inode_security *landlock_inode(
> +		const struct inode *const inode)
> +{
> +	return inode->i_security + landlock_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
> +}
> +
> +static inline struct landlock_superblock_security *landlock_superblock(
> +		const struct super_block *const superblock)
> +{
> +	return superblock->s_security + landlock_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
> +}
> +
> +__init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void);
> +
> +int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
> +		const struct path *const path, u32 access_hierarchy);
> +
> +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_FS_H */
> diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h
> index b734f597bb0e..2a0a1095ee27 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/limits.h
> +++ b/security/landlock/limits.h
> @@ -10,8 +10,12 @@
>  #define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LIMITS_H
>  
>  #include <linux/limits.h>
> +#include <uapi/linux/landlock.h>
>  
>  #define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS		64
>  #define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES		U32_MAX
>  
> +#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS		LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM
> +#define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS		((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS << 1) - 1)
> +
>  #endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LIMITS_H */
> diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
> index 2e616f6d5274..ec72b9262bf3 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
> @@ -116,9 +116,11 @@ static void build_check_ruleset(void)
>  		.num_rules = ~0,
>  		.num_layers = ~0,
>  	};
> +	typeof(ruleset.fs_access_masks[0]) fs_access_mask = ~0;
>  
>  	BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_rules < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES);
>  	BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_layers < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS);
> +	BUILD_BUG_ON(fs_access_mask < LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS);
>  }
>  
>  /**
> @@ -217,9 +219,11 @@ static void build_check_layer(void)
>  {
>  	const struct landlock_layer layer = {
>  		.level = ~0,
> +		.access = ~0,
>  	};
>  
>  	BUILD_BUG_ON(layer.level < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS);
> +	BUILD_BUG_ON(layer.access < LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS);
>  }
>  
>  /* @ruleset must be locked by the caller. */
> diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c
> index a5d6ef334991..f8e8e980454c 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/setup.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/setup.c
> @@ -11,17 +11,24 @@
>  
>  #include "common.h"
>  #include "cred.h"
> +#include "fs.h"
>  #include "ptrace.h"
>  #include "setup.h"
>  
> +bool landlock_initialized __lsm_ro_after_init = false;
> +
>  struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>  	.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct landlock_cred_security),
> +	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct landlock_inode_security),
> +	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct landlock_superblock_security),
>  };
>  
>  static int __init landlock_init(void)
>  {
>  	landlock_add_cred_hooks();
>  	landlock_add_ptrace_hooks();
> +	landlock_add_fs_hooks();
> +	landlock_initialized = true;
>  	pr_info("Up and running.\n");
>  	return 0;
>  }
> diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.h b/security/landlock/setup.h
> index 9fdbf33fcc33..1daffab1ab4b 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/setup.h
> +++ b/security/landlock/setup.h
> @@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
>  
>  #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
>  
> +extern bool landlock_initialized;
> +
>  extern struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes;
>  
>  #endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_SETUP_H */
> 



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