Add a security hook that allows a LSM to be notified when a task gets a
fatal signal. This patch is a previous step on the way to compute the
task crash period by the "brute" LSM (linux security module to detect
and mitigate fork brute force attack against vulnerable userspace
processes).
Signed-off-by: John Wood <john.wood@xxxxxxx>
---
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++++
include/linux/security.h | 4 ++++
kernel/signal.c | 1 +
security/security.c | 5 +++++
5 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 477a597db013..0208df0955fa 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -220,6 +220,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, -ENOSYS, task_prctl, int option, unsigned long arg2,
unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_to_inode, struct task_struct *p,
struct inode *inode)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_fatal_signal, const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ipc_permission, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, ipc_getsecid, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
u32 *secid)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index fb7f3193753d..beedaa6ee745 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -784,6 +784,10 @@
* security attributes, e.g. for /proc/pid inodes.
* @p contains the task_struct for the task.
* @inode contains the inode structure for the inode.
+ * @task_fatal_signal:
+ * This hook allows security modules to be notified when a task gets a
+ * fatal signal.
+ * @siginfo contains the signal information.
*
* Security hooks for Netlink messaging.
*
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 8aeebd6646dc..e4025a13630f 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -430,6 +430,7 @@ int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
+void security_task_fatal_signal(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo);
int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg);
@@ -1165,6 +1166,9 @@ static inline int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2,
static inline void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
{ }
+static inline void security_task_fatal_signal(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo)
+{ }
+
static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
short flag)
{
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index ba4d1ef39a9e..d279df338f45 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -2750,6 +2750,7 @@ bool get_signal(struct ksignal *ksig)
/*
* Anything else is fatal, maybe with a core dump.
*/
+ security_task_fatal_signal(&ksig->info);
current->flags |= PF_SIGNALED;
if (sig_kernel_coredump(signr)) {
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 5ac96b16f8fa..d9cf653a4e70 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1840,6 +1840,11 @@ void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
call_void_hook(task_to_inode, p, inode);
}
+void security_task_fatal_signal(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo)
+{
+ call_void_hook(task_fatal_signal, siginfo);
+}
+
int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
{
return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);
--
2.25.1
