Kernel Hardening

• Date Index

• [PATCH v10 0/9] Count rlimits in each user namespace, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v10 1/9] Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v10 2/9] Add a reference to ucounts for each cred, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v10 3/9] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v10 4/9] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v10 5/9] Reimplement RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE on top of ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v10 6/9] Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
    • 08ed4efad6: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -41.9% regression, kernel test robot
      • Re: 08ed4efad6: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -41.9% regression, Linus Torvalds
        • Re: 08ed4efad6: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -41.9% regression, Alexey Gladkov
        • Re: 08ed4efad6: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -41.9% regression, Eric W. Biederman
          • Re: 08ed4efad6: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -41.9% regression, Alexey Gladkov
          • Re: 08ed4efad6: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -41.9% regression, Oliver Sang
            • Re: 08ed4efad6: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -41.9% regression, Alexey Gladkov
              • Re: 08ed4efad6: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -41.9% regression, Oliver Sang
                • Re: 08ed4efad6: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -41.9% regression, Alexey Gladkov
                  • Re: 08ed4efad6: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -41.9% regression, Oliver Sang
  • [PATCH v10 7/9] Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
    • Re: [PATCH v10 7/9] Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts, kernel test robot
  • [PATCH v10 8/9] kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v10 9/9] ucounts: Set ucount_max to the largest positive value the type can hold, Alexey Gladkov
• [PATCH v33 00/12] Landlock LSM, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v33 01/12] landlock: Add object management, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v33 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v33 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v33 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v33 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v33 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v33 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v33 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, James Morris
  • [PATCH v33 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v33 09/12] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v33 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v33 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v33 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation, Mickaël Salaün
  • Re: [PATCH v33 00/12] Landlock LSM, James Morris
    • Re: [PATCH v33 00/12] Landlock LSM, Casey Schaufler
• [PATCH v10 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v10 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v10 1/6] jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v10 2/6] init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v10 5/6] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support, Kees Cook
    • Re: [PATCH v10 5/6] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support, Will Deacon
  • [PATCH v10 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall, Kees Cook
    • Re: [PATCH v10 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall, Will Deacon
  • [PATCH v10 6/6] lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets, Kees Cook
• [PATCH v32 00/12] Landlock LSM, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v32 01/12] landlock: Add object management, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v32 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v32 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v32 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v32 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v32 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v32 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v32 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v32 09/12] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v32 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v32 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v32 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation, Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH v9 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v9 2/6] init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v9 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v9 1/6] jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v9 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v9 6/6] lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v9 5/6] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support, Kees Cook
  • Re: [PATCH v9 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall, Will Deacon
    • Re: [PATCH v9 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall, Thomas Gleixner
• [PATCH v8 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v8 1/6] jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v8 2/6] init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v8 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support, Kees Cook
    • Re: [PATCH v8 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support, Thomas Gleixner
  • [PATCH v8 6/6] lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall, Kees Cook
    • Re: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall, Thomas Gleixner
      • Re: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall, Kees Cook
        • Re: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall, Thomas Gleixner
          • Re: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall, Kees Cook
    • Re: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall, Will Deacon
      • RE: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall, David Laight
        • Re: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v8 5/6] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH] Where we are for this patch?, Roy Yang
    • Re: [PATCH] Where we are for this patch?, Al Viro
      • Re: [PATCH] Where we are for this patch?, Theodore Ts'o
    • Re: [PATCH v8 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall, Kees Cook
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • [PATCH v8 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall, Roy Yang
    • Re: [PATCH v8 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall, Theodore Ts'o
• two potential randstruct improvements, Jann Horn
  • Re: two potential randstruct improvements, Vegard Nossum
  • Re: two potential randstruct improvements, Kees Cook
• Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Askar Safin
  • Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH v31 00/12] Landlock LSM, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v31 01/12] landlock: Add object management, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v31 01/12] landlock: Add object management, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v31 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v31 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v31 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v31 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v31 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v31 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v31 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Mickaël Salaün
      • Re: [PATCH v31 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Kees Cook
      • Re: [PATCH v31 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Al Viro
        • Re: [PATCH v31 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v31 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v31 09/12] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v31 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v31 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v31 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v31 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v31 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation, Kees Cook
• [PATCH v9 0/8] Count rlimits in each user namespace, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v9 1/8] Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v9 2/8] Add a reference to ucounts for each cred, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v9 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting, Alexey Gladkov
    • Re: [PATCH v9 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting, Eric W. Biederman
  • [PATCH v9 4/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
    • Re: [PATCH v9 4/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts, Eric W. Biederman
      • Re: [PATCH v9 4/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
        • Re: [PATCH v9 4/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts, Eric W. Biederman
  • [PATCH v9 6/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
    • Re: [PATCH v9 6/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts, Eric W. Biederman
  • [PATCH v9 5/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE on top of ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v9 8/8] kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v9 7/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
  • Re: [PATCH v9 0/8] Count rlimits in each user namespace, Eric W. Biederman
• [PATCH v7 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v7 2/6] init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v7 1/6] jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v7 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support, Kees Cook
    • Re: [PATCH v7 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support, Ingo Molnar
      • Re: [PATCH v7 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support, Kees Cook
    • Re: [PATCH v7 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support, Thomas Gleixner
      • Re: [PATCH v7 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v7 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall, Kees Cook
    • Re: [PATCH v7 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall, Thomas Gleixner
      • Re: [PATCH v7 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v7 5/6] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support, Kees Cook
    • Re: [PATCH v7 5/6] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support, Will Deacon
  • [PATCH v7 6/6] lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets, Kees Cook
• [PATCH v30 00/12] Landlock LSM, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v30 01/12] landlock: Add object management, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v30 01/12] landlock: Add object management, Kees Cook
      • Re: [PATCH v30 01/12] landlock: Add object management, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v30 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v30 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management, Kees Cook
      • Re: [PATCH v30 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management, Mickaël Salaün
        • Re: [PATCH v30 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management, Kees Cook
        • Re: [PATCH v30 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management, James Morris
          • Re: [PATCH v30 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v30 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management, Jann Horn
  • [PATCH v30 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v30 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials, Kees Cook
      • Re: [PATCH v30 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v30 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v30 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v30 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v30 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v30 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v30 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, James Morris
    • Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Kees Cook
      • Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Mickaël Salaün
        • Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Jann Horn
      • Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Mickaël Salaün
        • Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Jann Horn
          • Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Mickaël Salaün
            • Re: [PATCH v30 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Jann Horn
  • [PATCH v30 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v30 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations, Kees Cook
      • Re: [PATCH v30 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations, Mickaël Salaün
        • Re: [PATCH v30 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v30 09/12] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v30 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v30 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests, Kees Cook
      • Re: [PATCH v30 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests, Mickaël Salaün
        • Re: [PATCH v30 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests, Kees Cook
          • Re: [PATCH v30 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v30 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v30 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v30 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v30 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation, Kees Cook
      • Re: [PATCH v30 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation, Mickaël Salaün
        • Re: [PATCH v30 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation, Mickaël Salaün
        • Re: [PATCH v30 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation, Mickaël Salaün
  • Re: [PATCH v30 00/12] Landlock LSM, James Morris
    • Re: [PATCH v30 00/12] Landlock LSM, Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH v5 0/1] Unprivileged chroot, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Mickaël Salaün
      • Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Casey Schaufler
        • Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Mickaël Salaün
          • Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Casey Schaufler
          • Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Casey Schaufler
            • Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Mickaël Salaün
              • Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Casey Schaufler
                • Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Kees Cook
                  • Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Al Viro
• [PATCH v4 0/1] Unprivileged chroot, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Kees Cook
    • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Jann Horn
      • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Kees Cook
        • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Mickaël Salaün
      • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Mickaël Salaün
        • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Jann Horn
          • Re: [PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH v6 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v6 1/6] jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v6 2/6] init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches, Kees Cook
    • Re: [PATCH v6 2/6] init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches, Kees Cook
    • Re: [PATCH v6 2/6] init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches, Vlastimil Babka
  • [PATCH v6 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v6 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v6 5/6] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v6 6/6] lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets, Kees Cook
• [PATCH v3 0/1] Unprivileged chroot, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v3 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Kees Cook
      • Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH v2 0/1] Unprivileged chroot, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v2 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Eric W. Biederman
      • Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Jann Horn
        • Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Mickaël Salaün
      • RE: [PATCH v2 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), David Laight
• [PATCH v1 0/1] Unprivileged chroot, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v1 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Eric W. Biederman
      • Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2), Mickaël Salaün
  • Re: [PATCH v1 0/1] Unprivileged chroot, Casey Schaufler
    • Re: [PATCH v1 0/1] Unprivileged chroot, Mickaël Salaün
      • Re: [PATCH v1 0/1] Unprivileged chroot, Casey Schaufler
        • Re: [PATCH v1 0/1] Unprivileged chroot, Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH v8 0/8] Count rlimits in each user namespace, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v8 1/8] Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v8 2/8] Add a reference to ucounts for each cred, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v8 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting, Alexey Gladkov
    • Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting, Linus Torvalds
    • Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting, Kees Cook
      • Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting, Linus Torvalds
        • Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting, Kees Cook
          • Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting, Linus Torvalds
            • Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v8 4/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v8 5/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE on top of ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v8 6/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v8 7/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v8 8/8] kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces, Alexey Gladkov
• [PATCH v5 0/7] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v5 1/7] mm: Restore init_on_* static branch defaults, Kees Cook
    • Re: [PATCH v5 1/7] mm: Restore init_on_* static branch defaults, Andrew Morton
      • Re: [PATCH v5 1/7] mm: Restore init_on_* static branch defaults, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v5 3/7] init_on_alloc: Unpessimize default-on builds, Kees Cook
    • Re: [PATCH v5 3/7] init_on_alloc: Unpessimize default-on builds, Andrey Konovalov
      • Re: [PATCH v5 3/7] init_on_alloc: Unpessimize default-on builds, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v5 2/7] jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v5 5/7] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v5 6/7] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v5 7/7] lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v5 4/7] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall, Kees Cook
• [PATCH v6 0/8] Fork brute force attack mitigation, John Wood
  • [PATCH v6 1/8] security: Add LSM hook at the point where a task gets a fatal signal, John Wood
    • Re: [PATCH v6 1/8] security: Add LSM hook at the point where a task gets a fatal signal, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v6 2/8] security/brute: Define a LSM and manage statistical data, John Wood
    • Re: [PATCH v6 2/8] security/brute: Define a LSM and manage statistical data, Kees Cook
      • Re: [PATCH v6 2/8] security/brute: Define a LSM and manage statistical data, John Wood
        • Re: [PATCH v6 2/8] security/brute: Define a LSM and manage statistical data, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v6 3/8] securtiy/brute: Detect a brute force attack, John Wood
    • Re: [PATCH v6 3/8] securtiy/brute: Detect a brute force attack, Kees Cook
      • Re: [PATCH v6 3/8] securtiy/brute: Detect a brute force attack, John Wood
        • Re: [PATCH v6 3/8] securtiy/brute: Detect a brute force attack, Kees Cook
      • Re: [PATCH v6 3/8] securtiy/brute: Detect a brute force attack, John Wood
        • Re: [PATCH v6 3/8] securtiy/brute: Detect a brute force attack, Kees Cook
          • Re: [PATCH v6 3/8] securtiy/brute: Detect a brute force attack, John Wood
  • [PATCH v6 4/8] security/brute: Fine tuning the attack detection, John Wood
    • Re: [PATCH v6 4/8] security/brute: Fine tuning the attack detection, Kees Cook
      • Re: [PATCH v6 4/8] security/brute: Fine tuning the attack detection, John Wood
        • Re: [PATCH v6 4/8] security/brute: Fine tuning the attack detection, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v6 5/8] security/brute: Mitigate a brute force attack, John Wood
    • Re: [PATCH v6 5/8] security/brute: Mitigate a brute force attack, Kees Cook
      • Re: [PATCH v6 5/8] security/brute: Mitigate a brute force attack, John Wood
        • Re: [PATCH v6 5/8] security/brute: Mitigate a brute force attack, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v6 6/8] selftests/brute: Add tests for the Brute LSM, John Wood
    • Re: [PATCH v6 6/8] selftests/brute: Add tests for the Brute LSM, Kees Cook
      • Re: [PATCH v6 6/8] selftests/brute: Add tests for the Brute LSM, John Wood
  • [PATCH v6 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM, John Wood
    • Re: [PATCH v6 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM, Kees Cook
      • Re: [PATCH v6 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM, John Wood
    • Re: [PATCH v6 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM, Jonathan Corbet
      • Re: [PATCH v6 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM, John Wood
  • [PATCH v6 8/8] MAINTAINERS: Add a new entry for the Brute LSM, John Wood
• [PATCH v5 0/8] Fork brute force attack mitigation, John Wood
  • [PATCH v5 1/8] security: Add LSM hook at the point where a task gets a fatal signal, John Wood
  • [PATCH v5 2/8] security/brute: Define a LSM and manage statistical data, John Wood
    • [security/brute] cfe92ab6a3: WARNING:inconsistent_lock_state, kernel test robot
      • Re: [security/brute] cfe92ab6a3: WARNING:inconsistent_lock_state, John Wood
  • [PATCH v5 3/8] securtiy/brute: Detect a brute force attack, John Wood
  • [PATCH v5 4/8] security/brute: Fine tuning the attack detection, John Wood
  • [PATCH v5 5/8] security/brute: Mitigate a brute force attack, John Wood
    • Re: [PATCH v5 5/8] security/brute: Mitigate a brute force attack, peter enderborg
      • Re: [PATCH v5 5/8] security/brute: Mitigate a brute force attack, John Wood
  • [PATCH v5 6/8] selftests/brute: Add tests for the Brute LSM, John Wood
  • [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM, John Wood
    • Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM, Andi Kleen
      • Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM, John Wood
        • Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM, Andi Kleen
          • Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM, John Wood
            • Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM, Andi Kleen
              • Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM, John Wood
                • Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM, Andi Kleen
                  • Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM, John Wood
                    • Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM, John Wood
                      • Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM, Andi Kleen
                        • Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM, John Wood
                    • Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM, Andi Kleen
                      • Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM, John Wood
  • [PATCH v5 8/8] MAINTAINERS: Add a new entry for the Brute LSM, John Wood
  • Re: [PATCH v5 0/8] Fork brute force attack mitigation, John Wood
• [PATCH v4 0/8] Fork brute force attack mitigation, John Wood
  • Re: [PATCH v4 0/8] Fork brute force attack mitigation, John Wood
• [PATCH v29 00/12] Landlock LSM, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v29 01/12] landlock: Add object management, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v29 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v29 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v29 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v29 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v29 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v29 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v29 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v29 09/12] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v29 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v29 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v29 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation, Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH v1 1/1] Kernel Config to make randomize_va_space read-only., Lan Zheng (lanzheng)
  • Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Kernel Config to make randomize_va_space read-only., Greg KH
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • [PATCH v1 1/1] Kernel Config to make randomize_va_space read-only., Lan Zheng (lanzheng)
    • Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Kernel Config to make randomize_va_space read-only., Greg KH
• [PATCH 00/20] Manual replacement of all strlcpy in favor of strscpy, Romain Perier
  • [PATCH 01/20] cgroup: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Romain Perier
    • Re: [PATCH 01/20] cgroup: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Michal Koutný
      • Re: [PATCH 01/20] cgroup: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Romain Perier
  • [PATCH 02/20] crypto: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Romain Perier
    • Re: [PATCH 02/20] crypto: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Herbert Xu
      • Re: [PATCH 02/20] crypto: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Romain Perier
  • [PATCH 03/20] devlink: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Romain Perier
    • Re: [PATCH 03/20] devlink: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Jakub Kicinski
  • [PATCH 04/20] dma-buf: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Romain Perier
  • [PATCH 05/20] kobject: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Romain Perier
  • [PATCH 06/20] ima: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Romain Perier
    • Re: [PATCH 06/20] ima: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Mimi Zohar
  • [PATCH 07/20] SUNRPC: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Romain Perier
    • Re: [PATCH 07/20] SUNRPC: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Chuck Lever
      • Re: [PATCH 07/20] SUNRPC: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Romain Perier
  • [PATCH 08/20] kernfs: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Romain Perier
  • [PATCH 09/20] m68k/atari: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Romain Perier
  • [PATCH 10/20] module: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Romain Perier
  • [PATCH 11/20] hwmon: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Romain Perier
    • Re: [PATCH 11/20] hwmon: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Guenter Roeck
      • Re: [PATCH 11/20] hwmon: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Romain Perier
      • Re: [PATCH 11/20] hwmon: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Joe Perches
  • [PATCH 12/20] s390/hmcdrv: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Romain Perier
  • [PATCH 13/20] scsi: zfcp: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Romain Perier
    • Re: [PATCH 13/20] scsi: zfcp: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Benjamin Block
  • [PATCH 14/20] target: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Romain Perier
    • Re: [PATCH 14/20] target: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Bodo Stroesser
    • Re: [PATCH 14/20] target: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, kernel test robot
  • [PATCH 15/20] ALSA: usb-audio: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Romain Perier
    • Re: [PATCH 15/20] ALSA: usb-audio: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Takashi Iwai
  • [PATCH 16/20] tracing/probe: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Romain Perier
    • Re: [PATCH 16/20] tracing/probe: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Steven Rostedt
      • Re: [PATCH 16/20] tracing/probe: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Romain Perier
  • [PATCH 17/20] vt: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Romain Perier
    • Re: [PATCH 17/20] vt: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Jiri Slaby
      • Re: [PATCH 17/20] vt: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Romain Perier
  • [PATCH 18/20] usb: gadget: f_midi: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Romain Perier
  • [PATCH 19/20] usbip: usbip_host: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Romain Perier
    • Re: [PATCH 19/20] usbip: usbip_host: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Shuah Khan
    • Re: [PATCH 19/20] usbip: usbip_host: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Sergei Shtylyov
    • Re: [PATCH 19/20] usbip: usbip_host: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Andy Shevchenko
  • [PATCH 20/20] s390/watchdog: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Romain Perier
    • Re: [PATCH 20/20] s390/watchdog: Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Guenter Roeck
  • Re: [PATCH 00/20] Manual replacement of all strlcpy in favor of strscpy, Shuah Khan
    • Re: [PATCH 00/20] Manual replacement of all strlcpy in favor of strscpy, Romain Perier
• [PATCH v7 0/7] Count rlimits in each user namespace, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v7 1/7] Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v7 2/7] Add a reference to ucounts for each cred, Alexey Gladkov
    • e1e57d56fe: stress-ng.access.ops_per_sec -41.6% regression, kernel test robot
  • [PATCH v7 3/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v7 4/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE on top of ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v7 5/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
    • d28296d248: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -82.7% regression, kernel test robot
      • Re: d28296d248: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -82.7% regression, Eric W. Biederman
        • Re: d28296d248: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -82.7% regression, Alexey Gladkov
          • Re: d28296d248: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -82.7% regression, Eric W. Biederman
            • Re: d28296d248: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -82.7% regression, Alexey Gladkov
              • Re: d28296d248: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -82.7% regression, Eric W. Biederman
          • Re: d28296d248: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -82.7% regression, Linus Torvalds
  • [PATCH v7 6/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
    • 5b5c35b757: BUG:KASAN:use-after-free_in_dec_rlimit_ucounts, kernel test robot
  • [PATCH v7 7/7] kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces, Alexey Gladkov
• [PATCH v6 0/7] Count rlimits in each user namespace, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v6 1/7] Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v6 2/7] Add a reference to ucounts for each cred, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v6 3/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
    • Re: [PATCH v6 3/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts, Jens Axboe
      • Re: [PATCH v6 3/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
        • Re: [PATCH v6 3/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts, Jens Axboe
  • [PATCH v6 4/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE on top of ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v6 5/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v6 7/7] kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v6 6/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
    • Re: [PATCH v6 6/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts, kernel test robot
    • Re: [PATCH v6 6/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts, kernel test robot
    • [PATCH v7 6/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
    • f009495a8d: BUG:KASAN:use-after-free_in_user_shm_unlock, kernel test robot
  • Re: [PATCH v6 0/7] Count rlimits in each user namespace, Linus Torvalds
    • Re: [PATCH v6 0/7] Count rlimits in each user namespace, Alexey Gladkov
    • Re: [PATCH v6 0/7] Count rlimits in each user namespace, Eric W. Biederman
• Fine-grained Forward CFI on top of Intel CET / IBT, Joao Moreira
  • Re: Fine-grained Forward CFI on top of Intel CET / IBT, Kees Cook
    • Re: Fine-grained Forward CFI on top of Intel CET / IBT, Joao Moreira
      • Re: Fine-grained Forward CFI on top of Intel CET / IBT, Joao Moreira
• [ANNOUNCE][CFP] Linux Security Summit 2021, James Morris
  • Re: [ANNOUNCE][CFP] Linux Security Summit 2021, James Morris
    • Re: [ANNOUNCE][CFP] Linux Security Summit 2021, James Morris
      • Re: [ANNOUNCE][CFP] Linux Security Summit 2021, James Morris
• Joining the general Linux kernel hardening mailing list, Guy L
• [PATCH v28 00/12] Landlock LSM, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v28 01/12] landlock: Add object management, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v28 01/12] landlock: Add object management, Serge E. Hallyn
      • Re: [PATCH v28 01/12] landlock: Add object management, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v28 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v28 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management, Serge E. Hallyn
  • [PATCH v28 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v28 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials, Serge E. Hallyn
  • [PATCH v28 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v28 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions, Serge E. Hallyn
  • [PATCH v28 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v28 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock, Serge E. Hallyn
      • Re: [PATCH v28 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock, Casey Schaufler
      • Re: [PATCH v28 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock, Casey Schaufler
  • [PATCH v28 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v28 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook, Serge E. Hallyn
      • Re: [PATCH v28 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook, Mickaël Salaün
        • Re: [PATCH v28 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook, Serge E. Hallyn
  • [PATCH v28 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v28 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Serge E. Hallyn
      • Re: [PATCH v28 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Mickaël Salaün
        • Re: [PATCH v28 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Serge E. Hallyn
  • [PATCH v28 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v28 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations, Serge E. Hallyn
  • [PATCH v28 09/12] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v28 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v28 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v28 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation, Mickaël Salaün
• forkat(int pidfd), execveat(int pidfd), other awful things?, Jason A. Donenfeld
  • Re: forkat(int pidfd), execveat(int pidfd), other awful things?, Jason A. Donenfeld
  • Re: forkat(int pidfd), execveat(int pidfd), other awful things?, Andy Lutomirski
    • RE: forkat(int pidfd), execveat(int pidfd), other awful things?, David Laight
      • Leveraging pidfs for process creation without fork, John Cotton Ericson
        • Re: Leveraging pidfs for process creation without fork, Christian Brauner
          • Re: Leveraging pidfs for process creation without fork, John Ericson
          • Re: Leveraging pidfs for process creation without fork, Al Viro
            • Re: Leveraging pidfs for process creation without fork, John Ericson
              • Re: Leveraging pidfs for process creation without fork, Al Viro
                • Re: Leveraging pidfs for process creation without fork, Christian Brauner
                  • Re: Leveraging pidfs for process creation without fork, John Cotton Ericson
  • Re: forkat(int pidfd), execveat(int pidfd), other awful things?, Casey Schaufler
  • Re: forkat(int pidfd), execveat(int pidfd), other awful things?, Christian Brauner
• [PATCH v5 0/7] Count rlimits in each user namespace, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v5 1/7] Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v5 2/7] Add a reference to ucounts for each cred, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v5 3/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
    • c632dadc10: BUG:KASAN:null-ptr-deref_in_is_ucounts_overlimit, kernel test robot
  • [PATCH v5 4/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE on top of ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v5 5/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v5 6/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
    • 0ac0c30c8f: WARNING:at_kernel/ucount.c:#dec_rlimit_ucounts, kernel test robot
  • [PATCH v5 7/7] kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces, Alexey Gladkov
• [PATCH v4 0/7] Count rlimits in each user namespace, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v4 1/7] Add a reference to ucounts for each cred, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v4 2/7] Move RLIMIT_NPROC counter to ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v4 4/7] Move RLIMIT_SIGPENDING counter to ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v4 3/7] Move RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE counter to ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v4 5/7] Move RLIMIT_MEMLOCK counter to ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v4 6/7] Move RLIMIT_NPROC check to the place where we increment the counter, Alexey Gladkov
  • [PATCH v4 7/7] kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces, Alexey Gladkov
• [PATCH v27 00/12] Landlock LSM, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v27 01/12] landlock: Add object management, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v27 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v27 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v27 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v27 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v27 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v27 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v27 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v27 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v27 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v27 09/12] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v27 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v27 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v27 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v27 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
      • Re: [PATCH v27 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation, Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH kspp-next] kbuild: prevent CC_FLAGS_LTO self-bloating on recursive rebuilds, Alexander Lobakin
  • Re: [PATCH kspp-next] kbuild: prevent CC_FLAGS_LTO self-bloating on recursive rebuilds, Kees Cook
• [RFC PATCH v3 0/8] Count rlimits in each user namespace, Alexey Gladkov
  • [RFC PATCH v3 1/8] Use refcount_t for ucounts reference counting, Alexey Gladkov
    • c25050162e: WARNING:at_lib/refcount.c:#refcount_warn_saturate, kernel test robot
    • Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/8] Use refcount_t for ucounts reference counting, Linus Torvalds
      • Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/8] Use refcount_t for ucounts reference counting, Alexey Gladkov
        • Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/8] Use refcount_t for ucounts reference counting, Linus Torvalds
          • Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/8] Use refcount_t for ucounts reference counting, Alexey Gladkov
            • Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/8] Use refcount_t for ucounts reference counting, Kaiwan N Billimoria
            • Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/8] Use refcount_t for ucounts reference counting, Eric W. Biederman
              • Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/8] Use refcount_t for ucounts reference counting, Eric W. Biederman
              • Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/8] Use refcount_t for ucounts reference counting, Alexey Gladkov
                • Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/8] Use refcount_t for ucounts reference counting, Eric W. Biederman
                  • Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/8] Use refcount_t for ucounts reference counting, Alexey Gladkov
  • [RFC PATCH v3 2/8] Add a reference to ucounts for each cred, Alexey Gladkov
    • [PATCH v4 2/8] Add a reference to ucounts for each cred, Alexey Gladkov
    • 14c3c8a27f: kernel_BUG_at_kernel/cred.c, kernel test robot
  • [RFC PATCH v3 4/8] Move RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE counter to ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
  • [RFC PATCH v3 3/8] Move RLIMIT_NPROC counter to ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
  • [RFC PATCH v3 5/8] Move RLIMIT_SIGPENDING counter to ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
  • [RFC PATCH v3 6/8] Move RLIMIT_MEMLOCK counter to ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
  • [RFC PATCH v3 8/8] kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces, Alexey Gladkov
  • [RFC PATCH v3 7/8] Move RLIMIT_NPROC check to the place where we increment the counter, Alexey Gladkov
• linux-hardening list archive, Solar Designer
• [RFC PATCH v2 0/8] Count rlimits in each user namespace, Alexey Gladkov
  • [RFC PATCH v2 2/8] Add a reference to ucounts for each user, Alexey Gladkov
    • 59ebc79722: kernel_BUG_at_kernel/cred.c, kernel test robot
    • Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/8] Add a reference to ucounts for each user, Eric W. Biederman
  • [RFC PATCH v2 4/8] Move RLIMIT_NPROC counter to ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
  • [RFC PATCH v2 1/8] Use atomic type for ucounts reference counting, Alexey Gladkov
    • Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/8] Use atomic type for ucounts reference counting, Eric W. Biederman
      • Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/8] Use atomic type for ucounts reference counting, Kees Cook
  • [RFC PATCH v2 3/8] Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t, Alexey Gladkov
  • [RFC PATCH v2 6/8] Move RLIMIT_SIGPENDING counter to ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
  • [RFC PATCH v2 7/8] Move RLIMIT_MEMLOCK counter to ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
  • [RFC PATCH v2 5/8] Move RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE counter to ucounts, Alexey Gladkov
  • [RFC PATCH v2 8/8] Move RLIMIT_NPROC check to the place where we increment the counter, Alexey Gladkov
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/8] Count rlimits in each user namespace, Linus Torvalds
    • Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/8] Count rlimits in each user namespace, Eric W. Biederman
• Re: [PATCH v2] bug: further enhance use of CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION, Josh Poimboeuf
• [PATCH 04/13] x86/extable: Introduce _ASM_EXTABLE_UA for uaccess fixups, Wetp Zhang
  • Re: [PATCH 04/13] x86/extable: Introduce _ASM_EXTABLE_UA for uaccess fixups, wetp
• Kernel complexity, stefan . bavendiek
  • Re: Kernel complexity, Jann Horn
    • Re: Kernel complexity, stefan . bavendiek
      • Re: Kernel complexity, Greg KH
  • Re: Kernel complexity, Sandy Harris
• [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO, Sami Tolvanen
  • [PATCH v9 01/16] tracing: move function tracer options to Kconfig, Sami Tolvanen
    • Re: [PATCH v9 01/16] tracing: move function tracer options to Kconfig (causing parisc build failures), Guenter Roeck
      • Re: [PATCH v9 01/16] tracing: move function tracer options to Kconfig (causing parisc build failures), Kees Cook
        • Re: [PATCH v9 01/16] tracing: move function tracer options to Kconfig (causing parisc build failures), Sami Tolvanen
          • Re: [PATCH v9 01/16] tracing: move function tracer options to Kconfig (causing parisc build failures), Guenter Roeck
        • Re: [PATCH v9 01/16] tracing: move function tracer options to Kconfig (causing parisc build failures), Guenter Roeck
          • Re: [PATCH v9 01/16] tracing: move function tracer options to Kconfig (causing parisc build failures), Kees Cook
  • [PATCH v9 02/16] kbuild: add support for Clang LTO, Sami Tolvanen
  • [PATCH v9 03/16] kbuild: lto: fix module versioning, Sami Tolvanen
  • [PATCH v9 04/16] kbuild: lto: limit inlining, Sami Tolvanen
  • [PATCH v9 05/16] kbuild: lto: merge module sections, Sami Tolvanen
    • Re: [PATCH v9 05/16] kbuild: lto: merge module sections, Stephen Boyd
  • [PATCH v9 06/16] kbuild: lto: add a default list of used symbols, Sami Tolvanen
    • Re: [PATCH v9 06/16] kbuild: lto: add a default list of used symbols, Kees Cook
      • Re: [PATCH v9 06/16] kbuild: lto: add a default list of used symbols, Sami Tolvanen
        • Re: [PATCH v9 06/16] kbuild: lto: add a default list of used symbols, Nick Desaulniers
  • [PATCH v9 07/16] init: lto: ensure initcall ordering, Sami Tolvanen
  • [PATCH v9 08/16] init: lto: fix PREL32 relocations, Sami Tolvanen
  • [PATCH v9 09/16] PCI: Fix PREL32 relocations for LTO, Sami Tolvanen
  • [PATCH v9 10/16] modpost: lto: strip .lto from module names, Sami Tolvanen
  • [PATCH v9 11/16] scripts/mod: disable LTO for empty.c, Sami Tolvanen
  • [PATCH v9 12/16] efi/libstub: disable LTO, Sami Tolvanen
  • [PATCH v9 13/16] drivers/misc/lkdtm: disable LTO for rodata.o, Sami Tolvanen
  • [PATCH v9 14/16] arm64: vdso: disable LTO, Sami Tolvanen
  • [PATCH v9 15/16] arm64: disable recordmcount with DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS, Sami Tolvanen
  • [PATCH v9 16/16] arm64: allow LTO to be selected, Sami Tolvanen
  • Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO, Kees Cook
  • Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO, Kees Cook
  • Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO, Sedat Dilek
    • Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO, Josh Poimboeuf
      • Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO, Sedat Dilek
        • Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO, Josh Poimboeuf
          • Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO, Sedat Dilek
            • Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO, Josh Poimboeuf
              • Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO, Sedat Dilek
                • Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO, Josh Poimboeuf
                  • Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO, Josh Poimboeuf
                    • Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO, Sedat Dilek
                    • Re: [PATCH v9 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO, Sedat Dilek
• [PATCH v26 00/12] Landlock LSM, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v26 01/12] landlock: Add object management, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v26 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v26 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management, Jann Horn
  • [PATCH v26 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v26 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v26 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v26 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v26 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v26 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Jann Horn
      • Re: [PATCH v26 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Mickaël Salaün
        • Re: [PATCH v26 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Jann Horn
          • Re: [PATCH v26 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Mickaël Salaün
            • Re: [PATCH v26 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Jann Horn
              • Re: [PATCH v26 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v26 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v26 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v26 09/12] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v26 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v26 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example, Mickaël Salaün
    • Re: [PATCH v26 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example, Jann Horn
      • Re: [PATCH v26 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v26 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation, Mickaël Salaün
  • Re: [PATCH v26 00/12] Landlock LSM, Jann Horn
    • Re: [PATCH v26 00/12] Landlock LSM, Mickaël Salaün
• [PRE-REVIEW PATCH 0/2] Remove all strlcpy in favor of strscpy, Romain Perier
  • [PRE-REVIEW PATCH 1/2] Manual replacement of the deprecated strlcpy() with return values, Romain Perier
  • [PRE-REVIEW PATCH 2/2] Automated replacement of all other deprecated strlcpy(), Romain Perier
  • Re: [PRE-REVIEW PATCH 0/2] Remove all strlcpy in favor of strscpy, Romain Perier
• [PATCH v12 0/3] Add trusted_for(2) (was O_MAYEXEC), Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v12 1/3] fs: Add trusted_for(2) syscall implementation and related sysctl, Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v12 2/3] arch: Wire up trusted_for(2), Mickaël Salaün
  • [PATCH v12 3/3] selftest/interpreter: Add tests for trusted_for(2) policies, Mickaël Salaün
  • Re: [PATCH v12 0/3] Add trusted_for(2) (was O_MAYEXEC), bauen1
    • Re: [PATCH v12 0/3] Add trusted_for(2) (was O_MAYEXEC), Mickaël Salaün
      • Re: [PATCH v12 0/3] Add trusted_for(2) (was O_MAYEXEC), Kees Cook
        • Re: [PATCH v12 0/3] Add trusted_for(2) (was O_MAYEXEC), Mickaël Salaün
          • Re: [PATCH v12 0/3] Add trusted_for(2) (was O_MAYEXEC), Mimi Zohar
            • Re: [PATCH v12 0/3] Add trusted_for(2) (was O_MAYEXEC), Mickaël Salaün
• [PATCH v8 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO, Sami Tolvanen
  • [PATCH v8 01/16] tracing: move function tracer options to Kconfig, Sami Tolvanen
    • Re: [PATCH v8 01/16] tracing: move function tracer options to Kconfig, Steven Rostedt
  • [PATCH v8 02/16] kbuild: add support for Clang LTO, Sami Tolvanen
    • Re: [PATCH v8 02/16] kbuild: add support for Clang LTO, Masahiro Yamada
    • Re: [PATCH v8 02/16] kbuild: add support for Clang LTO, Nick Desaulniers
  • [PATCH v8 03/16] kbuild: lto: fix module versioning, Sami Tolvanen
  • [PATCH v8 04/16] kbuild: lto: limit inlining, Sami Tolvanen
  • [PATCH v8 05/16] kbuild: lto: merge module sections, Sami Tolvanen
  • [PATCH v8 06/16] kbuild: lto: remove duplicate dependencies from .mod files, Sami Tolvanen
  • [PATCH v8 07/16] init: lto: ensure initcall ordering, Sami Tolvanen
  • [PATCH v8 08/16] init: lto: fix PREL32 relocations, Sami Tolvanen
  • [PATCH v8 09/16] PCI: Fix PREL32 relocations for LTO, Sami Tolvanen
  • [PATCH v8 10/16] modpost: lto: strip .lto from module names, Sami Tolvanen
  • [PATCH v8 11/16] scripts/mod: disable LTO for empty.c, Sami Tolvanen
  • [PATCH v8 12/16] efi/libstub: disable LTO, Sami Tolvanen
  • [PATCH v8 13/16] drivers/misc/lkdtm: disable LTO for rodata.o, Sami Tolvanen
  • [PATCH v8 14/16] arm64: vdso: disable LTO, Sami Tolvanen
  • [PATCH v8 15/16] arm64: disable recordmcount with DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS, Sami Tolvanen
  • [PATCH v8 16/16] arm64: allow LTO to be selected, Sami Tolvanen
  • Re: [PATCH v8 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO, Nick Desaulniers
  • Re: [PATCH v8 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO, Will Deacon
    • Re: [PATCH v8 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO, Sami Tolvanen
      • Re: [PATCH v8 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO, Nathan Chancellor
      • Re: [PATCH v8 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO, Will Deacon
        • Re: [PATCH v8 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO, Nick Desaulniers
          • Re: [PATCH v8 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO, Will Deacon
          • Re: [PATCH v8 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO, Sami Tolvanen
            • Re: [PATCH v8 00/16] Add support for Clang LTO, Nathan Chancellor