Linux EFI/UEFI Development

• Thread Index

• Re: [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring
  • From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 11/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 10/20] Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 12/20] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 11/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 10/20] Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 09/20] x86: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 05/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 05/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 05/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
  • From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 05/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 12/20] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 10/20] Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 11/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
  • From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
  • From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 09/20] x86: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring
  • From: Petko Manolov <petkan@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 6/9] efi: Add EFI signature data types
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring
  • From: Petko Manolov <petkan@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 6/9] efi: Add EFI signature data types
  • From: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 01/16] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown
  • From: Justin Forbes <jmforbes@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown
  • From: One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 01/16] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 01/16] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 03/16] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 05/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 04/16] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 06/16] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 07/16] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 08/16] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 09/16] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 11/16] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 10/16] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 12/16] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 13/16] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 15/16] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 16/16] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 14/16] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 08/20] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/9] KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/9] X.509: Allow X.509 certs to be blacklisted
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/9] PKCS#7: Handle blacklisted certificates
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 6/9] efi: Add EFI signature data types
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 5/9] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 7/9] efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 9/9] MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 8/9] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 0/9] KEYS: Blacklisting & UEFI database load
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 08/20] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
  • From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
  • From: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi/libstub: Make efi_random_alloc() allocate below 4 GB on 32-bit
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] efi/libstub: add random.c to ARM build
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
  • From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] efi/libstub: add random.c to ARM build
  • From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
  • From: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME
  • From: Joerg Roedel <joro@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 06/20] x86: Add support to enable SME during early boot processing
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 06/20] x86: Add support to enable SME during early boot processing
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 06/20] x86: Add support to enable SME during early boot processing
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 02/20] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 14/20] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU if memory encryption is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 10/20] Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 14/20] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU if memory encryption is active
  • From: Joerg Roedel <joro@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/2] Honey, I shrunk the EFI stub
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 5/9] efi/arm*: libstub: Invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 5/9] efi/arm*: libstub: Invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 5/9] efi/arm*: libstub: Invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 5/9] efi/arm*: libstub: Invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/2] Honey, I shrunk the EFI stub
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 5/9] efi/arm*: libstub: Invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [efi:master 9/10] drivers/firmware/efi/apple-properties.c:149:3: error: implicit declaration of function 'efi_get_device_by_path'
  • From: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/9] MAINTAINERS: Add ARM and arm64 EFI specific files to EFI subsystem
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/9] efi/libstub: Fix allocation size calculations
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4/9] efi/libstub: Add random.c to ARM build
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 5/9] efi/arm*: libstub: Invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/9] efi: Add support for seeding the RNG from a UEFI config table
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 6/9] efi: Add device path parser
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 7/9] efi: Allow bitness-agnostic protocol calls
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 9/9] thunderbolt: Use Device ROM retrieved from EFI
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 8/9] x86/efi: Retrieve and assign Apple device properties
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL 0/9] EFI changes for v4.10
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI urgent fixes
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Fix EFI memmap pointer size warning
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/2] x86/efi: Prevent mixed mode boot corruption with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/2] Honey, I shrunk the EFI stub
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 0/4] Apple device properties
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 2/4] efi: Allow bitness-agnostic protocol calls
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 10/20] Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: "Kani, Toshimitsu" <toshi.kani@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 03/20] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 02/20] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
  • From: "Kani, Toshimitsu" <toshi.kani@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 02/20] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 00/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 11/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 09/20] x86: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 08/20] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 15/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 20/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 19/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 18/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 17/20] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 12/20] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 14/20] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU if memory encryption is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 05/20] x86: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 06/20] x86: Add support to enable SME during early boot processing
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 03/20] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 02/20] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 16/20] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 10/20] Add support to access boot related data in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
  • From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
  • From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCHv4 0/4] WX checking for arm64
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCHv4 0/4] WX checking for arm64
  • From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [tip:x86/asm] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks (CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK=y)
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCHv4 0/4] WX checking for arm64
  • From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCHv4 0/4] WX checking for arm64
  • From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCHv4 0/4] WX checking for arm64
  • From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] thunderbolt: Use Device ROM retrieved from EFI
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/2] x86/efi: Deduplicate efi_char16_printk()
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/2] efi: Deduplicate efi_file_size() / _read() / _close()
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 0/2] Honey, I shrunk the EFI stub
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 2/3] x86/efi: Retrieve and assign Apple device properties
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 4/4] thunderbolt: Use Device ROM retrieved from EFI
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 3/4] x86/efi: Retrieve and assign Apple device properties
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 2/4] efi: Allow bitness-agnostic protocol calls
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 1/4] efi: Add device path parser
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 0/4] Apple device properties
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Fix EFI memmap pointer size warning
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 0/3] Apple device properties
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 0/3] Apple device properties
  • From: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] thunderbolt: Use Device ROM retrieved from EFI
  • From: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] x86/efi: Fix EFI memmap pointer size warning
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 0/3] Apple device properties
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 2/3] x86/efi: Retrieve and assign Apple device properties
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 3/3] thunderbolt: Use Device ROM retrieved from EFI
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 2/3] x86/efi: Retrieve and assign Apple device properties
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 1/3] efi: Add device path parser
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 0/3] Apple device properties
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
  • From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
  • From: "Neri, Ricardo" <ricardo.neri@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] EFI loader: remove pointless "if" statement
  • From: Eugene Korenevsky <ekorenevsky@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] EFI loader: remove redundant code
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] EFI loader: remove redundant code
  • From: Eugene Korenevsky <ekorenevsky@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] efi/libstub: add random.c to ARM build
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] EFI loader: remove redundant code
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] EFI loader: remove dead code
  • From: Eugene Korenevsky <ekorenevsky@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2] EFI loader: remove redundant code
  • From: Eugene Korenevsky <ekorenevsky@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] EFI loader: remove dead code
  • From: Linn Crosetto <linn@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] EFI loader: remove dead code
  • From: Eugene Korenevsky <ekorenevsky@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
  • From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V4 10/10] arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
  • From: Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V4 10/10] arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/2] MAINTAINERS: add ARM and arm64 EFI specific files to EFI subsystem
  • From: Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V4 10/10] arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
  • From: Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] Fix allocation size calculations
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCHv4 0/4] WX checking for arm64
  • From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [tip:x86/asm] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks (CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK=y)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
  • From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
  • From: Thorsten Leemhuis <regressions@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/2] MAINTAINERS: add ARM and arm64 EFI specific files to EFI subsystem
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCHv4 4/4] arm64: dump: Add checking for writable and exectuable pages
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
  • From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCHv4 1/4] arm64: dump: Make ptdump debugfs a separate option
  • From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCHv4 0/4] WX checking for arm64
  • From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCHv4 3/4] arm64: dump: Remove max_addr
  • From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCHv4 4/4] arm64: dump: Add checking for writable and exectuable pages
  • From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCHv4 2/4] arm64: dump: Make the page table dumping seq_file optional
  • From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
  • From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] efi: Add device path parser
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4.8 104/140] x86/platform/UV: Fix support for EFI_OLD_MEMMAP after BIOS callback updates
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
  • From: David Daney <ddaney@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
  • From: David Daney <ddaney@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
  • From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] Fix allocation size calculations
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
  • From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions
  • From: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3] Fix allocation size calculations
  • From: Roy Franz <roy.franz@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] efi: Add device path parser
  • From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] efi: Add device path parser
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] efi: Add device path parser
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] Fix allocation size calculations
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V4 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V4 01/10] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [REGRESSION] EFI mixed mode patch triggers boot failure
  • From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2] Fix allocation size calculations
  • From: Roy Franz <roy.franz@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V4 09/10] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tip:x86/asm] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks (CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK=y)
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V4 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
  • From: Suzuki K Poulose <Suzuki.Poulose@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V4 01/10] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
  • From: Suzuki K Poulose <Suzuki.Poulose@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] Fix allocation size calculations
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
  • From: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] efi: Add device path parser
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tip:x86/asm] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks (CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK=y)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
  • From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V4 09/10] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event
  • From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] Fix allocation size calculations
  • From: Roy Franz <roy.franz@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] Fix allocation size calculations
  • From: Roy Franz <roy.franz@xxxxxxx>
• Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
  • From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V4 00/10] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V4 01/10] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V4 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V4 07/10] efi: print unrecognized CPER section
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V4 06/10] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V4 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V4 09/10] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V4 08/10] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V4 10/10] arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V4 03/10] efi: parse ARMv8 processor error
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V4 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] efi: Add device path parser
  • From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tip:x86/asm] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks (CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK=y)
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
  • From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for seeding the kernel RNG from UEFI
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
  • From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCHv3 4/4] arm64: dump: Add checking for writable and exectuable pages
  • From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [REGRESSION] EFI mixed mode patch triggers boot failure
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] efi: add support for seeding the RNG from a UEFI config table
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 3/3] efi/arm*: libstub: invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 2/3] efi/libstub: add random.c to ARM build
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 1/3] efi: add support for seeding the RNG from a UEFI config table
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 0/3] efi: add support for seeding the kernel RNG from UEFI
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCHv3 4/4] arm64: dump: Add checking for writable and exectuable pages
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCHv3 1/4] arm64: dump: Make ptdump debugfs a separate option
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• 4.9-rc1 boot regression, ambiguous bisect result
  • From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: add support for seeding the RNG from a UEFI config table
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: add support for seeding the RNG from a UEFI config table
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: add support for seeding the RNG from a UEFI config table
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: add support for seeding the RNG from a UEFI config table
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [REGRESSION] EFI mixed mode patch triggers boot failure
  • From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
  • From: "Abdulhamid, Harb" <harba@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
  • From: "Abdulhamid, Harb" <harba@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: add support for seeding the RNG from a UEFI config table
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: add support for seeding the RNG from a UEFI config table
  • From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 0/2] efi/arm64: add vmlinux link to PE/COFF debug table
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 2/2] efi: arm64: add vmlinux debug link to the Image binary
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 1/2] efi: libstub: preserve .debug sections after absolute relocation check
  • From: "Cohen, Eugene" <eugene@xxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: add support for seeding the RNG from a UEFI config table
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: add support for seeding the RNG from a UEFI config table
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] urgent EFI fix for v4.9
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 1/2] efi: libstub: preserve .debug sections after absolute relocation check
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] efi: Add device path parser
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] efi: Add device path parser
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCHv3 3/4] arm64: dump: Remove max_addr
  • From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCHv3 1/4] arm64: dump: Make ptdump debugfs a separate option
  • From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCHv3 2/4] arm64: dump: Make the page table dumping seq_file optional
  • From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCHv3 4/4] arm64: dump: Add checking for writable and exectuable pages
  • From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCHv3 0/4] WX checking for arm64
  • From: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] KVM: introduce KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl
  • From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] KVM: introduce KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
  • From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi/arm: Fix absolute relocation detection for older toolchains
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL] urgent EFI fix for v4.9
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL 0/8] EFI changes for v4.10
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL 0/8] EFI changes for v4.10
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL 0/8] EFI changes for v4.10
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL 0/8] EFI changes for v4.10
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 8/8] efi: efivar_ssdt_load: Don't return success on allocation failure
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 7/8] efifb: show framebuffer layout as device attributes
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/8] efi/arm*: efi_init() error handling fix
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4/8] efi/efi_test: Fix the uninitialized value datasize
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 5/8] efi/efi_test: Fix the uninitialized value rv
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/8] MAINTAINERS: add myself as EFI maintainer
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/8] efi: Remove unused including <linux/version.h>
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 6/8] efi/efi_test: Use memdup_user() as a cleanup
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL 0/8] EFI changes for v4.10
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
  • From: Hanjun Guo <hanjun.guo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
  • From: Hanjun Guo <hanjun.guo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
  • From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] partitions/efi: Ignore errors when alternate GPT is not at the end of disk
  • From: Hannes Reinecke <hare@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] partitions/efi: Ignore errors when alternate GPT is not at the end of disk
  • From: Karel Zak <kzak@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] KVM: introduce KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl
  • From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] KVM: introduce KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
  • From: Robert Richter <rric@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD)
  • From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 3/3] thunderbolt: Use Device ROM retrieved from EFI
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 2/3] x86/efi: Retrieve and assign Apple device properties
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 1/3] efi: Add device path parser
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 0/3] Apple device properties
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] partitions/efi: Ignore errors when alternate GPT is not at the end of disk
  • From: Hannes Reinecke <hare@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 10/10] arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
  • From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
  • From: Suzuki K Poulose <Suzuki.Poulose@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
  • From: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 10/10] arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
  • From: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 06/10] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 08/10] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 10/10] arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 01/10] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 10/10] arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
  • From: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 06/10] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block
  • From: Suzuki K Poulose <Suzuki.Poulose@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 20/28] KVM: SVM: prepare for SEV guest management API support
  • From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD)
  • From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 24/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH command
  • From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 22/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV launch start command
  • From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [patch] efi: fix an error code
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] KVM: introduce KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl
  • From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 08/10] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section
  • From: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 19/28] KVM: SVM: prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest
  • From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [patch] efi: fix an error code
  • From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
  • From: Suzuki K Poulose <Suzuki.Poulose@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 09/10] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event
  • From: "Baicar, Tyler" <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
  • From: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort
  • From: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 01/10] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
  • From: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: Use LocateHandleBuffer instead of LocateHandle
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
  • From: Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
  • From: Suzuki K Poulose <Suzuki.Poulose@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
  • From: David Daney <ddaney.cavm@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/arm: fix absolute relocation detection for older toolchains
  • From: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 09/10] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event
  • From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V3 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V3 08/10] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V3 09/10] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V3 10/10] arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V3 07/10] efi: print unrecognized CPER section
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V3 06/10] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V3 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V3 03/10] efi: parse ARMv8 processor error
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V3 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V3 01/10] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V3 00/10] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64
  • From: Tyler Baicar <tbaicar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
  • From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: arm64: kernel BUG at mm/page_alloc.c:1844!
  • From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/2] efi/arm*: libstub: invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/2] efi: add support for seeding the RNG from a UEFI config table
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 0/2] efi: add support for seeding the kernel RNG from UEFI
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
  • From: Robert Richter <rrichter@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64: mm: Fix memmap to be initialized for the entire section
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: Use LocateHandleBuffer instead of LocateHandle
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efifb: show framebuffer layout as device attributes
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/arm: fix absolute relocation detection for older toolchains
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: Use LocateHandleBuffer instead of LocateHandle
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• arm64: kernel BUG at mm/page_alloc.c:1844!
  • From: Robert Richter <robert.richter@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/3 V2] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user() as a cleanup
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/3 V2] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user() as a cleanup
  • From: Ivan Hu <ivan.hu@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/3] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user() as a cleanup
  • From: ivanhu <ivan.hu@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/3] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user() as a cleanup
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: Use LocateHandleBuffer instead of LocateHandle
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/arm: fix absolute relocation detection for older toolchains
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efifb: show framebuffer layout as device attributes
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: Use LocateHandleBuffer instead of LocateHandle
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efifb: show framebuffer layout as device attributes
  • From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efifb: show framebuffer layout as device attributes
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: Use LocateHandleBuffer instead of LocateHandle
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/arm: fix absolute relocation detection for older toolchains
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/arm: fix absolute relocation detection for older toolchains
  • From: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/3] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user() as a cleanup
  • From: ivanhu <ivan.hu@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi/arm: fix absolute relocation detection for older toolchains
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] efi/efi_test: fix the uninitialized value rv
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/3] efi/efi_test: fix the uninitialized value datasize
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/3] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user() as a cleanup
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH -next v2] arm*/efi: efi_init error handling fix
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH -next] efi: Remove unused including <linux/version.h>
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: Use LocateHandleBuffer instead of LocateHandle
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efifb: show framebuffer layout as device attributes
  • From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi/arm: fix absolute relocation detection for older toolchains
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] efi: MMC proxy support for the UEFI varstore
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] efi: MMC proxy support for the UEFI varstore
  • From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] efi: MMC proxy support for the UEFI varstore
  • From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/3] efi/efi_test: fix the uninitialized value rv
  • From: Ivan Hu <ivan.hu@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/3] efi/efi_test: fix the uninitialized value datasize
  • From: Ivan Hu <ivan.hu@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/3] efi/efi_test: use memdup_user() as a cleanup
  • From: Ivan Hu <ivan.hu@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 0/3] efi_test: fix Coccinelle warning and CoverityScan issues
  • From: Ivan Hu <ivan.hu@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Kai Huang <kaih.linux@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] efi: MMC proxy support for the UEFI varstore
  • From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 04/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 05/28] KVM: SVM: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] efi: MMC proxy support for the UEFI varstore
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] efi: MMC proxy support for the UEFI varstore
  • From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 2/3] efi/arm: add SIMD stash/unstash operations
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 1/3] efi/arm64: add SIMD stash/unstash operations
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 3/3] efi: implement MMC proxy support for the UEFI variable store
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 0/3] efi: MMC proxy support for the UEFI varstore
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: EFI co-maintainer
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: EFI co-maintainer
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: EFI co-maintainer
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: EFI co-maintainer
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 03/28] kvm: svm: Use the hardware provided GPA instead of page walk
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/2] MAINTAINERS: add ARM and arm64 EFI specific files to EFI subsystem
  • From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] MAINTAINERS: add myself as EFI maintainer
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] MAINTAINERS: add myself as EFI maintainer
  • From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/2] MAINTAINERS: add myself as EFI maintainer
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/2] MAINTAINERS: add ARM and arm64 EFI specific files to EFI subsystem
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: EFI co-maintainer
  • From: Grant Likely <grant.likely@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• EFI co-maintainer
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 02/28] kvm: svm: Add kvm_fast_pio_in support
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI urgent fixes
  • From: Waiman Long <waiman.long@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI urgent fixes
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fix for v4.9 queue
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI urgent fixes
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/2] x86/mm/pat: Prevent hang during boot when mapping pages
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/2] x86/efi: Only map RAM into EFI page tables if in mixed-mode
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL 0/2] EFI urgent fixes
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] x86/efi: Round EFI memmap reservations to EFI_PAGE_SIZE
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL] EFI fix for v4.9 queue
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH -next v2] arm*/efi: efi_init error handling fix
  • From: Yisheng Xie <xieyisheng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Add necessary checks before iterating over efi.memmap
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Add necessary checks before iterating over efi.memmap
  • From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64/efi: efi_init error handling fix
  • From: Yisheng Xie <xieyisheng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Cannot load linux after recent efi-related changes
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Cannot load linux after recent efi-related changes
  • From: Mike Krinkin <krinkin.m.u@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tip regression] efi: Allow drivers to reserve boot services forever == toxic
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Cannot load linux after recent efi-related changes
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tip regression] efi: Allow drivers to reserve boot services forever == toxic
  • From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [tip regression] efi: Allow drivers to reserve boot services forever == toxic
  • From: Mike Galbraith <umgwanakikbuti@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Cannot load linux after recent efi-related changes
  • From: Mike Krinkin <krinkin.m.u@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tip regression] efi: Allow drivers to reserve boot services forever == toxic
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Cannot load linux after recent efi-related changes
  • From: Mike Krinkin <krinkin.m.u@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tip regression] efi: Allow drivers to reserve boot services forever == toxic
  • From: Mike Galbraith <umgwanakikbuti@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tip regression] efi: Allow drivers to reserve boot services forever == toxic
  • From: Mike Galbraith <umgwanakikbuti@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tip regression] efi: Allow drivers to reserve boot services forever == toxic
  • From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] efi: Format EFI version prints the way the standard says.
  • From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tip regression] efi: Allow drivers to reserve boot services forever == toxic
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tip regression] efi: Allow drivers to reserve boot services forever == toxic
  • From: Mike Galbraith <umgwanakikbuti@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] efi: Format EFI version prints the way the standard says.
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [tip regression] efi: Allow drivers to reserve boot services forever == toxic
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 19/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 15/20] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU support for memory encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH -next] efi: Remove unused including <linux/version.h>
  • From: Wei Yongjun <weiyj.lk@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 19/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 11/20] mm: Access BOOT related data in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 15/20] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] efi: Format EFI version prints the way the standard says.
  • From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 11/20] mm: Access BOOT related data in the clear
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] efi: Format EFI version prints the way the standard says.
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 19/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 15/20] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU support for memory encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 20/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 19/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 11/20] mm: Access BOOT related data in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 16/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 10/20] x86: Insure that memory areas are encrypted when possible
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 18/20] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 16/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 15/20] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 14/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL 00/29] EFI changes for v4.9
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/3] efi: add firmware version information to sysfs
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/3] efi: don't call the system table version the runtime services version
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] Apple device properties
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Add necessary checks before iterating over efi.memmap
  • From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64/efi: efi_init error handling fix
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 01/28] kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error codes
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Add necessary checks before iterating over efi.memmap
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] x86/efi: Add necessary checks before iterating over efi.memmap
  • From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4/6] driver core: Don't leak secondary fwnode on device removal
  • From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/6] ACPI / bus: Make acpi_get_first_physical_node() public
  • From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 20/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 19/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 11/20] mm: Access BOOT related data in the clear
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 16/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 12/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 11/20] mm: Access BOOT related data in the clear
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 10/20] x86: Insure that memory areas are encrypted when possible
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 13/20] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 12/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 11/20] mm: Access BOOT related data in the clear
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 10/20] x86: Insure that memory areas are encrypted when possible
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 18/20] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 16/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 15/20] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU support for memory encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL 00/29] EFI changes for v4.9
  • From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 14/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL 00/29] EFI changes for v4.9
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 13/20] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 12/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 11/20] mm: Access BOOT related data in the clear
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 10/20] x86: Insure that memory areas are encrypted when possible
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 01/29] x86/efi: Test for EFI_MEMMAP functionality when iterating EFI memmap
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 02/29] x86/efi: Consolidate region mapping logic
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 03/29] efi: Refactor efi_memmap_init_early() into arch-neutral code
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 04/29] efi: Add efi_memmap_init_late() for permanent EFI memmap
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 05/29] efi/fake_mem: Refactor main two code chunks into functions
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 06/29] efi: Split out EFI memory map functions into new file
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 08/29] efi: Allow drivers to reserve boot services forever
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 07/29] efi: Add efi_memmap_install() for installing new EFI memory maps
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 14/29] efi: Use a file local lock for efivars
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 10/29] efi/esrt: Use efi_mem_reserve() and avoid a kmalloc()
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 11/29] x86/efi-bgrt: Use efi_mem_reserve() to avoid copying image data
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 12/29] efi/esrt: Use memremap not ioremap to access ESRT table in memory
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 13/29] efi/arm*: esrt: Add missing call to efi_esrt_init()
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 16/29] efi: Replace runtime services spinlock with semaphore
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 21/29] fs/efivarfs: Fix double kfree() in error path
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 19/29] lib/ucs2_string: Speed up ucs2_utf8size()
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 17/29] x86/efi: Initialize status to ensure garbage is not returned on small size
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 20/29] x86/efi: Map in physical addresses in efi_map_region_fixed
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 18/29] firmware-gsmi: Delete an unnecessary check before the function call "dma_pool_destroy"
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 22/29] x86/efi: Remove unused find_bits() function
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 25/29] efi: Add efi_test driver for exporting UEFI runtime service interfaces
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 27/29] x86/efi: Use kmalloc_array() in efi_call_phys_prolog()
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 23/29] efi/arm64: Add debugfs node to dump UEFI runtime page tables
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 28/29] x86/efi: Optimize away setup_gop32/64 if unused
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 29/29] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary boot services
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 26/29] efi/arm64: Treat regions with WT/WC set but WB cleared as memory
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 24/29] x86/efi: Defer efi_esrt_init until after memblock_x86_fill
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 15/29] efi: Don't use spinlocks for efi vars
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 09/29] efi/runtime-map: Use efi.memmap directly instead of a copy
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL 00/29] EFI changes for v4.9
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: Use LocateHandleBuffer instead of LocateHandle
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: Use LocateHandleBuffer instead of LocateHandle
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi: Use LocateHandleBuffer instead of LocateHandle
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/3] efi: Format EFI version prints the way the standard says.
  • From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/3] efi: don't call the system table version the runtime services version
  • From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/3] efi: add firmware version information to sysfs
  • From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 05/20] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 03/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) build enablement
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/3] efi: add firmware version information to sysfs
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] efi: Format EFI version prints the way the standard says.
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64/efi: efi_init error handling fix
  • From: Yisheng Xie <xieyisheng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 3/4] x86/efi: Retrieve and assign Apple device properties
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 4/4] thunderbolt: Use Device ROM retrieved from EFI
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 2/4] efi: Add device path parser
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 1/4] ACPI / bus: Make acpi_get_first_physical_node() public
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 0/4] Apple device properties
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 09/20] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/3] efi: Format EFI version prints the way the standard says.
  • From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/3] efi: add firmware version information to sysfs
  • From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/3] efi: don't call the system table version the runtime services version
  • From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/3] efi: add firmware version information to sysfs
  • From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Optimize away setup_gop32/64 if unused
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Optimize away setup_gop32/64 if unused
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Optimize away setup_gop32/64 if unused
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2] x86/efi: Optimize away setup_gop32/64 if unused
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi: fix memdup_user.cocci warnings
  • From: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [efi:next 25/27] drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.c:269:8-15: WARNING opportunity for memdup_user
  • From: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4.7 011/143] efi/capsule: Allocate whole capsule into virtual memory
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4.7 003/143] x86/platform/uv: Skip UV runtime services mapping in the efi_runtime_disabled case
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL v2 0/6] EFI urgent fixes
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/6] efi/libstub: Allocate headspace in efi_get_memory_map()
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4/6] efi/libstub: Introduce ExitBootServices helper
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 5/6] efi/libstub: Use efi_exit_boot_services() in FDT
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 6/6] x86/efi: Use efi_exit_boot_services()
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/6] efi: Fix handling error value in fdt_find_uefi_params
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/6] efi: Make for_each_efi_memory_desc_in_map() cope with running on Xen
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64/efi: efi_init error handling fix
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Use kmalloc_array() in efi_call_phys_prolog()
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] efi: arm64: treat regions with WT/WC set but WB cleared as memory
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V4] efi: add efi_test driver for exporting UEFI runtime service interfaces
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary boot services
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Optimize away setup_gop32/64 if unused
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/3] efi: add firmware version information to sysfs
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V5 0/4] Handle EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER from ExitBootServices
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64/efi: efi_init error handling fix
  • From: Yisheng Xie <xieyisheng1@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] efi: fix handling error value in fdt_find_uefi_params
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Cannot get EFI Pstore to work but there is no indication of what is wrong
  • From: Maciej Piechotka <uzytkownik2@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/3] efi: Format EFI version prints the way the standard says.
  • From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/3] efi: add firmware version information to sysfs
  • From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/3] efi: don't call the system table version the runtime services version
  • From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/2] efi: add firmware version information to sysfs
  • From: Peter Jones <pjones@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 05/20] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 03/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) build enablement
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] arm64/efi: efi_init error handling fix
  • From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] efi: arm64: treat regions with WT/WC set but WB cleared as memory
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 04/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 04/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 04/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2] efi: fix handling error value in fdt_find_uefi_params
  • From: Andrzej Hajda <a.hajda@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 6/6] efi/fdt: Fix handling error value in fdt_find_uefi_params
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4/6] driver core: Don't leak secondary fwnode on device removal
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V5 4/4] x86/efi: Use efi_exit_boot_services()
  • From: Jeffrey Hugo <jhugo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V5 1/4] efi/libstub: Allocate headspace in efi_get_memory_map()
  • From: Jeffrey Hugo <jhugo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V5 3/4] efi/libstub: Use efi_exit_boot_services() in FDT
  • From: Jeffrey Hugo <jhugo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V5 2/4] efi/libstub: Introduce ExitBootServices helper
  • From: Jeffrey Hugo <jhugo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V5 0/4] Handle EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER from ExitBootServices
  • From: Jeffrey Hugo <jhugo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] efi: arm64: treat regions with WT/WC set but WB cleared as memory
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] efi: arm64: treat regions with WT/WC set but WB cleared as memory
  • From: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] efi: arm64: treat regions with WT/WC set but WB cleared as memory
  • From: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2] efi: arm64: treat regions with WT/WC set but WB cleared as memory
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: arm64: treat regions with WT/WC set but WB cleared as memory
  • From: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: arm64: treat regions with WT/WC set but WB cleared as memory
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 04/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
  • From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: arm64: treat regions with WT/WC set but WB cleared as memory
  • From: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Use kmalloc_array() in efi_call_phys_prolog()
  • From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] x86/efi: Use kmalloc_array() in efi_call_phys_prolog()
  • From: SF Markus Elfring <elfring@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 02/20] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v24 5/9] arm64: kdump: add kdump support
  • From: Dave Young <dyoung@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V4] efi: add efi_test driver for exporting UEFI runtime service interfaces
  • From: Ivan Hu <ivan.hu@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/6] Apple device properties
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: arm64: treat regions with WT/WC set but WB cleared as memory
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] efi: arm64: treat regions with WT/WC set but WB cleared as memory
  • From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] efi: fix the wrong check for the offset of subnode
  • From: Matt Fleming <matt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 18/28] crypto: add AMD Platform Security Processor driver
  • From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/2] efi: add firmware version information to sysfs
  • From: Lukas Wunner <lukas@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v24 5/9] arm64: kdump: add kdump support
  • From: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx>