On 23/08/2016 01:28, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> The patch adds initial support required for Secure Encrypted
> Virtualization (SEV) guest management API's.
>
> ASID management:
> - Reserve asid range for SEV guest, SEV asid range is obtained
> through CPUID Fn8000_001f[ECX]. A non-SEV guest can use any
> asid outside the SEV asid range.
> - SEV guest must have asid value within asid range obtained
> through CPUID.
> - SEV guest must have the same asid for all vcpu's. A TLB flush
> is required if different vcpu for the same ASID is to be run
> on the same host CPU.
>
> - save SEV private structure in kvm_arch.
>
> - If SEV is available then initialize PSP firmware during hardware probe
>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 9 ++
> arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 213 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 221 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index b1dd673..9b885fc 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -715,6 +715,12 @@ struct kvm_hv {
> u64 hv_crash_ctl;
> };
>
> +struct kvm_sev_info {
> + unsigned int asid; /* asid for this guest */
> + unsigned int handle; /* firmware handle */
> + unsigned int ref_count; /* number of active vcpus */
> +};
> +
> struct kvm_arch {
> unsigned int n_used_mmu_pages;
> unsigned int n_requested_mmu_pages;
> @@ -799,6 +805,9 @@ struct kvm_arch {
>
> bool x2apic_format;
> bool x2apic_broadcast_quirk_disabled;
> +
> + /* struct for SEV guest */
> + struct kvm_sev_info sev_info;
> };
>
> struct kvm_vm_stat {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> index f010b23..dcee635 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
> #include <linux/sched.h>
> #include <linux/trace_events.h>
> #include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/ccp-psp.h>
>
> #include <asm/apic.h>
> #include <asm/perf_event.h>
> @@ -186,6 +187,9 @@ struct vcpu_svm {
> struct page *avic_backing_page;
> u64 *avic_physical_id_cache;
> bool avic_is_running;
> +
> + /* which host cpu was used for running this vcpu */
> + bool last_cpuid;
> };
>
> #define AVIC_LOGICAL_ID_ENTRY_GUEST_PHYSICAL_ID_MASK (0xFF)
> @@ -243,6 +247,25 @@ static int avic;
> module_param(avic, int, S_IRUGO);
> #endif
>
> +/* Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
> +static bool sev_enabled;
You can check max_sev_asid != 0 instead (wrapped in a sev_enabled()
function).
> +static unsigned long max_sev_asid;
Need not be 64-bit.
> +static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap;
Please note what lock protects this, and modify it with __set_bit and
__clear_bit.
> +#define kvm_sev_guest() (kvm->arch.sev_info.handle)
> +#define kvm_sev_handle() (kvm->arch.sev_info.handle)
> +#define kvm_sev_ref() (kvm->arch.sev_info.ref_count++)
> +#define kvm_sev_unref() (kvm->arch.sev_info.ref_count--)
> +#define svm_sev_handle() (svm->vcpu.kvm->arch.sev_info.handle)
> +#define svm_sev_asid() (svm->vcpu.kvm->arch.sev_info.asid)
> +#define svm_sev_ref() (svm->vcpu.kvm->arch.sev_info.ref_count++)
> +#define svm_sev_unref() (svm->vcpu.kvm->arch.sev_info.ref_count--)
> +#define svm_sev_guest() (svm->vcpu.kvm->arch.sev_info.handle)
> +#define svm_sev_ref_count() (svm->vcpu.kvm->arch.sev_info.ref_count)
Why is the reference count necessary? Could you use the kvm refcount
instead and free the ASID in kvm_x86_ops->vm_destroy? Also, what lock
protects the reference count?
Also please remove the macros in general. If there is only a struct
vcpu_svm*, use
struct kvm_arch *vm_data = &svm->vcpu.kvm->arch;
as done for example in avic_init_vmcb.
> +
> +static int sev_asid_new(void);
> +static void sev_asid_free(int asid);
> +
> static void svm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0);
> static void svm_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
> @@ -474,6 +497,8 @@ struct svm_cpu_data {
> struct kvm_ldttss_desc *tss_desc;
>
> struct page *save_area;
> +
> + void **sev_vmcb; /* index = sev_asid, value = vmcb pointer */
It's not a void**, it's a struct vmcb**. Please rename it to sev_vmcbs,
too, so that it's clear that it's an array.
> };
>
> static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svm_cpu_data *, svm_data);
> @@ -727,7 +752,10 @@ static int svm_hardware_enable(void)
> sd->asid_generation = 1;
> sd->max_asid = cpuid_ebx(SVM_CPUID_FUNC) - 1;
> sd->next_asid = sd->max_asid + 1;
> - sd->min_asid = 1;
> + sd->min_asid = max_sev_asid + 1;
> +
> + if (sev_enabled)
> + memset(sd->sev_vmcb, 0, (max_sev_asid + 1) * sizeof(void *));
This seems strange. You should clear the field, for each possible CPU,
in sev_asid_free, not in sev_uninit_vcpu. Then when you reuse the ASID,
sev_vmcbs[asid] will be NULL everywhere.
> @@ -931,6 +968,74 @@ static void svm_disable_lbrv(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> set_msr_interception(msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, 0, 0);
> }
>
> +static __init void sev_hardware_setup(void)
> +{
> + int ret, psp_ret;
> + struct psp_data_init *init;
> + struct psp_data_status *status;
> +
> + /*
> + * Check SEV Feature Support: Fn8001_001F[EAX]
> + * Bit 1: Secure Memory Virtualization supported
> + */
> + if (!(cpuid_eax(0x8000001F) & 0x2))
> + return;
> +
> + /*
> + * Get maximum number of encrypted guest supported: Fn8001_001F[ECX]
> + * Bit 31:0: Number of supported guest
> + */
> + max_sev_asid = cpuid_ecx(0x8000001F);
> + if (!max_sev_asid)
> + return;
> +
> + init = kzalloc(sizeof(*init), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!init)
> + return;
> +
> + status = kzalloc(sizeof(*status), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!status)
> + goto err_1;
> +
> + /* Initialize PSP firmware */
> + init->hdr.buffer_len = sizeof(*init);
> + init->flags = 0;
> + ret = psp_platform_init(init, &psp_ret);
> + if (ret) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "SEV: PSP_INIT ret=%d (%#x)\n", ret, psp_ret);
> + goto err_2;
> + }
> +
> + /* Initialize SEV ASID bitmap */
> + sev_asid_bitmap = kmalloc(max(sizeof(unsigned long),
> + max_sev_asid/8 + 1), GFP_KERNEL);
What you want here is
kcalloc(BITS_TO_LONGS(max_sev_asid), sizeof(unsigned long),
GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (IS_ERR(sev_asid_bitmap)) {
> + psp_platform_shutdown(&psp_ret);
> + goto err_2;
> + }
> + bitmap_zero(sev_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid);
... and then no need for the bitmap_zero.
> + set_bit(0, sev_asid_bitmap); /* mark ASID 0 as used */
> +
> + sev_enabled = 1;
> + printk(KERN_INFO "kvm: SEV enabled\n");
> +
> + /* Query the platform status and print API version */
> + status->hdr.buffer_len = sizeof(*status);
> + ret = psp_platform_status(status, &psp_ret);
> + if (ret) {
> + printk(KERN_ERR "SEV: PLATFORM_STATUS ret=%#x\n", psp_ret);
> + goto err_2;
> + }
> +
> + printk(KERN_INFO "SEV API: %d.%d\n",
> + status->api_major, status->api_minor);
> +err_2:
> + kfree(status);
> +err_1:
> + kfree(init);
> + return;
> +}
> +
> static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
> {
> int cpu;
> @@ -966,6 +1071,8 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
> kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_SVME | EFER_LMSLE);
> }
>
> + sev_hardware_setup();
> +
> for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
> r = svm_cpu_init(cpu);
> if (r)
> @@ -1003,10 +1110,25 @@ err:
> return r;
> }
>
> +static __exit void sev_hardware_unsetup(void)
> +{
> + int ret, psp_ret;
> +
> + ret = psp_platform_shutdown(&psp_ret);
> + if (ret)
> + printk(KERN_ERR "failed to shutdown PSP rc=%d (%#0x10x)\n",
> + ret, psp_ret);
> +
> + kfree(sev_asid_bitmap);
> +}
> +
> static __exit void svm_hardware_unsetup(void)
> {
> int cpu;
>
> + if (sev_enabled)
> + sev_hardware_unsetup();
> +
> for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
> svm_cpu_uninit(cpu);
>
> @@ -1088,6 +1210,11 @@ static void avic_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> svm->vcpu.arch.apicv_active = true;
> }
>
> +static void sev_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> +{
> + svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ENABLE;
> +}
> +
> static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> {
> struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
> @@ -1202,6 +1329,10 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> if (avic)
> avic_init_vmcb(svm);
>
> + if (svm_sev_guest())
> + sev_init_vmcb(svm);
> +
> +
> mark_all_dirty(svm->vmcb);
>
> enable_gif(svm);
> @@ -1413,6 +1544,14 @@ static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
> avic_update_vapic_bar(svm, APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE);
> }
>
> +static void sev_init_vcpu(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> +{
> + if (!svm_sev_guest())
> + return;
> +
> + svm_sev_ref();
> +}
> +
> static struct kvm_vcpu *svm_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id)
> {
> struct vcpu_svm *svm;
> @@ -1475,6 +1614,7 @@ static struct kvm_vcpu *svm_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id)
> init_vmcb(svm);
>
> svm_init_osvw(&svm->vcpu);
> + sev_init_vcpu(svm);
>
> return &svm->vcpu;
>
> @@ -1494,6 +1634,23 @@ out:
> return ERR_PTR(err);
> }
>
> +static void sev_uninit_vcpu(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> +{
> + int cpu;
> + int asid = svm_sev_asid();
> + struct svm_cpu_data *sd;
> +
> + if (!svm_sev_guest())
> + return;
> +
> + svm_sev_unref();
> +
> + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
> + sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
> + sd->sev_vmcb[asid] = NULL;
> + }
> +}
> +
> static void svm_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> @@ -1502,6 +1659,7 @@ static void svm_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> __free_pages(virt_to_page(svm->msrpm), MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER);
> __free_page(virt_to_page(svm->nested.hsave));
> __free_pages(virt_to_page(svm->nested.msrpm), MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER);
> + sev_uninit_vcpu(svm);
> kvm_vcpu_uninit(vcpu);
> kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, svm);
> }
> @@ -1945,6 +2103,11 @@ static int pf_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> default:
> error_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
>
> + /* In SEV mode, the guest physical address will have C-bit
> + * set. C-bit must be cleared before handling the fault.
> + */
> + if (svm_sev_guest())
> + fault_address &= ~sme_me_mask;
> trace_kvm_page_fault(fault_address, error_code);
> if (!npt_enabled && kvm_event_needs_reinjection(&svm->vcpu))
> kvm_mmu_unprotect_page_virt(&svm->vcpu, fault_address);
> @@ -4131,12 +4294,40 @@ static void reload_tss(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> load_TR_desc();
> }
>
> +static void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> +{
> + int asid = svm_sev_asid();
> + int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
> + struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
> +
> + /* Assign the asid allocated for this SEV guest */
> + svm->vmcb->control.asid = svm_sev_asid();
> +
> + /* Flush guest TLB:
> + * - when different VMCB for the same ASID is to be run on the
> + * same host CPU
> + * or
> + * - this VMCB was executed on different host cpu in previous VMRUNs.
> + */
> + if (sd->sev_vmcb[asid] != (void *)svm->vmcb ||
> + svm->last_cpuid != cpu)
> + svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ALL_ASID;
> +
> + svm->last_cpuid = cpu;
> + sd->sev_vmcb[asid] = (void *)svm->vmcb;
> +
> + mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_ASID);
> +}
> +
> static void pre_svm_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> {
> int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
>
> struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
>
> + if (svm_sev_guest())
> + return pre_sev_run(svm);
> +
> /* FIXME: handle wraparound of asid_generation */
> if (svm->asid_generation != sd->asid_generation)
> new_asid(svm, sd);
> @@ -4985,6 +5176,26 @@ static inline void avic_post_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> avic_handle_ldr_update(vcpu);
> }
>
> +static int sev_asid_new(void)
> +{
> + int pos;
> +
> + if (!sev_enabled)
> + return -ENOTTY;
> +
> + pos = find_first_zero_bit(sev_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid);
> + if (pos >= max_sev_asid)
> + return -EBUSY;
> +
> + set_bit(pos, sev_asid_bitmap);
> + return pos;
> +}
> +
> +static void sev_asid_free(int asid)
> +{
> + clear_bit(asid, sev_asid_bitmap);
> +}
Please move these (and sev_asid_bitmap) to patch 22 where they're first
used.
Paolo
> static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
> .cpu_has_kvm_support = has_svm,
> .disabled_by_bios = is_disabled,
>
> --
> To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
> the body to majordomo@xxxxxxxxx. For more info on Linux MM,
> see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
> Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@xxxxxxxxx";> email@xxxxxxxxx </a>
>
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-efi" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
