Petko Manolov <petkan@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > Well, I for one do not explicitly trust these keys. I may even want to > > > completely remove or replace them. > > > > Fine be me. However, if you remove them all I would guess that you cannot > > perform a secure boot. > > Maybe not on PC, but there's plenty of other architectures out there. What > if i replace all UEFI keys with my own? Then I would imagine that you can do a secure boot, but that you have to sign your own shim, grub, kernel, etc.. > > Note that it's to be expected that the keys being loaded from the UEFI > > database cannot have their signatures checked - which is why they would > > have to be implicitly trusted. For the same reason, the kernel does not > > check the signatures on the keys compiled into the kernel image. > > I build all kernels that matter to me and i _do_ trust myself. > Unfortunately i can't say the same for any corporation out there. > > Trusting a key because your vendor shipped the HW with it so that you have no > way to verify the signature is pretty weak argument IMHO. I'm not making an argument there. There is a reason I think that I can't check them. Well, possibly I could *if* those keys are actually signed *and* I have certs built into the kernel by which I can verify all those keys in UEFI variables. I don't know whether this is actually practical. > > You can argue this either way. There's a config option to allow you to > > turn this on or off. Arguably, this should be split in two: one for the > > whitelist (db, MokListRT) and one for the blacklist (dbx). > > I did not see the config option. There is one? See patch 8 where these variables are actually parsed. CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS is available there. David -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-efi" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
