Linux SGX

• Thread Index

• Re: [PATCH v20 22/28] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 22/28] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 3/3] selftests/x86: Augment SGX selftest to test new __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() and its callback interface
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] selftests/x86: Fixed Makefile for SGX selftest
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 0/3] x86/sgx: Amend vDSO API to allow enclave/host parameter passing on untrusted stack
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Jethro Beekman <jethro@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Jethro Beekman <jethro@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 01/12] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 2/4] x86/64: Call LSM hooks from SGX subsystem/module
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 0/4] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 0/4] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 0/4] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 0/4] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 01/12] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 12/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Show line of sight to LSM support SGX2's EAUG
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 3/4] X86/sgx: Introduce EMA as a new LSM module
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 4/4] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 1/4] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 2/4] x86/64: Call LSM hooks from SGX subsystem/module
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 0/4] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 05/12] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH v20 22/28] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_MAPWX to map enclave page WX
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: LSM module for SGX?
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] x86/sgx: Call LSM hooks from SGX subsystem/module
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: LSM module for SGX?
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• LSM module for SGX?
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_MAPWX to map enclave page WX
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_MAPWX to map enclave page WX
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_MAPWX to map enclave page WX
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 22/28] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 12/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Show line of sight to LSM support SGX2's EAUG
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_MAPWX to map enclave page WX
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 05/12] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 06/12] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 03/12] selftests: x86/sgx: Mark the enclave loader as not needing an exec stack
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 01/12] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 01/12] x86/sgx: Add mm to enclave at mmap()
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/sgx: rip off the refcount from sgx_encl_add_page flow
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH RFC] x86/sgx: Do not increase encl->refcount for VMAs
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v4 01/12] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v4 12/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Show line of sight to LSM support SGX2's EAUG
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v4 11/12] security/apparmor: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_MAPWX to map enclave page WX
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v4 06/12] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v4 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v4 05/12] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v4 03/12] selftests: x86/sgx: Mark the enclave loader as not needing an exec stack
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] x86/sgx: rip off the refcount from sgx_encl_add_page flow
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH RFC] x86/sgx: Do not increase encl->refcount for VMAs
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 05/12] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH RFC] x86/sgx: Do not increase encl->refcount for VMAs
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 01/12] x86/sgx: Add mm to enclave at mmap()
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 01/12] x86/sgx: Add mm to enclave at mmap()
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH RFC] x86/sgx: Check that the address is within ELRANGE
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] x86/sgx: rip off the refcount from sgx_encl_add_page flow
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 01/12] x86/sgx: Add mm to enclave at mmap()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 01/12] x86/sgx: Add mm to enclave at mmap()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 01/12] x86/sgx: Add mm to enclave at mmap()
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 01/12] x86/sgx: Add mm to enclave at mmap()
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH RFC] x86/sgx: Check that the address is within ELRANGE
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_EXECMEM to map enclave page WX
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 06/12] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 05/12] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 12/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Show line of sight to LSM support SGX2's EAUG
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 11/12] security/apparmor: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 01/12] x86/sgx: Add mm to enclave at mmap()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 03/12] selftests: x86/sgx: Mark the enclave loader as not needing an exec stack
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM, round 3
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH RFC] x86/sgx: Do not increase encl->refcount for VMAs
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH RFC] x86/sgx: Do not increase encl->refcount for VMAs
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 5/5] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH 4/7] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4/7] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4/7] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 5/7] x86/sgx: Add flag to zero added region instead of copying from source
  • From: Jethro Beekman <jethro@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4/7] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: Jethro Beekman <jethro@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 7/7] x86/sgx: Add a reserved field to sgx_enclave_add_region to drop 'packed'
  • From: Jethro Beekman <jethro@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 5/7] x86/sgx: Add flag to zero added region instead of copying from source
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4/7] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH RFC] x86/sgx: Check that the address is within ELRANGE
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH RFC] x86/sgx: Do not increase encl->refcount for VMAs
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH RFC] x86/sgx: Do not increase encl->refcount for VMAs
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 5/7] x86/sgx: Add flag to zero added region instead of copying from source
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 7/7] x86/sgx: Add a reserved field to sgx_enclave_add_region to drop 'packed'
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 5/7] x86/sgx: Add flag to zero added region instead of copying from source
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/7] x86/sgx: Clean up and enhance add pages ioctl
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 7/7] x86/sgx: Add a reserved field to sgx_enclave_add_region to drop 'packed'
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/7] x86/sgx: Clean up and enhance add pages ioctl
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 7/7] x86/sgx: Add a reserved field to sgx_enclave_add_region to drop 'packed'
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/5] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 5/7] x86/sgx: Add flag to zero added region instead of copying from source
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 5/7] x86/sgx: Add flag to zero added region instead of copying from source
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH 5/7] x86/sgx: Add flag to zero added region instead of copying from source
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 5/7] x86/sgx: Add flag to zero added region instead of copying from source
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 5/5] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/5] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 4/5] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 4/5] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/5] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v1 3/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Call new LSM hooks from SGX subsystem
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v1 1/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v1 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 5/5] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 4/5] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 5/7] x86/sgx: Add flag to zero added region instead of copying from source
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 5/7] x86/sgx: Add flag to zero added region instead of copying from source
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 5/7] x86/sgx: Add flag to zero added region instead of copying from source
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4/7] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 15/28] x86/sgx: Add the Linux SGX Enclave Driver
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v2 5/5] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v2 4/5] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v2 3/5] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v2 0/5] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 15/28] x86/sgx: Add the Linux SGX Enclave Driver
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 15/28] x86/sgx: Add the Linux SGX Enclave Driver
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 7/7] x86/sgx: Add a reserved field to sgx_enclave_add_region to drop 'packed'
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 7/7] x86/sgx: Add a reserved field to sgx_enclave_add_region to drop 'packed'
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 6/7] x86/sgx: Use the actual zero page as the source when adding zero pages
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 4/7] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/7] x86/sgx: Let ioctl helpers do copy to/from user
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 7/7] x86/sgx: Add a reserved field to sgx_enclave_add_region to drop 'packed'
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 5/7] x86/sgx: Add flag to zero added region instead of copying from source
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/7] x86/sgx: Remove unnecessary @cmd parameter from ioctl helpers
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/7] x86/sgx: Remove dead code to handle non-existent IOR ioctl
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 0/7] x86/sgx: Clean up and enhance add pages ioctl
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES
  • From: "Ayoun, Serge" <serge.ayoun@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 15/28] x86/sgx: Add the Linux SGX Enclave Driver
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 15/28] x86/sgx: Add the Linux SGX Enclave Driver
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 15/28] x86/sgx: Add the Linux SGX Enclave Driver
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 5/9] x86/sgx: Restrict mapping without an enclave page to PROT_NONE
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 4/9] mm: Introduce vm_ops->mprotect()
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 4/9] mm: Introduce vm_ops->mprotect()
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 1/9] x86/sgx: Remove unused local variable in sgx_encl_release()
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 9/9] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 9/9] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 5/9] x86/sgx: Restrict mapping without an enclave page to PROT_NONE
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 4/9] mm: Introduce vm_ops->mprotect()
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 1/9] x86/sgx: Remove unused local variable in sgx_encl_release()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 4/9] mm: Introduce vm_ops->mprotect()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 5/9] x86/sgx: Restrict mapping without an enclave page to PROT_NONE
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 9/9] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jethro Beekman <jethro@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: "Haitao Huang" <haitao.huang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
• SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: "Haitao Huang" <haitao.huang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: "Haitao Huang" <haitao.huang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: "Haitao Huang" <haitao.huang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: "Haitao Huang" <haitao.huang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Jethro Beekman <jethro@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Jethro Beekman <jethro@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Jethro Beekman <jethro@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 16/28] x86/sgx: Add provisioning
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 15/28] x86/sgx: Add the Linux SGX Enclave Driver
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] selftests/x86: Fixed Makefile for SGX selftest
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] selftests/x86: Augment SGX selftest to test new __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() and its callback interface
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 16/28] x86/sgx: Add provisioning
  • From: Jethro Beekman <jethro@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 15/28] x86/sgx: Add the Linux SGX Enclave Driver
  • From: Jethro Beekman <jethro@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 15/28] x86/sgx: Add the Linux SGX Enclave Driver
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 15/28] x86/sgx: Add the Linux SGX Enclave Driver
  • From: Jethro Beekman <jethro@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Jethro Beekman <jethro@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 3/3] selftests/x86: Augment SGX selftest to test new __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() and its callback interface
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 3/3] selftests/x86: Augment SGX selftest to test new __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() and its callback interface
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 3/3] selftests/x86: Augment SGX selftest to test new __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() and its callback interface
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 16/28] x86/sgx: Add provisioning
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 3/3] selftests/x86: Augment SGX selftest to test new __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() and its callback interface
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 3/3] selftests/x86: Augment SGX selftest to test new __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() and its callback interface
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 15/28] x86/sgx: Add the Linux SGX Enclave Driver
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 09/28] x86/sgx: Add ENCLS architectural error codes
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v1 3/3] selftests/x86: Augment SGX selftest to test new __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() and its callback interface
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v1 0/3] An alternative __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow enclave/host parameter passing using untrusted stack
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] x86/vdso: Modify __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to allow parameter passing on untrusted stack
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v1 1/3] selftests/x86: Fixed Makefile for SGX selftest
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Jethro Beekman <jethro@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Jethro Beekman <jethro@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Jethro Beekman <jethro@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Jethro Beekman <jethro@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Jethro Beekman <jethro@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Jethro Beekman <jethro@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Jethro Beekman <jethro@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 16/28] x86/sgx: Add provisioning
  • From: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 02/28] x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX sub-features (as Linux-defined bits)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 28/28] docs: x86/sgx: Document the enclave API
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 27/28] docs: x86/sgx: Document kernel internals
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 26/28] docs: x86/sgx: Add Architecture documentation
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 25/28] x86/sgx: Update MAINTAINERS
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 24/28] selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SGX
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 23/28] x86/vdso: Add __vdso_sgx_enter_enclave() to wrap SGX enclave transitions
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 22/28] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 21/28] x86/fault: Attempt to fixup unhandled #PF in vDSO before signaling
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 20/28] x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 19/28] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 18/28] x86/sgx: ptrace() support for the SGX driver
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 17/28] x86/sgx: Add swapping code to the core and SGX driver
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 16/28] x86/sgx: Add provisioning
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 15/28] x86/sgx: Add the Linux SGX Enclave Driver
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 14/28] x86/sgx: Add sgx_einit() for initializing enclaves
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 13/28] x86/sgx: Add functions to allocate and free EPC pages
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 12/28] x86/sgx: Enumerate and track EPC sections
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 11/28] x86/sgx: Add wrappers for ENCLS leaf functions
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 10/28] x86/sgx: Add SGX1 and SGX2 architectural data structures
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 09/28] x86/sgx: Add ENCLS architectural error codes
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>