SELinux - Date Index

• Thread Index

• [PATCH V4 0/2] Update restorecon to support new digest scheme
  • From: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V3 2/2] setfiles: Update utilities for the new digest scheme
  • From: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V3 1/2] libselinux: Save digest of all partial matches for directory
  • From: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V3 2/2] setfiles: Update utilities for the new digest scheme
  • From: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V3 0/2] Update restorecon to support new digest scheme
  • From: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V3 1/2] libselinux: Save digest of all partial matches for directory
  • From: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 19/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 02/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 23/23] SELinux: Verify LSM display sanity in binder
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 22/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 21/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 19/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 16/23] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 20/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 18/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 14/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 12/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 13/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 07/23] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 05/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 03/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 04/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] libselinux: Fix security_get_boolean_names build error
  • From: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL] SELinux patches for v5.3
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/2] Fix mcstrans secolor examples
  • From: Vit Mojzis <vmojzis@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/2] Revert "mcstransd select correct colour range."
  • From: Vit Mojzis <vmojzis@xxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Fwd: [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Fwd: [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  • From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH ghak57 V2] selinux: format all invalid context as untrusted
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC] libselinux: Use Python distutils to install SELinux python bindings
  • From: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Fwd: [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V2 1/2] libselinux: Save digest of all partial matches for directory
  • From: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley@xxxxxxxxx>
• Fwd: [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  • From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 18/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security
  • From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 22/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 21/23] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 20/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 19/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 18/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_MAPWX to map enclave page WX
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] x86/sgx: Call LSM hooks from SGX subsystem/module
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 04/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH ghak57 V2] selinux: format all invalid context as untrusted
  • From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
  • From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
  • From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 14/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 13/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 12/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 07/23] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 05/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 04/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 22/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 21/23] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 20/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 19/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 18/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 14/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 13/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 12/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 07/23] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 05/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 02/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 21/23] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 20/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 22/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 17/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 19/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 18/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 15/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 14/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 13/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 12/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 07/23] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 05/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 04/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 03/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_MAPWX to map enclave page WX
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/1] libsepol: include module.c internal header in module_to_cil.c
  • From: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_MAPWX to map enclave page WX
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_MAPWX to map enclave page WX
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/1] libsepol: include module.c internal header in module_to_cil.c
  • From: William Roberts <bill.c.roberts@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 21/24] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Non-DoD Source] [PATCH userspace v4 0/4] Remove redundant rules when building policydb
  • From: jwcart2 <jwcart2@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 21/24] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 21/24] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 21/24] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 21/24] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 22/24] LSM: Return the lsmblob slot on initialization
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 22/24] LSM: Return the lsmblob slot on initialization
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 22/24] LSM: Return the lsmblob slot on initialization
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 20/24] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 19/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 18/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 17/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 16/24] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 24/24] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 23/24] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 22/24] LSM: Return the lsmblob slot on initialization
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 21/24] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 10/24] Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/1] libsepol: include module.c internal header in module_to_cil.c
  • From: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@xxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 15/24] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 14/24] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 13/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 12/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 11/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 10/24] Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 09/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 07/24] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 05/24] Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 08/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 06/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 04/24] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 03/24] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 02/24] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 01/24] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V3 0/2] selinux: Remove legacy local boolean and user code
  • From: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V3 1/2] selinux: Remove legacy local boolean and user code
  • From: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 10/24] Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 10/24] Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH V2 1/2] selinux: Remove legacy local boolean and user code
  • From: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] selinux-testsuite: fix old python shebang in tests/overlay/access
  • From: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 24/24] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 23/24] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 22/24] LSM: Return the lsmblob slot on initialization
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 21/24] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 20/24] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 19/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 18/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 17/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 16/24] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 15/24] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 14/24] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 13/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 12/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 11/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 10/24] Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 09/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 08/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 07/24] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 06/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 05/24] Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 04/24] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Stacked LSMs (was Re: [PATCH v2 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor)
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 02/24] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 23/24] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 22/24] LSM: Return the lsmblob slot on initialization
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 24/24] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 20/24] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 21/24] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 18/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 19/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 15/24] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 16/24] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 17/24] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 14/24] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 11/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 12/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 13/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 10/24] Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 06/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 08/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 09/24] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 05/24] Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 07/24] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 04/24] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 03/24] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 01/24] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 00/24] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 12/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Show line of sight to LSM support SGX2's EAUG
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_MAPWX to map enclave page WX
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V2 1/2] selinux: Remove legacy local boolean and user code
  • From: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V2 2/2] selinux: Update manpages after removing legacy boolean and user code
  • From: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] selinux-testsuite: fix old python shebang in tests/overlay/access
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Non-DoD Source] [PATCH userspace v4 0/4] Remove redundant rules when building policydb
  • From: jwcart2 <jwcart2@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 05/12] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 06/12] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 03/12] selftests: x86/sgx: Mark the enclave loader as not needing an exec stack
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v4 01/12] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Stacked LSMs (was Re: [PATCH v2 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor)
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 18/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v4 12/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Show line of sight to LSM support SGX2's EAUG
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v4 06/12] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v4 11/12] security/apparmor: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] security/selinux: Require SGX_MAPWX to map enclave page WX
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v4 01/12] x86/sgx: Use mmu_notifier.release() instead of per-vma refcounting
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_map() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v4 02/12] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v4 05/12] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v4 03/12] selftests: x86/sgx: Mark the enclave loader as not needing an exec stack
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 1/1] selinux: Remove legacy local boolean and user code
  • From: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 24/25] Fix slotted list and getpeersec_d
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 18/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 1/1] selinux: Remove legacy local boolean and user code
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 16/25] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 15/25] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 07/25] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 04/25] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] selinux-testsuite: fix old python shebang in tests/overlay/access
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] libsepol/cil: fix mlsconstrain segfault
  • From: William Roberts <bill.c.roberts@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/2] libsepol: Replace constant with sizeof()
  • From: William Roberts <bill.c.roberts@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/11] libsemanage: add tests
  • From: William Roberts <bill.c.roberts@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] libsepol: remove unneeded int
  • From: William Roberts <bill.c.roberts@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 15/25] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] Restorecon: factor out a lookup helper for context matches
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] selinux-testsuite: fix old python shebang in tests/overlay/access
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] selinux-testsuite: fix old python shebang in tests/overlay/access
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 04/25] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 24/25] Fix slotted list and getpeersec_d
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 18/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 17/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 16/25] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 15/25] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 13/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 09/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 07/25] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 05/25] Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 04/25] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 15/25] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 02/25] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 24/25] Fix slotted list and getpeersec_d
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 25/25] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 23/25] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 22/25] LSM: Return the lsmblob slot on initialization
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 21/25] Audit: Store LSM audit information in an lsmblob
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 20/25] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 19/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 16/25] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 18/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 17/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 14/25] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 12/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 15/25] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 09/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 13/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 08/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 11/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 10/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 07/25] net: Prepare UDS for secuirty module stacking
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 06/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 04/25] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 05/25] Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 01/25] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 03/25] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH ghak57 V1] selinux: format all invalid context as untrusted
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH ghak57 V1] selinux: format all invalid context as untrusted
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] libsepol/cil: fix mlsconstrain segfault
  • From: William Roberts <bill.c.roberts@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/2] libsepol: Replace constant with sizeof()
  • From: William Roberts <bill.c.roberts@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 5/5] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] libsepol/cil: fix mlsconstrain segfault
  • From: mike.palmiotto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
• Re: [PATCH] libsepol: check strdup() failures and replace constant
  • From: Jokke Hämäläinen <jokke.hamalainen@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/2] libsepol: Replace constant with sizeof()
  • From: Jokke Hämäläinen <jokke.hamalainen@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/2] libsepol: Check strdup() failures
  • From: Jokke Hämäläinen <jokke.hamalainen@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] libsepol: check strdup() failures and replace constant
  • From: William Roberts <bill.c.roberts@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] libsepol: remove unneeded int
  • From: William Roberts <bill.c.roberts@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• ANN: SETools 4.2.2
  • From: Chris PeBenito <pebenito@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] libsepol: check strdup() failures and replace constant
  • From: Jokke Hämäläinen <jokke.hamalainen@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] trivial kernel_to_conf.c checks
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] Add CONTRIBUTING.md
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Non-DoD Source] [PATCH] libsepol: error in CIL if a permission cannot be resolved
  • From: jwcart2 <jwcart2@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Non-DoD Source] [PATCH userspace v4 2/4] libsemanage: optionally optimize policy on rebuild
  • From: jwcart2 <jwcart2@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Non-DoD Source] [PATCH userspace v4 2/4] libsemanage: optionally optimize policy on rebuild
  • From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH ghak57 V1] selinux: format all invalid context as untrusted
  • From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] libsepol: error in CIL if a permission cannot be resolved
  • From: Yuli Khodorkovskiy <yuli.khodorkovskiy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Non-DoD Source] [PATCH userspace v4 2/4] libsemanage: optionally optimize policy on rebuild
  • From: jwcart2 <jwcart2@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH ghak57 V1] selinux: format all invalid context as untrusted
  • From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [GIT PULL] SELinux fixes for v5.2 (#2)
  • From: pr-tracker-bot@xxxxxxxxxx
• RE: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/3] libsepol: remove unneeded int
  • From: Jokke Hämäläinen <jokke.hamalainen@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/3] checkpolicy: remove redundant if-clause
  • From: Jokke Hämäläinen <jokke.hamalainen@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/3] libsepol: more accurate error messages
  • From: Jokke Hämäläinen <jokke.hamalainen@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] trivial: remove unneeded int
  • From: Jokke Hämäläinen <jokke.hamalainen@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH userspace v4 2/4] libsemanage: optionally optimize policy on rebuild
  • From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH userspace v4 0/4] Remove redundant rules when building policydb
  • From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH userspace v4 1/4] libsepol: add a function to optimize kernel policy
  • From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH userspace v4 3/4] secilc: add flag to enable policy optimization
  • From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH userspace v4 4/4] checkpolicy: add flag to enable policy optimization
  • From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [GIT PULL] SELinux fixes for v5.2 (#2)
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] selinux: fix empty write to keycreate file
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/11] libsemanage: add tests
  • From: William Roberts <bill.c.roberts@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] trivial: remove unneeded int
  • From: William Roberts <bill.c.roberts@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5] selinux: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4] selinux: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_add_mnt_opt( )
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] selinux: log raw contexts as untrusted strings
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] trivial: remove unneeded int
  • From: Jokke Hämäläinen <jokke.hamalainen@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5] selinux: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
  • From: Gen Zhang <blackgod016574@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5] selinux: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
  • From: Gen Zhang <blackgod016574@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4] selinux: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_add_mnt_opt( )
  • From: Gen Zhang <blackgod016574@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] selinux: fix empty write to keycreate file
  • From: Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] selinux: fix empty write to keycreate file
  • From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 11/11] libsemanage: test semanage_msg_default_handler
  • From: Jan Zarsky <jzarsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 10/11] libsemanage: test semanage_context_* functions
  • From: Jan Zarsky <jzarsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 09/11] libsemanage: test semanage_user_* functions
  • From: Jan Zarsky <jzarsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 08/11] libsemanage: test semanage_port_* functions
  • From: Jan Zarsky <jzarsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 07/11] libsemanage: test semanage_node_* functions
  • From: Jan Zarsky <jzarsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 06/11] libsemanage: test semanage_ibendport_* functions
  • From: Jan Zarsky <jzarsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 05/11] libsemanage: test semanage_iface_* functions
  • From: Jan Zarsky <jzarsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 04/11] libsemanage: test semanage_fcontext functions
  • From: Jan Zarsky <jzarsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 03/11] libsemanage: test semanage_bool_* functions
  • From: Jan Zarsky <jzarsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 02/11] libsemanage: test semanage_handle_* functions
  • From: Jan Zarsky <jzarsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 01/11] libsemanage: add helper functions to tests
  • From: Jan Zarsky <jzarsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 00/11] libsemanage: add tests
  • From: Jan Zarsky <jzarsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] selinux: log raw contexts as untrusted strings
  • From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] selinux: log raw contexts as untrusted strings
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/5] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] selinux: log raw contexts as untrusted strings
  • From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] selinux: log raw contexts as untrusted strings
  • From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4] selinux: lsm: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_sb_eat_lsm_o pts()
  • From: Gen Zhang <blackgod016574@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] selinux: lsm: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_add_mnt_opt( )
  • From: Gen Zhang <blackgod016574@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4] selinux: lsm: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_sb_eat_lsm_o pts()
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] selinux: lsm: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_add_mnt_opt( )
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: New Container vulnerability could potentially use an SELinux fix.
  • From: Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: New Container vulnerability could potentially use an SELinux fix.
  • From: Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 5/5] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/5] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 4/5] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 4/5] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/5] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: New Container vulnerability could potentially use an SELinux fix.
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: New Container vulnerability could potentially use an SELinux fix.
  • From: Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: New Container vulnerability could potentially use an SELinux fix.
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 35/58] LSM: Limit calls to certain module hooks
  • From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v1 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v1 3/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Call new LSM hooks from SGX subsystem
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v1 1/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Add SGX specific LSM hooks
  • From: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• ANN: Reference Policy 2.20190609
  • From: Chris PeBenito <pebenito@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: New Container vulnerability could potentially use an SELinux fix.
  • From: Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: New Container vulnerability could potentially use an SELinux fix.
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 5/5] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: New Container vulnerability could potentially use an SELinux fix.
  • From: Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v2 4/5] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: New Container vulnerability could potentially use an SELinux fix.
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• New Container vulnerability could potentially use an SELinux fix.
  • From: Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC] libselinux: Use Python distutils to install SELinux python bindings
  • From: Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] trivial: remove unneeded int
  • From: Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] trivial: remove unneeded int
  • From: Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: José Bollo <jobol@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] selinux: lsm: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_add_mnt_opt( )
  • From: Gen Zhang <blackgod016574@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v4] selinux: lsm: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_sb_eat_lsm_o pts()
  • From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] selinux: lsm: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_add_mnt_opt( )
  • From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 22/58] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 22/58] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 22/58] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 22/58] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 05/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 22/58] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH userspace v3 6/7] [RFC] lisepol: slightly more thorough optimization
  • From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3] selinux: lsm: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_add_mnt_opt( )
  • From: Gen Zhang <blackgod016574@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v4] selinux: lsm: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_sb_eat_lsm_o pts()
  • From: Gen Zhang <blackgod016574@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v2 0/5] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v2 5/5] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v2 4/5] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v2 3/5] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES
  • From: "Ayoun, Serge" <serge.ayoun@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V2 0/2] Update restorecon to support new digest scheme
  • From: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: John Johansen <john.johansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] selinux-testsuite: Correct address count for asconf sctp test
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] selinux: Fix strncpy in libselinux and libsepol
  • From: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 1/1] selinux: Remove legacy local boolean and user code
  • From: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V2 2/2] setfiles: Update utilities for the new digest scheme
  • From: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 5/9] x86/sgx: Restrict mapping without an enclave page to PROT_NONE
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 4/9] mm: Introduce vm_ops->mprotect()
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 00/58] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 4/9] mm: Introduce vm_ops->mprotect()
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 1/9] x86/sgx: Remove unused local variable in sgx_encl_release()
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 05/58] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 22/58] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] selinux: Fix strncpy in libselinux and libsepol
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] selinux: lsm: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 46/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in release_secctx hooks
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 25/58] IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] selinux: lsm: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] selinux: lsm: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
  • From: Paul Moore <paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 04/58] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure.
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 9/9] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 9/9] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC V3 PATCH] selinux-testsuite: Add test for restorecon
  • From: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] selinux-testsuite: Correct address count for asconf sctp test
  • From: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH V2 1/2] libselinux: Save digest of all partial matches for directory
  • From: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
  • From: "Dr. Greg" <greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] selinux: lsm: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
  • From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] selinux: lsm: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
  • From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 5/9] x86/sgx: Restrict mapping without an enclave page to PROT_NONE
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 4/9] mm: Introduce vm_ops->mprotect()
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl()
  • From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 58/58] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 57/58] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 56/58] SELinux: Use blob offset in current_sid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 55/58] LSM: Special handling for secctx lsm hooks
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 53/58] kernfs: remove lsm_context scaffolding
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 54/58] LSM: Remove unused macro
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 52/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_setsecctx
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 49/58] fs: remove lsm_context scaffolding
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 48/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secid_to_secctx
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 50/58] LSM: Add the release function to the lsm_context
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 51/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_setsecctx hooks
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 47/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_release_secctx
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 46/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in release_secctx hooks
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 45/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secctx_to_secid
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 44/58] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_getsecctx
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>