On 7/22/2019 4:36 AM, Simon McVittie wrote: > On Fri, 19 Jul 2019 at 13:02:24 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote: >> On 7/19/2019 11:47 AM, Simon McVittie wrote: >>> I was hoping the syscall wrappers in glibc would be a viable user-space >>> interface to the small amount of LSM stuff that dbus needs to use in an >>> LSM-agnostic way. >> I don't see how to do that without making the Fedora and Ubuntu user space >> environments [not] remain functional. > What I was thinking of was a second, parallel kernel <-> user-space > interface (like the SO_PEERSECLABELS that I suggested) for future/updated > user-space components. SO_PEERSEC would continue to return some > hopefully-backwards-compatible thing, but would be deprecated, because it > cannot fully represent the reality of LSM stacking while remaining > backwards-compatible. I will propose SO_PEERCONTEXT and /proc/.../attr/stack/context, both of which will use the Hideous format, in the next round. I appreciate the suggestion and discussion. >> I see display being used in scripts: >> >> echo apparmor > /proc/self/attr/display >> apparmor-do-stuff --options --deamon >> >> much more than inside new or updated programs. > Note that this implicitly relies on echo being a shell builtin, which > is common but not guaranteed (I don't think). It would work in bash or > dash, though. Yes, echo being built-in can't be guaranteed. Most shells have some way of doing the equivalent. > If apparmor-do-stuff no longer works, and you have to wrap a shell > script around it, isn't that the same amount of user-space breakage as > if apparmor-do-stuff no longer works and you have to install a newer > version that does work? True when there is such a newer version. I'm sure you're aware of how much system software out there hasn't been updated in this century. > Either way, the sysadmin must take action to > change user-space components. I think the attr/display thing only reduces > the magnitude of the user-space changes required to catch up, and doesn't > eliminate the fact that those changes were needed. Agreed. It's a tool for the times of transition. >>> Lots of programs (including dbus-daemon) fork-and-exec arbitrary >>> child processes that come from a different codebase not under our >>> control and aren't necessarily LSM-stacking-aware. I don't really want >>> to have to reset /proc/self/attr/display in our increasingly crowded >>> after-fork-but-before-exec code path >> My hope is that new and updated programs will have to tools >> they need to get it right, and that those that don't won't >> fall over on a well configured system. > The problem I see here is that if we assume dbus-daemon is a new/updated > program that has set /proc/self/attr/display = "hideous" in order to get > the full stack of labels for its peer processes, then it will be causing > side-effects on its separately-maintained child processes - they will > no longer be able to benefit from the backwards-compatility thing where > /proc/self/attr/display (effectively) defaults to the first LSM that > has labels, because dbus-daemon overrode that (unless dbus-daemon takes > action to reverse it between fork and exec). This partially defeats the > semi-backwards-compatible handling of the existing kernel interfaces. Point. /proc/self/attr/stack/context and SO_PEERCONTEXT comprise a better, more reliable solution. > If dbus-daemon could read SO_PEERSECLABELS instead of SO_PEERSEC and > read /proc/<pid>/attr/current_stack instead of /proc/<pid>/attr/current, > leaving /proc/self/attr/display untouched, then this concern would go away. I agree. > Similarly, dbus-daemon can be linked to libselinux and/or libapparmor > (on Debian it's linked to both, even in the non-stackable present, > and the right one for the kernel configuration is chosen at runtime). > If one of those libraries wrote to /proc/self/attr/display, then the rest > of dbus-daemon's main thread and all child processes would implicitly be > getting the result of that - even if dbus-daemon itself had not yet been > updated for stacked LSMs (in which case it cannot be expected to reverse > their action between fork and exec, because it's an older codebase that > doesn't yet know that "big" LSMs can be stacked). Yes. > So I think libselinux and libapparmor should be enhanced to use > new kernel interfaces that get the label they want to get (either > just that label, or all the labels), instead of being enhanced to > write /proc/self/attr/display to change the meaning of old kernel > interfaces. Otherwise they can break other code in their process or > their subprocesses. The AppArmor team is already moving away from using the /proc/self/attr intefaces. /proc/self/attr/smack is already there, and the transition begun. The SELinux developers seem firmly set in the position that there is no reason they should ever change. In the long term I think we'll get the conflict sorted out. It's hard to say what value of "long term" we're looking at. >>> instead of repurposing /proc/<pid>/attr/current >>> and SO_PEERSEC to have contents that vary according to ambient process >>> state in their reader? >> In addition, yes. Instead of? I don't think that we can have a >> backward compatibility story that flies without it. > Consider only SELinux and AppArmor for a moment (I know there are other > "big" LSMs like Smack, but this same reasoning applies to any pair, with > appropriate search-and-replace on their names). > > Neither SELinux nor AppArmor: there are no labels, nothing changed. > > AppArmor is the only "big" LSM in the stack (Ubuntu): previously, > the label was the AppArmor label; now, if attr/display is not altered, > the label is the one used by the first "big" LSM in the stack, which is > AppArmor. Nothing changed. > > SELinux is the only "big" LSM in the stack (Red Hat): same as for AppArmor > being the only "big" LSM in the stack, but with s/AppArmor/SELinux/. > > SELinux and AppArmor stacked: this is a situation that could not exist > before, so distro/sysadmin action must have been necessary to make it > happen. However much ambient process state is invented, I don't see any > way to make both SELinux and AppArmor user-space work without modifications: > at least one of them (the one that is second in the stack) has to use new > kernel interfaces, or alter attr/display to change the meaning of the old > kernel interfaces, or something similar, to get the second LSM's labels. > So distro/sysadmin action in user-space is also going to be necessary here > whatever happens - backward compatibility has already been broken, it's > only a question of how intrusive the user-space changes are. Is it really > so much worse if the distro/sysadmin action taken to update user-space > has to take the form of using new kernel interfaces that always do the > same thing, rather than changing the meaning of old kernel interfaces? In addition to the big name distros/systems like RedHat, Ubuntu and Android there are a bunch of smaller players who don't have the expertise and/or staffing and/or upstream clout to update system services. Some of these are targets for stacked LSMs. They will be delighted to get updated programs, but will muddle through with the compatibility mechanisms if they have to. > smcv Thank you again for your insights on this topic. My next round should provide what you've suggested.
