Re: strange tclass in AVCs

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On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 9:18 AM Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On 9/18/19 10:03 AM, Ted Toth wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 8:53 AM Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>
> >> On 9/18/19 9:35 AM, Ted Toth wrote:
> >>> I'm seeing things like tclass=context#012 in some AVCs what is this telling me?
> >>
> >> Just a guess here, but octal 012 is '\n' aka a newline character, and
> >> libselinux/src/avc.c:avc_audit() appends a "\n" at the end of the buffer
> >> before calling avc_log() to log the entire string.  avc_log() will call
> >> the logging callback, and dbusd does define one, which calls
> >> audit_log_user_avc_message().  Maybe audit_log_user_avc_message() is
> >> escaping the newline character in its output as well as appending
> >> additional data.
> >>
> >> I'm a little unclear though on why dbusd is checking a context contains
> >> permission?
> >
> > These appear to only occur when systemd is starting the dbus daemon
> > and they end up in /var/log/messages not /var/log/audit/audit.log as
> > I'd expect.
>
> Sounds like auditd isn't operational at that point and therefore the
> output just goes to syslog.
>
> Arguably avc_audit() shouldn't be adding a newline at all and that
> should be handled by the logging callback (or default_selinux_log if no
> callback is set).  But it has been this way forever, so that would no
> doubt break some users.  Legacy of when this was a printk/printf.
>
>
>
>

FWIW here's the comments from the function dbus uses that calls
avs_has_perm where the contains check happens. Why dbus policy does
not allow this is seems like an oversight.

/**
 * Determine if the SELinux security policy allows the given sender
 * security context to go to the given recipient security context.
 * This function determines if the requested permissions are to be
 * granted from the connection to the message bus or to another
 * optionally supplied security identifier (e.g. for a service
 * context).  Currently these permissions are either send_msg or
 * acquire_svc in the dbus class.
 *
 * @param sender_sid source security context
 * @param override_sid is the target security context.  If SECSID_WILD this will
 *        use the context of the bus itself (e.g. the default).
 * @param target_class is the target security class.
 * @param requested is the requested permissions.
 * @returns #TRUE if security policy allows the send.
 */
#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
static dbus_bool_t
bus_selinux_check (BusSELinuxID        *sender_sid,
                   BusSELinuxID        *override_sid,
                   security_class_t     target_class,
                   access_vector_t      requested,
                   DBusString          *auxdata)



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