Provide mechanisms for security modules that use network interfaces to operate on the same system safely. Provide mechanisms for kerfs to maintain information about all the security modules active on a system. With these mechanisms in place, any combination of existing security modules can be used. It is not clear that all issues with the integrity calls have been addressed. Any review there would be much appreciated. There should be a mechanism in netfilter to identify which security module a given rule is associated with, but none is proposed here. Instead, the module first registered is given the secmark. Labeled NFS is an incomplete implementation, missing the "LFS" data needed to identify the format of the labels passed. The first registered assumption is made here as well. The Netlabel restriction that all sent attributes must be agreeable to all modules is reasonable. The implementation is awkward, and insights into improvement would be most welcome. It is important to be aware that while the mechanisms have been made cohabitational, there is no guarantee that the policies imposed by the security modules will be compatible. The handling of unlabeled IP packets using Netlabel is very different in SELinux and Smack. The use of capabilities is also very different in those modules. This has been tested on Fedora29 and Ubuntu19.04 using unmodified policies. The SELinux test suite demonstrates policy conflict issues when used with Smack. Patches 0001-0002 change the secmark_refcount LSM interfaces to call only the first registered security module's hooks. Smack is modified to use these interfaces to determine if the Internet Protocol secmark is meaningful to Smack. Patches 0003 and 0009 refactor security_inode_init_security() to accomodate integrity checking on multiple active security attributes. Patch 0004 updates security_inode_listsecurity() to provide multiple security attributes instead of just one. Patches 0005-0007 address NFS and kernfs. Labeled nfs has no mechanism to identify what kind of label (e.g. CIPSO or Flask) that is being sent across the wire, so an arbitrary choice must be made on how NFS labels are handled. The module in lsmslot 0 is always used. Kernfs uses context strings to store security attributes, so those are now saved in the "compound" format. Patch 0008 provides infrastructure management of mount option data. Patch 0010 addresses the case where one security module may fail to provide a valid secid on datagrams where another succeeds. Patches 0011-0015 allow the LSM infrastructure to check whether the security modules agree on network security attributes when netlabel is being used. Patch 0016 removes the exclusive flag from Smack. A note on the "v7" designation: This depends on the stack-5.2-v7-apparmor patches provided earlier. Since that is "v7" I've used the same number here in the hopes that it will reduce confusion. https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.2-v7-full Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- fs/kernfs/inode.c | 3 +- fs/nfs/inode.c | 9 +- fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 6 +- fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 5 +- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 23 +- include/linux/security.h | 30 ++- include/net/netlabel.h | 8 + net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 4 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 120 ++++++++--- security/security.c | 419 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- security/selinux/hooks.c | 54 +++-- security/selinux/include/netlabel.h | 7 + security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 1 + security/selinux/netlabel.c | 46 ++-- security/smack/smack.h | 17 ++ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 128 +++++++---- security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 45 +++- 17 files changed, 689 insertions(+), 236 deletions(-)
