Hi.
First, a minor point got lost between my original text and the long
discussion between that and Jari's message, but I think it's one that is
important.
There are more people subject to recall than appointed by nomcom. In
particular there are IAB and IESG appointees to the IAOC.
So, in my text, I think talking about people subject to recall would be
better than people subject to nomcom appointment.
Beyond that, the critical thing in this issue to me is that this
document provide a set of procedures sufficient to maintain a fair and
open standards process in the sense of RFc 2026 section 6.5.3. I
believe that harassment including harassment by IETF leaders is a
problem that acts against a fair and open standards process. I am not
aware of harassment conducted by the sitting IESG, nor am I aware of
harassment by an IESG, IAB or IAOC mebmber that I personally believe
would have been best addressed by removing that member. However, I'm
aware of enough that I believe that a procedure for removing leaders
that we have confidence in is a critical element of this document.
If potential subjects of the procedures outlined in section 4 don't have
confidence in such a procedure, I think they will not have sufficient
confidence in the procedures that they can adequately maintain a fair
and open standards process.
So, I expect to be able to read this document and understand how in
sufficiently serious cases a leader would be removed and have confidence
in that.
>From my standpoint, the text I proposed was a compromise I'm barely
happy with with regard to individuals subject to recall. I don't think
that excluding I* members from activities is the right approach when
what the Ombudsteam wishes they could do is remove that individual. I
think it's the best we can do without a lot more work.
I'd like to respond to some of the specific alternatives. I believe all
the alternatives below have substantial unresolved objections in the
sense of RFC 7282.
Ombudsteam Starts Recall
In a private message I received a proposal that the Ombudsteam be given
the power to start a recall committee without collecting signatures.
The committee would review the case and make a decision. Ah, I see
Adrian did propose some version of that on-list too.
John Klensin, Brian Carpenter, myself and perhaps Dave Crocker have all
raised objections that the recall process is unlikely to work in cases
of harassment. We've each discussed problems with the committee itself
both in terms of fairness and confidentiality of information provided by
subject and reporter.
Pete provided a response to my criticism of the committee process. His
response depended specifically on the committee not investigating the
details of the harassment, but only on deciding whether to remove
someone who had already been excluded from all their activities
specifically without gaining any details of the harassment at all.
That response is inapplicable to the situation we're dealing with in
this alternative where the committee is specifically charged with
holding the Ombudsteam accountable. More over, as we've seen in this
discussion, enough of our community strives to find some accountability
mechanism, I have high confidence that any committee would try and
sanity check/review an Ombudsteam's decision. Doing that leads directly
to the problems I and others described.
Text in 05
Adrian proposed going back to the text in 05 that talks about the
Ombudsteam recommending that someone be removed.
In his message he asked
>For example, if the Ombudsteam decides to remove someone from a WG chair
>>position, how will this actually work? Will they tell the AD "this person is no
>longer a WG chair" and will the AD be supposed to say "Ah, that was the
>Ombudsteam speaking, so I had better react by, for example, not instantly
>reappointing them"?
So, first, I think the job of BCPs is to set general policy and it's the
job of our teams especially including the IAOC and IESG (and for this
BPC the Ombudsteam) to put together procedures that implement this
policy.
I don't think this document should specify these procedures.
Were you asking whether there are possible procedures that could
credibly implement the Ombudsteam removing a working group chair.
My answer is that yes, I believe what you sketch above would be
credible. I trust the IESG to be able to put together procedures for
dealing with the Ombudsteam removing a chair. I suspect that if the
community gives this authority to the Ombudsteam, the ADs would do
their part.
Adrian goes on to discuss the language regarding recommending removal
and explores how it would work in practice.
>1. Document editor.
>"Hello WG chairs, we are the Ombudsteam and we ask you to remove Adrian from
>editing draft-ietf-foo."
>>The WG chairs will know what that means and don't need to know any more details.
>What is the difference between this and Sam's proposal?
The difference is that we have not given the Ombudsteam the authority to
remove, only the authority to recommend.
In my proposal, a wg chair who says "I refuse," is violating an
established BCP. I can go appeal that decision under 6.5.2, I can go
question the fairness of the process in that WG.
I read Adrian's text to give the WG chair the power to review the
recommendation and to decide whether they agree with it.
I have fairly high confidence that many WG chairs without significant
additional information would not be willing to remove the editor.
As a subject, I would not trust the process because I would not believe
that there was an adequate remedy to get an editor removed.
The problem is the same for interacting with ADs to get a WG chair
removed.
In particular, from Stephen's alternative text:
>enforce some remedies whilst preserving as much confidentiality
>as possible, (in particular for a Subject) the Ombudsteam may need
>to convince someone not involved in the situation that e.g. a change
>in role or organisation is needed.
When I read that text, I get the impression that Stephen, a sitting AD
would not take a recommendation to remove a chair without sufficient
detail to let him make his own evaluation.
In my opinion, Stephen is an incredibly effective security AD. I think
he's exactly the kind of person I hope the nomcom appoints in that role.
However, I don't think Stephen is qualified to judge harassment issues,
and based on my interactions with him, I feel fear and aprehension when
I think about the possibility that my concerns as a subject and my
ability to feel safe in the organization might depend on him reviewing
an Ombudsteam recommendation to remove a chair in his area.
I bring this up to say that even for excellent ADs the job description
is very different and that having ADs review these recommendations does
not provide an effective path to remove leaders sufficient to provide a
fair and open standards process.
I know I've raised the unsuitability of IESG members to review
harassment decisions in the past. I believe that John Klensin and Dave
Crocker and others have also done so. To me this remains a substantial
unresolved objection.
Stephen's Alternative
Stephen's text also suffers from asking WG chairs and ADs to review the
Ombudsteam's decisions regarding removal.
The same arguments and open objections apply from Adrian's text.
Consensus Question
Some of the discussion I'm seeing suggests that the consensus behind
excluding people from activities sufficient to make it impossible for
them to do their jobs may not actually be there.
We see a lot of discussion about holding the Ombudsteam accountable at
the individual decision level. I wonder why we seem more comfortable
allowing people to be preventing from doing their jobs than we are
allowing them to be removed. I understand Pete's reasoning here, but
some of the other messages on the list would seem to apply equally to
exclusions and removals.
Dave's Review
In the substantial unaddressed comments area, Dave Crocker published a
review that brings up some fairly important issues. I have not seen
discussion sufficient to believe we could have an informed consensus
that we've resolved any of the issues he brought forward.
--Sam