Re: Let's move on - Let's DNSCurve Re: DNSSEC is NOT secure end to end

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Past history is a good indicator of problems that may arise.

Past history is a very bad guarantee that problems will not arise in the future.




On Fri, Jun 12, 2009 at 7:54 PM, Masataka
Ohta<mohta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>
>> Past history is no guarantee of future performance.
>
> Is your argument applicable to the following statement you just made
> yesterday?
>
> : Trust roots have to be valid for at least a decade to be acceptable to
> : the application vendor community.
>
>> A pattern we see repeated over and over again is that a new control on
>> some form of Internet crime leads to a dramatic short term reduction
>> even though the control merely increases the cost of crime, not
>> eliminates the capability. This is the displacement effect. The
>> criminals attack weaker targets instead. Once the criminals have
>> exhausted the supply of easy targets the original targets see a sudden
>> increase in the crime rate, often orders of magnitude in a few days.
>
> Note that, given dynamically generated zones, signature generation
> mechanisms of DNSSEC is rather weaker targets.
>
>                                                        Masataka Ohta
>
>



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