Or alternatively, Be liberal in anticipating repeat of past problems, be conservative in your expectation that new problems will not arise. On Fri, Jun 12, 2009 at 8:21 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker<hallam@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Past history is a good indicator of problems that may arise. > > Past history is a very bad guarantee that problems will not arise in the future. > > > > > On Fri, Jun 12, 2009 at 7:54 PM, Masataka > Ohta<mohta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote: >> >>> Past history is no guarantee of future performance. >> >> Is your argument applicable to the following statement you just made >> yesterday? >> >> : Trust roots have to be valid for at least a decade to be acceptable to >> : the application vendor community. >> >>> A pattern we see repeated over and over again is that a new control on >>> some form of Internet crime leads to a dramatic short term reduction >>> even though the control merely increases the cost of crime, not >>> eliminates the capability. This is the displacement effect. The >>> criminals attack weaker targets instead. Once the criminals have >>> exhausted the supply of easy targets the original targets see a sudden >>> increase in the crime rate, often orders of magnitude in a few days. >> >> Note that, given dynamically generated zones, signature generation >> mechanisms of DNSSEC is rather weaker targets. >> >> Masataka Ohta >> >> > > > > -- > -- > New Website: http://hallambaker.com/ > View Quantum of Stupid podcasts, Tuesday and Thursday each week, > http://quantumofstupid.com/ > -- -- New Website: http://hallambaker.com/ View Quantum of Stupid podcasts, Tuesday and Thursday each week, http://quantumofstupid.com/ _______________________________________________ Ietf@xxxxxxxx https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf