Before folk start accusing me of 'solving the spam problem',
* I get 40-50 spam messages making it into my Gmail inbox per day, several times that in my spam folder and goodness knows how many Gmail drop by blocking the sender IPs.
* I have received 5 spam contact requests on Skype in >10 years, 2 on Signal in five. Similar vanishingly low number of fake contacts on Facebook, Twitter, etc. None of those have contained malicious payloads.
* I have never received a junk phone call on Skype, Zoom or Signal, not once.
There is really no reason to think that the same approach of requiring authentication and authorization could not be applied to an open interoperable messaging system.
At this point I have running code. I am just finishing off a few modifications to the platform that would be impossible to make after starting to build a user base. This is mostly a matter of eliminating code that is not required.
All I need to do now is to find a community of users for which an end to end communication system that supports all of today's messaging modalities or a system that manages keys and credentials across devices represents a 'killer application'.
On Mon, Apr 10, 2023 at 11:35 PM Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Sun, Apr 9, 2023 at 6:14 PM Hesham ElBakoury <helbakoury@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:Is using Everything more energy efficient than email systems that are currently in use?HeshamEnergy efficiency is not a consideration in the Mesh messaging system.If however, you believe there is utility in chain-type notary logs, the cross-notarization approach used in the Mesh is considerably stronger than the proof of waste approach used in Bitcoin and uses negligible electricity.When looking at SMTP mail and DNS, the vast majority of time and effort goes into handling abuse. In the case of running DNS root servers, 99% of the load is pure abuse.The Mesh does not prevent abuse but the fact that every message is authenticated and only authorized messages are accepted means that there is much less value in abuse to an attacker. The net is that while sending a Mesh message requires a lot of cryptographic operations not required in SMTP/STARTTLS, the net impact would probably be much less at scale.
