Linux EFI Development - Date Index

• Date Index

• [PATCH v4] efi: arm64: Add vmlinux debug link to the Image binary, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH v4] efi: arm64: Add vmlinux debug link to the Image binary, Will Deacon
    • Re: [PATCH v4] efi: arm64: Add vmlinux debug link to the Image binary, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH v4] efi: arm64: Add vmlinux debug link to the Image binary, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH v4] efi: arm64: Add vmlinux debug link to the Image binary, Will Deacon
          • Re: [PATCH v4] efi: arm64: Add vmlinux debug link to the Image binary, Ard Biesheuvel
• [GIT PULL] EFI urgent fix for v4.10, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH] efi: fdt: avoid FDT manipulation after ExitBootServices(), Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH] efi: fdt: avoid FDT manipulation after ExitBootServices(), Leif Lindholm
    • Re: [PATCH] efi: fdt: avoid FDT manipulation after ExitBootServices(), Ingo Molnar
      • Re: [PATCH] efi: fdt: avoid FDT manipulation after ExitBootServices(), Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH] efi: fdt: avoid FDT manipulation after ExitBootServices(), Ingo Molnar
    • Re: [PATCH] efi: fdt: avoid FDT manipulation after ExitBootServices(), Jeffrey Hugo
      • Re: [PATCH] efi: fdt: avoid FDT manipulation after ExitBootServices(), Jeffrey Hugo
        • Re: [PATCH] efi: fdt: avoid FDT manipulation after ExitBootServices(), Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH V8 00/10] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V8 03/10] efi: parse ARM processor error, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V8 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V8 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort, James Morse
      • Re: [PATCH V8 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort, Baicar, Tyler
  • [PATCH V8 06/10] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V8 06/10] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block, James Morse
      • Re: [PATCH V8 06/10] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block, Baicar, Tyler
        • Re: [PATCH V8 06/10] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block, James Morse
          • Re: [PATCH V8 06/10] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block, Baicar, Tyler
  • [PATCH V8 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V8 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, kbuild test robot
    • Re: [PATCH V8 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, James Morse
      • Re: [PATCH V8 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, Baicar, Tyler
    • Re: [PATCH V8 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, Zhengqiang
      • Re: [PATCH V8 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, Baicar, Tyler
  • [PATCH V8 08/10] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V8 08/10] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section, kbuild test robot
    • Re: [PATCH V8 08/10] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section, Steven Rostedt
      • Re: [PATCH V8 08/10] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section, Baicar, Tyler
        • Re: [PATCH V8 08/10] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section, Steven Rostedt
          • Re: [PATCH V8 08/10] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section, Baicar, Tyler
  • [PATCH V8 10/10] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V8 09/10] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V8 09/10] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event, kbuild test robot
    • Re: [PATCH V8 09/10] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event, Steven Rostedt
      • Re: [PATCH V8 09/10] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event, Baicar, Tyler
  • [PATCH V8 07/10] efi: print unrecognized CPER section, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V8 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V8 01/10] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption, Tyler Baicar
• [PATCH] efi: fdt: avoid FDT manipulation after ExitBootServices(), Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: fdt: avoid FDT manipulation after ExitBootServices(), Leif Lindholm
    • Re: [PATCH] efi: fdt: avoid FDT manipulation after ExitBootServices(), Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: fdt: avoid FDT manipulation after ExitBootServices(), Mark Rutland
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: fdt: avoid FDT manipulation after ExitBootServices(), Riku Voipio
• [PATCH] efi: arm: remove pointless dummy .reloc section, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH] efi: libstub: Make file I/O chunking x86-specific, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: libstub: Make file I/O chunking x86-specific, Arnd Bergmann
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: libstub: Make file I/O chunking x86-specific, Matt Fleming
• [PATCH 0/7] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #7], David Howells
  • [PATCH 1/7] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #7], David Howells
  • [PATCH 3/7] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions [ver #7], David Howells
  • [PATCH 2/7] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #7], David Howells
  • [PATCH 4/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #7], David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 4/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #7], kbuild test robot
    • Re: [PATCH 4/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #7], kbuild test robot
      • Re: [PATCH 4/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #7], Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH 4/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #7], David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH 4/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #7], Ard Biesheuvel
          • Re: [PATCH 4/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #7], Matt Fleming
            • Re: [PATCH 4/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #7], Ye Xiaolong
    • Re: [PATCH 4/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #7], Matt Fleming
  • [PATCH 5/7] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode [ver #7], David Howells
  • [PATCH 6/7] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 [ver #7], David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 6/7] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 [ver #7], Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 6/7] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 [ver #7], David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 6/7] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 [ver #7], Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH 6/7] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 [ver #7], David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH 6/7] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 [ver #7], Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH 6/7] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 [ver #7], David Howells
          • Re: [PATCH 6/7] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 [ver #7], Ard Biesheuvel
            • Re: [PATCH 6/7] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 [ver #7], Matt Fleming
              • Re: [PATCH 6/7] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 [ver #7], Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 6/7] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 [ver #7], David Howells
  • [PATCH 7/7] efi: Print the secure boot status in x86 setup_arch() [ver #7], David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 7/7] efi: Print the secure boot status in x86 setup_arch() [ver #7], Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 7/7] efi: Print the secure boot status in x86 setup_arch() [ver #7], David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 7/7] efi: Print the secure boot status in x86 setup_arch() [ver #7], Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH 7/7] efi: Print the secure boot status in x86 setup_arch() [ver #7], David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 7/7] efi: Print the secure boot status in x86 setup_arch() [ver #7], David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH 7/7] efi: Print the secure boot status in x86 setup_arch() [ver #7], Ard Biesheuvel
          • Re: [PATCH 7/7] efi: Print the secure boot status in x86 setup_arch() [ver #7], Ard Biesheuvel
          • Re: [PATCH 7/7] efi: Print the secure boot status in x86 setup_arch() [ver #7], David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 0/7] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #7], Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH 0/7] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #7], David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 0/7] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #7], Ard Biesheuvel
• [GIT PULL 00/10] EFI updates for v4.11, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 07/10] efi: Use typed function pointers for runtime services table, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 06/10] efi/esrt: Fix spelling mistake "doen't", Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 10/10] efi: libstub: Preserve .debug sections after absolute relocation check, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 09/10] efi/x86: Add debug code to print cooked memmap, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 08/10] efi/x86: Move EFI BGRT init code to early init code, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 08/10] efi/x86: Move EFI BGRT init code to early init code, Sabrina Dubroca
      • Re: [PATCH 08/10] efi/x86: Move EFI BGRT init code to early init code, Dave Young
        • Re: [PATCH 08/10] efi/x86: Move EFI BGRT init code to early init code, Sabrina Dubroca
          • Re: [PATCH 08/10] efi/x86: Move EFI BGRT init code to early init code, Dave Young
            • Re: [PATCH 08/10] efi/x86: Move EFI BGRT init code to early init code, Sabrina Dubroca
  • [PATCH 05/10] x86/efi: Add support for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 01/10] efi: Deduplicate efi_file_size() / _read() / _close(), Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 03/10] efi: Make EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE initialization common across all architectures, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 04/10] efi: Introduce EFI_MEM_ATTR bit and set it from memory attributes table, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 02/10] x86/efi: Deduplicate efi_char16_printk(), Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH v3 0/2] efi/arm64: add vmlinux link to PE/COFF debug table, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH v3 2/2] efi: arm64: Add vmlinux debug link to the Image binary, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH v3 1/2] efi: libstub: Preserve .debug sections after absolute relocation check, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH v2 1/3] x86/mm: Adapt MODULES_END based on Fixmap section size, Thomas Garnier
  • [PATCH v2 3/3] x86: Make the GDT remapping read-only on 64 bit, Thomas Garnier
  • [PATCH v2 2/3] x86: Remap GDT tables in the Fixmap section, Thomas Garnier
• Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: always map first physical page into EFI pagetables, Jiri Kosina
  • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: always map first physical page into EFI pagetables, Borislav Petkov
  • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: always map first physical page into EFI pagetables, Matt Fleming
    • [PATCH v2] x86/efi: always map first physical page into EFI pagetables, Jiri Kosina
      • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: always map first physical page into EFI pagetables, Matt Fleming
• [PATCH v2 0/2] efi/arm64: add vmlinux link to PE/COFF debug table, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH v2 1/2] efi: libstub: Preserve .debug sections after absolute relocation check, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH v2 2/2] arm64: efi: add vmlinux debug link to the Image binary, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] arm64: efi: add vmlinux debug link to the Image binary, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] arm64: efi: add vmlinux debug link to the Image binary, Mark Rutland
      • Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] arm64: efi: add vmlinux debug link to the Image binary, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] arm64: efi: add vmlinux debug link to the Image binary, Mark Rutland
          • Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] arm64: efi: add vmlinux debug link to the Image binary, Ard Biesheuvel
            • Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] arm64: efi: add vmlinux debug link to the Image binary, Mark Rutland
• [PATCH 4.9 032/120] efi/libstub/arm*: Pass latest memory map to the kernel, Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH V2 0/4] efi/x86: move efi bgrt init code to early init, Dave Young
  • [PATCH V2 3/4] efi/x86: add debug code to print cooked memmap, Dave Young
    • Re: [PATCH V2 3/4] efi/x86: add debug code to print cooked memmap, Nicolai Stange
  • [PATCH V2 2/4] efi/x86: move efi_print_memmap to drivers/firmware/efi/memmap.c, Dave Young
    • Re: [PATCH V2 2/4] efi/x86: move efi_print_memmap to drivers/firmware/efi/memmap.c, Nicolai Stange
    • Re: [PATCH V2 2/4] efi/x86: move efi_print_memmap to drivers/firmware/efi/memmap.c, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH V2 4/4] efi/x86: make efi_memmap_reserve only insert into boot mem areas, Dave Young
    • Re: [PATCH V2 4/4] efi/x86: make efi_memmap_reserve only insert into boot mem areas, Nicolai Stange
    • Re: [PATCH V2 4/4] efi/x86: make efi_memmap_reserve only insert into boot mem areas, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH V2 4/4] efi/x86: make efi_memmap_reserve only insert into boot mem areas, Nicolai Stange
        • Re: [PATCH V2 4/4] efi/x86: make efi_memmap_reserve only insert into boot mem areas, Dave Young
          • Re: [PATCH V2 4/4] efi/x86: make efi_memmap_reserve only insert into boot mem areas, Dave Young
            • Re: [PATCH V2 4/4] efi/x86: make efi_memmap_reserve only insert into boot mem areas, Dave Young
      • Re: [PATCH V2 4/4] efi/x86: make efi_memmap_reserve only insert into boot mem areas, Dave Young
  • [PATCH V2 1/4] efi/x86: move efi bgrt init code to early init code, Dave Young
    • Re: [PATCH V2 1/4] efi/x86: move efi bgrt init code to early init code, Nicolai Stange
    • Re: [PATCH V2 1/4] efi/x86: move efi bgrt init code to early init code, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH V2 1/4] efi/x86: move efi bgrt init code to early init code, Dave Young
      • [PATCH V3 1/4] efi/x86: move efi bgrt init code to early init code, Dave Young
        • Re: [PATCH V3 1/4] efi/x86: move efi bgrt init code to early init code, Ard Biesheuvel
          • Re: [PATCH V3 1/4] efi/x86: move efi bgrt init code to early init code, Bhupesh Sharma
            • Re: [PATCH V3 1/4] efi/x86: move efi bgrt init code to early init code, Ard Biesheuvel
              • Re: [PATCH V3 1/4] efi/x86: move efi bgrt init code to early init code, Dave Young
  • Re: [PATCH V2 0/4] efi/x86: move efi bgrt init code to early init, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH V2 0/4] efi/x86: move efi bgrt init code to early init, Dave Young
• [PATCH] partitions/efi: Fix integer overflow in GPT size calculation, Alden Tondettar
  • Re: [PATCH] partitions/efi: Fix integer overflow in GPT size calculation, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH] partitions/efi: Fix integer overflow in GPT size calculation, Jens Axboe
• [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, Ingo Molnar
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, Ingo Molnar
  • [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, Ingo Molnar
  • [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, Ingo Molnar
  • [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, Ingo Molnar
  • [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, Ingo Molnar
    • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, pr-tracker-bot
  • [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, Ingo Molnar
    • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, pr-tracker-bot
  • [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, Ingo Molnar
    • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, pr-tracker-bot
  • [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, Ingo Molnar
    • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, pr-tracker-bot
  • [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, Ingo Molnar
    • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, pr-tracker-bot
  • [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, Ingo Molnar
    • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, pr-tracker-bot
  • [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, Ingo Molnar
    • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, pr-tracker-bot
  • [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, Ingo Molnar
    • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, pr-tracker-bot
  • [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, Ingo Molnar
    • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, pr-tracker-bot
  • [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, Ingo Molnar
    • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, Linus Torvalds
      • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, Peter Zijlstra
        • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, Linus Torvalds
          • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, Peter Zijlstra
          • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, Arnd Bergmann
            • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, Kirill A. Shutemov
              • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, Arnd Bergmann
                • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, Kirill A. Shutemov
                  • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, Lukas Wunner
    • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, pr-tracker-bot
  • [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, Ingo Molnar
    • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fixes, pr-tracker-bot
• [PATCH V7 00/10] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V7 01/10] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V7 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V7 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V7 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort, Will Deacon
      • Re: [PATCH V7 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort, Baicar, Tyler
        • Re: [PATCH V7 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort, Will Deacon
          • Re: [PATCH V7 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort, Baicar, Tyler
      • Re: [PATCH V7 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort, James Morse
        • Re: [PATCH V7 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort, Baicar, Tyler
    • Re: [PATCH V7 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort, James Morse
      • Re: [PATCH V7 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort, Baicar, Tyler
        • Re: [PATCH V7 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort, James Morse
          • Re: [PATCH V7 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort, Baicar, Tyler
            • Re: [PATCH V7 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort, James Morse
              • Re: [PATCH V7 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort, Baicar, Tyler
  • [PATCH V7 03/10] efi: parse ARM processor error, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V7 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V7 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, James Morse
      • Re: [PATCH V7 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, Baicar, Tyler
        • Re: [PATCH V7 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, James Morse
          • Re: [PATCH V7 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, Baicar, Tyler
            • Re: [PATCH V7 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, James Morse
              • Re: [PATCH V7 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, Baicar, Tyler
  • [PATCH V7 10/10] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V7 10/10] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support, Marc Zyngier
      • Re: [PATCH V7 10/10] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support, Baicar, Tyler
  • [PATCH V7 06/10] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V7 09/10] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V7 08/10] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V7 07/10] efi: print unrecognized CPER section, Tyler Baicar
• [PATCH 0/4] efi/x86: move efi bgrt init code to early init, Dave Young
  • [PATCH 1/4] efi/x86: make efi_memmap_reserve only insert into boot mem areas, Dave Young
    • Re: [PATCH 1/4] efi/x86: make efi_memmap_reserve only insert into boot mem areas, Nicolai Stange
      • Re: [PATCH 1/4] efi/x86: make efi_memmap_reserve only insert into boot mem areas, Dave Young
        • Re: [PATCH 1/4] efi/x86: make efi_memmap_reserve only insert into boot mem areas, Matt Fleming
          • Re: [PATCH 1/4] efi/x86: make efi_memmap_reserve only insert into boot mem areas, Ard Biesheuvel
            • Re: [PATCH 1/4] efi/x86: make efi_memmap_reserve only insert into boot mem areas, Matt Fleming
              • Re: [PATCH 1/4] efi/x86: make efi_memmap_reserve only insert into boot mem areas, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 1/4] efi/x86: make efi_memmap_reserve only insert into boot mem areas, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH 1/4] efi/x86: make efi_memmap_reserve only insert into boot mem areas, Dave Young
        • Re: [PATCH 1/4] efi/x86: make efi_memmap_reserve only insert into boot mem areas, Dave Young
  • [PATCH 2/4] efi/x86: move efi bgrt init code to early init code, Dave Young
    • Re: [PATCH 2/4] efi/x86: move efi bgrt init code to early init code, Dave Young
    • Re: [PATCH 2/4] efi/x86: move efi bgrt init code to early init code, Nicolai Stange
      • Re: [PATCH 2/4] efi/x86: move efi bgrt init code to early init code, Dave Young
        • Re: [PATCH 2/4] efi/x86: move efi bgrt init code to early init code, Nicolai Stange
          • Re: [PATCH 2/4] efi/x86: move efi bgrt init code to early init code, Dave Young
            • Re: [PATCH 2/4] efi/x86: move efi bgrt init code to early init code, Dave Young
              • Re: [PATCH 2/4] efi/x86: move efi bgrt init code to early init code, Nicolai Stange
                • Re: [PATCH 2/4] efi/x86: move efi bgrt init code to early init code, Dave Young
    • Re: [PATCH 2/4] efi/x86: move efi bgrt init code to early init code, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH 2/4] efi/x86: move efi bgrt init code to early init code, Dave Young
        • Re: [PATCH 2/4] efi/x86: move efi bgrt init code to early init code, Bhupesh Sharma
          • Re: [PATCH 2/4] efi/x86: move efi bgrt init code to early init code, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 3/4] efi/x86: move efi_print_memmap to drivers/firmware/efi/memmap.c, Dave Young
    • Re: [PATCH 3/4] efi/x86: move efi_print_memmap to drivers/firmware/efi/memmap.c, Nicolai Stange
      • Re: [PATCH 3/4] efi/x86: move efi_print_memmap to drivers/firmware/efi/memmap.c, Dave Young
  • [PATCH 4/4] efi/x86: add debug code to print cooked memmap, Dave Young
    • Re: [PATCH 4/4] efi/x86: add debug code to print cooked memmap, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH 4.9 099/206] efi/efivar_ssdt_load: Dont return success on allocation failure, Greg Kroah-Hartman
• [PATCH v3 1/2] x86/efi: don't allocate memmap through memblock after mm_init(), Nicolai Stange
  • [PATCH v3 2/2] efi: efi_mem_reserve(): don't reserve through memblock after mm_init(), Nicolai Stange
    • Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] efi: efi_mem_reserve(): don't reserve through memblock after mm_init(), Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] efi: efi_mem_reserve(): don't reserve through memblock after mm_init(), Nicolai Stange
        • Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] efi: efi_mem_reserve(): don't reserve through memblock after mm_init(), Ard Biesheuvel
          • Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] efi: efi_mem_reserve(): don't reserve through memblock after mm_init(), Nicolai Stange
            • Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] efi: efi_mem_reserve(): don't reserve through memblock after mm_init(), Ard Biesheuvel
              • Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] efi: efi_mem_reserve(): don't reserve through memblock after mm_init(), Nicolai Stange
                • Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] efi: efi_mem_reserve(): don't reserve through memblock after mm_init(), Matt Fleming
              • Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] efi: efi_mem_reserve(): don't reserve through memblock after mm_init(), Matt Fleming
  • Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] x86/efi: don't allocate memmap through memblock after mm_init(), Dan Williams
• [PATCH 00/10] efi: Constify all the things, Lukas Wunner
  • [PATCH 01/10] efi: use typed function pointers for runtime services table, Lukas Wunner
  • [PATCH 02/10] efi: Constify GetVariable() / SetVariable() signatures, Lukas Wunner
    • Re: [PATCH 02/10] efi: Constify GetVariable() / SetVariable() signatures, Juergen Gross
  • [PATCH 03/10] efi: Constify GetVariable() / SetVariable() arguments, Lukas Wunner
    • Re: [PATCH 03/10] efi: Constify GetVariable() / SetVariable() arguments, Dennis Dalessandro
    • Re: [PATCH 03/10] efi: Constify GetVariable() / SetVariable() arguments, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH 03/10] efi: Constify GetVariable() / SetVariable() arguments, Lukas Wunner
        • Re: [PATCH 03/10] efi: Constify GetVariable() / SetVariable() arguments, Ard Biesheuvel
          • Re: [PATCH 03/10] efi: Constify GetVariable() / SetVariable() arguments, Kees Cook
  • [PATCH 04/10] efi: Constify HandleProtocol() / LocateHandle() / LocateProtocol(), Lukas Wunner
  • [PATCH 05/10] efi: Constify InstallConfigurationTable(), Lukas Wunner
  • [PATCH 06/10] efi: Constify EFI_FILE_PROTOCOL.GetInfo(), Lukas Wunner
  • [PATCH 07/10] efi: Constify EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL.GetRNG(), Lukas Wunner
  • [PATCH 08/10] efi: Constify EFI_SIMPLE_TEXT_OUTPUT_PROTOCOL.OutputString(), Lukas Wunner
  • [PATCH 09/10] efi: Constify efi_guidcmp() arguments, Lukas Wunner
  • [PATCH 10/10] uuid: Constify UUID compound literals, Lukas Wunner
    • Re: [PATCH 10/10] uuid: Constify UUID compound literals, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH 10/10] uuid: Constify UUID compound literals, Lukas Wunner
        • Re: [PATCH 10/10] uuid: Constify UUID compound literals, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH 00/10] efi: Constify all the things, Kees Cook
  • Re: [PATCH 00/10] efi: Constify all the things, Ard Biesheuvel
• [GIT PULL] efi: urgent fix for v4.10 with cc to stable, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm*: Pass latest memory map to the kernel, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/efi: don't allocate memmap through memblock after mm_init(), Nicolai Stange
  • [PATCH v2 2/2] efi: efi_mem_reserve(): don't reserve through memblock after mm_init(), Nicolai Stange
    • Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] efi: efi_mem_reserve(): don't reserve through memblock after mm_init(), Dave Young
      • Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] efi: efi_mem_reserve(): don't reserve through memblock after mm_init(), Matt Fleming
        • Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] efi: efi_mem_reserve(): don't reserve through memblock after mm_init(), Mel Gorman
          • Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] efi: efi_mem_reserve(): don't reserve through memblock after mm_init(), Matt Fleming
          • Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] efi: efi_mem_reserve(): don't reserve through memblock after mm_init(), Matt Fleming
        • Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] efi: efi_mem_reserve(): don't reserve through memblock after mm_init(), Dave Young
          • Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] efi: efi_mem_reserve(): don't reserve through memblock after mm_init(), Matt Fleming
            • Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] efi: efi_mem_reserve(): don't reserve through memblock after mm_init(), Dave Young
  • Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/efi: don't allocate memmap through memblock after mm_init(), Matt Fleming
    • Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/efi: don't allocate memmap through memblock after mm_init(), Nicolai Stange
      • Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/efi: don't allocate memmap through memblock after mm_init(), Ingo Molnar
        • Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/efi: don't allocate memmap through memblock after mm_init(), Dave Young
        • Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/efi: don't allocate memmap through memblock after mm_init(), Ard Biesheuvel
          • Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/efi: don't allocate memmap through memblock after mm_init(), Nicolai Stange
            • Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/efi: don't allocate memmap through memblock after mm_init(), Ard Biesheuvel
              • Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/efi: don't allocate memmap through memblock after mm_init(), Nicolai Stange
  • Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/efi: don't allocate memmap through memblock after mm_init(), Dan Williams
• [PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: don't allocate memmap through memblock after mm_init(), Nicolai Stange
  • [PATCH 2/2] efi: efi_mem_reserve(): don't reserve through memblock after mm_init(), Nicolai Stange
    • Re: [PATCH 2/2] efi: efi_mem_reserve(): don't reserve through memblock after mm_init(), Mika Penttilä
      • Re: [PATCH 2/2] efi: efi_mem_reserve(): don't reserve through memblock after mm_init(), Nicolai Stange
• [PATCH] x86/efi Fix regression in efi_arch_mem_reserve, Petr Oros
  • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi Fix regression in efi_arch_mem_reserve, Matt Fleming
    • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi Fix regression in efi_arch_mem_reserve, Petr Oros
• [efi:urgent 1/1] drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c:303:9: warning: cast from pointer to integer of different size, kbuild test robot
  • Re: [efi:urgent 1/1] drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c:303:9: warning: cast from pointer to integer of different size, Matt Fleming
    • Re: [efi:urgent 1/1] drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c:303:9: warning: cast from pointer to integer of different size, James Morse
    • [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm*: double cast memory_map to hide compiler warning, James Morse
      • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm*: double cast memory_map to hide compiler warning, Matt Fleming
        • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm*: double cast memory_map to hide compiler warning, Jeffrey Hugo
          • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm*: double cast memory_map to hide compiler warning, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH v2] efi/libstub: arm*: Pass latest memory map to the kernel, James Morse
  • Re: [PATCH v2] efi/libstub: arm*: Pass latest memory map to the kernel, Matt Fleming
    • Re: [PATCH v2] efi/libstub: arm*: Pass latest memory map to the kernel, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH v2] efi/libstub: arm*: Pass latest memory map to the kernel, Ard Biesheuvel
• Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Pass dmi_entry_point to kexec'ed kernel, Dave Young
  • Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Pass dmi_entry_point to kexec'ed kernel, Andy Shevchenko
  • Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Pass dmi_entry_point to kexec'ed kernel, Andy Shevchenko
    • Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Pass dmi_entry_point to kexec'ed kernel, Eric W. Biederman
      • Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Pass dmi_entry_point to kexec'ed kernel, Jean Delvare
        • Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Pass dmi_entry_point to kexec'ed kernel, Andy Shevchenko
          • Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Pass dmi_entry_point to kexec'ed kernel, Jean Delvare
            • Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Pass dmi_entry_point to kexec'ed kernel, Eric W. Biederman
              • Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Pass dmi_entry_point to kexec'ed kernel, Andy Shevchenko
      • Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Pass dmi_entry_point to kexec'ed kernel, Andy Shevchenko
        • Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Pass dmi_entry_point to kexec'ed kernel, Ard Biesheuvel
          • Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Pass dmi_entry_point to kexec'ed kernel, Andy Shevchenko
            • Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Pass dmi_entry_point to kexec'ed kernel, Eric W. Biederman
              • Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Pass dmi_entry_point to kexec'ed kernel, Andy Shevchenko
          • Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Pass dmi_entry_point to kexec'ed kernel, Andy Shevchenko
            • Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Pass dmi_entry_point to kexec'ed kernel, Andy Shevchenko
• [PATCH v3] efi: prune invalid memory map entries, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH v3] efi: prune invalid memory map entries, Matt Fleming
    • Re: [PATCH v3] efi: prune invalid memory map entries, Ard Biesheuvel
• [GIT PULL] EFI changes for v4.10, Ingo Molnar
• [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm*: Pass latest memory map to the kernel, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm*: Pass latest memory map to the kernel, James Morse
    • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: arm*: Pass latest memory map to the kernel, Jeffrey Hugo
• [BUG/RFC] efi/libstub: Preserve the memory map pointed to by the FDT, James Morse
  • Re: [BUG/RFC] efi/libstub: Preserve the memory map pointed to by the FDT, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH] efi/esrt: fix spelling mistake "doen't", Colin King
  • Re: [PATCH] efi/esrt: fix spelling mistake "doen't", Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH 0/8] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #6], David Howells
  • [PATCH 6/8] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode [ver #6], David Howells
  • [PATCH 8/8] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit [ver #6], David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 8/8] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit [ver #6], Matt Fleming
    • Re: [PATCH 8/8] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit [ver #6], David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 8/8] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit [ver #6], Matt Fleming
      • Re: [PATCH 8/8] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit [ver #6], David Howells
  • [PATCH 7/8] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 [ver #6], David Howells
  • [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #6], David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #6], Matt Fleming
    • Re: [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #6], David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #6], Matt Fleming
      • Re: [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #6], David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #6], Matt Fleming
        • Re: [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #6], David Howells
          • Re: [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #6], Matt Fleming
          • What should the default lockdown mode be if the bootloader sentinel triggers sanitization?, David Howells
            • Re: What should the default lockdown mode be if the bootloader sentinel triggers sanitization?, Matt Fleming
            • Re: What should the default lockdown mode be if the bootloader sentinel triggers sanitization?, David Howells
              • Re: What should the default lockdown mode be if the bootloader sentinel triggers sanitization?, Matt Fleming
          • Re: [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #6], David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #6], David Howells
  • [PATCH 4/8] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions [ver #6], David Howells
  • [PATCH 3/8] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #6], David Howells
  • [PATCH 2/8] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #6], David Howells
  • [PATCH 1/8] efi: use typed function pointers for runtime services table [ver #6], David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 0/8] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #6], Matt Fleming
    • Re: [PATCH 0/8] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #6], Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH 0/8] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #6], Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH 0/8] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #6], Ard Biesheuvel
• [GIT PULL] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel, David Howells
  • Re: [GIT PULL] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel, Matt Fleming
  • Re: [GIT PULL] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel, David Howells
    • Re: [GIT PULL] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel, Matt Fleming
    • Re: [GIT PULL] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel, David Howells
• [PATCH V6 00/10] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V6 06/10] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V6 08/10] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V6 10/10] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V6 07/10] efi: print unrecognized CPER section, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V6 09/10] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V6 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V6 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, James Morse
      • Re: [PATCH V6 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, Baicar, Tyler
        • Re: [PATCH V6 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, James Morse
          • Re: [PATCH V6 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, Baicar, Tyler
  • [PATCH V6 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V6 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort, Will Deacon
      • Re: [PATCH V6 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort, Baicar, Tyler
  • [PATCH V6 03/10] efi: parse ARM processor error, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V6 03/10] efi: parse ARM processor error, James Morse
      • Re: [PATCH V6 03/10] efi: parse ARM processor error, Baicar, Tyler
  • [PATCH V6 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V6 01/10] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption, Tyler Baicar
• [PATCH 1/4] efi: efi_print_memmap(): Call out invalid entries in the memory map early., Peter Jones
  • [PATCH 3/4] efi: efi_memmap_insert(): don't insert a region more than once, Peter Jones
  • [PATCH 2/4] efi: efi_map_region(): traceback if we try to map invalid sized regions, Peter Jones
  • [PATCH 4/4] efi: efi_memmap_insert(): don't split regions with invalid sizes., Peter Jones
  • Re: [PATCH 1/4] efi: efi_print_memmap(): Call out invalid entries in the memory map early., Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 1/4] efi: efi_print_memmap(): Call out invalid entries in the memory map early., Peter Jones
      • [PATCH 1/4] efi: prune invalid memory map entries, Peter Jones
        • [PATCH 2/4] efi: efi_map_region(): traceback if we try to map invalid sized regions, Peter Jones
        • [PATCH 3/4] efi: efi_memmap_insert(): don't insert a region more than once, Peter Jones
        • [PATCH 4/4] efi: efi_memmap_insert(): don't split regions with invalid sizes., Peter Jones
      • Re: [PATCH 1/4] efi: efi_print_memmap(): Call out invalid entries in the memory map early., Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH 1/4] efi: efi_print_memmap(): Call out invalid entries in the memory map early., Peter Jones
• Does anything ever enter through startup_64 in head_64.S?, David Howells
  • Re: Does anything ever enter through startup_64 in head_64.S?, Matt Fleming
  • Re: Does anything ever enter through startup_64 in head_64.S?, David Howells
• [PATCH 0/8] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #5], David Howells
  • [PATCH 8/8] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 [ver #5], David Howells
  • [PATCH 7/8] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit [ver #5], David Howells
  • [PATCH 6/8] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode [ver #5], David Howells
  • [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #5], David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #5], Lukas Wunner
    • Re: [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #5], David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #5], Lukas Wunner
      • Re: [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #5], David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #5], Lukas Wunner
  • [PATCH 4/8] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions [ver #5], David Howells
  • [PATCH 3/8] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #5], David Howells
  • [PATCH 2/8] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #5], David Howells
  • [PATCH 1/8] efi: use typed function pointers for runtime services table [ver #5], David Howells
• [PATCH 0/8] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #4], David Howells
  • [PATCH 1/8] efi: use typed function pointers for runtime services table [ver #4], David Howells
  • [PATCH 4/8] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions [ver #4], David Howells
  • [PATCH 3/8] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #4], David Howells
  • [PATCH 2/8] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #4], David Howells
  • [PATCH 6/8] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode [ver #4], David Howells
  • [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #4], David Howells
  • [PATCH 7/8] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit [ver #4], David Howells
  • [PATCH 8/8] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 [ver #4], David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #4], David Howells
• [PATCH 0/4] UEFI: EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE support for x86, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
  • [PATCH 4/4] efi: Skip parsing of EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE if EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE is detected, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
    • Re: [PATCH 4/4] efi: Skip parsing of EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE if EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE is detected, Matt Fleming
  • [PATCH 1/4] efi: Make EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE initialization common across all architectures, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
    • Re: [PATCH 1/4] efi: Make EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE initialization common across all architectures, Matt Fleming
  • [PATCH 3/4] x86/efi: Add support for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
  • [PATCH 2/4] efi: Introduce EFI_MEM_ATTR bit and set it from memory attributes table, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
  • Re: [PATCH 0/4] UEFI: EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE support for x86, Matt Fleming
  • Re: [PATCH 0/4] UEFI: EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE support for x86, Matt Fleming
    • Re: [PATCH 0/4] UEFI: EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE support for x86, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
      • Re: [PATCH 0/4] UEFI: EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE support for x86, Matt Fleming
        • Re: [PATCH 0/4] UEFI: EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE support for x86, Sai Praneeth Prakhya
          • Re: [PATCH 0/4] UEFI: EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE support for x86, joeyli
• linux kernel support for logitech g502 proteus, Samuel Bernardo
• [GIT PULL] one more EFI patch for v4.10, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH] efi/libstub: Make efi_random_alloc() allocate below 4 GB on 32-bit, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH 0/7] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #3], David Howells
  • [PATCH 1/7] efi: use typed function pointers for runtime services table [ver #3], David Howells
  • [PATCH 2/7] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #3], David Howells
  • [PATCH 3/7] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #3], David Howells
  • [PATCH 4/7] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions [ver #3], David Howells
  • [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3], David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3], James Bottomley
    • Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3], David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3], Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3], David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3], Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3], David Howells
          • Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3], Ard Biesheuvel
          • Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3], David Howells
            • Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3], Ard Biesheuvel
          • Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3], David Howells
            • Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3], Ard Biesheuvel
            • Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3], David Howells
          • Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3], David Howells
            • Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3], Ard Biesheuvel
            • Re: [PATCH 5/7] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #3], David Howells
  • [PATCH 6/7] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode [ver #3], David Howells
  • [PATCH 7/7] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit [ver #3], David Howells
• [PATCH] efi: use typed function pointers for runtime services table, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: use typed function pointers for runtime services table, Matt Fleming
    • Re: [PATCH] efi: use typed function pointers for runtime services table, Lukas Wunner
      • Re: [PATCH] efi: use typed function pointers for runtime services table, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH 0/6] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #2], David Howells
  • [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #2], David Howells
  • [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit [ver #2], David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit [ver #2], Lukas Wunner
    • Re: [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit [ver #2], David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit [ver #2], David Howells
  • [PATCH 3/6] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions [ver #2], David Howells
  • [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode [ver #2], David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode [ver #2], Mark Rutland
  • [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2], David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2], Lukas Wunner
    • Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2], David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2], Lukas Wunner
    • Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2], Mark Rutland
    • Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2], David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2], Mark Rutland
      • Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2], David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2], Mark Rutland
        • Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2], David Howells
          • Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2], Matthew Garrett
    • Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2], David Howells
  • [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #2], David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #2], Mark Rutland
    • Re: [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #2], David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #2], Mark Rutland
  • Re: [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #2], David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #2], Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services [ver #2], David Howells
• [PATCH v2] efi/libstub: Make efi_random_alloc() allocate below 4 GB on 32-bit, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH V5 00/10] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V5 01/10] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V5 01/10] acpi: apei: read ack upon ghes record consumption, James Morse
  • [PATCH V5 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V5 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1, James Morse
      • Re: [PATCH V5 02/10] ras: acpi/apei: cper: generic error data entry v3 per ACPI 6.1, Baicar, Tyler
  • [PATCH V5 04/10] arm64: exception: handle Synchronous External Abort, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V5 06/10] acpi: apei: panic OS with fatal error status block, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V5 10/10] arm/arm64: KVM: add guest SEA support, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V5 08/10] ras: acpi / apei: generate trace event for unrecognized CPER section, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V5 09/10] trace, ras: add ARM processor error trace event, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V5 07/10] efi: print unrecognized CPER section, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V5 05/10] acpi: apei: handle SEA notification type for ARMv8, Tyler Baicar
  • [PATCH V5 03/10] efi: parse ARMv8 processor error, Tyler Baicar
    • Re: [PATCH V5 03/10] efi: parse ARMv8 processor error, James Morse
      • Re: [PATCH V5 03/10] efi: parse ARMv8 processor error, Baicar, Tyler
  • Re: [PATCH V5 00/10] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64, John Garry
    • Re: [PATCH V5 00/10] Add UEFI 2.6 and ACPI 6.1 updates for RAS on ARM64, Baicar, Tyler
• [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown, David Howells
  • [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status, Lukas Wunner
      • [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services, David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services, Lukas Wunner
        • Re: [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services, David Howells
          • Re: [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services, Joe Perches
          • Re: [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services, David Howells
            • Re: [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services, Joe Perches
            • Re: [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services, David Howells
              • Re: [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services, Joe Perches
      • [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status, David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status, Lukas Wunner
          • Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status, David Howells
          • Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status, Lukas Wunner
          • Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status, David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status, David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status, David Howells
          • Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status, Lukas Wunner
      • [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit, David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit, Lukas Wunner
      • [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode, David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode, Lukas Wunner
      • [PATCH 3/6] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions, David Howells
      • [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status, David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status, Ard Biesheuvel
          • Re: [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status, Lukas Wunner
            • Re: [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 02/16] efi: Get the secure boot status, Lukas Wunner
  • [PATCH 14/16] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 16/16] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 15/16] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 13/16] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 12/16] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 10/16] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 11/16] x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 09/16] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 08/16] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot, David Howells
  • [PATCH 07/16] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down, David Howells
  • [PATCH 06/16] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode, David Howells
  • [PATCH 04/16] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode, David Howells
  • [PATCH 05/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 05/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH 05/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit, Josh Boyer
        • Re: [PATCH 05/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 05/16] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit, David Howells
  • [PATCH 03/16] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode, David Howells
  • [PATCH 01/16] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 01/16] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, Borislav Petkov
    • Re: [PATCH 01/16] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 01/16] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, Pavel Machek
    • Re: [PATCH 01/16] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image, David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown, One Thousand Gnomes
    • Re: [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown, One Thousand Gnomes
  • Re: [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown, Justin Forbes
  • Message not available
    • Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed, Dominik Brodowski
  • Message not available
    • Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed, Dominik Brodowski
      • Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed, David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed, Dominik Brodowski
        • Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed, David Howells
  • Message not available
    • Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed, Corey Minyard
  • Message not available
    • Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed, Corey Minyard
      • Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed, David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed, Corey Minyard
        • Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed, One Thousand Gnomes
        • Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed, David Howells
  • Message not available
    • Re: [PATCH] Lock down drivers that can have io ports, io mem, irqs and dma changed, David Howells
• [PATCH 0/9] KEYS: Blacklisting & UEFI database load, David Howells
  • [PATCH 8/9] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 8/9] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH 8/9] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot, Josh Boyer
        • Re: [PATCH 8/9] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot, James Bottomley
      • Re: [PATCH 8/9] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot, James Bottomley
        • Re: [PATCH 8/9] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot, James Bottomley
          • Re: [PATCH 8/9] MODSIGN: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot, Mimi Zohar
  • [PATCH 9/9] MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 9/9] MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH 9/9] MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed, Josh Boyer
        • Re: [PATCH 9/9] MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed, Ard Biesheuvel
          • Re: [PATCH 9/9] MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed, Peter Jones
            • Re: [PATCH 9/9] MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed, Ard Biesheuvel
              • Re: [PATCH 9/9] MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed, Peter Jones
                • Re: [PATCH 9/9] MODSIGN: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 7/9] efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser, David Howells
  • [PATCH 5/9] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 5/9] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring, Petko Manolov
    • Re: [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring, Petko Manolov
      • Re: [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring, Mimi Zohar
      • Re: [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring, David Howells
        • Re: [PATCH 4/9] KEYS: Allow unrestricted boot-time addition of keys to secondary keyring, Mimi Zohar
  • [PATCH 6/9] efi: Add EFI signature data types, David Howells
    • Re: [PATCH 6/9] efi: Add EFI signature data types, Mat Martineau
    • Re: [PATCH 6/9] efi: Add EFI signature data types, David Howells
      • Re: [PATCH 6/9] efi: Add EFI signature data types, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH 3/9] PKCS#7: Handle blacklisted certificates, David Howells
  • [PATCH 2/9] X.509: Allow X.509 certs to be blacklisted, David Howells
  • [PATCH 1/9] KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring, David Howells
  • Re: [PATCH 0/9] KEYS: Blacklisting & UEFI database load, Jiri Slaby
    • Re: [PATCH 0/9] KEYS: Blacklisting & UEFI database load, Mimi Zohar
      • Re: [PATCH 0/9] KEYS: Blacklisting & UEFI database load, James Bottomley
        • Re: [PATCH 0/9] KEYS: Blacklisting & UEFI database load, joeyli
          • Re: [PATCH 0/9] KEYS: Blacklisting & UEFI database load, Mimi Zohar
            • Re: [PATCH 0/9] KEYS: Blacklisting & UEFI database load, joeyli
• [PATCH] efi/libstub: Make efi_random_alloc() allocate below 4 GB on 32-bit, Ard Biesheuvel
• [efi:master 9/10] drivers/firmware/efi/apple-properties.c:149:3: error: implicit declaration of function 'efi_get_device_by_path', kbuild test robot
• [GIT PULL 0/9] EFI changes for v4.10, Matt Fleming
  • [PATCH 8/9] x86/efi: Retrieve and assign Apple device properties, Matt Fleming
  • [PATCH 9/9] thunderbolt: Use Device ROM retrieved from EFI, Matt Fleming
  • [PATCH 7/9] efi: Allow bitness-agnostic protocol calls, Matt Fleming
  • [PATCH 6/9] efi: Add device path parser, Matt Fleming
  • [PATCH 3/9] efi: Add support for seeding the RNG from a UEFI config table, Matt Fleming
  • [PATCH 5/9] efi/arm*: libstub: Invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table, Matt Fleming
    • Re: [PATCH 5/9] efi/arm*: libstub: Invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table, Ingo Molnar
      • Re: [PATCH 5/9] efi/arm*: libstub: Invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table, Matt Fleming
        • Re: [PATCH 5/9] efi/arm*: libstub: Invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table, Ingo Molnar
          • Re: [PATCH 5/9] efi/arm*: libstub: Invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table, Matt Fleming
      • Message not available
        • Message not available
          • Re: [PATCH 5/9] efi/arm*: libstub: Invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table, Lukas Wunner