Linux EFI Development - Date Index

• Date Index

• [PATCH 03/11] powerpc/pseries/svm: Add a powerpc version of prot_guest_has(), (continued)
  • [PATCH 03/11] powerpc/pseries/svm: Add a powerpc version of prot_guest_has(), Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH 04/11] x86/sme: Replace occurrences of sme_active() with prot_guest_has(), Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH 04/11] x86/sme: Replace occurrences of sme_active() with prot_guest_has(), Joerg Roedel
  • [PATCH 05/11] x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_active() with prot_guest_has(), Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH 05/11] x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_active() with prot_guest_has(), Joerg Roedel
  • [PATCH 07/11] treewide: Replace the use of mem_encrypt_active() with prot_guest_has(), Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH 07/11] treewide: Replace the use of mem_encrypt_active() with prot_guest_has(), Sean Christopherson
      • Re: [PATCH 07/11] treewide: Replace the use of mem_encrypt_active() with prot_guest_has(), Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH 07/11] treewide: Replace the use of mem_encrypt_active() with prot_guest_has(), Christophe Leroy
      • Re: [PATCH 07/11] treewide: Replace the use of mem_encrypt_active() with prot_guest_has(), Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH 07/11] treewide: Replace the use of mem_encrypt_active() with prot_guest_has(), Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
      • Re: [PATCH 07/11] treewide: Replace the use of mem_encrypt_active() with prot_guest_has(), Tom Lendacky
        • Re: [PATCH 07/11] treewide: Replace the use of mem_encrypt_active() with prot_guest_has(), Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
        • Re: [PATCH 07/11] treewide: Replace the use of mem_encrypt_active() with prot_guest_has(), Kirill A. Shutemov
          • Re: [PATCH 07/11] treewide: Replace the use of mem_encrypt_active() with prot_guest_has(), Tom Lendacky
            • Re: [PATCH 07/11] treewide: Replace the use of mem_encrypt_active() with prot_guest_has(), Kirill A. Shutemov
              • Re: [PATCH 07/11] treewide: Replace the use of mem_encrypt_active() with prot_guest_has(), Tom Lendacky
                • Re: [PATCH 07/11] treewide: Replace the use of mem_encrypt_active() with prot_guest_has(), Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH 06/11] x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_es_active() with prot_guest_has(), Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH 06/11] x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_es_active() with prot_guest_has(), Joerg Roedel
      • Re: [PATCH 06/11] x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_es_active() with prot_guest_has(), Tom Lendacky
        • Re: [PATCH 06/11] x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_es_active() with prot_guest_has(), Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
  • [PATCH 08/11] mm: Remove the now unused mem_encrypt_active() function, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH 08/11] mm: Remove the now unused mem_encrypt_active() function, Joerg Roedel
  • [PATCH 09/11] x86/sev: Remove the now unused mem_encrypt_active() function, Tom Lendacky
    • Re: [PATCH 09/11] x86/sev: Remove the now unused mem_encrypt_active() function, Joerg Roedel
  • [PATCH 10/11] powerpc/pseries/svm: Remove the now unused mem_encrypt_active() function, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH 11/11] s390/mm: Remove the now unused mem_encrypt_active() function, Tom Lendacky
  • Re: [PATCH 00/11] Implement generic prot_guest_has() helper function, Tom Lendacky
  • Re: [PATCH 00/11] Implement generic prot_guest_has() helper function, Christian König
  • Re: [PATCH 00/11] Implement generic prot_guest_has() helper function, Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
    • Re: [PATCH 00/11] Implement generic prot_guest_has() helper function, Tom Lendacky
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.13 15/21] efi/mokvar: Reserve the table only if it is in boot services data, Sasha Levin
• [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 13/17] efi/mokvar: Reserve the table only if it is in boot services data, Sasha Levin
• [efi:urgent] BUILD SUCCESS 6dec88b1f3caee8c8460ac199a6c6ea702c85603, kernel test robot
• [PATCH] efi: sysfb_efi: fix build when EFI is not set, Randy Dunlap
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: sysfb_efi: fix build when EFI is not set, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: sysfb_efi: fix build when EFI is not set, Javier Martinez Canillas
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: sysfb_efi: fix build when EFI is not set, Thomas Zimmermann
    • Re: [PATCH] efi: sysfb_efi: fix build when EFI is not set, Daniel Vetter
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: sysfb_efi: fix build when EFI is not set, kernel test robot
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: sysfb_efi: fix build when EFI is not set, Geert Uytterhoeven
    • Re: [PATCH] efi: sysfb_efi: fix build when EFI is not set, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH v3 0/4] efi/arm64: work around Image placement issues, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH v3 1/4] efi/libstub: arm64: Force Image reallocation if BSS was not reserved, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH v3 2/4] efi/libstub: arm64: Relax 2M alignment again for relocatable kernels, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH v3 3/4] efi/libstub: arm64: Warn when efi_random_alloc() fails, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH v3 4/4] efi/libstub: arm64: Double check image alignment at entry, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH v3 0/4] efi/arm64: work around Image placement issues, Benjamin Herrenschmidt
    • Re: [PATCH v3 0/4] efi/arm64: work around Image placement issues, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH v2 0/2] efi/arm64: work around Image placement issues, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH v2 1/2] efi/libstub: arm64: Force Image reallocation if BSS was not reserved, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] efi/libstub: arm64: Force Image reallocation if BSS was not reserved, Benjamin Herrenschmidt
    • Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] efi/libstub: arm64: Force Image reallocation if BSS was not reserved, Herrenschmidt, Benjamin
  • [PATCH v2 2/2] efistub: arm64: relax 2M alignment again for relocatable kernels, Ard Biesheuvel
• [efi:urgent] BUILD SUCCESS 5bb60b28ce5bee48838c3fdc667c7247e722b34d, kernel test robot
• [PATCH] efistub: arm64: relax 2M alignment again for relocatable kernels, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [PATCH] efistub: arm64: relax 2M alignment again for relocatable kernels, Benjamin Herrenschmidt
• [efi:urgent] BUILD SUCCESS 47e1e233e9d822dfda068383fb9a616451bda703, kernel test robot
• [PATCH v11 0/5] Enable Linux guests on Hyper-V on ARM64, Michael Kelley
  • [PATCH v11 1/5] arm64: hyperv: Add Hyper-V hypercall and register access utilities, Michael Kelley
  • [PATCH v11 2/5] arm64: hyperv: Add panic handler, Michael Kelley
    • Re: [PATCH v11 2/5] arm64: hyperv: Add panic handler, Boqun Feng
    • RE: [PATCH v11 2/5] arm64: hyperv: Add panic handler, Sunil Muthuswamy
  • [PATCH v11 3/5] arm64: hyperv: Initialize hypervisor on boot, Michael Kelley
    • Re: [PATCH v11 3/5] arm64: hyperv: Initialize hypervisor on boot, Boqun Feng
    • RE: [PATCH v11 3/5] arm64: hyperv: Initialize hypervisor on boot, Sunil Muthuswamy
    • Re: [PATCH v11 3/5] arm64: hyperv: Initialize hypervisor on boot, Marc Zyngier
    • Re: [PATCH v11 3/5] arm64: hyperv: Initialize hypervisor on boot, Mark Rutland
      • RE: [PATCH v11 3/5] arm64: hyperv: Initialize hypervisor on boot, Michael Kelley
  • [PATCH v11 4/5] arm64: efi: Export screen_info, Michael Kelley
  • [PATCH v11 5/5] Drivers: hv: Enable Hyper-V code to be built on ARM64, Michael Kelley
    • Re: [PATCH v11 5/5] Drivers: hv: Enable Hyper-V code to be built on ARM64, Boqun Feng
  • RE: [PATCH v11 0/5] Enable Linux guests on Hyper-V on ARM64, Michael Kelley
  • Re: [PATCH v11 0/5] Enable Linux guests on Hyper-V on ARM64, Marc Zyngier
    • Re: [PATCH v11 0/5] Enable Linux guests on Hyper-V on ARM64, Mark Rutland
• [PATCH 2/2] arm64: efi: kaslr: Fix boot failure if efi_random_alloc() fails, Benjamin Herrenschmidt
  • Re: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: efi: kaslr: Fix boot failure if efi_random_alloc() fails, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: efi: kaslr: Fix boot failure if efi_random_alloc() fails, Benjamin Herrenschmidt
      • Re: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: efi: kaslr: Fix boot failure if efi_random_alloc() fails, Ard Biesheuvel
        • Re: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: efi: kaslr: Fix boot failure if efi_random_alloc() fails, Benjamin Herrenschmidt
          • Re: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: efi: kaslr: Fix boot failure if efi_random_alloc() fails, Ard Biesheuvel
            • Re: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: efi: kaslr: Fix boot failure if efi_random_alloc() fails, Benjamin Herrenschmidt
              • Re: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: efi: kaslr: Fix boot failure if efi_random_alloc() fails, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH 1/2] arm64: efi: kaslr: Fix occasional random alloc (and boot) failure, Benjamin Herrenschmidt
  • Re: [PATCH 1/2] arm64: efi: kaslr: Fix occasional random alloc (and boot) failure, Ard Biesheuvel
• [GIT PULL] EFI fixes for v5.14-rc2, Ard Biesheuvel
  • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fixes for v5.14-rc2, Ingo Molnar
• [efi:urgent] BUILD SUCCESS 7c33940e16b6cc297c5648b65180451b404b8a5e, kernel test robot
• [efi:urgent] BUILD SUCCESS 2bab693a608bdf614b9fcd44083c5100f34b9f77, kernel test robot
• [PATCH v2 1/1] ACPI: utils: Fix reference counting in for_each_acpi_dev_match(), Andy Shevchenko
  • Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] ACPI: utils: Fix reference counting in for_each_acpi_dev_match(), Daniel Scally
    • Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] ACPI: utils: Fix reference counting in for_each_acpi_dev_match(), Rafael J. Wysocki
• [PATCH] efi/tpm: Differentiate missing and invalid final event log table., Michal Suchanek
  • Re: [PATCH] efi/tpm: Differentiate missing and invalid final event log table., Jarkko Sakkinen
    • Re: [PATCH] efi/tpm: Differentiate missing and invalid final event log table., Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 00/40] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 01/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 01/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol, Sean Christopherson
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 01/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol, Joerg Roedel
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 01/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol, Tom Lendacky
        • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 01/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol, Sean Christopherson
          • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 01/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 02/40] KVM: SVM: Provide the Hypervisor Feature support VMGEXIT, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 02/40] KVM: SVM: Provide the Hypervisor Feature support VMGEXIT, Sean Christopherson
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 02/40] KVM: SVM: Provide the Hypervisor Feature support VMGEXIT, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 03/40] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 04/40] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 04/40] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support, Sean Christopherson
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 04/40] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 04/40] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support, Sean Christopherson
          • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 04/40] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 04/40] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support, Jarkko Sakkinen
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 04/40] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support, Dr. David Alan Gilbert
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 05/40] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 05/40] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers, Sean Christopherson
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 05/40] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 05/40] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers, Brijesh Singh
          • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 05/40] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers, Sean Christopherson
            • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 05/40] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 06/40] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 06/40] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction, Peter Gonda
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 06/40] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction, Dave Hansen
        • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 06/40] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction, Sean Christopherson
          • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 06/40] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction, Dave Hansen
            • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 06/40] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction, Sean Christopherson
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 08/40] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 08/40] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code, Sean Christopherson
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 08/40] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code, Dave Hansen
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 13/40] crypto: ccp: Shutdown SNP firmware on kexec, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 09/40] x86/fault: Add support to dump RMP entry on fault, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 09/40] x86/fault: Add support to dump RMP entry on fault, Dave Hansen
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 09/40] x86/fault: Add support to dump RMP entry on fault, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 09/40] x86/fault: Add support to dump RMP entry on fault, Dave Hansen
          • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 09/40] x86/fault: Add support to dump RMP entry on fault, Brijesh Singh
            • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 09/40] x86/fault: Add support to dump RMP entry on fault, Dave Hansen
              • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 09/40] x86/fault: Add support to dump RMP entry on fault, Brijesh Singh
                • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 09/40] x86/fault: Add support to dump RMP entry on fault, Dave Hansen
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 10/40] x86/fault: Add support to handle the RMP fault for user address, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 10/40] x86/fault: Add support to handle the RMP fault for user address, Dave Hansen
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 10/40] x86/fault: Add support to handle the RMP fault for user address, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 10/40] x86/fault: Add support to handle the RMP fault for user address, Dave Hansen
          • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 10/40] x86/fault: Add support to handle the RMP fault for user address, Brijesh Singh
            • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 10/40] x86/fault: Add support to handle the RMP fault for user address, Dave Hansen
              • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 10/40] x86/fault: Add support to handle the RMP fault for user address, Brijesh Singh
                • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 10/40] x86/fault: Add support to handle the RMP fault for user address, Dave Hansen
                  • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 10/40] x86/fault: Add support to handle the RMP fault for user address, Brijesh Singh
                    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 10/40] x86/fault: Add support to handle the RMP fault for user address, Sean Christopherson
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 10/40] x86/fault: Add support to handle the RMP fault for user address, Vlastimil Babka
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 10/40] x86/fault: Add support to handle the RMP fault for user address, Dave Hansen
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 15/40] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 15/40] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled, Marc Orr
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 15/40] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 15/40] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled, Marc Orr
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 15/40] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled, Sean Christopherson
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 15/40] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 15/40] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled, Sean Christopherson
          • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 15/40] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 11/40] crypto:ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 12/40] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 16/40] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy SEV command when SNP is enabled, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 14/40] crypto:ccp: Provide APIs to issue SEV-SNP commands, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 14/40] crypto:ccp: Provide APIs to issue SEV-SNP commands, Dr. David Alan Gilbert
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 07/40] x86/sev: Split the physmap when adding the page in RMP table, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 07/40] x86/sev: Split the physmap when adding the page in RMP table, Sean Christopherson
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 07/40] x86/sev: Split the physmap when adding the page in RMP table, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 07/40] x86/sev: Split the physmap when adding the page in RMP table, Sean Christopherson
          • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 07/40] x86/sev: Split the physmap when adding the page in RMP table, Brijesh Singh
            • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 07/40] x86/sev: Split the physmap when adding the page in RMP table, Sean Christopherson
              • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 07/40] x86/sev: Split the physmap when adding the page in RMP table, Brijesh Singh
                • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 07/40] x86/sev: Split the physmap when adding the page in RMP table, Sean Christopherson
                  • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 07/40] x86/sev: Split the physmap when adding the page in RMP table, Brijesh Singh
                • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 07/40] x86/sev: Split the physmap when adding the page in RMP table, Vlastimil Babka
                  • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 07/40] x86/sev: Split the physmap when adding the page in RMP table, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 17/40] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 24/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 24/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command, Sean Christopherson
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 24/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 24/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command, Sean Christopherson
          • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 24/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command, Brijesh Singh
            • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 24/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 18/40] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_{SET,GET}_EXT_CONFIG command, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 19/40] crypto: ccp: provide APIs to query extended attestation report, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 25/40] KVM: SVM: Reclaim the guest pages when SEV-SNP VM terminates, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 25/40] KVM: SVM: Reclaim the guest pages when SEV-SNP VM terminates, Sean Christopherson
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 25/40] KVM: SVM: Reclaim the guest pages when SEV-SNP VM terminates, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 25/40] KVM: SVM: Reclaim the guest pages when SEV-SNP VM terminates, Sean Christopherson
          • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 25/40] KVM: SVM: Reclaim the guest pages when SEV-SNP VM terminates, Brijesh Singh
            • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 25/40] KVM: SVM: Reclaim the guest pages when SEV-SNP VM terminates, Sean Christopherson
              • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 25/40] KVM: SVM: Reclaim the guest pages when SEV-SNP VM terminates, Brijesh Singh
                • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 25/40] KVM: SVM: Reclaim the guest pages when SEV-SNP VM terminates, Sean Christopherson
                  • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 25/40] KVM: SVM: Reclaim the guest pages when SEV-SNP VM terminates, Sean Christopherson
                  • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 25/40] KVM: SVM: Reclaim the guest pages when SEV-SNP VM terminates, Brijesh Singh
                    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 25/40] KVM: SVM: Reclaim the guest pages when SEV-SNP VM terminates, Sean Christopherson
                      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 25/40] KVM: SVM: Reclaim the guest pages when SEV-SNP VM terminates, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 26/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 26/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command, Sean Christopherson
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 26/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 26/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command, Sean Christopherson
          • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 26/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command, Brijesh Singh
            • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 26/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command, Sean Christopherson
              • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 26/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command, Brijesh Singh
                • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 26/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command, Sean Christopherson
          • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 26/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command, Marc Orr
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 33/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 33/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT, Sean Christopherson
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 33/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 33/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT, Sean Christopherson
          • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 33/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT, Brijesh Singh
          • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 33/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 20/40] KVM: SVM: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 20/40] KVM: SVM: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe, Marc Orr
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 20/40] KVM: SVM: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 20/40] KVM: SVM: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe, Sean Christopherson
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 20/40] KVM: SVM: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 21/40] KVM: SVM: Add initial SEV-SNP support, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 21/40] KVM: SVM: Add initial SEV-SNP support, Sean Christopherson
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 21/40] KVM: SVM: Add initial SEV-SNP support, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 21/40] KVM: SVM: Add initial SEV-SNP support, Sean Christopherson
          • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 21/40] KVM: SVM: Add initial SEV-SNP support, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 36/40] KVM: X86: Export the kvm_zap_gfn_range() for the SNP use, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 27/40] KVM: X86: Add kvm_x86_ops to get the max page level for the TDP, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 27/40] KVM: X86: Add kvm_x86_ops to get the max page level for the TDP, Sean Christopherson
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 27/40] KVM: X86: Add kvm_x86_ops to get the max page level for the TDP, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 27/40] KVM: X86: Add kvm_x86_ops to get the max page level for the TDP, Sean Christopherson
          • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 27/40] KVM: X86: Add kvm_x86_ops to get the max page level for the TDP, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 28/40] KVM: X86: Introduce kvm_mmu_map_tdp_page() for use by SEV, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 28/40] KVM: X86: Introduce kvm_mmu_map_tdp_page() for use by SEV, Sean Christopherson
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 34/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle Page State Change VMGEXIT, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 34/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle Page State Change VMGEXIT, Sean Christopherson
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 34/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle Page State Change VMGEXIT, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 22/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SNP_INIT command, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 22/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SNP_INIT command, Sean Christopherson
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 22/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SNP_INIT command, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 22/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SNP_INIT command, Sean Christopherson
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 23/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 23/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command, Peter Gonda
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 23/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command, Sean Christopherson
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 23/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 40/40] KVM: SVM: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 40/40] KVM: SVM: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event, Sean Christopherson
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 40/40] KVM: SVM: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event, Tom Lendacky
        • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 40/40] KVM: SVM: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event, Sean Christopherson
          • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 40/40] KVM: SVM: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event, Tom Lendacky
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 29/40] KVM: X86: Introduce kvm_mmu_get_tdp_walk() for SEV-SNP use, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 30/40] KVM: X86: Define new RMP check related #NPF error bits, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 30/40] KVM: X86: Define new RMP check related #NPF error bits, Sean Christopherson
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 30/40] KVM: X86: Define new RMP check related #NPF error bits, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 35/40] KVM: Add arch hooks to track the host write to guest memory, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 35/40] KVM: Add arch hooks to track the host write to guest memory, Sean Christopherson
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 35/40] KVM: Add arch hooks to track the host write to guest memory, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 37/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle the RMP nested page fault, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 37/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle the RMP nested page fault, Sean Christopherson
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 37/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle the RMP nested page fault, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 37/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle the RMP nested page fault, Sean Christopherson
          • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 37/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle the RMP nested page fault, Brijesh Singh
            • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 37/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle the RMP nested page fault, Sean Christopherson
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 31/40] KVM: X86: update page-fault trace to log the 64-bit error code, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 31/40] KVM: X86: update page-fault trace to log the 64-bit error code, Sean Christopherson
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 31/40] KVM: X86: update page-fault trace to log the 64-bit error code, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 38/40] KVM: SVM: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 38/40] KVM: SVM: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event, Sean Christopherson
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 38/40] KVM: SVM: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 38/40] KVM: SVM: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event, Sean Christopherson
          • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 38/40] KVM: SVM: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event, Brijesh Singh
            • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 38/40] KVM: SVM: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event, Sean Christopherson
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 32/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 32/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT, Sean Christopherson
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 32/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 32/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT, Sean Christopherson
  • [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 39/40] KVM: SVM: Use a VMSA physical address variable for populating VMCB, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 39/40] KVM: SVM: Use a VMSA physical address variable for populating VMCB, Sean Christopherson
      • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 39/40] KVM: SVM: Use a VMSA physical address variable for populating VMCB, Tom Lendacky
  • Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 00/40] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support, Dave Hansen
• [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 00/36] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 01/36] x86/sev: shorten GHCB terminate macro names, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 02/36] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 02/36] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 02/36] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 02/36] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 02/36] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 03/36] x86/sev: Add support for hypervisor feature VMGEXIT, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 03/36] x86/sev: Add support for hypervisor feature VMGEXIT, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 03/36] x86/sev: Add support for hypervisor feature VMGEXIT, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 03/36] x86/sev: Add support for hypervisor feature VMGEXIT, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 05/36] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 05/36] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 05/36] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 05/36] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons, Tom Lendacky
          • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 05/36] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 04/36] x86/mm: Add sev_feature_enabled() helper, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 04/36] x86/mm: Add sev_feature_enabled() helper, Dr. David Alan Gilbert
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 04/36] x86/mm: Add sev_feature_enabled() helper, Paolo Bonzini
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 04/36] x86/mm: Add sev_feature_enabled() helper, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 04/36] x86/mm: Add sev_feature_enabled() helper, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 06/36] x86/sev: check SEV-SNP features support, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 07/36] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 08/36] x86/sev: check the vmpl level, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 08/36] x86/sev: check the vmpl level, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 08/36] x86/sev: check the vmpl level, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 08/36] x86/sev: check the vmpl level, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 09/36] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 09/36] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 09/36] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 09/36] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 10/36] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 10/36] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 11/36] x86/sev: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 13/36] x86/kernel: Make the bss.decrypted section shared in RMP table, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 13/36] x86/kernel: Make the bss.decrypted section shared in RMP table, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 12/36] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 12/36] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 14/36] x86/kernel: Validate rom memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 17/36] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 25/36] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 25/36] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 15/36] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 15/36] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 15/36] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 15/36] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit, Borislav Petkov
          • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 15/36] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit, Brijesh Singh
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 15/36] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 15/36] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 18/36] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB save area, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 19/36] KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 28/36] x86/compressed/64: store Confidential Computing blob address in bootparams, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 27/36] x86/boot: add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 26/36] x86/compressed/64: enable SEV-SNP-validated CPUID in #VC handler, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 16/36] KVM: SVM: define new SEV_FEATURES field in the VMCB Save State Area, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 16/36] KVM: SVM: define new SEV_FEATURES field in the VMCB Save State Area, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 16/36] KVM: SVM: define new SEV_FEATURES field in the VMCB Save State Area, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 16/36] KVM: SVM: define new SEV_FEATURES field in the VMCB Save State Area, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 20/36] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 20/36] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 20/36] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs, Tom Lendacky
        • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 20/36] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 21/36] x86/head/64: set up a startup %gs for stack protector, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 21/36] x86/head/64: set up a startup %gs for stack protector, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 35/36] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 29/36] x86/compressed/64: add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 22/36] x86/sev: move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID to helper, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 22/36] x86/sev: move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID to helper, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 22/36] x86/sev: move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID to helper, Michael Roth
        • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 22/36] x86/sev: move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID to helper, Borislav Petkov
          • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 22/36] x86/sev: move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID to helper, Michael Roth
            • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 22/36] x86/sev: move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID to helper, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 30/36] x86/sev: enable SEV-SNP-validated CPUID in #VC handlers, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 23/36] KVM: x86: move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs to helper, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 23/36] KVM: x86: move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs to helper, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 36/36] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 31/36] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 32/36] x86/sev: Add snp_msg_seqno() helper, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 24/36] x86/compressed/acpi: move EFI config table access to common code, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 24/36] x86/compressed/acpi: move EFI config table access to common code, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 24/36] x86/compressed/acpi: move EFI config table access to common code, Michael Roth
        • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 24/36] x86/compressed/acpi: move EFI config table access to common code, Borislav Petkov
          • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 24/36] x86/compressed/acpi: move EFI config table access to common code, Michael Roth
            • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 24/36] x86/compressed/acpi: move EFI config table access to common code, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 33/36] x86/sev: Register SNP guest request platform device, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v4 34/36] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver, Brijesh Singh
• [PATCH] efi/libstub: Fix the efi_load_initrd function description, Atish Patra
  • Re: [PATCH] efi/libstub: Fix the efi_load_initrd function description, Ard Biesheuvel
• [RFC PATCH] efi/mokvar: Reserve the table only if it is in boot services data, Borislav Petkov
  • Re: [RFC PATCH] efi/mokvar: Reserve the table only if it is in boot services data, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [RFC PATCH] efi/mokvar: Reserve the table only if it is in boot services data, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [RFC PATCH] efi/mokvar: Reserve the table only if it is in boot services data, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH 1/1] RISC-V: load initrd wherever it fits into memory, Heinrich Schuchardt
  • Re: [PATCH 1/1] RISC-V: load initrd wherever it fits into memory, Atish Patra
    • Re: [PATCH 1/1] RISC-V: load initrd wherever it fits into memory, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH 1/1] RISC-V: load initrd wherever it fits into memory, Atish Patra
  • Re: [PATCH 1/1] RISC-V: load initrd wherever it fits into memory, Andreas Schwab
    • Re: [PATCH 1/1] RISC-V: load initrd wherever it fits into memory, Atish Patra
      • Re: [PATCH 1/1] RISC-V: load initrd wherever it fits into memory, Heinrich Schuchardt
  • Re: [PATCH 1/1] RISC-V: load initrd wherever it fits into memory, Palmer Dabbelt
• [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] Allow access to confidential computing secret area, Dov Murik
  • [RFC PATCH v2 1/3] efi/libstub: Copy confidential computing secret area, Dov Murik
  • [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] efi: Reserve confidential computing secret area, Dov Murik
    • Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] efi: Reserve confidential computing secret area, Tom Lendacky
      • Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] efi: Reserve confidential computing secret area, Dov Murik
  • [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] virt: Add sev_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets, Dov Murik
    • Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] virt: Add sev_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] virt: Add sev_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets, Dov Murik
        • Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] virt: Add sev_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets, Borislav Petkov
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] Allow access to confidential computing secret area, Borislav Petkov
    • Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] Allow access to confidential computing secret area, Dov Murik
      • Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/3] Allow access to confidential computing secret area, Borislav Petkov
• [GIT PULL] EFI changes for v5.14, Ingo Molnar
  • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI changes for v5.14, pr-tracker-bot
• [PATCH v3 2/2] drivers/firmware: consolidate EFI framebuffer setup for all arches, Javier Martinez Canillas
  • Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] drivers/firmware: consolidate EFI framebuffer setup for all arches, Thomas Zimmermann
• [PATCH v3 0/2] allow simple{fb,drm} drivers to be used on non-x86 EFI platforms, Javier Martinez Canillas
  • [PATCH v3 1/2] drivers/firmware: move x86 Generic System Framebuffers support, Javier Martinez Canillas
  • Re: [PATCH v3 0/2] allow simple{fb,drm} drivers to be used on non-x86 EFI platforms, Javier Martinez Canillas
    • Re: [PATCH v3 0/2] allow simple{fb, drm} drivers to be used on non-x86 EFI platforms, Thomas Zimmermann
      • Re: [PATCH v3 0/2] allow simple{fb, drm} drivers to be used on non-x86 EFI platforms, Dave Airlie
        • Re: [PATCH v3 0/2] allow simple{fb, drm} drivers to be used on non-x86 EFI platforms, Ard Biesheuvel
          • Re: [PATCH v3 0/2] allow simple{fb, drm} drivers to be used on non-x86 EFI platforms, Daniel Vetter
            • Re: [PATCH v3 0/2] allow simple{fb, drm} drivers to be used on non-x86 EFI platforms, Javier Martinez Canillas
              • Re: [PATCH v3 0/2] allow simple{fb, drm} drivers to be used on non-x86 EFI platforms, Daniel Vetter
                • Re: [PATCH v3 0/2] allow simple{fb, drm} drivers to be used on non-x86 EFI platforms, Thomas Zimmermann
                  • Re: [PATCH v3 0/2] allow simple{fb, drm} drivers to be used on non-x86 EFI platforms, Javier Martinez Canillas
                    • Re: [PATCH v3 0/2] allow simple{fb, drm} drivers to be used on non-x86 EFI platforms, Thomas Zimmermann
                      • Re: [PATCH v3 0/2] allow simple{fb, drm} drivers to be used on non-x86 EFI platforms, Javier Martinez Canillas
                        • Re: [PATCH v3 0/2] allow simple{fb, drm} drivers to be used on non-x86 EFI platforms, Daniel Vetter
• [PATCH v3] lockdown,selinux: fix wrong subject in some SELinux lockdown checks, Ondrej Mosnacek
  • Re: [PATCH v3] lockdown,selinux: fix wrong subject in some SELinux lockdown checks, Paul Moore
    • Re: [PATCH v3] lockdown,selinux: fix wrong subject in some SELinux lockdown checks, Ondrej Mosnacek
      • Re: [PATCH v3] lockdown,selinux: fix wrong subject in some SELinux lockdown checks, Paul Moore
  • Re: [PATCH v3] lockdown,selinux: fix wrong subject in some SELinux lockdown checks, Dan Williams
    • Re: [PATCH v3] lockdown,selinux: fix wrong subject in some SELinux lockdown checks, Ondrej Mosnacek
      • Re: [PATCH v3] lockdown,selinux: fix wrong subject in some SELinux lockdown checks, Paul Moore
        • Re: [PATCH v3] lockdown,selinux: fix wrong subject in some SELinux lockdown checks, Dan Williams
          • Re: [PATCH v3] lockdown,selinux: fix wrong subject in some SELinux lockdown checks, Paul Moore
  • Re: [PATCH v3] lockdown,selinux: fix wrong subject in some SELinux lockdown checks, Thomas Gleixner
    • Re: [PATCH v3] lockdown,selinux: fix wrong subject in some SELinux lockdown checks, Paul Moore
  • Re: [PATCH v3] lockdown,selinux: fix wrong subject in some SELinux lockdown checks, Steffen Klassert
• x86 UEFI stub builtin cpio rootfs., Christian Melki
  • Re: x86 UEFI stub builtin cpio rootfs., Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH 0/4] efi/libstub: measurement initrd data loaded by the EFI stub, Ilias Apalodimas
  • [PATCH 1/4] efi/libstub: add prototype of efi_tcg2_protocol::hash_log_extend_event(), Ilias Apalodimas
  • [PATCH 2/4] efi/libstub: x86/mixed: increase supported argument count, Ilias Apalodimas
  • [PATCH 3/4] efi/libstub: consolidate initrd handling across architectures, Ilias Apalodimas
  • [PATCH 4/4] efi/libstub: measure loaded initrd info into the TPM, Ilias Apalodimas
• [PATCH v4 4/5] EFI: Introduce the new AMD Memory Encryption GUID., Ashish Kalra
• [PATCH v3 0/5] Add Guest API & Guest Kernel support for SEV live migration., Ashish Kalra
  • [PATCH v3 1/5] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hypercall, Ashish Kalra
    • Re: [PATCH v3 1/5] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hypercall, Paolo Bonzini
  • [PATCH v3 2/5] KVM: x86: invert KVM_HYPERCALL to default to VMMCALL, Ashish Kalra
    • Re: [PATCH v3 2/5] KVM: x86: invert KVM_HYPERCALL to default to VMMCALL, Sean Christopherson
      • Re: [PATCH v3 2/5] KVM: x86: invert KVM_HYPERCALL to default to VMMCALL, Kalra, Ashish
        • Re: [PATCH v3 2/5] KVM: x86: invert KVM_HYPERCALL to default to VMMCALL, Kalra, Ashish
          • Re: [PATCH v3 2/5] KVM: x86: invert KVM_HYPERCALL to default to VMMCALL, Sean Christopherson
            • Re: [PATCH v3 2/5] KVM: x86: invert KVM_HYPERCALL to default to VMMCALL, Ashish Kalra
  • [PATCH v3 3/5] mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed, Ashish Kalra
    • Re: [PATCH v3 3/5] mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH v3 3/5] mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed, Ashish Kalra
  • [PATCH v3 4/5] EFI: Introduce the new AMD Memory Encryption GUID., Ashish Kalra
    • Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] EFI: Introduce the new AMD Memory Encryption GUID., Ard Biesheuvel
  • [PATCH v3 5/5] x86/kvm: Add guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live Migration feature., Ashish Kalra
    • Re: [PATCH v3 5/5] x86/kvm: Add guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live Migration feature., Borislav Petkov
• [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 00/22] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 01/22] x86/sev: shorten GHCB terminate macro names, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 01/22] x86/sev: shorten GHCB terminate macro names, Venu Busireddy
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 02/22] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 02/22] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons, Venu Busireddy
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 02/22] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 03/22] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 03/22] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version, Borislav Petkov
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 03/22] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version, Venu Busireddy
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 04/22] x86/mm: Add sev_feature_enabled() helper, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 04/22] x86/mm: Add sev_feature_enabled() helper, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 05/22] x86/sev: Add support for hypervisor feature VMGEXIT, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 05/22] x86/sev: Add support for hypervisor feature VMGEXIT, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 05/22] x86/sev: Add support for hypervisor feature VMGEXIT, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 06/22] x86/sev: check SEV-SNP features support, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 06/22] x86/sev: check SEV-SNP features support, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 06/22] x86/sev: check SEV-SNP features support, Brijesh Singh
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 06/22] x86/sev: check SEV-SNP features support, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 06/22] x86/sev: check SEV-SNP features support, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 10/22] x86/sev: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 10/22] x86/sev: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 10/22] x86/sev: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 17/22] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB save area, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 11/22] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 11/22] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 11/22] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 11/22] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes, Borislav Petkov
          • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 11/22] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes, Brijesh Singh
            • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 11/22] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes, Borislav Petkov
              • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 11/22] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes, Brijesh Singh
                • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 11/22] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes, Borislav Petkov
                  • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 11/22] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes, Brijesh Singh
                    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 11/22] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes, Borislav Petkov
                      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 11/22] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes, Brijesh Singh
                        • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 11/22] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes, Brijesh Singh
                          • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 11/22] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes, Brijesh Singh
                    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 11/22] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes, Dr. David Alan Gilbert
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 20/22] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing address to setup_header, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 20/22] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing address to setup_header, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 20/22] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing address to setup_header, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 20/22] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing address to setup_header, Borislav Petkov
          • Message not available
            • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 20/22] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing address to setup_header, Borislav Petkov
              • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 20/22] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing address to setup_header, Michael Roth
                • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 20/22] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing address to setup_header, Borislav Petkov
                  • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 20/22] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing address to setup_header, Michael Roth
                  • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 20/22] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing address to setup_header, Michael Roth
                    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 20/22] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing address to setup_header, Borislav Petkov
                      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 20/22] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing address to setup_header, Michael Roth
                        • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 20/22] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing address to setup_header, Borislav Petkov
                          • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 20/22] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing address to setup_header, Brijesh Singh
                            • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 20/22] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing address to setup_header, Borislav Petkov
                              • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 20/22] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing address to setup_header, Michael Roth
                                • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 20/22] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing address to setup_header, Borislav Petkov
                • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 20/22] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing address to setup_header, Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 07/22] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 07/22] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 12/22] x86/kernel: Make the bss.decrypted section shared in RMP table, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 12/22] x86/kernel: Make the bss.decrypted section shared in RMP table, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 18/22] KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 21/22] x86/sev: Register SNP guest request platform device, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 21/22] x86/sev: Register SNP guest request platform device, Sergio Lopez
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 21/22] x86/sev: Register SNP guest request platform device, Dr. David Alan Gilbert
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 21/22] x86/sev: Register SNP guest request platform device, Tom Lendacky
        • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 21/22] x86/sev: Register SNP guest request platform device, Dr. David Alan Gilbert
          • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 21/22] x86/sev: Register SNP guest request platform device, Brijesh Singh
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 21/22] x86/sev: Register SNP guest request platform device, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 21/22] x86/sev: Register SNP guest request platform device, Dr. David Alan Gilbert
          • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 21/22] x86/sev: Register SNP guest request platform device, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 21/22] x86/sev: Register SNP guest request platform device, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 21/22] x86/sev: Register SNP guest request platform device, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 08/22] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 08/22] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 08/22] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 08/22] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 13/22] x86/kernel: Validate rom memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 22/22] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 22/22] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 22/22] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 22/22] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver, Borislav Petkov
          • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 22/22] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver, Brijesh Singh
            • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 22/22] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver, Borislav Petkov
              • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 22/22] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 09/22] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 09/22] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 09/22] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 14/22] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 14/22] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 14/22] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit, Brijesh Singh
        • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 14/22] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 16/22] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 16/22] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 16/22] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area, Tom Lendacky
        • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 16/22] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area, Borislav Petkov
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 15/22] KVM: SVM: define new SEV_FEATURES field in the VMCB Save State Area, Brijesh Singh
  • [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 19/22] x86/sev-snp: SEV-SNP AP creation support, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 19/22] x86/sev-snp: SEV-SNP AP creation support, Borislav Petkov
      • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 19/22] x86/sev-snp: SEV-SNP AP creation support, Tom Lendacky
  • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 00/22] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support, Venu Busireddy
    • Re: [PATCH Part1 RFC v3 00/22] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support, Borislav Petkov
• Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Make it work in kexec'ed kernel, Andy Shevchenko
  • Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Make it work in kexec'ed kernel, Andy Shevchenko
    • Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Make it work in kexec'ed kernel, Dave Young
      • Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Make it work in kexec'ed kernel, Andy Shevchenko
        • Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Make it work in kexec'ed kernel, Andy Shevchenko
          • Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Make it work in kexec'ed kernel, Dave Young
            • Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Make it work in kexec'ed kernel, Andy Shevchenko
              • Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Make it work in kexec'ed kernel, Dave Young
                • Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Make it work in kexec'ed kernel, Dave Young
                  • Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Make it work in kexec'ed kernel, Andy Shevchenko
                    • Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Make it work in kexec'ed kernel, Andy Shevchenko
                      • Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Make it work in kexec'ed kernel, Andy Shevchenko
                        • Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Make it work in kexec'ed kernel, Ard Biesheuvel
                          • Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Make it work in kexec'ed kernel, Andy Shevchenko
                        • Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Make it work in kexec'ed kernel, Andy Shevchenko
                          • Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Make it work in kexec'ed kernel, Ard Biesheuvel
                            • Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Make it work in kexec'ed kernel, Andy Shevchenko
                              • Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] firmware: dmi_scan: Make it work in kexec'ed kernel, Ard Biesheuvel
• [PATCH v2 2/2] drivers/firmware: consolidate EFI framebuffer setup for all arches, Javier Martinez Canillas
  • Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] drivers/firmware: consolidate EFI framebuffer setup for all arches, Thomas Zimmermann
    • Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] drivers/firmware: consolidate EFI framebuffer setup for all arches, Javier Martinez Canillas
• [PATCH v2 0/2] allow simple{fb,drm} drivers to be used on non-x86 EFI platforms, Javier Martinez Canillas
  • [PATCH v2 1/2] drivers/firmware: move x86 Generic System Framebuffers support, Javier Martinez Canillas
    • Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] drivers/firmware: move x86 Generic System Framebuffers support, Greg Kroah-Hartman
  • Re: [PATCH v2 0/2] allow simple{fb,drm} drivers to be used on non-x86 EFI platforms, Borislav Petkov
    • Re: [PATCH v2 0/2] allow simple{fb,drm} drivers to be used on non-x86 EFI platforms, Javier Martinez Canillas
• [PATCH 0/3] x86/setup: always resrve the first 1M of RAM, Mike Rapoport
  • [PATCH 1/3] x86/setup: always reserve the first 1M of RAM, Mike Rapoport
    • Re: [PATCH 1/3] x86/setup: always reserve the first 1M of RAM, Baoquan He
      • Re: [PATCH 1/3] x86/setup: always reserve the first 1M of RAM, Mike Rapoport
    • Re: [PATCH 1/3] x86/setup: always reserve the first 1M of RAM, Borislav Petkov
    • Re: [PATCH 1/3] x86/setup: always reserve the first 1M of RAM, Dave Hansen
      • Re: [PATCH 1/3] x86/setup: always reserve the first 1M of RAM, Mike Rapoport
  • [PATCH 2/3] x86/setup: remove CONFIG_X86_RESERVE_LOW and reservelow options, Mike Rapoport
  • [PATCH 3/3] x86/crash: remove crash_reserve_low_1M(), Mike Rapoport
  • Re: [PATCH 0/3] x86/setup: always resrve the first 1M of RAM, Hugh Dickins
• [PATCH v2] x86/efi: unconditionally hold the whole low-1MB memory regions, Lianbo Jiang
  • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: unconditionally hold the whole low-1MB memory regions, Borislav Petkov
    • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: unconditionally hold the whole low-1MB memory regions, Mike Rapoport
      • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: unconditionally hold the whole low-1MB memory regions, Borislav Petkov
        • Message not available
          • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: unconditionally hold the whole low-1MB memory regions, Mike Rapoport
        • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: unconditionally hold the whole low-1MB memory regions, Mike Rapoport
          • Re: [PATCH v2] x86/efi: unconditionally hold the whole low-1MB memory regions, Borislav Petkov
• [GIT PULL] EFI fixes for v5.13-rc, Ard Biesheuvel
  • [GIT PULL] EFI updates for v5.14, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI updates for v5.14, Ingo Molnar
  • Re: [GIT PULL] EFI fixes for v5.13-rc, Ingo Molnar
• [efi:next] BUILD SUCCESS bb11580f61b6c4ba5c35706abd927c8ac8c32852, kernel test robot
• [efi:urgent] BUILD SUCCESS 942859d969de7f6f7f2659a79237a758b42782da, kernel test robot
• [PATCH 2/2] drivers/firmware: consolidate EFI framebuffer setup for all arches, Javier Martinez Canillas
  • Re: [PATCH 2/2] drivers/firmware: consolidate EFI framebuffer setup for all arches, Thomas Zimmermann
    • Re: [PATCH 2/2] drivers/firmware: consolidate EFI framebuffer setup for all arches, Javier Martinez Canillas
• [PATCH 0/2] allow the sysfb support to be used in non-x86 arches, Javier Martinez Canillas
  • [PATCH 1/2] drivers/firmware: move x86 Generic System Framebuffers support, Javier Martinez Canillas
  • Re: [PATCH 0/2] allow the sysfb support to be used in non-x86 arches, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH 0/2] allow the sysfb support to be used in non-x86 arches, Javier Martinez Canillas
• [PATCH] x86/efi: Log 32/64-bit mismatch with kernel as an error, Paul Menzel
  • Re: [PATCH] x86/efi: Log 32/64-bit mismatch with kernel as an error, Ard Biesheuvel
• [RFC PATCH 0/3] Allow access to confidential computing secret area, Dov Murik
  • [RFC PATCH 1/3] efi/libstub: Copy confidential computing secret area, Dov Murik
  • [RFC PATCH 2/3] efi: Reserve confidential computing secret area, Dov Murik
  • [RFC PATCH 3/3] virt: Add sev_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets, Dov Murik
  • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] Allow access to confidential computing secret area, Brijesh Singh
    • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] Allow access to confidential computing secret area, Dov Murik
    • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] Allow access to confidential computing secret area, Dr. David Alan Gilbert
      • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] Allow access to confidential computing secret area, Andi Kleen
        • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] Allow access to confidential computing secret area, Brijesh Singh
          • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] Allow access to confidential computing secret area, James Bottomley
            • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] Allow access to confidential computing secret area, Brijesh Singh
          • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] Allow access to confidential computing secret area, Andi Kleen
            • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] Allow access to confidential computing secret area, Dr. David Alan Gilbert
              • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] Allow access to confidential computing secret area, James Bottomley
              • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] Allow access to confidential computing secret area, Andi Kleen
                • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] Allow access to confidential computing secret area, James Bottomley
                  • Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] Allow access to confidential computing secret area, Dov Murik
• [PATCH v10 0/7] Enable Linux guests on Hyper-V on ARM64, Michael Kelley
  • [PATCH v10 2/7] arm64: hyperv: Add Hyper-V hypercall and register access utilities, Michael Kelley
    • Re: [PATCH v10 2/7] arm64: hyperv: Add Hyper-V hypercall and register access utilities, Mark Rutland
      • RE: [PATCH v10 2/7] arm64: hyperv: Add Hyper-V hypercall and register access utilities, Michael Kelley
        • Re: [PATCH v10 2/7] arm64: hyperv: Add Hyper-V hypercall and register access utilities, Mark Rutland
          • RE: [PATCH v10 2/7] arm64: hyperv: Add Hyper-V hypercall and register access utilities, Michael Kelley
  • [PATCH v10 1/7] asm-generic: hyperv: Fix incorrect architecture dependencies, Michael Kelley
  • [PATCH v10 4/7] arm64: hyperv: Add kexec and panic handlers, Michael Kelley
  • [PATCH v10 3/7] arm64: hyperv: Add Hyper-V clocksource/clockevent support, Michael Kelley
    • Re: [PATCH v10 3/7] arm64: hyperv: Add Hyper-V clocksource/clockevent support, Mark Rutland
      • RE: [PATCH v10 3/7] arm64: hyperv: Add Hyper-V clocksource/clockevent support, Michael Kelley
        • Re: [PATCH v10 3/7] arm64: hyperv: Add Hyper-V clocksource/clockevent support, Mark Rutland
          • RE: [PATCH v10 3/7] arm64: hyperv: Add Hyper-V clocksource/clockevent support, Michael Kelley
            • Re: [PATCH v10 3/7] arm64: hyperv: Add Hyper-V clocksource/clockevent support, Mark Rutland
              • RE: [PATCH v10 3/7] arm64: hyperv: Add Hyper-V clocksource/clockevent support, Michael Kelley
                • Re: [PATCH v10 3/7] arm64: hyperv: Add Hyper-V clocksource/clockevent support, Mark Rutland
                  • RE: [PATCH v10 3/7] arm64: hyperv: Add Hyper-V clocksource/clockevent support, Michael Kelley
                    • RE: [PATCH v10 3/7] arm64: hyperv: Add Hyper-V clocksource/clockevent support, Michael Kelley
                    • Re: [PATCH v10 3/7] arm64: hyperv: Add Hyper-V clocksource/clockevent support, Mark Rutland
                      • Re: [PATCH v10 3/7] arm64: hyperv: Add Hyper-V clocksource/clockevent support, Marc Zyngier
                        • RE: [PATCH v10 3/7] arm64: hyperv: Add Hyper-V clocksource/clockevent support, Michael Kelley
  • [PATCH v10 5/7] arm64: hyperv: Initialize hypervisor on boot, Michael Kelley
    • Re: [PATCH v10 5/7] arm64: hyperv: Initialize hypervisor on boot, Wei Liu
  • [PATCH v10 6/7] arm64: efi: Export screen_info, Michael Kelley
  • [PATCH v10 7/7] Drivers: hv: Enable Hyper-V code to be built on ARM64, Michael Kelley
  • Re: [PATCH v10 0/7] Enable Linux guests on Hyper-V on ARM64, Sudeep Holla
• Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] EFI: Introduce the new AMD Memory Encryption GUID., Borislav Petkov
  • Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] EFI: Introduce the new AMD Memory Encryption GUID., Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] EFI: Introduce the new AMD Memory Encryption GUID., Ashish Kalra
• efivarfs fails with `No such device` when EFI runtime is missing, Paul Menzel
  • Re: efivarfs fails with `No such device` when EFI runtime is missing, Paul Menzel
    • Re: efivarfs fails with `No such device` when EFI runtime is missing, Ard Biesheuvel
• [RFC PATCH v5 17/28] dyndbg: prevent build bugs via -DNO_DYNAMIC_DEBUG_TABLE, Jim Cromie
  • Re: [RFC PATCH v5 17/28] dyndbg: prevent build bugs via -DNO_DYNAMIC_DEBUG_TABLE, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [RFC PATCH v5 17/28] dyndbg: prevent build bugs via -DNO_DYNAMIC_DEBUG_TABLE, jim . cromie
• [RFC PATCH 0/4] efi/libstub: measurement initrd data loaded by the EFI stub, Ilias Apalodimas
  • [RFC PATCH 1/4] efi/libstub: add prototype of efi_tcg2_protocol::hash_log_extend_event(), Ilias Apalodimas
  • [RFC PATCH 2/4] efi/libstub: x86/mixed: increase supported argument count, Ilias Apalodimas
  • [RFC PATCH 3/4] efi/libstub: consolidate initrd handling across architectures, Ilias Apalodimas
  • [RFC PATCH 4/4] efi/libstub: measure loaded initrd info into the TPM, Ilias Apalodimas
• [PATCH] builddeb: Support signing kernels with a Machine Owner Key, Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)
  • Re: [PATCH] builddeb: Support signing kernels with a Machine Owner Key, Ard Biesheuvel
    • Re: [PATCH] builddeb: Support signing kernels with a Machine Owner Key, Matthew Wilcox
      • Re: [PATCH] builddeb: Support signing kernels with a Machine Owner Key, Ard Biesheuvel
  • <Possible follow-ups>
  • [PATCH] builddeb: Support signing kernels with a Machine Owner Key, Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)
    • Re: [PATCH] builddeb: Support signing kernels with a Machine Owner Key, Ard Biesheuvel
      • Re: [PATCH] builddeb: Support signing kernels with a Machine Owner Key, Masahiro Yamada
        • Re: [PATCH] builddeb: Support signing kernels with a Machine Owner Key, Matthew Wilcox
          • Re: [PATCH] builddeb: Support signing kernels with a Machine Owner Key, Masahiro Yamada
• [PATCH] efi: Allow EFI_MEMORY_XP and EFI_MEMORY_RO both to be cleared, Heiner Kallweit
  • Re: [PATCH] efi: Allow EFI_MEMORY_XP and EFI_MEMORY_RO both to be cleared, Ard Biesheuvel
• Still required that EFI_MEMORY_XP and EFI_MEMORY_RO must not both be cleared?, Heiner Kallweit