Linux API

• Thread Index

• Re: [RFC] Hugepage collapse in process context
  • From: Zi Yan <ziy@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v28 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
  • From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fanotify: configurable limits via sysfs
  • From: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 4/5] x86/signal: Detect and prevent an alternate signal stack overflow
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC] Hugepage collapse in process context
  • From: David Rientjes <rientjes@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 01/13] futex2: Implement wait and wake functions
  • From: André Almeida <andrealmeid@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 06/13] docs: locking: futex2: Add documentation
  • From: André Almeida <andrealmeid@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fanotify: configurable limits via sysfs
  • From: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page
  • From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 01/13] futex2: Implement wait and wake functions
  • From: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC] Hugepage collapse in process context
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC] Hugepage collapse in process context
  • From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 01/13] futex2: Implement wait and wake functions
  • From: André Almeida <andrealmeid@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH RFC] madvise.2: Document MADV_POPULATE
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH RFC] mm/madvise: introduce MADV_POPULATE to prefault/prealloc memory
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH RFC] mm/madvise: introduce MADV_POPULATE to prefault/prealloc memory
  • From: Rolf Eike Beer <eike-kernel@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC] Hugepage collapse in process context
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC] Hugepage collapse in process context
  • From: Song Liu <songliubraving@xxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC] Hugepage collapse in process context
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC] Hugepage collapse in process context
  • From: Song Liu <songliubraving@xxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page
  • From: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 7/7] x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 6/7] x86/vdso/32: Add ENDBR32 to __kernel_vsyscall entry point
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 3/7] x86/cet/ibt: Handle signals for Indirect Branch Tracking
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 4/7] x86/cet/ibt: Update ELF header parsing for Indirect Branch Tracking
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 5/7] x86/cet/ibt: Update arch_prctl functions for Indirect Branch Tracking
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 26/26] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK for shadow stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 23/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 25/26] mm: Move arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 24/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 22/26] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property()
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 2/7] x86/cet/ibt: User-mode Indirect Branch Tracking support
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 1/7] x86/cet/ibt: Update Kconfig for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 0/7] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 21/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 17/26] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 18/26] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 19/26] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap()
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 20/26] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 12/26] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 14/26] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 13/26] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 16/26] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack.
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 15/26] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 10/26] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 09/26] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 11/26] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 07/26] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 08/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 06/26] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 05/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 04/26] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_CET and setup functions
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 02/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 03/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET)
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 01/26] Documentation/x86: Add CET description
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v21 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH] MAINTAINERS: add uapi directories to API/ABI section
  • From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH RFC] mm/madvise: introduce MADV_POPULATE to prefault/prealloc memory
  • From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: James Bottomley <jejb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fanotify: configurable limits via sysfs
  • From: Jan Kara <jack@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC] Hugepage collapse in process context
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 01/13] futex2: Implement wait and wake functions
  • From: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 06/13] docs: locking: futex2: Add documentation
  • From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/2] fanotify: support limited functionality for unprivileged users
  • From: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fanotify: configurable limits via sysfs
  • From: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page
  • From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/2] fanotify: support limited functionality for unprivileged users
  • From: Jan Kara <jack@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: James Bottomley <jejb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2] fanotify: configurable limits via sysfs
  • From: Jan Kara <jack@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: James Bottomley <jejb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 01/13] futex2: Implement wait and wake functions
  • From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 01/13] futex2: Implement wait and wake functions
  • From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 01/13] futex2: Implement wait and wake functions
  • From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 01/13] futex2: Implement wait and wake functions
  • From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 01/13] futex2: Implement wait and wake functions
  • From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3] mm/vmalloc: randomize vmalloc() allocations
  • From: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 03/13] futex2: Implement vectorized wait
  • From: Zebediah Figura <zfigura@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 03/13] futex2: Implement vectorized wait
  • From: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 03/13] futex2: Implement vectorized wait
  • From: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH 01/13] futex2: Implement wait and wake functions
  • From: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: James Bottomley <jejb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] mm/vmalloc: randomize vmalloc() allocations
  • From: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 13/13] kernel: Enable waitpid() for futex2
  • From: André Almeida <andrealmeid@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 09/13] selftests: futex2: Add wouldblock test
  • From: André Almeida <andrealmeid@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 12/13] perf bench: Add futex2 benchmark tests
  • From: André Almeida <andrealmeid@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 11/13] selftests: futex2: Add requeue test
  • From: André Almeida <andrealmeid@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 10/13] selftests: futex2: Add waitv test
  • From: André Almeida <andrealmeid@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 05/13] futex2: Add compatibility entry point for x86_x32 ABI
  • From: André Almeida <andrealmeid@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 07/13] selftests: futex2: Add wake/wait test
  • From: André Almeida <andrealmeid@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 08/13] selftests: futex2: Add timeout test
  • From: André Almeida <andrealmeid@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 06/13] docs: locking: futex2: Add documentation
  • From: André Almeida <andrealmeid@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 04/13] futex2: Implement requeue operation
  • From: André Almeida <andrealmeid@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 03/13] futex2: Implement vectorized wait
  • From: André Almeida <andrealmeid@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 02/13] futex2: Add support for shared futexes
  • From: André Almeida <andrealmeid@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 01/13] futex2: Implement wait and wake functions
  • From: André Almeida <andrealmeid@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH 00/13] Add futex2 syscalls
  • From: André Almeida <andrealmeid@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] mm/vmalloc: randomize vmalloc() allocations
  • From: Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: James Bottomley <jejb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page
  • From: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] mm/vmalloc: randomize vmalloc() allocations
  • From: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] mm/vmalloc: randomize vmalloc() allocations
  • From: Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] mm/vmalloc: randomize vmalloc() allocations
  • From: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Linux-cifsd-devel] RFC: ksmbd ABI for ksmbd-tools...
  • From: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 1/5] uapi: Move the aux vector AT_MINSIGSTKSZ define to uapi
  • From: Will Deacon <will@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 3/3] arm64: pac: Optimize kernel entry/exit key installation code paths
  • From: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Are vDSO addresses special?
  • From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@xxxxxxxxxx>
• RFC: ksmbd ABI for ksmbd-tools...
  • From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 3/3] arm64: pac: Optimize kernel entry/exit key installation code paths
  • From: James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 3/3] arm64: pac: Optimize kernel entry/exit key installation code paths
  • From: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 2/3] arm64: Introduce prctl(PR_PAC_{SET,GET}_ENABLED_KEYS)
  • From: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v7 1/3] arm64: mte: make the per-task SCTLR_EL1 field usable elsewhere
  • From: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 3/3] arm64: pac: Optimize kernel entry/exit key installation code paths
  • From: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 2/3] arm64: Introduce prctl(PR_PAC_{SET,GET}_ENABLED_KEYS)
  • From: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 1/3] arm64: mte: make the per-task SCTLR_EL1 field usable elsewhere
  • From: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: Are vDSO addresses special?
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Patch v4 1/3] lib: Restrict cpumask_local_spread to houskeeping CPUs
  • From: Nitesh Narayan Lal <nitesh@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: LINUX_VERSION_CODE overflow (was: Re: Linux 4.9.256)
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• LINUX_VERSION_CODE overflow (was: Re: Linux 4.9.256)
  • From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Are vDSO addresses special?
  • From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 21/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 1/1] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG
  • From: rao.shoaib@xxxxxxxxxx
• RE: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: "Song Bao Hua (Barry Song)" <song.bao.hua@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 21/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] selftest/arm64/ptrace: add tests for PTRACE_O_ARM64_RAW_REGS
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v28 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 21/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 25/25] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK for shadow stack
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 11/25] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v28 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
  • From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 07/25] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v20 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: Matthew Wilcox <willy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 25/25] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK for shadow stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 21/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 18/25] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 23/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 22/25] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property()
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 6/7] x86/vdso/32: Add ENDBR32 to __kernel_vsyscall entry point
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 4/7] x86/cet/ibt: Update ELF header parsing for Indirect Branch Tracking
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 7/7] x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 3/7] x86/cet/ibt: Handle signals for Indirect Branch Tracking
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 17/25] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 19/25] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap()
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 1/7] x86/cet/ibt: Update Kconfig for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 20/25] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@xxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 14/25] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 16/25] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack.
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 0/7] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 2/7] x86/cet/ibt: User-mode Indirect Branch Tracking support
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 5/7] x86/cet/ibt: Update arch_prctl functions for Indirect Branch Tracking
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 15/25] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 03/25] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET)
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 11/25] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 13/25] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 04/25] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_CET and setup functions
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 12/25] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 00/25] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 07/25] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 10/25] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 09/25] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v20 01/25] Documentation/x86: Add CET description
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH bpf 2/4] nsfs: add an ioctl to discover the network namespace cookie
  • From: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH bpf 2/4] nsfs: add an ioctl to discover the network namespace cookie
  • From: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH bpf 1/4] net: add SO_NETNS_COOKIE socket option
  • From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH bpf 2/4] nsfs: add an ioctl to discover the network namespace cookie
  • From: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH bpf 1/4] net: add SO_NETNS_COOKIE socket option
  • From: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH bpf 0/4] Expose network namespace cookies to user space
  • From: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: "Song Bao Hua (Barry Song)" <song.bao.hua@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: Zhou Wang <wangzhou1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: Zhou Wang <wangzhou1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: Zhou Wang <wangzhou1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: Zhou Wang <wangzhou1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: Zhou Wang <wangzhou1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [x86/signal] dc8df6e85d: kernel-selftests.sigaltstack.sas.fail
  • From: "Bae, Chang Seok" <chang.seok.bae@xxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: "Song Bao Hua (Barry Song)" <song.bao.hua@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: "Song Bao Hua (Barry Song)" <song.bao.hua@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: "Song Bao Hua (Barry Song)" <song.bao.hua@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] x86/signal: Prevent an alternate stack overflow before a signal delivery
  • From: "Bae, Chang Seok" <chang.seok.bae@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/3 v2] arm64/ptrace: allow to get all registers on syscall traps
  • From: Keno Fischer <keno@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/3 v2] arm64/ptrace: allow to get all registers on syscall traps
  • From: Andrei Vagin <avagin@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/3] arm64/ptrace: introduce PTRACE_O_ARM64_RAW_REGS
  • From: Andrei Vagin <avagin@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: "Song Bao Hua (Barry Song)" <song.bao.hua@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v17 10/10] secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2)
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v17 09/10] arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call where relevant
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v17 05/10] set_memory: allow querying whether set_direct_map_*() is actually enabled
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v17 06/10] arm64: kfence: fix header inclusion
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v17 04/10] set_memory: allow set_direct_map_*_noflush() for multiple pages
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v17 03/10] riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMU
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v17 02/10] mmap: make mlock_future_check() global
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v17 01/10] mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: "Song Bao Hua (Barry Song)" <song.bao.hua@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: "Song Bao Hua (Barry Song)" <song.bao.hua@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: David Rientjes <rientjes@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: Matthew Wilcox <willy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] Add namespace tags that can be used for matching without pinning a ns
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: "Song Bao Hua (Barry Song)" <song.bao.hua@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: Matthew Wilcox <willy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support
  • From: Chris Down <chris@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support
  • From: Chris Down <chris@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support
  • From: Joe Perches <joe@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support
  • From: Chris Down <chris@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/6] fs-verity: add FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA ioctl
  • From: Chao Yu <yuchao0@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 2/2] selftests/vm: add mempinfd test
  • From: Zhou Wang <wangzhou1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 0/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: Zhou Wang <wangzhou1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] mempinfd: Add new syscall to provide memory pin
  • From: Zhou Wang <wangzhou1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/6] fs-verity: add FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA ioctl
  • From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [f2fs-dev] [PATCH 3/6] fs-verity: add FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA ioctl
  • From: Chao Yu <yuchao0@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support
  • From: Joe Perches <joe@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v28 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
  • From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Patch v4 1/3] lib: Restrict cpumask_local_spread to houskeeping CPUs
  • From: Nitesh Narayan Lal <nitesh@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support
  • From: Chris Down <chris@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support
  • From: Joe Perches <joe@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support
  • From: Chris Down <chris@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support
  • From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support
  • From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support
  • From: Chris Down <chris@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Patch v4 1/3] lib: Restrict cpumask_local_spread to houskeeping CPUs
  • From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Patch v4 1/3] lib: Restrict cpumask_local_spread to houskeeping CPUs
  • From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support
  • From: Chris Down <chris@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v28 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v28 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
  • From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v28 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
  • From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Patch v4 1/3] lib: Restrict cpumask_local_spread to houskeeping CPUs
  • From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2] entry: Use different define for selector variable in SUD
  • From: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support
  • From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v28 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v28 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] printk: Userspace format enumeration support
  • From: Petr Mladek <pmladek@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 04/25] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_CET and setup functions
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v28 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
  • From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 04/25] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_CET and setup functions
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH RESEND] entry: Use different define for selector variable in SUD
  • From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] Add namespace tags that can be used for matching without pinning a ns
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] Add namespace tags that can be used for matching without pinning a ns
  • From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 12/25] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] Add namespace tags that can be used for matching without pinning a ns
  • From: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 12/25] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory
  • From: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 22/25] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property()
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 20/25] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 19/25] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap()
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 18/25] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 17/25] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 16/25] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack.
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 15/25] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 07/25] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 14/25] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 11/25] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 10/25] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 7/7] x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 2/7] x86/cet/ibt: User-mode Indirect Branch Tracking support
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/2] Add namespace tags that can be used for matching without pinning a ns
  • From: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 01/25] Documentation/x86: Add CET description
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 03/25] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET)
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 04/25] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_CET and setup functions
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/2] keys: Allow request_key upcalls from a container to be intercepted
  • From: kernel test robot <lkp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 01/25] Documentation/x86: Add CET description
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 6/7] x86/vdso/32: Add ENDBR32 to __kernel_vsyscall entry point
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 5/7] x86/cet/ibt: Update arch_prctl functions for Indirect Branch Tracking
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 4/7] x86/cet/ibt: Update ELF header parsing for Indirect Branch Tracking
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 3/7] x86/cet/ibt: Handle signals for Indirect Branch Tracking
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v19 1/7] x86/cet/ibt: Update Kconfig for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking
  • From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Patch v4 1/3] lib: Restrict cpumask_local_spread to houskeeping CPUs
  • From: Nitesh Narayan Lal <nitesh@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Patch v4 1/3] lib: Restrict cpumask_local_spread to houskeeping CPUs
  • From: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH RESEND] entry: Use different define for selector variable in SUD
  • From: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Patch v4 1/3] lib: Restrict cpumask_local_spread to houskeeping CPUs
  • From: Nitesh Narayan Lal <nitesh@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Patch v4 1/3] lib: Restrict cpumask_local_spread to houskeeping CPUs
  • From: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/2] Add namespace tags that can be used for matching without pinning a ns
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/2] keys: Allow request_key upcalls from a container to be intercepted
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [RFC][PATCH 0/2] keys: request_key() interception in containers
  • From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/3] arm64/ptrace: don't clobber task registers on syscall entry/exit traps
  • From: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v5 1/5] uapi: Move the aux vector AT_MINSIGSTKSZ define to uapi
  • From: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/3] selftest/arm64/ptrace: add tests for PTRACE_O_ARM64_RAW_REGS
  • From: Will Deacon <will@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/3] arm64/ptrace: introduce PTRACE_O_ARM64_RAW_REGS
  • From: Will Deacon <will@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/3] arm64/ptrace: don't clobber task registers on syscall entry/exit traps
  • From: Will Deacon <will@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/3 v2] arm64/ptrace: allow to get all registers on syscall traps
  • From: Will Deacon <will@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 06/11] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v28 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
  • From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v28 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
  • From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 01/25] Documentation/x86: Add CET description
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 03/25] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET)
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 00/25] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 16/25] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack.
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 14/25] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 09/25] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 18/25] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 17/25] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 23/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 22/25] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property()
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 2/7] x86/cet/ibt: User-mode Indirect Branch Tracking support
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 7/7] x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 0/7] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 3/7] x86/cet/ibt: Handle signals for Indirect Branch Tracking
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 6/7] x86/vdso/32: Add ENDBR32 to __kernel_vsyscall entry point
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 4/7] x86/cet/ibt: Update ELF header parsing for Indirect Branch Tracking
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 5/7] x86/cet/ibt: Update arch_prctl functions for Indirect Branch Tracking
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 1/7] x86/cet/ibt: Update Kconfig for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 25/25] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK for shadow stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 21/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 20/25] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 15/25] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 19/25] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap()
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 11/25] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 12/25] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 13/25] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 10/25] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 07/25] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 04/25] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_CET and setup functions
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v19 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v18 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v18 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v18 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 5/5] selftest/x86/signal: Include test cases for validating sigaltstack
  • From: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 4/5] x86/signal: Detect and prevent an alternate signal stack overflow
  • From: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 3/5] x86/elf: Support a new ELF aux vector AT_MINSIGSTKSZ
  • From: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 2/5] x86/signal: Introduce helpers to get the maximum signal frame size
  • From: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 1/5] uapi: Move the aux vector AT_MINSIGSTKSZ define to uapi
  • From: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v5 0/5] x86: Improve Minimum Alternate Stack Size
  • From: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 00/10] fs: interface for directly reading/writing compressed data
  • From: Omar Sandoval <osandov@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v28 01/12] landlock: Add object management
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v28 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations
  • From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v28 01/12] landlock: Add object management
  • From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 06/11] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] procfs/dmabuf: Add /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/dmabuf_fds
  • From: Daniel Vetter <daniel@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page
  • From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: James Bottomley <jejb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v28 01/12] landlock: Add object management
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v28 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v28 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v28 00/12] Landlock LSM
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v28 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v28 09/12] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v28 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v28 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v28 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v28 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v28 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v28 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v28 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page
  • From: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] mm/madvise: replace ptrace attach requirement for process_madvise
  • From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v3 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page
  • From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page
  • From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/3 v2] arm64/ptrace: allow to get all registers on syscall traps
  • From: Keno Fischer <keno@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v18 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v18 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v18 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v18 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v18 21/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v18 21/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v18 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 3/3] selftest/arm64/ptrace: add tests for PTRACE_O_ARM64_RAW_REGS
  • From: Andrei Vagin <avagin@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 1/3] arm64/ptrace: don't clobber task registers on syscall entry/exit traps
  • From: Andrei Vagin <avagin@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 2/3] arm64/ptrace: introduce PTRACE_O_ARM64_RAW_REGS
  • From: Andrei Vagin <avagin@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH 0/3 v2] arm64/ptrace: allow to get all registers on syscall traps
  • From: Andrei Vagin <avagin@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [EXT] Re: [Patch v4 1/3] lib: Restrict cpumask_local_spread to houskeeping CPUs
  • From: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/6] fs-verity: add an ioctl to read verity metadata
  • From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: James Bottomley <jejb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v18 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page
  • From: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] mm/page_alloc: count CMA pages per zone and print them in /proc/zoneinfo
  • From: David Rientjes <rientjes@xxxxxxxxxx>
• RE: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG
  • From: David Laight <David.Laight@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [NEEDS-REVIEW] [PATCH v18 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG
  • From: Shoaib Rao <rao.shoaib@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG
  • From: Matthew Wilcox <willy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG
  • From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v18 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [NEEDS-REVIEW] [PATCH v18 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG
  • From: Shoaib Rao <rao.shoaib@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v18 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG
  • From: Shoaib Rao <rao.shoaib@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v18 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG
  • From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG
  • From: Shoaib Rao <rao.shoaib@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG
  • From: Shoaib Rao <rao.shoaib@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG
  • From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v18 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v18 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection
  • From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG
  • From: Shoaib Rao <rao.shoaib@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v18 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG
  • From: Shoaib Rao <rao.shoaib@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v18 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG
  • From: Matthew Wilcox <willy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page
  • From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v18 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG
  • From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v18 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG
  • From: Shoaib Rao <rao.shoaib@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [EXT] Re: [Patch v4 1/3] lib: Restrict cpumask_local_spread to houskeeping CPUs
  • From: Alex Belits <abelits@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v18 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
  • From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 00/10] fs: interface for directly reading/writing compressed data
  • From: Josef Bacik <josef@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] mm/page_alloc: count CMA pages per zone and print them in /proc/zoneinfo
  • From: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3] mm/page_alloc: count CMA pages per zone and print them in /proc/zoneinfo
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page
  • From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] mm/madvise: replace ptrace attach requirement for process_madvise
  • From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page
  • From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] mm/page_alloc: count CMA pages per zone and print them in /proc/zoneinfo
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] mm/page_alloc: count CMA pages per zone and print them in /proc/zoneinfo
  • From: David Rientjes <rientjes@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] mm/page_alloc: count CMA pages per zone and print them in /proc/zoneinfo
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] mm/page_alloc: count CMA pages per zone and print them in /proc/zoneinfo
  • From: David Rientjes <rientjes@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2] mm/page_alloc: count CMA pages per zone and print them in /proc/zoneinfo
  • From: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: James Bottomley <jejb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page
  • From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page
  • From: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Patch v4 1/3] lib: Restrict cpumask_local_spread to houskeeping CPUs
  • From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] mm/madvise: replace ptrace attach requirement for process_madvise
  • From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Patch v4 1/3] lib: Restrict cpumask_local_spread to houskeeping CPUs
  • From: Nitesh Narayan Lal <nitesh@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Patch v4 1/3] lib: Restrict cpumask_local_spread to houskeeping CPUs
  • From: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Patch v4 1/3] lib: Restrict cpumask_local_spread to houskeeping CPUs
  • From: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v2] mm/page_alloc: count CMA pages per zone and print them in /proc/zoneinfo
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Patch v4 1/3] lib: Restrict cpumask_local_spread to houskeeping CPUs
  • From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: Christoph Lameter <cl@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Patch v4 1/3] lib: Restrict cpumask_local_spread to houskeeping CPUs
  • From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: James Bottomley <jejb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting
  • From: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting
  • From: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting
  • From: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: Christoph Lameter <cl@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page
  • From: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] procfs/dmabuf: Add /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/dmabuf_fds
  • From: Pekka Paalanen <ppaalanen@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/6] fs-verity: don't pass whole descriptor to fsverity_verify_signature()
  • From: Amy Parker <enbyamy@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4/6] fs-verity: support reading Merkle tree with ioctl
  • From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 3/6] fs-verity: add FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA ioctl
  • From: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 5/6] fs-verity: support reading descriptor with ioctl
  • From: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 6/6] fs-verity: support reading signature with ioctl
  • From: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 4/6] fs-verity: support reading Merkle tree with ioctl
  • From: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 2/6] fs-verity: don't pass whole descriptor to fsverity_verify_signature()
  • From: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/6] fs-verity: factor out fsverity_get_descriptor()
  • From: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@xxxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 5/7] x86/cet/ibt: Update arch_prctl functions for Indirect Branch Tracking
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 0/7] Control-flow Enforcement: Indirect Branch Tracking
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 23/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 3/7] x86/cet/ibt: Handle signals for Indirect Branch Tracking
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 6/7] x86/vdso/32: Add ENDBR32 to __kernel_vsyscall entry point
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 25/25] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK for shadow stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 2/7] x86/cet/ibt: User-mode Indirect Branch Tracking support
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 4/7] x86/cet/ibt: Update ELF header parsing for Indirect Branch Tracking
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 1/7] x86/cet/ibt: Update Kconfig for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 21/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 22/25] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property()
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 20/25] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 7/7] x86/vdso: Insert endbr32/endbr64 to vDSO
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 17/25] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 18/25] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 19/25] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap()
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 16/25] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack.
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 15/25] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 00/25] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 01/25] Documentation/x86: Add CET description
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 13/25] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 14/25] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 11/25] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 10/25] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 12/25] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 07/25] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 09/25] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 04/25] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_CET and setup functions
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v18 03/25] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET)
  • From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v27 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control
  • From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting
  • From: Roman Gushchin <guro@xxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] procfs/dmabuf: Add /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/dmabuf_fds
  • From: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/8] quota: Allow to pass mount path to quotactl
  • From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/8] quota: Allow to pass mount path to quotactl
  • From: Jan Kara <jack@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [Patch v4 1/3] lib: Restrict cpumask_local_spread to houskeeping CPUs
  • From: Nitesh Narayan Lal <nitesh@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Patch v4 1/3] lib: Restrict cpumask_local_spread to houskeeping CPUs
  • From: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [Patch v4 1/3] lib: Restrict cpumask_local_spread to houskeeping CPUs
  • From: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Patch v4 1/3] lib: Restrict cpumask_local_spread to houskeeping CPUs
  • From: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [Patch v4 1/3] lib: Restrict cpumask_local_spread to houskeeping CPUs
  • From: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [Patch v4 1/3] lib: Restrict cpumask_local_spread to houskeeping CPUs
  • From: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] procfs/dmabuf: Add /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/dmabuf_fds
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] procfs/dmabuf: Add /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/dmabuf_fds
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] procfs/dmabuf: Add /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/dmabuf_fds
  • From: Christian König <christian.koenig@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] procfs/dmabuf: Add /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/dmabuf_fds
  • From: Christian König <christian.koenig@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] procfs/dmabuf: Add /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/dmabuf_fds
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] procfs/dmabuf: Add /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/dmabuf_fds
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] procfs/dmabuf: Add /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/dmabuf_fds
  • From: Christian König <christian.koenig@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] procfs/dmabuf: Add /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/dmabuf_fds
  • From: Jann Horn <jannh@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] procfs/dmabuf: Add /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/dmabuf_fds
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 23/40] exec: handle idmapped mounts
  • From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v15 03/11] riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMU
  • From: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@xxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 00/40] idmapped mounts
  • From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 (resend)] tee: Add -q, --quiet, --silent option to not write to stdout
  • From: Alex Henrie <alexhenrie24@xxxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v24 24/25] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 11/26] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 11/26] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page
  • From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 0/6] fs-verity: add an ioctl to read verity metadata
  • From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 23/40] exec: handle idmapped mounts
  • From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH 1/1] process_madvise.2: Add process_madvise man page
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 (resend)] tee: Add -q, --quiet, --silent option to not write to stdout
  • From: "Alejandro Colomar (man-pages)" <alx.manpages@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 (resend)] tee: Add -q, --quiet, --silent option to not write to stdout
  • From: "Alejandro Colomar (man-pages)" <alx.manpages@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 06/11] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 11/26] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW
  • From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• [PATCH v24 14/25] LSM: Specify which LSM to display
  • From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 06/11] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 06/11] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 06/11] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 06/11] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting
  • From: Matthew Wilcox <willy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] mm/madvise: replace ptrace attach requirement for process_madvise
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 3/3] arm64: pac: Optimize kernel entry/exit key installation code paths
  • From: Will Deacon <will@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 1/3] arm64: mte: make the per-task SCTLR_EL1 field usable elsewhere
  • From: Will Deacon <will@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 2/3] arm64: Introduce prctl(PR_PAC_{SET,GET}_ENABLED_KEYS)
  • From: Will Deacon <will@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 11/26] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 07/11] secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 06/11] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 06/11] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 06/11] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 11/26] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW
  • From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 23/40] exec: handle idmapped mounts
  • From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 23/40] exec: handle idmapped mounts
  • From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH] af_unix: Allow Unix sockets to raise SIGURG
  • From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 11/26] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 11/26] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 06/11] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting
  • From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 11/26] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW
  • From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 04/10] btrfs: fix check_data_csum() error message for direct I/O
  • From: Josef Bacik <josef@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v7 02/10] fs: add O_ALLOW_ENCODED open flag
  • From: Josef Bacik <josef@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v17 11/26] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW
  • From: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 10/11] arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call where relevant
  • From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@xxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting
  • From: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@xxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v16 06/11] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
  • From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@xxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v6 23/40] exec: handle idmapped mounts
  • From: ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx (Eric W. Biederman)
• Re: [PATCH v16 08/11] secretmem: add memcg accounting
  • From: Matthew Wilcox <willy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
• Re: [PATCH v3 (resend)] tee: Add -q, --quiet, --silent option to not write to stdout
  • From: Philipp-Joachim Ost <pj@xxxxxx>